Chadian Armed Opposition Groups

Since Chad's independence in 1960, most armed opposition groups have originated from a common source, the Front de libération nationale du Tchad (Front for the National Liberation of Chad, FROLINAT), founded in 1966 in Nyala, South Darfur. A leftist movement recruited from Muslim communities in Chad's northern region, FROLINAT was established to fight the southern-dominated and French-supported government. In 1979, its rival factions managed to put an end to 19 years of southern rule, and since then the three presidents who have taken power in N'Djaména—each one ousting his predecessor—have come from ethnic groups from the far north: the Tubu, Goran, and Beri (Zaghawa and Bideyat). Nevertheless, northerners, even those well represented in government, have continued to stage rebellions. Since 1966, Chadian armed opposition groups have been dominated by three ethnic groups, collectively nicknamed GAZ (for 'Goran, Arab, Zaghawa').
A chronic feature of the Chadian political scene has been the inability of opposition groups to obtain power without staging an armed insurgency. These groups have either taken power by force, or they have coerced governments into negotiations that resulted in the award of key positions. Since he took power in 1990, President Idriss Déby has been confronted by several rebellions, including from within his own ethnic group, the Beri. His long tenure and the general lack of democratic accountability in Chad have aggravated this trend. Local inter-ethnic conflicts—and the impunity that the regime provides to Déby's Beri kin who are involved in them—also play a role in drawing recruits, such as the Tama, Ouaddaïan, and some Arabs. To a lesser extent, these rebellious movements have also attracted southerners whose main political leaders gave up the armed struggle following violent repression in the 1980s in favour of secondary roles in the government or peaceful opposition.
President Déby contained these groups using both carrots (positions and money) and sticks (war and the elimination of opponents). The situation became more difficult to manage when the war started in the neighbouring Darfur region of Sudan in 2003, however. Déby was unable to prevent his own forces and family from supporting their Zaghawa kin fighting against the Sudanese government across the border. Khartoum responded by offering support to almost any Chadian armed group and tried, with limited success, to unite the various factions as coalitions. This policy of proxy war reached its zenith between 2005 and 2009. During this period, the Sudanese government allowed most Chadian armed opposition groups to benefit from rear bases in West Darfur, from where they could launch lightning raids on Chad. With N'Djaména as their main target, they rarely sought to control Chadian territory, except in small pockets along the shared border.
Since late 2009, Chad and Sudan have engaged in a rapprochement, which calls the future role of the Chadian armed opposition into question. The Sudanese government has ordered the groups to move from West to North Darfur, farther away from the border. Then, following Chad's expulsion of Justice and Equality Movement leader Khalil Ibrahim in May 2010, Khartoum ordered the main Chadian armed opposition group leaders (in particular, Timan Erdimi and Mahamat Nouri) to leave Sudan. Of the major Chadian political leaders, only Abdelwahid Aboud Makaye remains in Sudan.
Following these expulsions, the Chadian and Sudanese authorities flew some 150 ex-armed opposition forces from Khartoum and Al Fasher, capital of North Darfur, back to Chad, while others have returned home by land in small groups and are trying to negotiate separately with the Chadian government. Bideyat and Goran fighters, in particular, are relying on their Déby-allied kin. As a consequence, the Chadian rebel strength has gradually dwindled, from at least 6,000 overall in May 2009 to around 3,000–4,000 in September–October 2010, and fewer than 1,000 in early 2011, as part of the main opposition forces (the UFR, ANCD, and FPRN).
Chad's official position has been that all armed opposition forces have to be disarmed and must then either return home, stay in Sudan as refugees, or find asylum in a third country. Until September 2010, Sudan's approach was more cautious: Khartoum was reluctant to undertake any large forced disarmament campaign or mass expulsions. But it physically contained the Chadian opposition forces within their bases in North Darfur while continuing to provide them with food.
Then, in October 2010, the Sudanese authorities managed to peacefully disarm some 2,000 Chadian combatants remaining in North Darfur. Those who refused to disarm (no more than a few hundred) left for the tri-border area where the Central African Republic, Chad, and Sudan meet, from where they hope to continue to fight. By themselves, they do not pose a significant threat to the Chadian government; however, ongoing dissatisfaction among the ex-rebels who joined forces with the government and were not rewarded as expected, as well as the very real internal conflicts inside the inner Beri circle of the Chadian government, remain a concern for the future.
Updated March 2011


Click below for more information on specific armed opposition groups and coalitions:

Click here for an overview of the Sudan-Chad proxy war and here to go to the Darfur armed groups page.


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