Legal Framework Covering Arms Flows to and within Sudan

The legal instruments designed to regulate arms flows to and within Sudan are extremely inadequate. There are three relevant legal instruments:
  • A United Nations embargo pursuant to Security Council resolution 1591 (established in 2004 and expanded in 2005) prohibits arms and military equipment transfers to state and non-state actors operating in the Darfur region (as interpreted by the relevant UN Sanctions Committee). The Sudanese government may transfer arms to Darfur with advance approval from the Committee, but has never sought such authorization. In practice, states continue to export legally to Khartoum, which then routinely violates the embargo by transferring to Darfur without seeking approval.
  • The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 prohibits transfers of ammunition, weapons and military equipment within an agreed 'Ceasefire Zone' (covering all of South Sudan, as well as the East and the Three Areas) without approval from the CPA-mandated Joint Defence Board (JDB). In practice, the Sudanese government, through its participation in the JDB, enjoys veto power over the resupply of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The Government of South Sudan continues to acquire weapons on the international market without consulting the JDB.
  • A 1994 European Union embargo (expanded in 2004) prohibits all 27 member states and their nationals from transferring arms, ammunition, and related materiel to anywhere in Sudan. Significantly, this embargo also applies to brokering 'and other services' related to military activities including the provision of financial assistance. In practice, there is evidence of EU nationals and companies being involved in supplying both Sudan Armed Forces and the SPLA.
Reasons for the shortcomings of the legal framework include the unwillingness of the UN Security Council's veto-yielding members to strengthen the UN embargo to cover the whole of Sudan as well as inadequate end-use monitoring by exporting member states and poor export risk assessment, allowing the easy diversion of arms in third countries. The ability of the UN Mission in Sudan and the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur to monitor violations is also seriously constrained.


Relevant HSBA Publications



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