Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM)

Origins/composition
The LJM was created in February 2010 as a negotiating umbrella for two coalitions formed at international urging—the Libyan-backed Sudan Liberation Revolutionary Forces (SLRF, popularly known as the Tripoli Group) and the Addis Ababa Group that is identified with former US special envoy to Sudan Gen. Scott Gration. The LJM has no unified military command; its component parts are relatively insignificant militarily.

The SLRF or Tripoli Group
The SLRF initially included six factions, five of which signed a ‘common ground agreement’ in Libya in March 2009. Only one, the United Revolutionary Forces Front (URFF), is militarily significant:

1. Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Field Leadership;
2. SLA-Unity (2);
3. SLA-Juba (2);
4. SLA-Khamis Abaker;
5. SLA-Mainstream; and
6. URFF.

The Addis Ababa Group
The Addis Ababa Group initially included four factions, brought together by Gration in August 2009:

1. SLA-Unity (1). Joined the SLRF in April 2010 after initially opposing the leadership of Tijani Sese;
2. SLA-Juba (1). Joined the LJM in April 2010 after initially opposing the leadership of Tijani Sese. The decision caused a split between Ahmed Abdel Shafi and his close associate, Babiker Abdalla;
3. United Resistance Front (URF). The best-armed faction in the Addis Ababa Group, the URF has reportedly received small arms from SLA-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) in return for fighting alongside SLA-MM and Darfur-based Chadian armed opposition groups against the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM); and
4. SLA-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) dissidents, including Ali Haroun, a former humanitarian coordinator of SLA-AW who hails from the Ain Siro mountains north of Jebel Marra; Abdalla Khalil, formerly deputy head of the political bureau of SLA-AW; and Ismail Rifa Jara, a popular commander and former military chief of SLA-Unity from the Meidop tribe. In April 2010 Babiker Abdalla was appointed leader of this group; he died in Uganda in December 2010 and was replaced by Ali Haroun.

Leadership
Tijani Sese, a member of the Fur tribe whose involvement satisfies the mediation’s urgent desire for Fur representation in Doha, leads the LJM. Some groups initially contested his leadership because he played no part in the uprising, having lived outside Sudan for 20 years. Yet Sese, a former member of the Umma Party of Sadeq al Mahdi and a former economics professor at Khartoum University, has experience rarely found in the armed movements—as both state minister of finance and governor of Darfur in...
the Mahdi government (1986–89). Sese’s brother, Fadul Sese, is the second-highest-ranking Fur in the Native Administration, the hierarchy of local chiefs and parallel courts established by the British before independence. The LJMJ structure announced in March 2010 includes five deputy chairmen—two Masalit, one Zaghawa, one Fur, and one Arab—with Bahr Abu Garda as secretary-general; Ali Carabino as commander in chief; and Tajuddin Bashir Nyam, JEM’s deputy chief negotiator in Abuja, as secretary for peace negotiations. Paradoxically, the LJMJ is dominated by Zaghawa groups; one of its greatest weaknesses is its limited Fur support.

Areas of control/activity
There is at best limited coordination among the factions represented in the LJMJ. Their total strength is estimated at 2,000 fighters with fewer than 40 vehicles. Only four groups are considered militarily significant:

1. Democratic Sudan Liberation Movement (‘SLA-Carabino’), in the Tukumare and Khazan Tunjur areas of North Darfur;
2. URF of Bahr Abu Garda, in the Daba Tuga and Abu Gamra areas of North Darfur;
3. SLA-Field Leadership of Ali Mukhtar, in the Um Marahik, Liil, and Um Berro areas of North Darfur; and
4. URFF of Yassin Yousif, around Malam in South Darfur.

Sources of financing/support
The LJMJ, an artificial alliance brought into being by outside pressure, enjoyed the political backing of the mediation, the United States, and Libya. Early support from Libya waned as the LJMJ took on a life of its own in Doha, not Tripoli, and a Libyan intelligence officer in Doha, Mohammed Garsala, encouraged defections to JEM.

Status
The LJMJ is the chief interlocutor of the international community and its main partner in peacemaking efforts. It is fiercely opposed by JEM, the strongest rebel group militarily and the most coherent politically, and by SLA-AW, which exerts strong, albeit waning, influence over the displaced in camps. The LJMJ’s test will be whether it can maintain its tenuous cohesion into the implementation phase of the Doha peace agreement, and indeed whether the agreement can be implemented at all. Difficulties lie in apportioning power sharing. The LJMJ is to take over two of the Darfur governorship posts, but this is dependent on the government creating two new provinces in Darfur; in El Dain, South Darfur, and Zalengei, West Darfur, and then a reshuffling of the current National Congress Party governors, which is far from certain.

Many of the SLA commanders who initially joined the LJMJ, but grew disenchanted with it, continue to support reunification efforts. Saleh Mahmoud, a leading Fur MP and relative of Abdul Wahid, led efforts to reunite the rebels from Doha during the summer of 2011. These efforts enjoyed the support of the United States and, to a lesser degree, Qatar and the mediation, but did not achieve conclusive results. A more successful unification effort that benefits the LJMJ was that of the Fur Shura. This civilian body linked to the Fur Traditional Authority structure had been divided into three branches, variously aligned with the Government of Sudan or against it.
Defections and desertions have affected LJM since its inception. SLM-AW dissidents Abdallah Khalil and Ali Haroun never formally joined LJM. The same is the case with SLA-Carabino (led by Ali Carabino) and SLA-Field Leadership (led by Ali Mokhtar).

SLA-Unity is no longer part of LJM.

Updated 17 October 2011