DARFUR PEACE PROCESS CHRONOLOGY

2013

1 January: Restrictions on five international NGOs working in West Darfur come into effect. The humanitarian organizations, which previously operated in IDP camps, are now only allowed to operate inside the state capital, El Geneina.

2 January: Two Jordanian UNAMID police officers, held hostage for 136 days, are released unharmed. It is unclear who was responsible for their abduction.

In Hashaba, North Darfur, three people are killed, allegedly by pro-government militia.

4 January: SAF aircraft bombs Golo, Central Darfur; casualties unknown.

In Kalma camp, south of Nyala, South Darfur, pro-government militia kill one displaced person and injure three others.

5 January: Intense fighting between Abbala Rizeigat and Beni Hussein breaks out in Kabkabiya, North Darfur, over control of gold mining in the Jebel Amir area. Fighting is sparked when a Rizeigat leader and officer in the government border guards claims an area also claimed by the Beni Hussein. Some 60,000 people are thought to be displaced.

In Kampala, the SRF signs a cooperation deal with the opposition coalition National Consensus Forces (NCF). The NCF had previously called for the peaceful overthrow of the NCP regime; the SRF states it would pursue only armed opposition. In the joint ‘New Dawn Charter’, the signatories agree to use both means. Fearing possible repercussions from Khartoum, a number of NCF parties subsequently distance themselves from the deal.

6 January: LJM member and federal minister of health Bahr Abu Garda announces that the five states of Darfur are free of yellow fever following a campaign that vaccinated more than three million people. But in Mukjar, Central Darfur, local residents complain that they still have not been vaccinated.

SLA-AW claims to have killed 70 soldiers, and suffered five casualties, in the battle for the garrison of Jildu, Central Darfur.

8 January: Three Darfuri students go on trial in Khartoum, charged with crimes related to the anti-tuition student protests of December 2012. However, no one has been held responsible for the deaths of the four students, which triggered the protests.

9 January: The government claims to have killed 30 SLA-AW troops in ongoing fighting in Jildu, Central Darfur. SLA-AW denies the claims.

In Zalingei, Central Darfur, secondary school students start fires at seven schools in protest at the murder of a classmate. At least six students are arrested.
10 January: Abbala Rizeigat attack the town of al Sref Beni Hussein, in ongoing clashes between the two groups over control of the gold mining trade.

11 January: Ten civilians are reportedly killed after SAF aircraft bomb the SLA-AW controlled town of Dresa, East Jebel Marra, North Darfur.

12 January: In an embarrassment for the government, fifteen road construction staff working on the flagship Salvation Road project are kidnapped by unidentified armed men near El Fasher. Four Chinese nationals are among the abductees. The government accuses rebel groups of responsibility.

Kabkabiya town is threatened by the ongoing Abbala-Ben Hussein conflict, as the dispute escalates. Kabkabiya is the most important settlement affected so far by the fighting.

13 January: Rebel movement Sudan Liberation Movement for Justice (SLJM) claims it destroyed the army garrison at Abu Adjura, South Darfur, killing 25 soldiers. The government rejects the claims.

14 January: JEM-Bashar begins pre-negotiation meetings in Doha, Qatar.

16 January: The four Chinese road construction workers seized on 12 January are released after government negotiations. The Sudanese remain in captivity.

17 January: Beni Hussein and Abbala Rizeigat sign a ceasefire in Saraf Omra. Estimates of those displaced by the fighting have climbed to 100,000, with people moving to Kabkabiya, Saraf Omra, El Sireaf and Garra Az Azawia. 260 have died. SLA-AW representatives announce that they will launch a reconciliation effort between the two groups.

18 January: Abbala on camels attack the market at El Salam camp, South Darfur. The attack is an apparent reprisal for the earlier killing of an Abbala man in the area.

20 January: As part of the ceasefire agreement signed on 17 January, the Beni Hussein make the first restitution (diya) payment of 250 cows to the Abbala.

22 January: An argument at the livestock market in Umm Dukhun, Central Darfur, between an Abbala man and a soldier of the joint Sudanese-Chadian border force escalates, causing people to flee the town. The situation is defused when, confronted by the soldier’s colleagues, the Abbala withdraw from the town.

24 January: JEM-Bashar signs an agenda for negotiations with the government of Sudan in Doha, Qatar.

The DRA council members first appointed on 14 October 2012 are finally sworn into office in Nyala, South Darfur.
25 January: JEM, SLA-AW, and SLA-MM reject the statements of the businessman Siddig Wada’a that they will join the Doha process. Wada’a was appointed by President Bashir to head a committee to encourage non-signatory parties to join the Doha process, but has little to show for his efforts to date.

27 January: SAF reinforcements withdraw from Jebel Amir, where they were policing the ceasefire agreement signed between the Beni Hussein and the Abbala on 17 January.

29 January: Pro-government militia attack market at Kendebe, Sirba, West Darfur, looting 23 shops. The attack appears to have been motivated by events earlier in the day when a local policeman shot a member of the militia who had stolen a cow.

Near Umm Nunu, on the border between Central and South Darfur states, clashes between Beni Halba and Missiriya kill seven.

30 January: DRA officials, including the regional minister for reconstruction, confirm receipt of the balance of the USD 200 million from the central government earmarked for Darfur reconstruction, although there are questions over the liquidity of funds, which may only have been issued as a letter of credit from the central bank. The funds are 12 months late. Release of the funding is a pre-condition for Qatar to set a date for the indefinitely postponed Darfur donor conference, originally scheduled for December 2012 and then postponed to January 2013.

31 January: With fighting near Golo, Central Darfur continuing, the Sudanese government and rebel groups continue to deny humanitarian access to the region, as SAF attempts to regain control of the area.

4 February: A state government vehicle carrying more than SDP 300 million in salaries is robbed at gunpoint in Nyala, South Darfur. Witnesses suggest the robbers have links to the Sudanese border guards.

5 February: Qatar announces that the delayed Darfur donor conference will be held in Doha on 7–8 April 2013.

6 February: After protracted fighting, the government retakes control of Golo, Central Darfur from SLA-AW. SLA-AW confirms its withdrawal from the town.

7 February: In a possible indication of the regional widening of the conflict, SLA-AW claims it killed insurgents from Mali fighting alongside Sudanese government forces in a battle on Derbat, West Jebel Marra, Central Darfur. SLA-AW evidence is based on questioning of a captured fighter. The government rejects these claims.

10 February: JEM-Bashar and the government sign a ceasefire agreement in Doha.

UN independent expert on human rights in Sudan, Mashood Adebayo Baderin, completes his second visit to Sudan. Baderin states that some progress has been made in Darfur, but criticizes the handling of conflict related crimes, saying that trials continue in the ordinary courts rather than in the special courts required by the DDPC.
12 February: New clashes between SLA-AW and government forces occur near Golo, Central Darfur.

13 February: SLA-MM and JEM engage SAF in a joint operation near Umm Gunja in Bilel locality, near Nyala, South Darfur. The rebels claim to kill 87 SAF soldiers and capture nine officers.

14 February: The UN Security Council renews the arms embargo on Sudan and the mandate of the panel of experts appointed to oversee it until 17 February 2014.

15 February: Three people, including two police officers, are killed in Umm Shalaya, Central Darfur, after reported attacks from Abbala militants.

17 February: In apparent positioning for the upcoming Doha donors conference, Tijani Sese tells reporters Darfur’s economic recovery needs USD 6 billion.

19 February: President Bashir’s envoy Mustafa Ismail visits Oman for talks. Ismail’s key goal is to obtain a funding pledge for the upcoming donor conference in Doha.

21 February: SAF bombs a market in Ungdeita, south of Nyala, South Darfur. Three people are reported killed and 15 injured. The deputy governor of South Darfur later confirms government forces bombed the market, but that it was an accident.

23 February: In a breakdown of the 17 January ceasefire, more than 50 people are killed in El Sireaf, North Darfur after a Riezigat militia attack, in renewed fighting between Beni Hussein and Abbala. One NCP official states that at least 500 people have died since the fighting began in January.

24 February: In a rare conviction obtained by the Special Prosecutor for Darfur Crimes, six members of the PDF are found guilty of murder and are sentenced to death.

26 February: LJM clashes with pro-government militia at a market in Kabkabiya, North Darfur. A member of the militia was killed in an initial dispute, which led to a reprisal attack.

Visiting Paris, Sudanese foreign minister Ali Karti discusses with French officials the possible presence in Darfur of fighters from Mali. Intelligence has passed to France from Chadian sources, and if true, suggests that the Sudanese-Chadian border cooperation is either ineffective or at worst potentially complicit in the migration of Malian insurgents.

1 March: Beni Halba and Gimir clash in Ed al Fursan and Katila, South Darfur, over ownership of land and control of grazing rights. Eight people are reported killed.

2 March: JEM attacks Wad Bahr, North Kordofan, its first confirmed activity in the area since 2011. Wad Bahr is the district in which JEM’s former leader, Khalil Ibrahim, was killed in late December 2011.
Governor of North Darfur Osman Kibir announces a reconciliation agreement between Beni Hussein and Northern Rezeigat, following a meeting in Saraf Omra. Both sides agree to open access to El Sireaf in the gold mining area of Jebel Amir. Previous agreements have been quickly violated.

In Nyala, South Darfur, traders publicly protest the deteriorating security situation in the city. Nyala has seen repeated attacks on its merchant class, with kidnapping and armed robbery becoming increasingly common.

**6 March:** JEM and SLA-MM jointly engage SAF troops outside Tawila, North Darfur. The rebels claim to kill 25 soldiers.

**8–9 March:** Several homes are destroyed and livestock killed when SAF planes bomb Al Malaha, North Darfur, in continued contravention of UN Security Council resolutions against offensive over flights by the Sudanese military.

**9 March:** A police station in Gereida, South Darfur, is attacked by unidentified armed men, killing a senior police officer.

**10 March:** SLM-Justice and SLM-Unity kill two PDF militiamen west of El Fasher, North Darfur.

**13 March:** Militia kidnap nine people from Murnei, West Darfur, including an official of the government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC).

**15 March:** SLA-MM forces kill four Rizeigat in an attack near Beleil, South Darfur. SLA-MM claim an exaggerated 260 casualties and 36 SAF prisoners of war.

Near Al Salam IDP camp, South Darfur, unidentified men kill five. Humanitarian agencies are unable to provide assistance, as security restrictions have prevented access to the camp since 12 March.

At a school near Yassin, East Darfur, at least three policemen are killed in an attack by unidentified men.

**24 March:** 31 IDPs travelling to a refugee and IDPs conference in Nyala, South Darfur are taken hostage by SLA-AW near Kass. The three-bus convoy was being escorted by UNAMID troops, who were unable to prevent the attack.

In Doha, JEM-Bashar and the Government of Sudan reach a preliminary agreement to endorse the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD).

**25–26 March:** In preparation for the upcoming summit in Doha, a refugee and IDPs conference is held in Nyala, South Darfur, although only half of the participants are IDPs or refugees. The conference is overshadowed by the abduction, a day earlier, of part of the refugee delegation.

**29 March:** JEM-Bashar and the Government of Sudan reach agreement on the group’s participation in government and integration of forces into SAF.
30 March: SLA-AW release the 31 civilians abducted on 24 March. Government-aligned militias attack a market in Nyala, South Darfur, after local police arrest two militia members.

31 March: Former governor of South Darfur Abdel Hamid Kasha is appointed governor of East Darfur, an appointment he had refused last year.

1 April: Mohamed ibn Chambas takes up his duties as head of UNAMID. Chambas is the third head of mission since UNAMID was formed in 2007, succeeding Ibrahim Gambari.

6 April: JEM-Bashar signs the DDPD in a ceremony in Doha, Qatar. There are few substantive changes in the supplemental agreement. Protests occur across Darfur to oppose the Doha agreement.

In a rebuttal to Doha and Qatari claims that “the war is over”, SLM-MM attack and occupy Muhajeria and Labado, East Darfur, prompting the GoS to respond with air strikes. An estimated 17,000 people flee their homes.

An attempted robbery in Um Dukhun, Central Darfur triggers a series of clashes between Missiriya, Ta’aisha, and Salamat across Central and South Darfur, killing approximately 100 people.

8 April: The International Donors Conference for Reconstruction and Development in Darfur concludes, raising approximately USD 3.7 billion in pledges, of which USD 2.65 billion is from the Government of Sudan.

10 April: Missiriya and Salamat agree to cease hostilities. However, fighting continues in South Darfur, displacing an estimated 3,000 people to Nyala.

16 April: SAF, supported by militias, regain control of the Muhajeria and Labado from SLM-MM.

19 April: Saleh Mohammed Jerbo, due to be tried by the International Criminal Court for the September 2007 attack on AMIS peacekeepers in Haskanita, South Darfur, is reportedly killed during fighting in North Darfur.

Unidentified armed men attack the UNAMID base in Muhajeria, East Darfur, killing one peacekeeper.

22 April: After SLA-MM attempts to shell Nyala airport, clashes ensue with SAF. At least five SLA-MM fighters are killed; SLA-MM claims to have killed 89 SAF soldiers (clearly an extreme exaggeration).

24 April: In a potentially major setback to the peace process, LJM suspends its participation in the government and DRA, in protest at the removal of its minister of health in West Darfur; the expulsion of IRI, an organization providing capacity-
building support to LJM and the DRA; and continued, delayed implementation of DDPD security arrangements.

Following the attack on Nyala airport, SLA-MM and SAF clash in Bileil, South Darfur.

25 April: Emergency meetings between Vice President Taha and DRA chair Sese rescind LJM’s decision a day earlier to suspend participation in the government. The government agrees to “take appropriate steps” to implement security arrangements and review the expulsion of IRI.

27 April: JEM confirms it participated in a SRF attack earlier today on Um Rawaba, North Kordofan’s second largest town.

28–29 April: New clashes between Missiriya and Salamat force a reconciliation conference scheduled for 30 April to be postponed.

29 April: A gold mine in Jebel Amir, North Darfur, collapses, killing sixty.

1 May: Unidentified armed men attack UNAMID peacekeepers in Ed al Fursan, South Darfur, injuring one soldier.

3 May: SLA-MM forces attack PDF at Joghana and Mashrou, South Darfur, killing six.

8 May: Government forces and aligned militias attack SLA-MM forces in Abu Jabra, 30 km north of Gereida, South Darfur.

12 May: Mohammed Bashar, leader of JEM-Bashar, his deputy, Arku Suleiman, and at least six others of his group are killed during an engagement with JEM near the Sudan-Chad border. Bashar’s death, little over a month after he signed the DDPPD, is a serious setback for the Doha process and is an embarrassment to the Qatari and AU mediation.

16 May: Headed by the chair of the DRA, the government establishes a new Darfur Regional Security Committee, responsible for the maintenance of security in Darfur.

22 May: Beni Halba attack Gimir at Katila, South Darfur, killing 31 and displacing an estimated 13,000.

23 May: Bakheit Abdallah Abdel-Karim, aka Dabajo, succeeds Mohammed Bashar as leader of the JEM-Bashar faction.

27 May: Clashes between Salamat, Missiriya, and Ta’aisha are reported in Al Gara’aya and Um Sawri, south of Um Dukhun, Central Darfur, killing 32.

29 May: South Darfur police announce the death toll has climbed to 64 in fighting between Gimir and Bani Halba. In an apparent evolution of Darfur’s resource conflict,
fighting appears to have been motivated by over control of gum Arabic production and harvest.

**2 June:** Fighting between Salamat and Missiriya continues in Central Darfur. 14 are killed in Sarow village, near Mukjar.

**3 June:** Missiriya and Salamat begin a reconciliation conference in Zalingei, Central Darfur, under the mediation of East Darfur governor Abdel Hamid Kasha. An estimated 35,000 people are displaced by the conflict to date, with many crossing the border to Chad.

**4 June:** Four Missiriya are killed and five others wounded in clashes with Salamat at Muradaf, north of Um Dukhun, Central Darfur.

In Doha, an extraordinary meeting of the DDPD’s implementation follow-up commission condemns JEM for its attack on JEM-Bashar on 12 May and expresses its concern at the deteriorating security situation in Darfur.

**9 June:** A military convoy carrying army payroll is ambushed at Nertiti, Central Darfur by SLA-AW. One SAF soldier is killed.

In an apparent retaliation, later that day SAF soldiers enter an IDP camp in Nertiti and burn 25 buildings, steal livestock, and kill a local doctor. People flee the camp for Nertiti town.

**17 June:** Gunmen open fire on merchants in Gereida, South Darfur, injuring two.

1,500 Salamat flee their homes for Zalingei, Central Darfur following fighting with Missiriya at Irikom. Irikom had previously been considered a successful area for IDP return.

Meanwhile, special envoys for Sudan meet in El Fasher, North Darfur, convened by UNAMID head Chambas. DRA chair Sese states “the implementation of the agreement is moving forward in the right direction for reaching a sustainable peace in Darfur”.

**19 June:** The prosecutor for Darfur crimes files charges against 18 defendants for the 12 May attack on the JEM-Bashar convoy.

Clashes between Missiriya and Salamat leave 40 dead and 45 injured at Shataya, South Darfur.

**20 June:** The UN independent expert on human rights in Sudan, Mashood Adebayo Baderin, reports that fighting had displaced 4,500 people to Otash IDP camp, South Darfur, in the last six weeks.

**21 June:** Fighting between Rizeigat and Beni Hussein in El Sireaf, North Darfur, kills 60. The latest fighting began when Beni Hussein grazing cattle were attacked.
24 June: Fighting between Gimir and Beni Halba kills 11 near Ed al Fursan, over land disputes.

25 June: JEM-Bashar confirms Bakheit Abdallah Abdel-Karim, aka Dabajo, as leader at an extraordinary meeting of the movement in Kutum, North Darfur. Dabajo assumed leadership of the group on 23 May.

Clashes between Missiriya and Salamat are reported in Abu Garadil in Um Dukhun, Central Darfur, killing 17 and injuring 29.

26 June: Renewed clashes between Bani Hussein and Rizeigat over control of gold mining near El Sireaf, North Darfur kill at least 39 people.

27 June: Continued clashes between Missiriya and Salamat are reported at Muradaf village in Um Dukhun, Central Darfur.

2012

1 January: In a letter, the SRF coalition asks the National Consensus Forces (NCF), a Khartoum-based political opposition coalition pursuing political change by peaceful means, to abandon the political track in favour of a unified armed struggle with the SRF. The NCF consists of a variety of Sudanese opposition political parties, including the Popular Congress Party (PCP) and the National Umma Party.

3 January: Sudan’s intelligence chief, Mohammed Atta, claims to have evidence linking PCP leader Hassan al Turabi to the SRF in planning a coup.

10 January: President Omar al Bashir issues three decrees that establish two new Darfur states and re-shuffle the governors with the appointment of two new ones. The new Central and East Darfur states center around Ed Daein and Zalingei, areas traditionally associated respectively with the Baggara Arabs (Rizeigat) and Fur.

President Bashir’s first decree relieves the governors of South Darfur state, Abdul Hamid Musa Kasha, and of West Darfur state, Al Sharati Gaffar Abdul Hakam, of their positions. The second decree establishes East and Central Darfur states. The GoS seeks to compensate Kasha by appointing him governor of East Darfur, but he refuses, claiming he had a legal mandate to continue as South Darfur governor. Yusif Tibin, a former minister of infrastructure of Khartoum state, takes over as governor of Central state. While the governor of North Darfur state, Osman Kibbir, retains his position, Abdul Hakam loses his position to Haydar Koma, a Masalit vice-chairman of LJM. Another new appointee is Ismail Hamad, who is named governor of South Darfur. Hamad, a Rizeigat, was until recently one of the Darfur leaders associated with the NCP.

19 January: JEM Collective Leadership, another splinter group led by Zakaria Musa, is formed and says it will sign the DDPD.

21 January: In east Darfur, one Nigerian UNAMID peacekeeper is killed and three
others are wounded by unknown gunmen.

**25 January:** Protests calling for the reinstatement of former governor Abdul Hamid Musa Kasha greet the appointment of new South Darfur governor Ismail Hamad.

**26 January:** JEM says Khalil Ibrahim’s brother, Jibril, is its new chairman following a two-day leadership conference in South Kordofan. The Government of Sudan claims the meeting took place in Bor, South Sudan.

**31 January:** Displaced people in three North Darfur IDP camps reject Gambari’s proposal to return to their villages as part of the DDPD process, saying security must improve first.

**1 February:** Gambari is cautioned by UN HQ in New York after he attends the wedding of Musa Hilal’s daughter to President Déby in Khartoum.

**3 February:** New JEM Chairman Jibril Ibrahim appoints an 18-member executive office.

**4 February:** JEM says it has notified the UN secretary-general that Gambari is an obstacle to peacemaking efforts in Darfur. The full deployment of the joint Sudan/Chad/Central African Republic border protection force is announced.

**6 February:** LJM’s deputy chairman, Ahmed Abdel Shafi, announces his withdrawal from the movement and any commitment to the DDPD.

**8 February:** President Bashir, President Déby, and LJM Chairman Tijani Sese celebrate the inauguration of the Darfur Regional Authority (formally established on 27 December 2011) in Al Fasher, North Darfur.

**20 February:** Malik Agar is elected head of the SRF. The leaders of the constituent Darfur movements (SLA-MM, SLA-AW, and JEM) are elected vice-presidents. Abu Elgasim Imam al-Haj is appointed spokesman.

**21 February:** JEM temporarily holds 55 UNAMID peacekeepers, saying they failed to notify the group of their movements into JEM’s territory. UNAMID asserts its right to unrestricted access to all of Darfur.

**25 February:** Former West Darfur Governor Hamid Musa Kasha is nominated to lead a group of ‘wise-men’ whose primary mandate is to engage with DDPD non-signatories.

**26 February:** SRF claims to have taken control of Jau town and Toroge areas in South Kordofan. The GoS asserts that the GoSS supported the attack—a claim the SRF rejects.

**29 February:** One UNAMID peacekeeper is killed in Shearia, South Darfur by unidentified gunman while on patrol.
**1 March:** The ICC issues an arrest warrant for Sudanese defense/interior minister Abdel Rahim Muhammed Hussein on 20 counts of crimes against humanity, including persecution, murder, forcible transfer, rape, inhumane acts, imprisonment, and torture.

**1 March:** The LJM accuses SLM-AW of attacking and killing six of their fighters in a battle near Korma, North Darfur. SLM-AW claim to have targeted SAF, not LJM, in the attack.

**5 March:** SRF forces claim to have attacked an army garrison in Dilling, South Kordofan.

**6 March:** JEM forces announce a clash with SAF near Ba’achin, North Darfur.

**8 March:** Sudan’s defense minister announces a tri-partite force composed of Sudanese, Chadian, and Libyan forces that will be deployed to protect the joint border.

**11 March:** Following DRA Chairman Tijani Sese’s criticism of delays, UNAMID completes the verification of LJM forces process (begun 5 March).

**16 March:** Vice president of the Umma party, Nasreldin Hadi El Mahdi, announces that Umma had joined the SRF.

The DRA announces a large conference for displaced Darfurians to discuss repatriation and voluntary return. Some IDP and refugee leaders publicly oppose the conference on the grounds that conditions for return are not safe.

DRA chairman Tijani Sese calls for UNAMID forces to be gradually replaced by the joint Chad/Sudan border force, freeing UNAMID to focus on facilitating returns of displaced, and other activities.

**20 March:** Sudan sentence six JEM fighters in custody to death: Ibrahim el Maz, Siir Jibril Tia, Mahjoub al Gazouli, Muhammed Khameis, Ibrahim Abdullah, and Yahia Adam.

**23 March:** High-level UK and US public statements call on South Sudan to end military support to the SPLM-N.

**26 March:** Sudan accuses the SPLM-N and JEM of being the main forces behind the taking of the Heglig area from Sudan after battles in the surrounding areas.

**27 March:** UNAMID and Sudanese police forces repulse Kabkabiyia IDP camp protesters objecting to the North Darfur commissioner’s plan to dismantle the camp. Seven protesters are killed and 21 injured. LJM calls the action “deplorable” and demands an independent inquiry.
28 March: JEM clashes with SAF forces near Heglig, in South Kordofan, as the SAF attempt to retake the area from SPLA control.

30 March: SRF forces overrun villages surrounding Teludi, South Kordofan, a strategic center.

1 April: Sudanese refugees in Chad, interviewed on Radio Dabanga, refute claims that 100,000 refugees had returned to Darfur.

SLM-AW claims to have repelled a SAF attack near Jebel Marra, seizing 40 vehicles in the process.

2 April: JEM calls on AU/UN Joint Special Representative Gambari to step down over the Kabbabiya IDP incident.

4 April: Hundreds of Darfur students demonstrate in Khartoum protesting the killing of a Darfur student by the security services.

Reports emerge that one of South Darfur’s GoS paramilitary forces, the Border Patrol Force, rejected calls to mobilize in a “deterrence force” against South Sudan, citing past broken promises by the GoS.

17 April: The GoS announce a string of rebel attacks: SPLM-N attacked a SAF column in al Meram locality in South Kordofan; JEM attacked the Sispan area in Katila locality, which borders South Sudan; and SLA-MM claimed to have attacked and occupied Um Dafouq, South Darfur. SAF denied SLA-MM occupied the area.

18 April: CAR claim that unidentified Darfur rebels killed 11 of its soldiers earlier in the month.

19 April: JEM claims to have fought SAF at Kharsana near Heglig, South Kordofan.

20 April: Four UNAMID peacekeepers are killed near Mourn, West Darfur by unspecified armed groups. SRSG Gambari uses the occasion to draw attention to increased violence in Darfur, speculating that it is due to Sudan-South Sudan tensions.

24 April: DRA Chairman Tijani Sese accuses the finance ministry of failing to produce USD 200 million stipulated under the terms of the DDPD for the Darfur Development Bank. This Qatari-initiated bank is meant to act as the holding account for all Darfur donor grants. Following receipt of the funds, a Joint Assessment Mission is slated to explore projects for early recovery and voluntary return.

26 April: Under-Secretary General for UN Peacekeeping, Herve Ladsous, announces a scale down of 4,000 peacekeepers from UNAMID, citing improved conditions due to the Chad-Sudan and the Sudan-Libya rapprochement. Other forces formerly stationed at these borders areas will be redeployed to East and South Darfur states.

2 May: President Bashir forms the High Follow-Up Committee for Peace in Darfur (HFCPD) to oversee the implementation of DDPD, appointing himself as chairman.
Amin Hassan Omer announces that arrangements are underway to hold the first meeting of the 20-member HFCPD within two weeks.

3 May: SAF arrest three Sudanese in Nyalal, South Darfur, for “spying” on behalf of the SPLM and the ICC. SAF claimed the staffers were linked to SUDAN AID and SCC; both partners of the UK-based Sudan Social Development Organization and the Norwegian Church Aid.

7 May: DRA Chairman Tijani Sese condemns the SPLA’s alleged occupation of four areas in South Darfur: Al Amood al Akhdar, Kafan Dabi, Hofrat al Nuhas, and Safaha areas.

8 May: SLM-AW and SLA-MM mount a major attack on Guereda, South Darfur, occupying the town for two hours. SAF forces push the rebels out of the town soon after.

9 May: Tijani Sese announces the release of the first funds from the ministry of finance to fund the DRA.

9 May: A SAF spokesman announces that Kafya Kingi (50 kilometers from Kafan Dibi, South Darfur) had been “liberated” from SPLA occupation.

15 May: JEM and SLA-AW claim the GoS arrested 30 civilians from Guereda, South Darfur, in retaliation for the recent rebel attack on the town.

28 May: The International Follow up Commission and the HFCPD hold its third meeting in Doha, Qatar, calling for international financial support for the DDPD. LJM Chairman Sese acknowledges that the GoS has transferred some but not all of the promised USD 200 million to fund the DRA.

1 June: Following its third leadership bureau meeting, the SRF reiterates its call for a comprehensive solution to Sudan’s conflicts. The alliance’s stated goal is to topple the government of President Omar al Bashir through a mix of armed struggle on the peripheries and mass civil unrest in the centre.

3 June: SAF says its forces killed 45 rebels while repulsing a JEM attack on a garrison at Fataha, North Darfur. JEM says it captured the garrison and seized 15 vehicles, some armoured.

14 June: The UN independent expert on human rights in Sudan, Mashood Adebayo Baderin, is denied access to Darfur during his first visit to Sudan.

19 June: Sudan’s justice minister, Mohamed Bushara Dousa, appoints Yasir Ahmed Mohamed as special prosecutor for Darfur crimes. He is the third special prosecutor in six months.

24 June: At a meeting in El Fasher, North Darfur, the AU, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the GoS agree to scale back UNAMID’s size over the next 18 months.
26 June: SLM-MM claims an attack on a GoS military convoy in Nyala, South Darfur.

10–12 July: The DRA-led Darfur Peoples’ Conference for Peace and Development is held in El Fasher, North Darfur. Attended by First Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, it seeks to bring together leaders of the displaced and refugee communities, civil society, and traditional authority figures to produce a vision for managing voluntary return and the necessary inter-tribal reconciliation. Non-signatory rebel groups and a wide sampling of displaced and refugee leaders refuse to participate, denouncing the meeting as pro-GoS, and the DDPD as a failure. The conference concludes by calling for workshops in all five Darfur states to encourage the voluntary return of displaced persons. The attendees also call for the implementation of security arrangements and the establishment of mechanisms to secure the roads and spread a culture of reconciliation and tolerance.

16 July: SLM-MM says it downed a MI-17 military helicopter that crashed in the Khazan Tunjur area of North Darfur.

18 July: LJM and the GoS, represented respectively by Bahr Abu Garda and Amin Hassan Omer, announce the rescheduling of the DDPD implementation agreement to account for ongoing delays.

22 July: The GoS announces the deployment of a buffer force after clashes between Missiriya and Rizeigat tribes in East Darfur and South Kordofan. The fighting killed 58 and injured 24.

23 July: JEM’s military spokesman says JEM/SLA-Unity captured Tabun and Karkade (South Darfur) and Tabaldi oil field (South Kordofan), seizing 26 armoured vehicles, 10 transport trucks, and military and logistical supplies. SAF’s spokesperson says the rebels attacked Karkade and Um Showaikah but were repelled by the army when they attacked and shelled Tabun.

24 July: SRSG Gambari tells the UNSC that it is time to move forward with early recovery in Darfur and that some splinter rebel groups have contacted him to request inclusion in the DDPD.

31 July: Eight students are killed during protests against price increases in Nyala, South Darfur.

1 August: The district commissioner of Al Waha in North Darfur is killed by unknown gunmen in Kutum, triggering revenge attacks. The commissioner was a leader of the Al Zayidya Arab tribal group. Arab militias seek reprisals against Zaghawa groups blamed for the assassination. Attacks mainly target Kassab IDP camp, leading to the displacement of 25,000 and 21 deaths.

6 August: In Rahid al Barad, South Darfur, people riot against an increase in electricity charges, burning several government buildings.
9 August: JEM Chairman Jibril Ibrahim sacks his commander-in-chief, Bakheit Abdallah Abdel Karim (Dabajo).

10 August: SLM-MM says its fighters killed 11 army soldiers in an ambush between the towns of Al Mujlad and Babanosa, 50 km east of East Darfur.

11 August: LJM announces a deal with the GoS over disarmament and demobilization modalities that have delayed DDPD implementation.

12 August: Unknown gunmen kill a Bangladeshi member of UNAMID in Otash camp, South Darfur. Another Bangladeshi is injured.

13 August: In El Fasher, North Darfur, a group claiming to be an LJM splinter faction attacks the ministry of environment, the ministry of youth and sport, and the headquarters of the Peace and Reconciliation Commission, stealing four vehicles.

14 August: SRSG Ibrahim Gambari resigns. Deputy Joint Special Representative (Political) Aichatou Mindaoudou is appointed interim officer-in-charge of the mission and the joint mediation.

15 August: Clashes break out in Nyala’s Sikka Hadid neighbourhood between government forces and an unknown armed group.

17 August: JEM leader Ibrahim denounces efforts by Chad and others to sow dissent within JEM by encouraging the formation of a splinter group.

30 August: The director of the National Intelligence and Security Services claims to have intercepted a truckload of smuggled arms to be used in Khartoum by the SRF to start an internal uprising. SRF denies the allegation.

3 September: During a series of revenge killings in the Kutum and Al Waha districts, the district commissioner of Kutum escapes an assassination attempt. Five policemen and two civilians are killed and 11 are injured in the attack.

5 September: North Darfur Governor Osman Kibbir declares a state of emergency and appoints a temporary military ruler for Kutum and Al Waha.

5–6 September: Central Reserve Police and SAF forces clash in Kutum and Al Waha, leading to a number of casualties. An unidentified armed group also sets fire to the police headquarters in Kutum. Three armed men are killed in the attack.

6 September: JEM military spokesperson Badawi Moussa al Sakin says there was a battle between SLM-AW/JEM forces and SAF in Tanga, eastern Jebel Marra, South Darfur. The rebels allegedly defeated the SAF, which was equipped with 110 vehicles and two tanks. They captured 30 vehicles and destroyed 10 others (as well as the tanks).

7 September: SAF soldiers clash with SPLM-N and Darfur rebels in Hagar al Dom, 30 km northeast of Kallugi, South Kordofan, and claim to have killed 77 rebels. In a second clash with the SRF in Al Arabeib al Ashara in eastern Jebel Marra, North
Darfur, 32 rebels are reportedly killed and 10 vehicles destroyed. SLM-AW says SAF attacked its base in Fanga Suk on the West Darfur/North Darfur border, resulting in the capture of 32 vehicles and heavy SAF losses.

11 September: Following a conference on 8-9 September in Furawiyia, North Darfur, a JEM splinter group (JEM-Bashar) emerges. It is headed by an interim military council under Mohammed Bashar Ahmed, and under the military command of former JEM chief commander, Abdel Karim (Dabajo).

16 September: The JEM splinter group says it is interested in a peace agreement, provided it has serious international support. Chadian President Idriss Déby conveys this offer from the splinter group.

17 September: JEM says it fought SAF between the Al Dabib and Al Mujald areas of South Kordofan, seizing 11 vehicles and destroying 17 others.

19 September: SLA-MM says its fighters, led by Mohamed Harri Cherdgo, clashed with GoS forces near Jebel Marra and captured 12 vehicles.

25–27 September: The US government condemns the killing of more than 70 civilians in Hashaba, North Darfur, in an aerial bombardment and fighting between Sudanese government forces and rebels.

27 September: SLA-MM and JEM say they attacked a military convoy between Tabet and Hamrah in North Darfur, and seized 15 four-wheel drive vehicles loaded with military equipment, and four fuel trucks. The deputy governor of South Darfur confirms the incident but says the convoy was commercial, not military.

1 October: The SRF issues a new political platform drafted in Kampala, Uganda.

2 October: Four South African peacekeepers are killed in an attack by unknown gunmen on a UNAMID patrol in El Geneina, West Darfur. Eight others are injured. The South African government appeals to Khartoum to investigate the incident.

7 October: SAF military An-12 aircraft en route to Darfur crashes west of Omdurman, killing 15. The SAF spokesman states that ‘military equipment’ was also on board.

8 October: In protest over a range of issues, including sexual violence against female students, students at the University of El Fasher begin a peaceful sit-in of the university premises.

10 October: NISS storms the campus of the University of El Fasher and fires tear gas students. Several dozen students are reportedly detained.

In Nyala, an unidentified armed group kills a policeman at Otash camp. The police return fire and kill two.

14 October: The government appoints 42 members of the Darfur Regional Authority Council, 20 from the NCP, 17 from the LJM, and 5 from other parties. A further 25
positions are reserved for representatives from the yet to be appointed Eastern Darfur State Legislature and for potential future DDPD signatories. The Council is responsible for supervising and monitoring the work of the DRA executive, but its effectiveness and relations towards the five state legislatures is uncertain.

15 October: The DDPD Joint Commission meets in Khartoum, warning: ‘No tangible progress has been made towards the implementation of the most critical aspects of the Final Security Arrangements.’ The Commission sets 15 November as the new deadline for the verification of the strength of LJM forces.

17 October: A UNAMID convoy is attacked about 10 km from Hashaba, North Darfur, killing one South African peacekeeper and wounding three others. Heavy weapons not seen before in Darfur were used in the ambush, suggesting the attack was carefully planned. Suspicions fall on government-aligned forces aiming to prevent UNAMID from investigating fighting in Hashaba (see 25–27 September). SLA-MM attack PDF and SAF near Abu Delek, south of El Fasher, North Darfur, killing 16 PDF soldiers.

21 October: LJM boycotts a Ceasefire Commission meeting, delaying the Joint Commission timetable agreed on 15 October.

22 October: JEM-Bashar signs a cessation of hostilities agreement in Doha, and agrees to further talks on the basis of the DDPD. UNAMID and Qatar call the development a major breakthrough, claiming JEM-Bashar represents a significant part of JEM’s forces, a characterization rejected by the mainstream JEM.

24 October: Residents report aerial bombardment of east Jebel Marra. No casualties are reported.

25 October: On the eve of Eid al Adha, DDPD non-signatories once more reject participation in the Doha negotiations.

27 October: JEM and SLA-MM claim to shell El Fasher, but the government dismisses their claims. UNAMID reports hearing routine gunfire near the city.

Near El Geneina, West Darfur nine millet farms are destroyed in an unexplained fire. Pro-government militias have previously burned other farms in West Darfur.

29 October: The federal Ministry of Health informs the World Health Organisation (WHO) of a yellow fever epidemic in Darfur. The WHO later calls the outbreak the worst anywhere in the world in a generation, which prompts an emergency vaccination campaign targeting three million people.

30 October: Kunjara, Sunduga, Karyala and Tardona are bombed by government aircraft, destroying livestock and crops.

2 November: PDF attack the village of Sigili in an apparent reprisal attack against SLA-MM for its 17 October attack on Abu Delek, killing ten. In protest at the incident and UNAMID inaction, villagers bring the bodies of those killed to the gates
of UNAMID headquarters in El Fasher. Some 1,000 people leave Sigili for the safety of El Fasher.

7 November: PDF prevent UNAMID from travelling to Abu Delek, in violation of the Status of Forces Agreement. UNAMID continues to routinely experience access violations, but not all such incidents are publicly reported.

9 November: SLA-MM and JEM ambush a SAF convoy at Abu Zerega, south of El Fasher, killing at least 18. The attack demonstrates the potential for increased military coordination of non-signatory forces.

At Wadi Murrah, near Tabet, North Darfur, SLA-MM fight SAF, and claim to have killed 100 government soldiers. This is likely an exaggerated figure.

10 November: In response to the Abu Zerega convoy ambush, SAF aircraft bomb the area of Shangil Tobay.

12 November: Fourth meeting of the DDPD Implementation Follow-Up Commission in Doha. The deputy prime minister of Qatar says ‘progress in DDPD implementation had fallen short of expectations.’

14 November: Military commanders from JEM’s Kordofan sector announce their defection to JEM-Bashar. JEM had previously fought alongside SPLM-N in South Kordofan, so this defection has potentially greater implications for the SRF and the fighting in the Nuba Mountains than for conflict in Darfur.

SAF aircraft bomb Abu Zerega, Shangil Tobaya and Tawila in North Darfur.

15 November: Speaker of the legislative assembly of West Darfur, Mustafa Mohammed Ishaaq, is impeached due to his repeated absence from El Geneina. Ishaaq is allegedly involved in gold mining activities in Jebel Amir (see report of 5 January 2013).

16 November: SLA-MM clashes with government forces west of El Fasher airport.

17 November: SAF aircraft bomb Um Kadada, targeting rebel vehicles.

19-20 November: 500 fighters meet in Darma, North Darfur, to confirm Bakhit Abdullah Abdul Karim as military chief and Mohamed Bashar as president of the JEM interim military council.

SAF bomb Samaha, near the Darfur-South Sudan border, in an attempt to disrupt rebel movement supply lines between South Sudan and Darfur. 11 civilians are killed.

23 November: SLA-AW forces attach the SAF military camp at Ed Al Nagab, near Kabkabiya, North Darfur. 22 soldiers are reported killed, and a number of vehicles and weapons are stolen.
3 December: Clashes at Gezira University between Darfuri students and student supporters of the NCP turn violent. The Darfuri students are protesting the university’s refusal to exempt them from tuition fees, as provided for by the DDPD.

SAF aircraft bomb Foula, near Shangil Tobaya, North Darfur. The number of casualties is unknown.

5 December: SAF attack a LJM convoy on the road from Kutum to El Fasher, killing two. The LJM officially protests the attack, and claims SAF was aware of its movements. For its part, SAF asserts it repelled SRF forces moving towards El Fasher. The incident is significant as the first serious military violation between signatories of the DDPD, and demonstrates the tensions that exist between the DRA, headquartered in El Fasher, and the North Darfur state authorities, which work closely with the local SAF command. LJM also threatens to withdraw from the DDPD, but quickly moderates this position.

7 December: Four Darfuri students, previously reported missing, are found dead in an irrigation canal near the University of Gezira. The dead students had participated in the anti-tuition protests earlier in the month. The official explanation—that the students drowned—is widely discounted, and protests at the deaths take place at universities across Sudan. Violence is reported at a number of universities in Khartoum.

8 December: In Nyala, armed men storm the special court for crimes in Darfur, freeing three defendants and beating the judge. The governor of South Darfur later confirms that the attackers were affiliated with SAF.

10 December: Following the university protests, the government directs institutions of higher education to exempt Darfuri students from tuition fees for the current academic year.

12 December: Pro-government militia attack the village of Dali, north-west of Shangil Tobaya, North Darfur. Ground attacks are followed by SAF bombing. Meanwhile, in Khartoum, outgoing US senior advisor on Darfur, Dane Smith, states that Darfur militias ‘seem to be more and more out of control.’

15 December: Fighting between rival groups of soldiers at the SAF garrison in Mornei, West Darfur leaves eight troops dead. The apparent dispute was over a refusal of troops to move to fight in East Jebel Marra.

16 December: Berti and Ziyaddiyah tribal leaders sign a peace agreement in El Fasher under the sponsorship of the governor of North Darfur, Osman Kibbir, following clashes in August.

19 December: Fuel shortages and power outages continue for the third day in Nyala, South Darfur, as insufficient supplies reach the city. Officials deny the fuel shortage, to the anger of the local population.

20 December: Mohamed ibn Chambas of Ghana is appointed as the new Joint Special Representative, Joint Chief Mediator, and head of UNAMID. However,
UNAMID continues for the time being under the leadership of Aïchatou Mindaoudou, as Chambas will not take up his post full-time until April 2013.

20 December: In Mukjar, Central Darfur, an Ethiopian soldier kills three fellow UNAMID peacekeepers before turning the gun on himself.

24 December: SLM-AW forces attack and seize the town of Golo, Central Darfur. SAF experiences heavy casualties and sends reinforcements from Zalingei. Golo is of strategic importance as one of the few remaining government controlled towns in Jebel Marra.

In Nyala, three UNAMID national staff are arrested for alleged involvement in anti-government activities, in violation of the status of forces agreement.

25 December: President Bashir forms a new committee to oversee foreign NGOs in Sudan. Headed by a ministry of defence general, the DRA is a member of the committee. The added bureaucracy is unlikely to make NGO activities in Sudan, and particularly Darfur, easier.

28 December: SLA-AW seize the garrison town of Jumera, near Kass in South Darfur. SLA-AW also claim to control Jildu, near Nertiti, but this cannot be independently confirmed.

In Khartoum, Tijani Sese meets with Ali Osman Taha to discuss NGO access to Darfur and government obligations under the DDPD.
2011

3 January: Salva Kiir announces that he is expelling all Darfur rebels from South Sudan. He says ‘no opposition in the North shall take Juba as a base’.

4 January: The LJM accepts the mediators’ compromise proposals.

5 January: Mbeki says the outcome of the Doha process will ‘be submitted to an inclusive process which will take place in Darfur to give the people in this region the opportunity to help to determine their future’. Two days later, US Senator John Kerry calls for the Doha talks to move to a neighbouring capital to get the ‘Darfur peace process back onto the agenda in a larger, more significant way’.

23 January: Darfur members of the National Assembly reject the armed movements’ demand for Darfur to be reorganized as a single administrative region. The bloc’s leader, Hasabo Mohamed Abdel Rahman, says the movements do not represent the people of Darfur.

3 February: Minawi formally withdraws from the DPA, declaring that he will work by all means to overthrow the government.

5 February: AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra says the mediation is aiming to have a Darfur agreement ready to sign by July, when South Sudan is due to become independent.

6 February: Addressing security and intelligence officers, President Bashir says ‘Darfur will be cleansed of outlaws [insurgents] by the end of July’.

10 February: The Sudanese government says it will send a ‘limited’ delegation back to Doha to review compromise proposals drafted by the mediation.

18 February: A JEM delegation travels to Kenya to meet Abdul Wahid. The two sides agree to hold talks on working together, possibly as early as mid-March. Meeting in Nyala amid heavy fighting between government and rebel forces, special envoys from more than half a dozen countries including the United States, China, and Russia agree that talks with Darfurians other than the movements—the Darfur Political Process or DPP—will open in Darfur only when the Doha process is complete, with or without a signed agreement. (The NCP and AUHIP had agreed in January that the DPP would begin in February and would not be delayed by lack of agreement in Doha.)

23 February: The mediation hands the parties new proposals on outstanding areas of disagreement.

25 February: JEM and the LJM reject the new proposals. JEM says they do not meet even the minimum demands of the movements, including a single region and a vice-presidency for Darfur.
28 February: JEM asks the UN to rescue Khalil Ibrahim from Libya and says it is willing to resume negotiations in Doha.

2 March: Having failed to convince the mediation to wind up the talks by 15 March and hand over to the DPP, Ghazi Atabani announces the government’s plans to hold a referendum on the administrative status of Darfur, previously a focus of effort in Doha, within three months. JEM calls the initiative ‘yet another attempt to undermine the efforts of the mediation’ to pave the way for a domestic process under NCP control; the LJM says the announcement is tantamount to ‘the abolition of the negotiations’. The two movements form a joint committee to establish a unified position on the issue.

5 March: Speaking for the pro-government bloc of Darfur parliamentarians in the National Assembly, Hasabo Mohamed Abdel Rahman proposes further division of the region, with two new states in Jebel Marra (capital Zalingei) and Bahr al Arab (capital al Daein). The government quickly endorses the proposal, raising the possibility of a five-state region rather than the single region the armed movements say is the prerequisite for any peace agreement. Ghazi Atabani says the parliamentarians’ proposal was adopted because it represents ‘the will of the people of Darfur’. Citing the DPA, he says there is a legal obligation on the government to hold the referendum by April.

10 March: In a joint press statement, JEM and the LJM agree to cooperate and coordinate in the peace process. They inform the mediation they are also coordinating efforts to bring Abdul Wahid and Minni Minawi into a single platform. The government delegation in Doha, until now scathing of rebel disunity, says the announcement undoes the progress already made with the LJM. Amin Hassan Omer warns the movements that the government has ‘other keys’ to end the conflict in Darfur.

13 March: Seeking a success to strengthen its case for the continuation of the Doha process, the mediation proposes that the parties adopt the four chapters they agree on—Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Justice and Reconciliation, Compensation and Return of IDPs and Refugees, and Wealth Sharing—and keep talking about the remaining disputed issues, including the administrative status of Darfur.

21 March: A UNAMID delegation headed by Gambari meets Abdul Wahid in Kampala. SLA-AW announces an initiative—identical to that already announced by JEM—to unite all armed movements in order to build ‘a state of citizenship and democracy’. After the meeting, UNAMID officials express the hope that Abdul Wahid may soon travel to Doha. In Doha, the mediators announce an ‘all Darfur stakeholders’ conference’, reportedly of some 400 people, to be held in April. They invite government officials; representatives of the armed movements; civil society groups; IDPs, and refugees; tribal leaders; political forces; and regional and international partners. Speaking privately, government officials say the meeting is an attempt to force Khartoum to bow to the movements’ demand for a single region, and they reject it.
27–31 May: All Darfur Stakeholders’ Conference (ADSC) convened. The precise purpose of the ADSC was not stated in order to adjust in accordance with evolving circumstances at the negotiation table. It was announced at the end of the conference that the ADSC had endorsed the draft peace document being negotiated by the rebels and the government, but the reality was more complicated. Endorsement was not universal, nor were the participants in the ADSC fully representative of Darfur’s many stakeholders.

14 July: The LJM and government sign the Darfur Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). Many members of the international community are absent. A Follow-up Committee to oversee the agreement’s elaboration and implementation is also created, led by Qatar, the United States, and the European Union. The first meeting of the committee is scheduled for early September 2011.

19 July: Gambari is appointed interim joint AU/UN mediator for Darfur. Former mediator Djibril Bassolé leaves the post to become foreign minister of Burkina Faso.

29 July: The UN Security Council renews UNAMID’s mandate for one year. Despite the AU’s endorsement, the Security Council fails to support Mbeki’s Darfur Peace Process until certain preconditions are met.

7 August: The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), SLA-AW, and SLA-MM sign a political alliance announcing the establishment of the Sudan Revolutionary Front alliance. The three signatories agree to unite their political and military means to overthrow the NCP-led government and set up a liberal and secular state. JEM is not part of the agreement, but remains in negotiations about joining.

22 August: Libyan opposition forces reach Tripoli, causing JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim to flee Libya. The Libyan conflict creates a windfall of material support for a number of Darfur rebel movements, especially JEM, but also SLA-MM.

27 August: The government appoints Amin Hassan Omer to lead on the Darfur file, including the implementation of the recent DDPD.

29 August: JEM delegates visit Burkina Faso and meet with President Blaise Compaoré to discuss how to revitalize the Darfur peace process.

4 September: SLA-AW, JEM, and SPLM-N call for a no-fly zone over Blue Nile.

7 September: An LJM advance delegation arrives in Khartoum to prepare for the movement’s integration.

11 September: Inaugural meeting of the International Follow-up Committee convenes in Doha.

13 September: Al Haj Adam Youssef is appointed vice-president of Sudan, in line with the DDPD’s stipulation that a person from Darfur receive a vice-presidential appointment. JEM and SLA-AW opposed the appointment; the LJM was slighted because it presumed the job would be given to someone from its ranks.
16 September: North Darfur Governor Osman Kibbir confirms JEM’s return from Libya and says that Khalil Ibrahim is in Wadi Huwar, North Darfur.

26 September: JEM deputy chairman Mohamed Bahr Hamadein is relieved of his position.

7 October: The LJM advance delegation to Sudan completes tour of Darfur. Announces the formation of two technical committees in preparation for establishing the Darfur Regional Authority.

12 October: The government says it will not send a representative to a planned DDPD implementation meeting in Washington on 27–28 October because it objects to US intentions to discuss ways of accommodating non-signatories such as JEM.

19 October: The fourth meeting of the special envoys takes place in Darfur. A reference is made to potential ‘targeted measures’ against DDPD non-signatories. UNAMID outlines its initial thinking on a new AU/UN road map for peace in Darfur.

23 October: LJM leader Tijani Sese arrives in Khartoum for the first time since the Doha process. He is received by Nafie Ali Nafie, Amin Hassan Omer, Joint Special Representative Gambari, and Qatar’s mediator, Al Mahmoud.

24 October: Sese is sworn in as head of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority.

24 October–3 November: Sese tours Darfur, meeting with displaced communities and NCP leaders, and finishing with further meetings in Khartoum with opposition parties. Two people are killed in Kalma IDP camp in violence attributed to clashes between supporters and opponents of the DDPD. Sese hears both sides: caution is voiced regarding the danger of premature return and the need for further outreach to DDPD non-signatories.

14 November: The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) is formed, consisting of four groups: SPLM-N, SLA-AW, SLA-MM, and JEM. SRF calls for regime change, the end to partial political processes, and the unification of all of Sudan’s opposition forces.

15–16 November: A closed-door US Institute of Peace workshop is held, bringing together DDPD non-signatories JEM and SLA-MM (now represented under the single banner of the SRF), the LJM, civil society groups, UNAMID, special envoys, and other representatives of the international community.

22–23 November: US congressmen call for a single, unified peace process throughout Sudan. The SRF issues a similar position statement the next day.

2 December: ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo requests an arrest warrant for Sudan’s Defence Minister Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, for crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed between August 2003 and March 2004 in Darfur. (During that time, he served as interior minister and special representative
of the president in Darfur.)

**12-13 December:** First Malawi and then Chad are referred by the ICC to the UNSC and the Assembly of State Parties to the ICC for allowing Bashir to visit their countries without taking action to apprehend him.

**20 December:** The Kenyan Court of Appeal declines Sudan’s request to suspend the ICC warrant against Bashir, prompting Sudan’s president to threaten sanctions and the expulsion of Kenya’s envoy to Sudan.

**18 December:** Bahr Abu Garda, LJM’s secretary-general, is appointed federal minister of health.

**21 December:** LJM field commanders are arrested in West Darfur.

**22-23 December:** JEM forces rally and begin moving east to Kordofan. JEM announces this is the beginning of regime change. JEM claims Government of Sudan (GoS) defectors join its ranks: the GoS denies this.

**22-24 December:** JEM’s leader Khalil Ibrahim is killed by an aerial bombardment during a battle in Wad Banda, North Kordofan. Tahir al Faki is appointed interim chairman. Other members of the SRF say they continue to stand with JEM and the armed struggle against the GoS.

**26 December:** Ten ministers and five commissioners are appointed as part of the DDPD. Four are chosen from the LJM, two had taken part in the Darfur Peace Agreement, and two came from civil society organizations. The two chosen from civil society are Amna Haroun (the first woman to hold a ministerial post in Darfur), and Muhammed Ali. Abdul Hamid Ahmed Amin, a civil society figure, is appointed Justice and Reconciliation Commissioner.

**28 December:** In response to Khalil Ibrahim’s death, JEM and NCP student groups clash at Sudan University, Khartoum, leading to a GoS crackdown and temporary closure of the university.

**29 December:** LJM vice chairman Moktar Abdelkareem and Ahmed Fadoul, another member of LJM’s senior leadership, are appointed state ministers of industry and cabinet affairs respectively.

**29 December:** The GoS lodges formal complaints at the UNSC and the AU PSC (the third since South Sudan became independent) against South Sudan for hosting the JEM: it alleges 350 combatants and 79 armored vehicles crossed from South Darfur state into Bahr al Ghazal, South Sudan, through the “Al Sarag and Sakara” crossing point, south of Ed Daein before finally settling in Tumsaha.

**30 December:** Chadian President Idriss Déby becomes engaged to the daughter of Musa Hilal, a prominent ‘janjaweed’ leader in Darfur.
2010

January: Government forces and militias attack JEM positions near the border with Chad.

9 February: Chadian president Idriss Déby visits Khartoum for talks with Bashir.

23 February: Squeezed by the rapprochement between N’Djaména and Khartoum, JEM moves its fighters out of Chad and into Darfur and signs a ‘framework agreement’ with Khartoum in Doha. The agreement has only two operative paragraphs—for a ceasefire and a prisoner release—but it sets an agenda for substantive talks, to include a permanent ceasefire, the future status of JEM combatants, compensation, and power-sharing at all levels of government. Qatar offers a sweetener: nearly USD 1 billion for development in Darfur. Darfur’s Arabs, especially, are unhappy over a second emerging deal with a Zaghawa-based movement.

3 March: JEM threatens to leave Doha if there are ‘multiple agreements’.

18 March: Disregarding JEM, the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) and the Sudanese government sign a framework agreement.

26 March: Khalil Ibrahim travels to Doha to demand the expulsion of the LJM. The state-run Sudan Media Centre accuses JEM of violating the ceasefire 23 times in one month.

April: The government intensifies its offensive against JEM, claiming it has moved out of four agreed locations. JEM scatters its forces. Fighting spreads.

2 May: JEM freezes its participation in Doha, citing ‘continuous aerial and ground assaults’.

8 May: Meeting in Addis Ababa, the Sudan Consultative Forum\(^1\) introduces a distinction between the peace process and the political process. The peace process is between the belligerents for a ceasefire and a political settlement; the political process is a wider initiative that would address all issues—including reconciliation and accountability. With Bassolé’s term due to expire in June, African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) chief Ibrahim Gambari wants an All Darfur Conference under UNAMID auspices, with a continuing strong Qatari role to guarantee development money for Darfur.

10 May: Justice Minister Abdel Basit Sabderat says the Sudanese government has asked Interpol to arrest Khalil Ibrahim to face 14 charges, including murder and waging war against the state.

15 May: Government forces occupy Jebel Moon, JEM’s stronghold in north-western Darfur. JEM claims it has already expanded into other parts of Darfur and Kordofan.
19 May: Khalil Ibrahim flies into Chad from Libya, aiming to travel overland to Darfur, but is detained at N’Djaména airport for 19 hours before being sent back to Libya. Sudan asks neighbouring states not to give him refuge. JEM and government forces fight in South Darfur, with heavy casualties on both sides.

25 May: In a letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, JEM says the government is seeking a military solution to the conflict. It alleges that the Doha process is only ‘for public relations business and image improvement’. Demanding radical reform of the Doha forum, JEM says it will not negotiate under ‘intimidation and menace’. Presidential adviser Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani, in charge of Darfur’s political file for the government, says Khartoum is ‘not concerned and not interested in the positions of the Justice and Equality Movement, especially as it has no real desire to negotiate for peace.’

27 May: JEM and SLA-AW clash with government forces around Deribat in eastern Jebel Marra. A JEM official says privately that ‘JEM will do whatever possible to keep Jebel Marra free or in hands other than the government and the “janjaweed”’.

30 May: Bassolé tells Khalil Ibrahim that UNAMID cannot fly him from Libya to Darfur without Khartoum’s permission. JEM makes its presence in Doha contingent upon its commanders’ ability to return to Darfur, where, by UN count, 440 people died in May in fighting between government forces and JEM. UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes says the humanitarian crisis in Darfur is hostage to the lack of progress in Doha.

5 June: President Bashir says that following the April elections, ‘the current Doha round will be the last for any armed group. There will be no legitimacy through the gun—only through the ballot box.’

6 June: Talks between the government and the LJM resume in Doha, after a two-month break for elections. The backdrop is not auspicious: the February 2009 ceasefire has collapsed—with fresh government offensives against JEM and SLA-AW in May causing the largest number of recorded violent fatalities in Darfur since the arrival of UNAMID in January 2008—and JEM is refusing further negotiation. Four smaller factions also boycott the round: the original SLA-Unity, Democratic JEM, the United Revolutionary Front Forces (URFF), and a group of commanders including Ali Haroun Dud, Abdalla Khalil, and Babiker Abdalla, who left SLA-AW—in part over Abdul Wahid’s rejection of negotiations. The commanders resent mediation pressure on them to join the LJM, which they consider an artificial creation that will not respond to the needs of Darfurians—and especially the Fur—and want to unite Fur dissidents under a separate umbrella. URFF leader Ibrahim al Zubaidi accuses the mediation of lacking neutrality.

14 June: Khalil Ibrahim says ‘Doha is over’ and warns that an agreement between the government and the LJM that excludes the two original movements, JEM and SLA-AW, will not bring peace. He cites the DPA as an example.

22 June: Government negotiators in Doha turn away delegates of the Heidelberg Committee—Darfur academics, activists, and civil society organizations brought
together in 2008 by the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg, Germany, in tandem with the Peace Institute of Khartoum University. The delegates had travelled to Doha, at the invitation of the mediation, to present proposals for peace drawn up in nearly three years of discussions. The proposals, strongly supported by the LJM, include reuniting the three states of Darfur as one administrative territory, creating ways to allow IDPs to return to their homes and be compensated—both individually and collectively—and expelling settlers from neighbouring countries. The Sudanese government spokesman in Doha, Omer Adam Rahman, claims the Heidelberg group is biased towards the armed movements. The LJM warns that rejection of the Heidelberg proposals will mean a return to war.

24 June: The government and the LJM begin talks on wealth sharing. The mediation’s timetable requires a number of protocols to be finalized by the end of July, despite the absence of the main movements and the breakdown of the ceasefire.

29 June: The government and movements meet with civil society representatives, for the first time, in the framework of discussions on compensation and the return of refugees and IDPs. The government bans leaders of Kalma IDP camp, one of the most militant in Darfur, from travelling to Doha. The LJM threatens to walk out.

30 June: Speaking in Port Sudan on the 21st anniversary of the coup that brought him to power, President Bashir says: ‘Whoever wants peace should go to Doha. Whoever wants something else will be taught a lesson they will never forget.’

5 July: The United States and British special envoys are absent from a meeting for international envoys called by UNAMID chief Ibrahim Gambari in al Fasher to review ‘the Darfur political process, including the way forward to help Darfurians and all the people of the Sudan achieve lasting peace’. The scheduling of the meeting so close to US Independence Day celebrations on 4 July, and only two weeks before special envoys meet in Khartoum under the auspices of the Consultative Forum, is widely criticized, with Mbeki suggesting a two-week postponement, which Gambari refuses. The divided and acrimonious international environment continues to contribute to the Darfurians’ lack of confidence in any mediation process.

8 July: Under military pressure in Jebel Marra, Abdul Wahid meets Qatari officials in Paris but reiterates his refusal to go to Doha until security is restored in Darfur. Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, who had reportedly been considering asking the rebel leader to leave France, says this marks an important step forward in the peace process. Others—including IDPs in their seventh year in camps—believe it is a sign of Abdul Wahid’s growing weakness.

12 July: The second civil society forum opens in Doha, overshadowed by new tensions within civil society that complicate a proposal to hold ‘broad-based and inclusive political consultations inside Darfur’ to provide ‘structured popular input into the Doha negotiations during June–August’. The consultations are necessary, the mediation says, to ‘give particular focus to those communities whose support of any agreements is critical for their durability, in particular newly elected officials, IDPs, and Arab communities’.
**15 July:** Civil society delegates, including IDP representatives, call for Darfur to be reorganized as a single administrative region. The chief government negotiator, Amin Hassan Omer, questions the delegates’ right to speak for Darfurians; delegates question the government’s commitment to peace and express concern over reports that it intends to launch a parallel initiative inside Darfur. They believe that any ‘domestic’ initiative will be subject to government manipulation, bribery, and coercion, and fear that Western nations seeking Khartoum’s cooperation in peaceful Southern secession after the referendum will be unwilling to exert pressure to rein in government abuses in Darfur. The talks adjourn until mid-September.

**26 July:** Bashir extends Atabani’s management of the Darfur file and announces a high-level ‘follow-up committee’ composed of the ministers of defence, interior, foreign affairs, finance, and media, Darfur’s three state governors (hardliners elected in the April 2010 elections, which were widely boycotted in Darfur), and a representative of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) headed by SLA-MM. The announcement heralds a more aggressive, hands-on approach to the Darfur problem. The committee is charged not only with crafting a new peacemaking strategy, but also with monitoring and assessing international media reports on Darfur ‘in order to counteract hostile reports’.

**27 July:** Clashes break out in Hamadiya camp, near Zalingei, between supporters of SLA-AW and the Ahmed Abdel Shafi faction that joined the Doha talks. Three Abdel Shafi supporters are killed and homes are burned. A number of Fur elders claim that Abdul Wahid ordered the killings from Paris. Ibrahim Gambari tells the UN Security Council about encouraging signs of a deal to end the conflict, with ‘civil society [...] now more involved in peace talks than ever, the Government of Sudan [...] demonstrating renewed commitment to negotiations, and the leaders of most armed opposition movements [...] either participating in or [...] expressing an interest in participating in the talks’.

**29 July:** The clashes spread to Kalma camp, which houses almost 100,000 of Darfur’s 2.7 million displaced, leaving 35 dead and displacing 25,000, according to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. South Darfur Governor Abdul Hamid Musa Kasha accuses SLA-AW loyalists of attacking Kalma with heavy and light arms to sabotage the Doha talks; SLA-AW accuses the government of infiltrating agents and weapons into the camp. UNAMID refuses to surrender six IDPs who sought refuge in a UNAMID police post, and local authorities respond by closing Kalma to international relief organizations. President Bashir says anyone attempting to block or hinder the work of the authorities will be expelled ‘the same day’.

The NCP approves a new ‘domestication’ strategy that emphasizes recovery and development (rather than a negotiated political agreement in Doha) and is premised on the assertion that ‘the war is over’. The reality in Darfur suggests otherwise. While violent death is much reduced in comparison to 2002–04, intra-Arab fighting took some 700 lives in the first half of the year. Ghazi Atabani lists his top priorities as security and development. Secondary priorities include justice, through national mechanisms; a shift from relief to development aid; and the conclusion of a peace agreement—to be signed before the end of the year with the movements in Doha and with other sectors of society in Darfur.
If Doha is neglected, ‘domestication’ risks making the movements into spoilers of any initiative—especially at a time when President Bashir, already risking the wrath of his powerful security services for giving Southerners the option of independence, may well be reluctant to offer new concessions to Darfurians. All the armed movements oppose the new strategy, which JEM calls a replay of the ‘peace from within’ policy implemented in the Nuba Mountains in the 1990s. That strategy sought to co-opt Nuba leaders and make them accomplices in their own oppression. It was accompanied, in the name of development, by the sale—to supporters of the regime—of large areas of land ‘cleansed’ of their original inhabitants.

4 August: President Bashir travels to Libya to defuse a diplomatic crisis caused by Col. Muammar Gaddafi’s refusal to expel Khalil Ibrahim. Reports circulating in Khartoum say Libya has rearmed JEM, with B-10 rifles, anti-aircraft guns, and AK-47s. The weapons are said to be stored at two locations—one close to Libya’s border with Chad and the other near Darfur. After two days of talks, Bashir says Gaddafi has pledged not to allow attacks on Sudan from Libyan territory.

9 August: South Darfur Governor Musa Kasha says the government will dismantle Kalma camp, a ‘military base and political platform’ for Abdul Wahid and ‘a hideout for criminals fleeing from justice’. Echoing the language of genocide used by Western activists, Abdul Wahid appeals to the international community to take a stand against this ‘Final Solution’.

23 August: Vice-President Ali Osman Taha announces USD 1.9 billion worth of recovery and development projects to support ‘domestication’. The projects include the completion of the Western Salvation Road linking Darfur to Khartoum, planned for the past two decades but bedeviled by conflict and corruption.

26 August: After meeting with Ghazi Atabani in Cairo, the AU, UNAMID, and the United States give unqualified support to Sudan’s new peace strategy. The Arab League follows five days later.

16 September: The Sudanese cabinet endorses the strategy, stressing the importance of collecting illegal arms and punishing law-breakers. Previous disarmament efforts have focused on non-Arabs.

8 October: Negotiations between the government and LJM resume in Doha, with the parties considering a draft agreement assembled by a third party (the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations). The deadline for agreement—19 October—recalls the failed ‘deadline diplomacy’ of the last days of Abuja. Bassolé meets with Abdul Wahid in Paris and Khalil Ibrahim in Libya, acknowledging that ‘without the participation of these movements beside the Sudanese government, LJM, and civil society, peace will remain fragile and unstable’.

19 October: With security and power-sharing issues resisting consensus, the first Doha deadline passes and is extended—by a week.

23 October: JEM announces it will send a delegation to meet Bassolé in Doha, but says it will return to the negotiating table only as part of a single ‘resistance’ group.
29 October: The Mbeki panel makes public a road map of its own for a ‘global political agreement’—a cessation of hostilities, rebel unity, and inclusive negotiations. The panel proposes a ‘hybrid’ court—envisaged as a chamber of the existing judicial system, hybridized through international staff—to bring to trial individuals with particular responsibility for the gravest crimes committed in Darfur. It supports the ICC as ‘a court of last resort’.

Ten factions in the Addis Ababa and Tripoli groups unite under the name Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) for the purposes of negotiation. (Their military commands, such as they are, remain separate.) They choose as leader Tijani Sese, a widely respected Fur politician and former governor of Darfur who has lived abroad for 20 years. The mediation hopes Sese will win Fur support for the peace process, especially in the IDP camps. JEM snubs him, saying he has no history in the rebellion.

Government troops and planes attack SLA-AW positions in Jebel Marra in the wake of heavy intra-rebel fighting as part of which SLA-AW seeks help both from JEM and government-backed militias.

6 November: Bassolé presents a plan to conclude Doha by 19 December at the Sudan Consultative Forum meeting in Addis Ababa. At the same time he predicts that ‘the fighting will continue’.

7 November: President Bashir holds talks with the joint mediators in Doha. The LJM says it will not compromise on the issue of a single region and demands a vice-presidency for Darfur.

11 November: Bassolé asks for another extension of the process—into 2011—apparently believing there is a chance of convincing JEM to approve a final document alongside the LJM.

13–14 November: As Khartoum accuses the Sudan People’s Liberation Army of aiding JEM and launches air raids across Darfur’s southern border, just inside South Sudan, a JEM delegation holds two days of talks with mediators in Doha. The delegation is headed, for the first time, by a non-Darfurian—Mohamed Bahr Hamadein, JEM’s deputy chairman and a member of the Missiriya tribe from Kordofan. The appointment shows the new interest JEM has in areas bordering Darfur as government troops target JEM fighters in Darfur.

1 December: Angry students shouting ‘Bassolé is a foreign agent’ stone mediators during a tour of Darfur.

3 December: The army declares SLA-MM a legitimate military target two weeks after a senior NCP official accuses Minawi of moving to Juba to seek Southern support for a new rebellion. An army spokesman says ‘a large portion of Minawi’s forces […] are moving towards the South’ with weapons and vehicles. The bank accounts of the TDRA, headed by Minawi, are frozen. One day later, Minawi cadres are arrested in al Fasher and Nyala, and vehicles seized in Khartoum. Two days later, Minawi is removed from the TDRA by presidential decree and replaced with West Darfur Governor Al-Sharati Gaffar Abdul Hakam widely accused of having mobilized
'janjaweed' in 2002–03.

10 December: Government forces attack Khor Abeche, 80 km south of Nyala. Minawi says the DPA is dead.

12 December: In a meeting in London, seven small factions announce another coalition—the Charter of Sudanese Alliance Resistance Forces in Darfur—with JEM. The seven groups are the United Revolutionary Forces Front; the Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Babiker Abdalla, who died in January 2011 after a long illness; a Libyan-supported LJM splinter led by Magoub Hussein; the United Resistance Front; the mainly Masalit Sudan Liberation Movement splinter led by Khamis Abaker; the Democratic Revolutionary Forces Front; and the Democratic Justice and Equality Movement of Idris Azraq, a splinter of JEM that has accused JEM of tribalism, nepotism, and corruption.

The alliance is seen as a Libyan-supported attempt to counter the LJM’s claim to represent a broad spread of Darfur opinion. With the exception of JEM, it has little military strength. It is not expected to have any political or military impact.

13 December: Dane Smith, a former US deputy chief of mission in Khartoum, is appointed to take the Darfur file for the US administration, working with Gration.

16 December: US National Security Council spokesman Mike Hammer says ‘the United States is deeply concerned about reports that the Sudanese Armed Forces attacked and burned’ Khor Abeche.

24 December: UN agencies say more than 18,000 people have been displaced in the new fighting and request urgent humanitarian assistance. An army spokesman accuses the rebels of having established a new base outside Darfur, in Bahr al Ghazal in South Sudan.

26 December: JEM meets mediators on the sidelines of the talks in Doha, returning to Doha for the first time in seven months.

29 December: Ghazi Atabani says Khartoum is withdrawing its delegation from Doha because ‘negotiating in the conventional manner’ is not helpful. JEM, which has boycotted most of the Doha process, calls the withdrawal ‘a declaration of war’.

30 December: The mediation hands the two parties proposals to end the deadlock, including over the administrative status of Darfur, participation in the institution of the presidency, compensation and justice. The package includes a regional authority and vice-presidency for Darfur. Khartoum rejects the proposals as being inconsistent with the constitution and the framework agreement signed in Doha.

31 December: Ghazi Atabani and his team leave Doha to prepare for a political process inside Darfur.
2009

**February:** The government and JEM sit down together, in Doha, for the first time since June 2007. On 17 February, they sign a goodwill agreement that combines a ceasefire with a commitment to exchange prisoners and facilitate the delivery of aid. The agreement stalls over the sequencing of the ceasefire and prisoner releases.

**15 March:** Libya, chair of the AU for the coming year, convinces five factions—SLA-Unity, SLA-Khamis Abaker, the United Resistance Front, Democratic JEM, and SLA-Juba—to join the Doha process.

**18 March:** US President Barack Obama names Scott Gration, a retired Air Force general, as his special envoy to Sudan. Reflecting concern over the lack of Fur representation in Doha, Gration prioritizes unifying Fur commanders, who are critical of SLA-AW and its refusal to negotiate until security is restored and the government-supported militias, popularly known as ‘janjaweed’, are disarmed.

**20 March:** JEM suspends talks with the government, citing Khartoum’s expulsion of 13 international relief agencies in response to the ICC’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for President Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

**June:** Mandate Darfur, a civil society conference planned by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation to draw up ‘an authoritative mandate’ for rebel negotiators, collapses when the government arrests the Darfur coordinator and threatens to charge with treason anyone attempting to attend the meeting in Addis Ababa.

**13 July:** JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim threatens to pull out of the Doha talks if mediators invite other insurgents.

**August:** Almost a dozen rebel factions coalesce into two groups—the ‘Addis Ababa Group’ (otherwise known as the ‘road map group’) formed by Gration, and the ‘Tripoli group’ formed by Libya. JEM dismisses most as ‘Internet groups’, insists that they join JEM if they want representation in Doha, and regrets that ‘some birds are trying to move away from the flock’. The talks stall.

**7 November:** The ‘Tripoli group’, renamed SLA-Revolutionary Forces, declines an invitation to Doha, prioritizing rebel unity. The Doha talks, due to begin on 16 November after an eight-month hiatus, are postponed indefinitely.

**6–19 November:** With other tracks stalled, civil society representatives are invited to Doha—for the first time since the peace process began in Abuja in 2004. JEM and SLA-AW condemn the meeting, alleging that most of the representatives are NCP sympathizers. The ‘Doha Declaration’ issued at the end of the meeting does not bear out this claim: it calls for an immediate ceasefire and negotiations; justice and an end to impunity; settlement of land disputes, including the return of all IDPs to their villages; and the evacuation of settlers. Follow-up talks with civil society and the armed movements are scheduled for January 2010. JEM rejects them.
26 December: Sudan and Chad agree to enforce border controls on each other’s armed opposition movements. Within days, Darfur-based Chadian rebels move back from the border.

2008

30 June: Ending the experiment in joint mediation, Djibril Bassolé of Burkina Faso is appointed chief mediator for the peace process, representing both the AU and UN.

21 July: The AU Peace and Security Council authorizes a High-Level Panel on Darfur—since October 2009, the AU High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, or AUHIP—headed by former South African president Thabo Mbeki, to focus on peace, reconciliation, and justice.

9 September: A League of Arab States resolution proposes that Qatar should host new peace talks. The UN acquiesces, needing a sponsor for the talks, and Bassolé begins working alongside Qatar’s minister for foreign affairs, Sheikh Ahmed bin Abdalla al-Mahmoud.

16 October: With the International Criminal Court (ICC) demanding that President Omar al Bashir stand trial for genocide, the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) organizes the Sudan People’s Initiative to provide ‘national’ solutions to the Darfur conflict. The conference, in Khartoum, is attended by most main political parties and, unusually, civil society, but internally displaced persons (IDPs) are not represented. The government agrees to incorporate the movements’ demands for compensation and a single Darfur region into its negotiating position at future talks. But the initiative stalls as efforts to defer the prosecution of the president fail, and the mediation and Western nations show no interest.

10 November: Chad and Sudan restore diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors.

2007

8 June: The mediators announce a three-phase ‘road map’ that consists of aligning regional initiatives; uniting the rebel movements; and holding new talks. In July, Chad, Eritrea, and Libya agree to coordinate with the ‘hybrid’ mediation and phase one is declared a success. But SLA-AW stays away from a meeting of the armed movements in Arusha, Tanzania, in early August and talks between the movements and the government in Sirte, Libya, in October are boycotted by the three most significant movements—SLA-AW, JEM, and SLA-Unity. The hybrid mission ends in failure: it does not create a genuine consensus among neighbouring states, does not bring all the armed movements on board, and does not restrain the parties on the battlefield.

2006

5 May: The predominantly Zaghawa Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) and the Sudanese government sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in...
Abuja; SLA-Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur (SLA-AW) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) do not. Limited support for the agreement and a failure to sell (or even explain) it to civil society, Darfur’s Arabs, and the masses in the displaced camps, plus scant attention to implementation as insecurity deepens, condemn it to irrelevance. A decision to seek wider support by allowing splinter groups to sign Declarations of Commitment backfires, encouraging factional splits and divide-and-rule tactics. In September, United Nations (UN) special envoy Jan Pronk told the UN Security Council: ‘In hindsight, maybe we should have taken more time. Not to get a better agreement, but in order to bring on board all parties.’

30 June: Non-signatories, including JEM, form the National Redemption Front in Eritrea, creating a military alliance that inflicts a number of crushing defeats on the army before it breaks apart at year-end.

16 November: The African Union (AU) and UN decide to ‘re-energize’ the peace process by organizing talks between the government and non-signatories. Tanzania’s Salim Ahmed Salim, chief mediator in Abuja, and Jan Eliasson, a former Swedish foreign minister, are appointed joint mediators for the AU and UN, respectively.

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NOTES

1 Co-chaired by the African Union (AU) and the UN, the forum brings together Sudan, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development, the League of Arab States, AU partners, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the European Union, and other relevant bilateral partners to support implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the North–South war.
