



Commercial actors in the Sudanese Armed Forces' supply chains

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Since 2005, when the UN Security Council first imposed an arms embargo and a prohibition of military overflights on the region of Darfur, both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Darfur rebel groups have continued to move weapons into Darfur from other parts of Sudan, largely without impediment, as described in detail in HSBA Issue Briefs in 2012 and 2016.¹ SAF has also continued the regular resupply of ground-attack aircraft, Antonov transport aircraft, and attack helicopters in Darfur. The UN Panel of Experts on Sudan has reported publicly on the appearance of previously unseen SAF Mi-24/35 helicopter gunships and Su-25 attack aircraft in Darfur in every year since 2006, and on their use in violation of the prohibition on offensive military overflights and aerial attacks.²

With the UN Security Council unable or unwilling to enforce restrictions on SAF's domestic supply chain within the territory of Sudan itself, UN Security Council Resolution 2091 of 2013 and subsequent Sudan resolutions have cautiously expanded the focus of the sanctions regime to foreign entities that provide technology, training, components, dual-use items, and logistics to the Government of Sudan. These resolutions 'urge all States to be mindful of [the] risk' that:

- 'the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Sudan of technical assistance and support, including training, financial or other assistance and the provision of spare parts, weapons systems and related materiel, could be used by the Government of Sudan to support military aircraft being used in violation of resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005)'; and that
- 'certain items continue to be converted for military purposes and transferred to Darfur'.³

This language points to two key transnational equipment supply chains: one sustains SAF's **aircraft**, the other its **ground vehicles**. Both include purely military and dual-use items, and both, in part, sustain SAF's acquisition and maintenance of equipment it deploys in violation of the Darfur sanctions.⁴

¹ HSBA (2012; 2016).

² UNSC (2006, para. 87; 2007, paras. 87–91; 2008, para. 86; 2009, paras. 190–91; 2011, paras. 86–90; 2013a, paras. 69–72; 2014a, para. 85, annexe X; 2015a, paras. 106–11). The Panel's 2016 report has not yet been published, but is understood to contain similar allegations.

³ UNSC (2013b, paras. 2, 9; 2014b, paras. 5, 7; 2015b, paras. 6, 9; 2016, paras. 6, 9).

⁴ AI (2012); HSBA (2012).



As a supplement to the HSBA's latest Issue Brief on the Darfur arms embargo,⁵ this document presents additional information on commercial entities—some associated with states and some purely private—that have provided goods or services within these two supply chains. It draws on research by the HSBA, Conflict Armament Research, and the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan.

There is no suggestion that any of the companies or entities mentioned in this paper have themselves violated the Darfur arms embargo or other sanctions, or acted at all unlawfully. The above-mentioned 'mindfulness' language of Resolutions 2091 and 2138—a considerably weakened version of the Panel of Experts' 2013 recommendations to disrupt the supply chain for sanctions-violating weapons platforms⁶—does not impose specific obligations on commercial entities, nor does it require states to place concrete restrictions on commercial entities' activities.⁷

SAF's air warfare supply chain

Acting outside Darfur to facilitate the procurement and maintenance of the military aircraft that SAF subsequently deploys in Darfur is discouraged by Resolution 2091 and subsequent resolutions, but not explicitly prohibited—although the deployment of those aircraft into Darfur may violate contractual end-user assurances that several suppliers impose on Sudan. Such facilitation is undertaken at three levels:

- at Eastern European aircraft plants—particularly at **Repair Plant 410 at Zhulyany (Ukraine)**, where Antonov aircraft acquired by SAF have been reconditioned and overhauled,⁸ and in **St. Petersburg (Russian Federation)**, where a number of SAF's Mil military helicopters have been reconditioned;⁹
- at Sudanese aircraft plants in and around Khartoum, particularly the state-run **Safat** plant at Wadi Seyyidna near Omdurman, where SAF Antonovs, Mi-8/17 transport aircraft, Su-25 ground attack aircraft, and Mi-24 attack helicopters, including those deployed in Darfur, are regularly overhauled;¹⁰ and
- at SAF's Darfur forward operating bases at Al Fasher, Al Geneina, and Nyala, where refuelling and some maintenance take place.¹¹

⁵ HSBA (2016).

⁶ For the Panel's much stronger recommendations, see UNSC (2013a, paras. 195b–c; 2014a, paras. 242a–b).

⁷ The HSBA has written to all the companies named in this document to request their response to the information provided herein (correspondence dated 24 June 2012 and 13 April 2016). At the time of writing, no responses had been received.

⁸ Photographs of Antonov-26s with serial numbers 12606, 13307, and 13405, taken in 2009–10, on file; aircraft spotter records and photographs of Antonov-32s with serial numbers 2803 and 2805, taken in 2013, on file.

⁹ Photographs taken in St. Petersburg in 2012, on file.

¹⁰ UNSC (2014a, para. 118).

¹¹ HSBA (2012); UNSC (2014a).



At each stage procurement and maintenance are facilitated—entirely lawfully—by a penumbra of non-Sudanese commercial actors:

- Safat is supported by the **Novosibirsk Aircraft Repair Plant (NARP)**, based in the **Russian Federation**. Since 2008, the Russian aircraft maintenance certification authority has licensed NARP to maintain a range of Mil-manufactured Russian transport helicopters in Khartoum, and NARP’s engineers work at Safat itself.¹²
- A **Greek- and Panamanian-**registered aircraft broker operated by **Ukrainian** nationals,¹³ **Asterias Commercial**, has been involved in the supply of at least two of the Antonov-26 aircraft that SAF has deployed in Darfur since 2010.¹⁴ These two An-26 aircraft, as well as one further An-26 deployed by SAF in South Darfur during 2013 (tail number 7717),¹⁵ were themselves obtained from surplus **Romanian** air force stock.¹⁶
- Other military aircraft that SAF has deployed in Darfur, including MiG-29 fighter aircraft and Mi-24 attack helicopters, were transported to Khartoum from at least July 2004 and as late as June 2011 by **Volga-Dnepr**, the world’s leading operator of the giant An-124 (‘Ruslan’), the largest cargo aircraft in commercial use.¹⁷

The ‘mindfulness’ language introduced by Resolution 2091 does not appear to have significantly altered the involvement of these commercial or state actors in the supply chain, nor their due diligence regarding support for air assets known to have been used in Darfur. In March 2014, for instance, the 410 Plant at Zhulyany, Ukraine, once again overhauled an Antonov-32B that had operated for SAF in Darfur and elsewhere between 2008 and 2011, and that displayed a Sudanese Air Force tail number (7710). Although the aircraft carried a civilian registration during its overhaul, its military tail number had been re-applied by the time it returned to Dongola, Sudan, in August 2014; it continued to operate for the Sudanese Air Force during that year.¹⁸ In May 2014, despite extensive prior reporting by the UN Panel that Safat was the key overhaul location for Sudanese military aircraft that were violating the Darfur embargo and overflight ban, Safat announced that it had signed a memorandum of

¹² HSBA (2012).

¹³ Company director records and accounts from Greek and Panamanian company registries, on file.

¹⁴ Gramizzi, Lewis, and Tubiana (2012).

¹⁵ Photographs taken in Al Fasher, on file; aircraft spotter record from Nyala.

¹⁶ Aircraft spotter records, 2004–13.

¹⁷ Screenshots from Russian Vesti television showing SAF MiG-29 fighter aircraft being loaded onto Volga-Dnepr An-124 aircraft at the Likhovitsy airport, Moscow oblast, in July 2004 (MiG-29 aircraft number 612 operated in South Darfur during December 2011; photograph from a confidential source, on file); photographs of delivery of SAF Mi-24 attack helicopters numbers 949, 950, and 951 to Khartoum Airport, on 11 July 2011, from a confidential source, on file; flight records for Volga-Dnepr flights VDA6890 and VDA6891, 10–11 July 2011, from a confidential source, on file. Mi-24 number 950 was stationed in South Darfur in August 2013.

¹⁸ Aircraft spotter records, 2008–14.



understanding with Volga-Dnepr's subsidiary based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Volga-Dnepr Gulf, to start aircraft maintenance at Safat.¹⁹

The continued involvement of these commercial and state actors in the SAF supply chain can be attributed in part to the challenges of demonstrating incontrovertibly that the military aircraft regularly supplied to SAF along this supply chain since 2005 have been moved into Darfur, thereby proving that their end-use conditions—and the UN embargo—have been violated. Since the Sudanese government does not permit the UN embargo monitors to inspect SAF's attack helicopters and ground attack aircraft in Darfur in order to identify their unique, unchanging serial numbers, documenting embargo violations rests upon observing attack aircraft with previously unseen, sequentially increasing tail numbers in Darfur (see Figure 1). Meanwhile, the Sudanese government and its suppliers are able to deny such embargo violations in part by claiming that the tail numbers of helicopters already present in Darfur are changed regularly.²⁰

In at least one case documented by the HSBA, however, photographs and eyewitnesses in the Russian Federation, Khartoum, and Darfur make it possible to illustrate this supply chain all the way from export to Darfur deployment, and thus to confirm the violation of the embargo. Three Mi-24s with Sudanese Air Force insignia and tail numbers 949, 950, and 951 were photographed during May 2011 at Pulkovo Airport in St. Petersburg, with one of their serial numbers visible.²¹ On 12 June 2011 in Khartoum, the three helicopters were photographed being offloaded from a Volga-Dnepr An-124 aircraft,²² which had most likely undertaken the Volga-Dnepr flight from Pulkovo to Khartoum (flight number VDA6890) on 11 June 2011.²³ Less than two months after this delivery to Khartoum, the Mi-24 with tail number 949 was deployed in fighting around al Ithemir in South Kordofan, where it crashed. Its serial number was identifiable from the wreckage, confirming that it was indeed the same helicopter number 949 shipped to Sudan in June 2011 (see Photos 1 and 2).²⁴ Both 950 and 951, moreover, were sighted in Darfur between May 2012 and December 2013.²⁵ Unlike the serial number of tail number 949 in South Kordofan, those of these two helicopters could not be physically verified, but their markings and camouflage paint scheme matched precisely the helicopters photographed in Pulkovo and Khartoum.

¹⁹ Safat (2014). The HSBA wrote to Volga-Dnepr to ask for its comments on this reported memorandum of understanding. At the time of writing, no response had been received.

²⁰ UNSC (2014a, para. 102).

²¹ Photographs obtained from a confidential source, 2012, on file. Serial numbers 3532434116248 (SAF tail number 949) and 3532432521421 (SAF tail number 951) are visible on the port-side pylon of each aircraft.

²² Photographs obtained from a confidential source, 2012, on file.

²³ Flight records from a confidential source, 2012, on file.

²⁴ Photographs taken in 2012, on file.

²⁵ UNSC (2013b, para. 70; 2014a, para. 85).



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Photos 1 and 2 Sudanese Air Force Mi-24/35 number 949 (serial number 3532434116248) at the crash site near al Ihemir, South Kordofan state, on 2 August 2011. © Confidential





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Figure 1 Observed SAF air fleet in Darfur, January 2007–February 2016

Aircraft	Tail number	Year observed									
		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
An-26	7705		Orange								
	7706				Orange	Red		Red	Red		
	7715				Orange	Red		Red			
	7717							Orange			
	7718							Orange			
	7719							Orange			
	7766								Orange		
	7777		Orange				Red				
Fantan A5	402					Grey					
	403			Grey		Black					
	404	Grey	Black								
	406		Grey								
	407					Grey					
	410	Grey									
	482	Grey	Black		Black						
	537			Grey		Black					
	543					Grey			Black		
	544							Grey	Black		
	546							Grey	Black		
Mi-24	912	Light Blue									Dark Blue
	913	Light Blue									
	916			Light Blue							
	923			Light Blue							
	925				Dark Blue						
	926			Light Blue							
	928				Light Blue	Dark Blue					
	929			Light Blue	Dark Blue						
	932	Light Blue									
	933				Light Blue		Dark Blue				
	937			Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue		Dark Blue			
	938			Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue		Dark Blue			
	939				Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue				
	940						Light Blue				
	941			Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue					
942			Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue						



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Aircraft	Tail number	Year observed												
		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016			
Mi-24 (cont.)	943													
	944													
	945													
	946													
	947													
	948													
	950													
	951													
	952													
	955													
	956													
	965													
	995													
	996													
MiG-29	612													
Su-25	201													
	203													
	204													
	205													
	206													
	207													
	208													
	209													
	210													
	211													
	212													
	214													
	215													

Notes: This table includes only military aircraft that displayed unambiguously military (numeric) tail numbers. An-26 aircraft are included because they are used as rudimentary bombers. The table does not include Antonov and Ilyushin transport aircraft that have civil registrations and sometimes operate under military call signs for the Sudanese Ministry of Defence in Darfur.

Lighter-shaded boxes mark the first year in which a particular aircraft was documented in Darfur, indicating a likely embargo violation. The table cannot show whether a single aircraft was cycled into and out of Darfur, which would constitute an additional embargo violation. Nor does the table include the UN Panel of Experts' observations for the year 2015, whose publication remained blocked by members of the UN Security Council's Sudan Sanctions Committee at the time of writing.

Sources: Dutch Aviation Society (n.d.); Gramizzi, Lewis, Tubiana (2012); UNSC (2008; 2009; 2011; 2013a; 2014a; 2015a); photographs from a confidential source, taken in December 2012, on file



SAF's vehicle supply chain

Like the commercial actors in SAF's international aircraft supply chain, those in its vehicle procurement network also operate on three levels:

- manufacturers and dealers are based in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East;
- state-linked procurement companies and factories, such as the various manufacturing entities of the **Military Industry Corporation (MIC)** and the **Giad Industrial Group**, based in and around Khartoum, procure military vehicles; and
- transfers are primarily carried out by air to Al Fasher, Al Geneina, and Nyala, from where vehicles are distributed to SAF and allied forces.

MIC and Giad are the central agencies of Sudan's military equipment programmes. Vehicles and other equipment documented in Darfur in contravention of the embargo have been consistently traced back to overseas procurement and domestic production undertaken by these two entities.²⁶ MIC-manufactured and -assembled equipment displayed at international arms exhibitions indicates that MIC continues to have access to civilian and military components from a wide circle of commercial suppliers in China, Germany, Greece, Iran, Oman, the Russian Federation, South Korea, and the United States. One example is a South Korean truck chassis manufactured in 2012.²⁷

In recent years, a number of other companies have also appeared as consignees and recipients for equipment procured for SAF, possibly in response to the US decision to impose sanctions on Giad and MIC in 2007.²⁸ This proliferation of procurement companies complicates end-user due diligence, particularly for exporters of dual-use goods such as vehicles, as the following cases demonstrate.²⁹

- MAN 4x4 trucks used by SAF in South Kordofan in 2012—and also documented in 2014 by Conflict Armament Research with Séléka forces in Bangui, Central African Republic (having been supplied by Sudan)—had been exported by a Dutch vehicle exporter in 2010–11. They were consigned to **Concept Development Co. Ltd**, a company giving its address as 'Arkweet, Africa Str, Villa No. 3, Block 46, Khartoum'.³⁰ Giad Investment Services Co Ltd, a subsidiary of Giad Industrial Group, uses the same address.³¹ Concept Development Co. Ltd paid for the trucks from its

²⁶ HSBA (2014); Lewis (2009).

²⁷ HSBA (2015).

²⁸ USDoT (2007).

²⁹ Evidence suggests that new weapons-production companies related to MIC are emerging. Specifically, MIC displayed copies of Chinese CQ 5.56 x 45 mm rifles, which HSBA researchers first documented in South Sudan in 2012, at the IDEX defence exhibition in 2013. The rifles were stamped with 'Made in Sudan', alongside the logo and name of a previously unknown company, **Delta Tech Center**. Photograph on file.

³⁰ Small Arms Survey correspondence with the Government of the Netherlands, 13 July 2012; Conflict Armament Research (2015); Gramizzi and Tubiana (2013).

³¹ Contact list of Sudanese transporters, on file.



account at the Omdurman National Bank in Khartoum.³²

- Armoured vehicles used in fighting against the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) during 2013 had been shipped from a large international armoured vehicle manufacturer in a Gulf state to the Sudanese police in 2012.³³ The ‘customer inspection’ of the goods at the production factory, however, was carried out not by the Sudanese police or another Sudanese government agency directly, but by a UAE-registered company, **Qaderah Trading LLC**.³⁴ It is not known whether this company is related to **Kadera Company for Trade Services**, whose representative the UN Panel previously found sat alongside members of the Sudanese Air Force and Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) on the board of directors of Green Flag Aviation Services Ltd, a Sudanese air cargo company part-owned by the Sudanese CAA whose aircraft operate routinely for SAF in Darfur.³⁵ On arrival in Sudan, these vehicles were consigned, according to shipping documents, to **Al Mashariq Trading**.³⁶

The vehicles used by SAF in Darfur—and correspondingly, after capture, by Darfur rebel groups—are often dual-use items such as 4x4 trucks and Toyota Land Cruiser and Hilux vehicles, which are available from hundreds of distributors and suppliers throughout the world. In practice, however, their supply chains appear to be relatively focused. All of the Toyota Land Cruiser and Hilux vehicles that HSBA researchers documented in use by SAF, JEM, the Sudan Liberation Army–Minni Minawi (SLA–MM), and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N) during 2011–12 were originally shipped from Toyota manufacturing plants in Japan to **two Toyota distributors** in the **UAE** and **Oman**, just 12 to 20 months before their documentation in the field.³⁷

This finding mirrors those of UN Panel investigations dating as far back as 2009: Toyota vehicles that the Panel documented in use by combatants in Darfur were overwhelmingly either originally sold by the same **UAE distributor**, or by second-hand dealers.³⁸ The UAE distributor has stated that it sells Toyota vehicles exclusively to other UAE distributors and thus does not require end-user information from its customers for the purposes of due diligence.³⁹ While there is no suggestion that this or the other overseas distributors mentioned above knowingly sold Toyotas directly to SAF or its enemies, or acted in any way

³² Small Arms Survey correspondence with the Government of the Netherlands, 13 July 2012.

³³ Documents and commercial correspondence from confidential sources, on file.

³⁴ Document from a confidential source, on file.

³⁵ UNSC (2008, para. 75).

³⁶ There is no evidence that this company is related to the Saudi company of the same name.

³⁷ Small Arms Survey correspondence with Toyota Motor Company, 14 September 2012. The company responded to questions regarding the distribution of Toyota vehicles that were observed in use by SAF, the SLA–MM, and the SPLM–N, as documented by HSBA researchers in 2011 and 2012. A list of these distributors is available on request.

³⁸ UNSC (2009, para. 158).

³⁹ Interview with the head of compliance for the UAE distributor, Dubai, August 2014.



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unlawfully, this research shows that a small number of commercial dealerships remain central to the supply chain of 4x4 vehicles to all sides of the Darfur conflict.

The MAN truck example above serves to illustrate how supply-chain due diligence might enhance the enforcement of embargo measures. SAF has long used 4x4 and 6x6 trucks manufactured by MAN Group in Germany, which Giad previously assembled from knocked-down kits. In May 2007, Giad was placed on the US sanctions list and MAN Group decided to stop the supply of kits and parts to Giad, following controversy surrounding the use of MAN trucks in Darfur.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, MAN trucks clearly continued to be militarily important for SAF, perhaps because their mechanics and drivers are familiar with them, or because they have access to spare parts. SAF continued to purchase ex-German military MAN trucks via a related company in Khartoum, which had sourced them from a Dutch vehicle dealer.⁴¹ Due to differences in the interpretation of the EU common military list, these trucks required a licence for export from Germany to Sudan, but not from Germany to the Netherlands or from the Netherlands to Sudan. In mid-2015, after some publicity, the German and Dutch governments acted to require export licences for all such truck exports to Sudan; shortly thereafter, a consignment of trucks due to be exported to Sudan was reportedly blocked at Amsterdam's port.⁴²

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⁴⁰ UNSC (2009, paras. 165–69).

⁴¹ For full details, see HSBA (2016).

⁴² For full details, see HSBA (2016).



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