The following is an outcome statement from a workshop held in Juba, Southern Sudan, on 25-26 June 2009, entitled ‘Southern Sudan and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR): Adopting an integrated approach to stabilization.’ The workshop was organized by the Small Arms Survey and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) in consultation with the Southern Sudan DDR Commission. It was officially opened by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) Chief of Staff, Lt. General James Hoth Mai, and attended by representatives from the Southern Sudan DDR Commission, SPLA, Ministry of SPLA Affairs, Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC), the Community Security and Small Arms Control Bureau (CSSAC), as well as representatives of the Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue, the University of Addis Ababa, UN DDR Unit, UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), UN Development Programme (UNDP), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS)/SPLA international advisories, and donor institutions.\(^1\) The primary objectives of the workshop were to discuss the feasibility of DDR as it is being planned and to explore linkages between DDR and other post-conflict stabilization measures in Southern Sudan.
**Preamble**

In the wake of a rapidly deteriorating security environment, this document issues an urgent call for an enhanced focus on community security promotion by the GoSS and the international community. Highlighting the character and severity of external and internal threats confronting Southern Sudanese authorities and communities, the document contains a range of policy considerations and practical entry-points for the GoSS and international partners.

The worsening security environment in Southern Sudan is due to a combination of external and internal factors. In line with the security arrangements in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and against a backdrop of persistent mistrust and repeated violations of the ceasefire, high military spending, and a global financial crisis and fluctuating oil prices, the GoSS has redeployed troops, equipment and munitions to strategic areas as part of efforts to combat ‘external’ threats.

Meanwhile, internally, there is evidence of a large number of inter- and intra-communal clashes amongst tribal groups and clans that are threatening to worsen. Alarmingly, the nature of these conflicts appears to have changed with the civilian population, including women and children, now being targeted. While some of these tensions can be linked to external challenges, most appear to reflect systemic grievances ‘at home’. A major concern preoccupying the GoSS and core security institutions is the abundance of small arms and light weapons in civilian hands, and the willingness of various groups—including unaligned armed groups, competing ethnic groups, criminals, and civilians—to use them.

**Conventional security promotion in Southern Sudan**

Building on demonstrated political will from the GoSS and its security institutions and with support from the international community, a combination of efforts have been undertaken since the signing of the CPA in 2005 to encourage a rapid improvement in security. Many of these efforts flow directly from the peace agreement and, while undertaken by government authorities, are supported by the UNMIS, UNDP, and a host of donor agencies and NGOs. These important efforts are being implemented in a volatile political climate that can be described as akin to ongoing ‘conflict management’ rather than ‘post-conflict stabilization’. There is, therefore, a need for increased alignment and coordination between the various actors, including those within the GoSS, as well as an expansion of programmes.

With support from UNMIS, UNDP, NGOs, donors, and private advisories, the GoSS/SPLA have embarked on a combination of DDR and broad security sector transformation\(^1\) since 2005. Focusing predominantly on erstwhile SPLA combatants, the Interim DDR Programme and subsequent Multi-Year DDR Programme were developed to ‘right size’ the SPLA and reduce military expenditures. The current DDR initiative emphasizes an individual (as opposed to collective) approach to disarmament and demobilization, utilizing a

\(^{1}\) It is important to note that the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Inspector General of Police were unable to attend the workshop. This outcome document, therefore, may not reflect their views.

\(^{2}\) See, for example, the 2008 SPLA White Paper on Defence, 2009 Southern Sudan Security Strategy, and the 2009 SPLA Act.
host of reinsertion and reintegration incentives. While the programme targets 90,000 ex-combatants in the South, the GoSS/SPLA are focusing primarily on 35,000 Phase 1 candidates in the interim period ahead of the 2011 referendum, largely comprising ‘special needs groups’ (SNGs). Disarmament and demobilization was initiated in the Three Areas in February 2009 and in Southern Sudan on 10 June 2009 although questions remain over the extent to which reintegration as currently conceived is appropriately targeted, sufficient and sustainable. Concerns also persist over the lack of available funding for Phase 1 candidates.

Second, UNDP, donors, NGOs, and a number of other partners are supporting the GoSS to develop its capacity to undertake community security programming. From 2008 onwards, the government formed the CSSAC Bureau (currently under the Ministry of Internal Affairs) with a mandate to coordinate the development of small arms control policy, law, and strategy, as well as to formulate holistic approaches to addressing community insecurity. A range of international partners has invested in supporting a community security approach, which is a cross-cutting issue affecting broad peace-building, conflict mitigation, governance, the rule of law, and the security sector. Relevant GoSS actors including the Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC), the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA)/Peace and Reconciliation Committee and various ministries and law enforcement agencies have yet to become involved.

Third, the GoSS and SPLA have alternated between ad hoc coercive and ‘voluntary’ disarmament campaigns in the post-CPA environment. A key priority of the Southern government is to secure a monopoly over the use of force and to ensure that lingering threats (including non-aligned armed groups) are brought under control. In an effort to ensure security in key strategic areas of Southern Sudan, the SPLA has periodically opted for militaristic cordon and search initiatives, some of which have generated high military and civilian casualties. Facing a host of political, capacity, and budgetary constraints, such activities are seldom followed-up with legitimate security guarantees (e.g. buffer zones, SPLA or police protection). As a result, disarmed communities are routinely attacked by neighbouring ethnic groups. While there have been a wide variety of peace processes that have sought solutions to these conflicts, follow-up and execution has been lacking. At present, there appears to be a growing consensus within political and military establishments, and among civilians themselves, that coercive disarmament may be the only ‘solution’ to stability. There are enormous risks attached to the process of civilian disarmament, as well as concerns over its sustainability in the absence of protection from the state. Furthermore, there is a profound lack of trust between the GoSS and law enforcement agencies on the one hand, and local communities on the other, which seriously undermines the prospects for civilian disarmament—whether ‘voluntary’ or forcible.

3 The parties to the North–South conflict engaged in post-CPA negotiations and agreed to demobilize a total of 180,000 combatants—90,000 each in the North and South.
4 According to the SSDDRC, disabled veterans, women and children associated with armed forces and groups, and elderly people fall under this category.
5 As of the end of May 2009, 3,180 candidates (SAF and SPLA) had been demobilized in Damazin, Blue Nile State, and 562 in Kadugli, Southern Kordofan State.
6 Discussions are ongoing between the GoSS and donors on the use of USD 40 million from the Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund for reintegration activities.
7 The CSSAC Bureau is primarily a technical body. The responsibility for implementation lies with the relevant ministries, law enforcement agencies, and the State and local government authorities.
Policy Considerations

The following policy considerations emerged from a series of presentations delivered at the workshop and subsequent discussions.  

**DDR programme policy considerations**

1. It is essential that donors fulfil their pledges on DDR quickly to sustain momentum in Southern Sudan during the interim period. It is equally important that new donors make pledges to ensure the successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of 35,000 Phase 1 candidates.

2. Funding should have a specific focus on sustainable reintegration, since there is a grave security risk attached to proceeding with disarmament and demobilization without adequate funding for reintegration.

3. It is important for the GoSS to map out the security risks attached to DDR mismanagement/unsustainable DDR and the different groups being targeted. At a minimum, there is a need to understand the impact of DDR on existing tensions and conflicts as well as future levels of community security—understood in these policy considerations as a desired end state of safety and security for individuals and communities—as well as on nascent civil security institutions such as the police and courts (customary as well as official), and to ensure that it does not undermine them.

4. Sustainable DDR will require sensitization and awareness-raising among members of the SPLA, ex-combatants and host communities to avoid misunderstandings and false expectations. There is an urgent need for a scaled-up information and outreach programme to manage inflated expectations of the programme, which currently threaten to jeopardize its success.

5. All candidates for DDR within the South must be treated equitably (with regard to benefits and transparent criteria for the selection of candidates) to minimize DDR-related grievances and security risks.

6. During the pilot phase of DDR, it is important that the numbers of candidates are not chosen arbitrarily. All pre-registered candidates in a given area should be demobilized together to minimize potential grievances.

7. It is important for the GoSS/SPLA to begin to engage in contingency planning for DDR in the post-2011 period.

8. SPLA reforms with regard to management of budgets, human resources, pay-scales, and ranking will be critical to ensure sustainable DDR.

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8 The following policy considerations, drafted by the Small Arms Survey, stem from discussions during the workshop and subsequent written feedback from participants to the Survey. The intention is to reflect some of the main concerns outlined in the presentations and discussed at the workshop, while acknowledging that the document is not comprehensive, was finalized after the workshop, and does not reflect views from several GoSS ministries and commissions which were not present at the workshop.
9. Support for DDR candidates (in the form of sustained counseling, advice and follow-up) needs to be available long-term at a local (county and payam) level. A more comprehensive Information Counseling and Referral Service—also needed at local level—than is currently planned should also be considered to meet the extensive needs of ex-combatants.

10. All DDR decision-making needs to consider the fast-changing political and security realities in Southern Sudan in order to ensure that those concerns are addressed in programme design and implementation.

11. It would be beneficial for the GoSS and SPLA to demonstrate to donors and other partners how DDR supports SPLA transformation, specifically in relation to down-sizing and defence spending.

12. Verification of weapons collected as part of DDR is important to ensure transparency on the fate of collected weapons.

13. It is important for the GoSS to develop a coordinated economic strategy for Southern Sudan under which reintegration programmes can fit.

14. Community participation in DDR is crucial at all stages to ensure that DDR has positive benefits for community security as well as economic recovery.

15. The DDR programme, especially reintegration, is an unprecedented opportunity being provided by the GoSS and the international community. While the GoSS and SSDDRC will assist and launch the process, however, the responsibility also lies with each demobilized individual to make the most of the reintegration opportunities on offer.

**General policy considerations**

16. Implementation of the CPA will determine the level of success, or failure, of DDR and other components of security sector reforms. Likewise, key security sector reform documents such as the 2008 Defence White Paper and the 2009 SPLA Act are only as good as their level of implementation.

17. Successful security sector reform and DDR will, in turn, determine the level of community security in Southern Sudan.

18. The GoSS should consider placing the concept of community security at the centre of its decision-making on security, by making it central to how it conceives, manages, and responds to both external and internal threats. This would entail shifting community security from a ‘project’ focus to mainstreaming it into all of its security planning and programming. Towards this end, there is a need for the GoSS and international partners to rapidly scale-up community security interventions and for enhanced cooperation, coordination, and communication between all of the actors involved, including the Office of the First Vice-President of Sudan/President of the Government of Southern Sudan, Office of the Vice-President of the Government of Southern Sudan, the CSSAC Bureau, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the SSPC, SSLA, police and law enforcement institutions, and the SPLA.

19. Development and implementation of an overarching community-security focused security policy and legal framework would assist the GoSS to provide stability and protection to its people, extend its own legitimacy, and provide an enabling environment for sustainable reintegration, economic recovery and development.
20. As part of the above, the GoSS needs to accelerate the transformation of the Southern Sudan Police Service—including by dramatically scaling-up police capacities and promoting respect for the rule of law and human rights—as well as related security and justice institutions (e.g. wildlife, fire brigade, prisons, legal institutions).

21. The alignment and integration of the Other Armed Groups following the signing of the 2005 CPA and 2006 Juba Declaration was a positive development but has yet to be completed. It neglected to follow a structured process that involved vetting of troop strengths, ranks, and weapons. This lack of structure is hindering the ongoing SPLA transformation process and creating security problems.

22. The emphasis to date has been on top-down security sector and SPLA reforms, including the development of key policy and legal documents. A focus on ensuring synergies between top-down and bottom-up security sector reform interventions is crucial, as part of which ‘bottom-up’ assistance, advice, training, outreach, capacity building and sustainable integration of the former Other Armed Group members are critical.

23. Sensitization of SPLA and other security personnel (as well as local communities) to the shape and character of ongoing security sector transformation, including the SPLA’s new role in serving the citizens of Southern Sudan based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, is central to building confidence in the process and ensuring its implementation.

24. There is a need for a renewed GoSS focus on South–South reconciliation of political leaders and ethnic groups. The GoSS needs to urgently support the numerous existing peace processes by following up on, and implementing, agreed resolutions and outcomes in a consistent manner.

25. The SPLA, GoSS, UN partners, donors, and civil society could usefully shift from a discourse of ‘disarmament’ to one that emphasizes arms control and regulation, reconciliation, and community security/peaceful coexistence. There is a need for the GoSS/SPLA and international community to emphasize a more nuanced and sustainable approach to the management, regulation, control and disposal of small arms, light weapons, and ammunition in Southern Sudan. The development of a guiding legal and policy framework is central to this.

26. It is important to ensure that efforts to regulate and control civilian arms are undertaken in concert with other stabilization initiatives. There is a very real preoccupation concerning the progressive militarization of civilians and corollary outbursts of extreme violence. In certain cases, carefully planned military- and/or police-led operations may be required for non-compliant armed groups to hand-over their arms. Such interventions should be considered as an option of last resort, however, and require scaled-up training, oversight, and should be grounded in respect for human rights and the rule of law. They should also be complimented with peace-building, reconciliation and recovery programmes.

27. Local and traditional authorities, as well as state- and Juba-level governments, have a key role to play in all stabilization interventions in Southern Sudan.
The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment

The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) is a multi-year project administered by the Small Arms Survey. It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and a wide array of international and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely, empirical research, the project supports violence reduction initiatives, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes; incentive schemes for civilian arms collection; and security sector reform and arms control interventions across Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy-relevant advice on redressing insecurity.

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