DARFUR PEACE PROCESS CRHONOLOGY

2011

3 January: Salva Kiir announces that he is expelling all Darfur rebels from South Sudan. He says ‘no opposition in the North shall take Juba as a base’.

4 January: The LJM accepts the mediators’ compromise proposals.

5 January: Mbeki says the outcome of the Doha process will ‘be submitted to an inclusive process which will take place in Darfur to give the people in this region the opportunity to help to determine their future’. Two days later, US Senator John Kerry calls for the Doha talks to move to a neighbouring capital to get the ‘Darfur peace process back onto the agenda in a larger, more significant way’.

23 January: Darfur members of the National Assembly reject the armed movements’ demand for Darfur to be reorganized as a single administrative region. The bloc’s leader, Hasabo Mohamed Abdel Rahman, says the movements do not represent the people of Darfur.

3 February: Minawi formally withdraws from the DPA, declaring that he will work by all means to overthrow the government.

5 February: AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra says the mediation is aiming to have a Darfur agreement ready to sign by July, when South Sudan is due to become independent.

6 February: Addressing security and intelligence officers, President Bashir says ‘Darfur will be cleansed of outlaws [insurgents] by the end of July’.

10 February: The Sudanese government says it will send a ‘limited’ delegation back to Doha to review compromise proposals drafted by the mediation.

18 February: A JEM delegation travels to Kenya to meet Abdul Wahid. The two sides agree to hold talks on working together, possibly as early as mid-March. Meeting in Nyala amid heavy fighting between government and rebel forces, special envoys from more than half a dozen countries including the United States, China, and Russia agree that talks with Darfurians other than the movements—the Darfur Political Process or DPP—will open in Darfur only when the Doha process is complete, with or without a signed agreement. (The NCP and AUHIP had agreed in January that the DPP would begin in February and would not be delayed by lack of agreement in Doha.)

23 February: The mediation hands the parties new proposals on outstanding areas of disagreement.

25 February: JEM and the LJM reject the new proposals. JEM says they do not meet even the minimum demands of the movements, including a single region and a vice-presidency for Darfur.
28 February: JEM asks the UN to rescue Khalil Ibrahim from Libya and says it is willing to resume negotiations in Doha.

2 March: Having failed to convince the mediation to wind up the talks by 15 March and hand over to the DPP, Ghazi Atabani announces the government’s plans to hold a referendum on the administrative status of Darfur, previously a focus of effort in Doha, within three months. JEM calls the initiative ‘yet another attempt to undermine the efforts of the mediation’ to pave the way for a domestic process under NCP control; the LJM says the announcement is tantamount to ‘the abolition of the negotiations’. The two movements form a joint committee to establish a unified position on the issue.

5 March: Speaking for the pro-government bloc of Darfur parliamentarians in the National Assembly, Hasabo Mohamed Abdel Rahman proposes further division of the region, with two new states in Jebel Marra (capital Zalingei) and Bahr al Arab (capital al Daein). The government quickly endorses the proposal, raising the possibility of a five-state region rather than the single region the armed movements say is the prerequisite for any peace agreement. Ghazi Atabani says the parliamentarians’ proposal was adopted because it represents ‘the will of the people of Darfur’. Citing the DPA, he says there is a legal obligation on the government to hold the referendum by April.

10 March: In a joint press statement, JEM and the LJM agree to cooperate and coordinate in the peace process. They inform the mediation they are also coordinating efforts to bring Abdul Wahid and Minni Minawi into a single platform. The government delegation in Doha, until now scathing of rebel disunity, says the announcement undoes the progress already made with the LJM. Amin Hassan Omer warns the movements that the government has ‘other keys’ to end the conflict in Darfur.

13 March: Seeking a success to strengthen its case for the continuation of the Doha process, the mediation proposes that the parties adopt the four chapters they agree on—Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Justice and Reconciliation, Compensation and Return of IDPs and Refugees, and Wealth Sharing—and keep talking about the remaining disputed issues, including the administrative status of Darfur.

21 March: A UNAMID delegation headed by Gambari meets Abdul Wahid in Kampala. SLA-AW announces an initiative—identical to that already announced by JEM—to unite all armed movements in order to build ‘a state of citizenship and democracy’. After the meeting, UNAMID officials express the hope that Abdul Wahid may soon travel to Doha. In Doha, the mediators announce an ‘all Darfur stakeholders’ conference’, reportedly of some 400 people, to be held in April. They invite government officials; representatives of the armed movements; civil society groups; IDPs, and refugees; tribal leaders; political forces; and regional and international partners. Speaking privately, government officials say the meeting is an attempt to force Khartoum to bow to the movements’ demand for a single region, and they reject it.
27–31 May: All Darfur Stakeholders’ Conference (ADSC) convened. The precise purpose of the ADSC was not stated in order to adjust in accordance with evolving circumstances at the negotiation table. It was announced at the end of the conference that the ADSC had endorsed the draft peace document being negotiated by the rebels and the government, but the reality was more complicated. Endorsement was not universal, nor were the participants in the ADSC fully representative of Darfur’s many stakeholders.

14 July: The LJM and government sign the Darfur Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). Many members of the international community are absent. A Follow-up Committee to oversee the agreement’s elaboration and implementation is also created, led by Qatar, the United States, and the European Union. The first meeting of the committee is scheduled for early September 2011.

19 July: Gambari is appointed interim joint AU/UN mediator for Darfur. Former mediator Djibril Bassolé leaves the post to become foreign minister of Burkina Faso.

29 July: The UN Security Council renews UNAMID’s mandate for one year. Despite the AU’s endorsement, the Security Council fails to support Mbeki’s Darfur Peace Process until certain preconditions are met.

7 August: The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), SLA-AW, and SLA-MM sign a political alliance announcing the establishment of the Sudan Revolutionary Front alliance. The three signatories agree to unite their political and military means to overthrow the NCP-led government and set up a liberal and secular state. JEM is not a part of the agreement, but remains in negotiations about joining.

22 August: Libyan opposition forces reach Tripoli, causing JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim to flee Libya. The Libyan conflict creates a windfall of material support for a number of Darfur rebel movements, especially JEM, but also SLA-MM.

27 August: The government appoints Amin Hassan Omer to lead on the Darfur file, including the implementation of the recent DDPD.

29 August: JEM delegates visit Burkina Faso and meet with President Blaise Compaoré to discuss how to revitalize the Darfur peace process.

4 September: SLA-AW, JEM, and SPLM-N call for a no-fly zone over Blue Nile.

7 September: An LJM advance delegation arrives in Khartoum to prepare for the movement’s integration.

11 September: Inaugural meeting of the International Follow-up Committee convenes in Doha.

13 September: Al Haj Adam Youssef is appointed vice-president of Sudan, in line with the DDPD’s stipulation that a person from Darfur receive a vice-presidential appointment. JEM and SLA-AW opposed the appointment; the LJM was slighted because it presumed the job would be given to someone from its ranks.
16 September: North Darfur Governor Osman Kibbir confirms JEM’s return from Libya and says that Khalil Ibrahim is in Wadi Huwar, North Darfur.

26 September: JEM deputy chairman Mohamed Bahr Hamadein is relieved of his position.

7 October: The LJM advance delegation to Sudan completes tour of Darfur. Announces the formation of two technical committees in preparation for establishing the Darfur Regional Authority.

12 October: The government says it will not send a representative to a planned DDPD implementation meeting in Washington on 27–28 October because it objects to US intentions to discuss ways of accommodating non-signatories such as JEM.

19 October: The fourth meeting of the special envoys takes place in Darfur. A reference is made to potential ‘targeted measures’ against DDPD non-signatories. UNAMID outlines its initial thinking on a new AU/UN road map for peace in Darfur.

23 October: LJM leader Tijani Sese arrives in Khartoum for the first time since the Doha process. He is received by Nafie Ali Nafie, Amin Hassan Omer, Joint Special Representative Gambari, and Qatar’s mediator, Al Mahmoud.

24 October: Sese is sworn in as head of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority.

24 October–3 November: Sese tours Darfur, meeting with displaced communities and NCP leaders, and finishing with further meetings in Khartoum with opposition parties. Two people are killed in Kalma IDP camp in violence attributed to clashes between supporters and opponents of the DDPD. Sese hears both sides: caution is voiced regarding the danger of premature return and the need for further outreach to DDPD non-signatories.

14 November: The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) is formed, consisting of four groups: SPLM-N, SLA-AW, SLA-MM, and JEM. SRF calls for regime change, the end to partial political processes, and the unification of all of the opposition forces.

15–16 November: A closed-door US Institute of Peace workshop is held, bringing together DDPD non-signatories JEM and SLA-MM (now represented under the single banner of the SRF), the LJM, civil society groups, UNAMID, special envoys, and other representatives of the international community.

22–23 November: US congressmen call for a single, unified peace process throughout Sudan. The SRF issues a similar position statement the next day.

2 December: ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo requests an arrest warrant for Sudan’s Defence Minister Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, for crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed between August 2003 and March 2004 in Darfur. (During that time, he served as interior minister and special representative of the president in Darfur.)
12-13 December: First Malawi and then Chad are referred by the ICC to the UNSC and the Assembly of State Parties to the ICC for allowing Bashir to visit their countries without taking action to apprehend him.

20 December: The Kenyan Court of Appeal declines Sudan’s request to suspend the ICC warrant against Bashir, prompting Sudan’s president to threaten sanctions and the expulsion of Kenya’s envoy to Sudan.

18 December: Bahr Abu Garda, LJM’s secretary-general, is appointed federal minister of health.

21 December: LJM field commanders are arrested in West Darfur.

22-23 December: JEM forces rally and begin moving east to Kordofan. JEM announces this is the beginning of regime change. JEM claims Government of Sudan (GoS) defectors join its ranks: the GoS denies this.

22-24 December: JEM’s leader Khalil Ibrahim is killed by an aerial bombardment during a battle in Wad Banda, North Kordofan. Tahir al Faki is appointed interim chairman. Other members of the SRF say they continue to stand with JEM and the armed struggle against the GoS.

26 December: Ten ministers and five commissioners are appointed as part of the DDPD. Four are chosen from the LJM, two had taken part in the Darfur Peace Agreement, and two came from civil society organizations. The two chosen from civil society are Amna Haroun (the first woman to hold a ministerial post in Darfur), and Muhammed Ali. Abdul Hamid Ahmed Amin, a civil society figure, is appointed Justice and Reconciliation Commissioner.

28 December: In response to Khalil Ibrahim’s death, JEM and NCP student groups clash at Sudan University, Khartoum, leading to a GoS crackdown and temporary closure of the university.

29 December: LJM vice chairman Moktar Abdelkareem and Ahmed Fadoul, another member of LJM’s senior leadership, are appointed state ministers of industry and cabinet affairs respectively.

29 December: The GoS lodges formal complaints at the UNSC and the AU PSC (the third since South Sudan became independent) against South Sudan for hosting the JEM: it alleges 350 combatants and 79 armored vehicles crossed from South Darfur state into Bahr al Ghazal, South Sudan, through the “Al Sarag and Sakara” crossing point, south of Ed Daein before finally settling in Tumsaha.

30 December: Chadian President Idriss Déby becomes engaged to the daughter of Musa Hilal, a prominent ‘janjaweed’ leader in Darfur.