was vice president of the JEM at the
time of the attacks, but later switched to
a JEM splinter group (JEM-Collective); he is now the chairperson of the United
Resistance Front and being tried at the
International Criminal Court for his
role in the attack.  

The inadequate resources provided
to UNAMID for its own force protec-
tion are exacerbated by the lack of
security measures taken by some
UNAMID units when transporting
arms and ammunition supplies through
insecure parts of Darfur. As a result,
thefts from UNAMID have enhanced
the equipment of armed groups both
quantitatively and qualitatively: adding
substantial quantities of ammunition,
including 12 tons of Chinese-made
small arms ammunition stolen from a
commercial truck convoy operating for
a UNAMID contingent on its way
to Nyala in South Darfur in March
2008; and also adding armoured vehi-
cles to their holdings for the first time.

Chadian insurgents in Darfur

In the long-running proxy conflict
between the governments of Sudan
and Chad, SAF-supported Chadian
groups have used Darfur as their
staging grounds. The NCP’s aims are
both to aid and abet the insurgent
groups in their campaign to destabi-
lize the government of Idriss Déby and
to use the Chadian forces as auxiliaries
in its counter-insurgency in Darfur.
Since the publication of the Small Arms
Survey’s (2007a) Issue Brief on militar-
ization and arms holdings in Sudan,
the number of Chadian groups oper-
ating in Darfur has grown exponen-
tially (see Table 3). In recent months
there has been a significant increase
in their numbers, as well as their joint
operations with the SAF. Chadian
insurgents and SAF units are now
travelling, training, and co-locating
together in Darfur.

This development comes as the UN
Panel of Experts has highlighted the
existence of an ‘arms race’ between
the Government of Chad and Darfur-
based Chadian insurgent groups,
following a February 2008 attack on
N’Djamena. After the failed assault,
the government acquired additional
armoured vehicles, Sukhoi-25 jets,
and attack helicopters. The Panel of
Experts documented in statements by
Chadian insurgent group leaders
and eyewitness identifications that by
May 2009 the armed groups had also
acquired improved weaponry, includ-
ing Chinese QLZ-87 automatic grenade
launchers, 9M113 ‘Konkurs’ and
9M14M ‘Sagger’ anti-tank guided
missile systems, and Chinese HN-5
shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles.

Box 3 Fragmentation and proliferation: Chadian groups in Darfur

Proxy arming has a long tradition in the Horn of Africa, with the governments of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan,
Chad, Somalia, and Uganda arming and supporting armed groups from neighbouring countries for decades.
For Sudan, the origins and metamorphosis of the Darfur conflict are deeply entwined with decades of
civil war in Chad and a long-running conflict between successive governments in Khartoum and N’Djamena.

In fact, the Chadian and Darfurian conflicts are best understood as two sides of one aggregate con-
flict. Early Darfur-based Fur self-defence groups received arms from the Chadian regime of Hissène Habré
for their own purposes, as well as to counter Sudanese government-supported Chadian insurgent groups.
In the mid-1990s Chadian Arab (Abbala/Jammala) pastoralists who fled the Habré regime moved into north
Darfur and joined the raiding forces known as ‘Janjaweed’. Similar Arab militia in eastern Chad are respon-
sible for displacing more than 200,000 Chadians, some of whom fled into Darfur. Many of the SLA leadership
were also originally members of the armed forces under Idriss Déby, who overthrew Habré in 1990.

In recent years, since 2005 especially, Chadian armed groups have become more effective, due partly
to increased assistance from Khartoum. On two occasions the NCP has tried to force the groups into large
coalitions to increase their effectiveness. The nearly successful February 2008 assault on N’Djamena by the
Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), UFDD-Fundamental, and the Rally of Forces for
Change was launched from Darfur with extensive support from the NCP. In the last two years, however,
these Darfur-based Chadian forces have fractured and proliferated (see Table 3).

Table 3 Darfur-based Chadian armed groups as of September 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Abbreviation (in French)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Front for (Democratic) Change</td>
<td>FUC/FUCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally for Democratic Change and Freedom</td>
<td>RDL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Forces for Democracy and Develop</td>
<td>UFDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Forces for Change and Democracy</td>
<td>UFCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFDD-Fundamental</td>
<td>UFDD-Fondamentale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front for the Salvation of the Republic</td>
<td>FSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally of Democratic Forces</td>
<td>RFC/RAFD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(an umbrella for several groups, of which the Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy (SCUD) is the principal one)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad National Concord/Convention</td>
<td>CNT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for Peace, Reconstruction, and Development</td>
<td>MPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for National Rebirth</td>
<td>FPRN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: More heavily shaded boxes indicate groups that are part of the National Alliance (AN). This table is representative rather than exhaustive.
Source: Berman (2009)