

# Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarmament: The Case of Jonglei

*By Richard Garfield*

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Danida 

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# The Human Security Baseline Assessment

The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) is a three-year research project (2005–08) administered by the Small Arms Survey. It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN Mission in Sudan, the UN Development Programme, and a wide array of international and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely empirical research, the HSBA project works to support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and arms control interventions to promote security.

The HSBA is being carried out by a multidisciplinary team of regional, security, and public health specialists. It reviews the spatial distribution of armed violence throughout Sudan and offers policy-relevant advice to redress insecurity.

*HSBA Working Papers* are timely and user-friendly reports on current research activities in English and Arabic. Future papers will focus on a variety of issues, including victimization and perceptions of security, armed groups, and local security arrangements. The project also generates a series of *Issue Briefs*.

The HSBA project is supported by Canada, the UK Government Global Conflict Prevention Pool, the Danish International Development Agency (Danida), and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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
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## Abstract

Although almost three years have passed since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended the second North–South Sudanese civil war (1983–2005), security has not improved demonstrably in many areas of the South. On the assumption that small arms and light weapons are one source of ongoing insecurity, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) have administered or allowed a series of coercive and voluntary civilian disarmament efforts. The absence of reliable evidence and baseline data has prevented an accurate assessment of the outcomes of these activities. This working paper reports findings of a victimization survey undertaken in Jonglei State, South Sudan, where both coercive and ‘voluntary’ disarmament occurred. It finds that violent victimization remains prevalent since the CPA. Nevertheless, residents of Jonglei who had undergone disarmament by the time of the survey reported a considerable reduction in weapons carrying, an increase in perceived security, and reliance on public authorities. These positive changes are remarkable in light of serious problems associated with the disarmament process in some areas, including violence and significant loss of life.



## I. Introduction

On 9 January 2005, the SPLM/A signed the CPA with the Government of Sudan, officially ending the country's second North–South civil war and making the SPLM a partner in the Government of National Unity (GNU). At the heart of the conflict—which was responsible for an estimated 1.9 million direct and indirect deaths and more than four million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP)<sup>1</sup>—was a struggle for political, economic, religious, and cultural autonomy for the South. The signing of the CPA and subsequent formation of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) on 22 October 2005, in which the SPLM holds a majority of seats,<sup>2</sup> requires the guerrilla movement to transform itself into a civilian and democratic political party ahead of national elections in 2009, with a separate and professional army that is accountable to civilian authority.<sup>3</sup> Yet the new government's acute lack of experience in governance, institutional incapacity, and administrative weakness hamper its ability to formulate and implement policy and to deliver the peace dividends that southern Sudanese have long awaited. These include basic services such as access to health, clean water, and education, as well as improvements in human security.

As in many other post-conflict contexts the peace agreement has not led to a cessation of violence,<sup>4</sup> particularly within South Sudan, in part because the CPA failed to address many inter-southern sources of conflict. Hostilities in the South have continued with clashes between the SPLA and 'rump' Other Armed Groups (OAG)<sup>5</sup> refusing to disband in accordance with the CPA; among tribal militias; and between pastoralist groups competing over resources and grazing lands (Small Arms Survey, 2006; Young, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). It is also widely believed that elements within the National Congress Party have continued actively to support southern groups resisting SPLA authority. The legacy of government- and rebel-arming of partisan forces in the form of vast stockpiles of small arms and light weapons continues to threaten community safety and curtail freedom of movement. With tensions simmering over the lack of CPA implementation and the recent withdrawal by the SPLM from the

GNU in protest, some are predicting a possible return to open war (Young, 2007b).

Quantifying ongoing armed violence and insecurity in South Sudan has remained challenging both logistically and scientifically. Almost three years after the agreement was signed, very little is known about the scale and distribution of violence in the region. Reporting on the use of small arms in the post-CPA period is largely anecdotal and limited in scope. In April 2006, in order to start building an evidence base on which sound policy responses to insecurity could be established, the Small Arms Survey's Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) conducted the first systematic and quantitative assessment of victimization and perceived insecurity since the end of the war. Utilizing a robust questionnaire and sampling framework, a victimization survey of 674 households in Lakes State described real and relative impacts of armed violence on civilians.<sup>6</sup> It found that residents in the state were heavily armed and that over 50 percent of people thought security had worsened or remained the same since the end of the war.

The Jonglei household survey builds and expands the evidence-base on insecurity in South Sudan. Working in partnership with NGOs Pact Sudan and Standard Action Liaison Focus (SALF), the HSBA team administered a household survey in five of eleven counties in Jonglei State in January 2007. At the time, a number of Jonglei communities had gone through a forcible civilian disarmament campaign—and a 'voluntary' campaign in Pibor county had just begun. Thus, the survey provides not only an assessment of real and perceived insecurity in the state, but also differentiates between the attitudes and experiences of different communities. Given that the GoSS and the SPLA appear committed to civilian disarmament as a core tactic to bringing stability and security to southern Sudan—even in the absence of a credible strategy or legal framework—the findings reported here should help inform civilian and military authorities, donors, and other policy-makers and practitioners. ▣

## II. Key findings

### **Victimization remains a frequent occurrence in the aftermath of the CPA.**

Almost 85 per cent of respondents reported at least one victimization event, and 44.8 per cent had experienced at least two victimizations events. More than half of all households reported having been robbed at least once and involved in at least one physical fight with someone from outside their compound since the signing of the CPA. Likewise, 41.2 per cent of all respondents claimed that robbery with a weapon had become the most common violent crime in this period.

**The incidence of victimization varies widely across Jonglei.** At the time of the survey, reported victimization ranged from an average of 1.05 victimizations per resident in Ayod county to 0.22 victimizations per person in Pibor county. Uror county reportedly experienced 0.96 victimizations per resident, Duk 0.82 victimizations per resident, and Nyirol 0.75 victimizations per resident.

**Despite ongoing victimization, residents believe that security has improved since the CPA.** More than two-thirds of respondents (67 per cent) indicated that security was better in the two years since the CPA. When asked specifically about the area in which they lived, 59 per cent of respondents overall said security had improved in their area; but residents in areas that had undergone disarmament found improved security much more often than those in areas where disarmament was just getting underway (63.9 per cent compared to 38.2 per cent). In Pibor county 53.5 per cent said security was 'the same' or 'worse' since the CPA.

### **Small arms carrying for protection has decreased dramatically since the CPA.**

Across the areas surveyed, 46.6 per cent of residents reported that they had carried firearms for protection prior to the CPA, while only 2.1 per cent reported that they carried firearms after the CPA. The most common weapon reported to be carried after the CPA was sticks (37.2 per cent), while 32 per cent of respondents indicated that since the CPA they did not carry any weapons.

### **Disarmament appears to have yielded significant numbers of weapons.**

Almost three quarters (73.2 per cent) of the population residing in areas that had undergone disarmament reported giving up at least one weapon, and almost half (48.5 per cent) had surrendered more than one.

### **Disarmament is perceived as having triggered insecurity.**

Outside Pibor, 23.5 per cent of people reported that disarmament had been the cause of fighting, a likely reference to subsequent attacks targeting disarmed communities or fighting between the SPLA and local communities. Within Pibor, 21.7 per cent also feared being 'less safe' due to a reduction in firearms. 🗨️

### III. Jonglei State: background and disarmament

Located in the Upper Nile region, Jonglei is the largest state in South Sudan, with its capital located in Bor. It covers more than 122,000 km<sup>2</sup> but is sparsely populated with an estimated 1,230,000 inhabitants.<sup>7</sup> The main tribes inhabiting the state are the Anuak, Dinka, Jie, Kachipo, Murle, and Nuer. The Greater Bor area, a Dinka stronghold, has been ‘the heartland of the SPLM/A since its inception’ (Rolandsen, 2007), following the mutiny in Bor in 1983 that marked the start of the second civil war.

Jonglei has featured as the site of one of the world’s largest development project failures during the twentieth century: the Jonglei canal. Designed to drain water from massive swamps in the South for use in plantation agriculture in the North, the project collapsed following the outbreak of civil war. The two decades of conflict that followed left the world’s largest cranes rusting in one of the poorest areas on earth. Despite some security gains made after the end of the war, Jonglei is still considered unstable and largely insecure, and with only limited investment potential beyond the oil industry.<sup>8</sup> The state remains extremely underdeveloped with only 5–10 per cent of children of primary school age attending school and 25–45 per cent<sup>9</sup> of people using ‘improved water sources’.<sup>10</sup> What limited services have been available are now being stretched further by the influx of returning refugees and IDPs to their homes following the CPA.

During the civil war, a variety of armed tribal groups competed for power and control of resources in Jonglei. One such armed entity was the ‘White Army’, an umbrella term for semi-organized militias comprising young armed Nuer men (aged 14–35). The original purpose of the White Army at village level was to protect communities from attacks, many of which are related to cattle-raiding, water sources, grazing rights, and revenge feuds as well as undisciplined acts by disgruntled soldiers (UNSC, 2007, para. 4; Young, 2007a).

Though never fully organized, the White Army became increasingly enmeshed in the civil war as both Khartoum and the SPLA supplied it with small arms

at different times. Gradually, gun possession became a rite of passage from childhood to adulthood among Nuer males, replacing more traditional weapons, such as spears, which have been part of this rite for centuries. AK-47s could be bartered for or bought, while PKMs, RPGs, and G-3s or G-4s were obtained by stealing from the SPLA, or from local people after fights.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, the price of weapons in Jonglei reflects the heavy supply and demand. The cost of an assault rifle was reportedly ten cows in the late 1980s. From 1994–2000, the price reportedly dropped to as low as three cows, where it has remained since.<sup>12</sup>

The spread of arms to young males represented a marked departure from traditional local customs, which had prohibited youth under 18 having guns. This increase in firepower has contributed to a rise in confrontations and inter-ethnic rivalries in Jonglei (Young, 2007a) as well as to an increase in the deadliness of these conflicts (Small Arms Survey, 2007). Persistent civil insecurity and unrelenting cattle raids and inter-clan/inter-tribal attacks remain ongoing threats to human security. In late July and early August 2007, for example, reported clashes between Murle and Nuer left 60–80 people dead.

#### Civilian disarmament in Jonglei

Between December 2005 and May 2006 the SPLA administered a coercive civilian disarmament campaign in Jonglei State.<sup>13</sup> It sought to remove weapons from local pastoralists, primarily the Lou Nuer, many of whom perceived it as a political crackdown. From the beginning, the initiative encountered resistance from the White Army. In the course of the disarmament programme more than 3,000 weapons were collected, and an estimated 1,600 White Army and SPLA soldiers were killed—approximately one death for every two weapons seized (Small Arms Survey, 2007, p. 4). The bloodshed was attributed to poor planning and implementation, and limited buy-in from local chiefs and communities.

In light of the mounting casualties resulting from the SPLA-led arms recovery effort, the UN acted quickly to promote peaceful disarmament elsewhere in the state. A Lou–Murle peace agreement, based on an April 2006 ceasefire, provided a starting point. The UN, with limited resources, focused initially on Akobo County. Its initiative benefited significantly from mediation by a

local CSO that had a strong presence in the region and was able to engage local tribal chiefs. The intervention was then implemented via county, *payam* (state administrative unit), and community-level ‘disarmament committees’. The campaign netted some 1,200–1,400 functioning assault rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and mortars by the end of August 2006. Although the disarmament could not be described as ‘voluntary’ as the threat of force was explicit, no lives were lost as a direct result of the exercise.

By January 2007, when the household survey was conducted, areas of Akobo, Ayod, Duk, Fangak, Khorfulos, Nyirol, Twic East, and Uror counties had been ‘disarmed’ by Jonglei authorities.<sup>14</sup> A third disarmament exercise had just begun to reduce weapon stocks among the Murle, a tribe that had hitherto not participated in the arms recovery campaigns, and which is particularly feared locally.<sup>15</sup> Undertaken from January through May 2007 in four *payams* of Pibor county (Gumuruk, Fertait, Lekwangolei, and Pibor), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) DDR Unit, and the South Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) all participated in the ‘voluntary’ campaign alongside local civil society organizations. It was conducted peacefully and netted 1,126 weapons, most of them military style (Small Arms Survey, 2007). However, Murle raids continued throughout, possibly with external support.

The threat of a forcible campaign among the Murle and other groups remains: a resolution from a May 2007 ‘confidence building meeting’ in Bor, attended by local chiefs and commissioners, explicitly committed local authorities to peaceful disarmament of the entire state between May and July 2007. Failing that, there would be a forcible campaign. This intention was reconfirmed in a Joint Security Meeting of the Southern Sudan Security Committee and Jonglei Security Committee on 18 August 2007.<sup>16</sup> A second forcible campaign in Jonglei has yet to occur, and there are credible fears that if it does it could destabilize the entire region.

Technically, then, most of Jonglei has been ‘disarmed’,<sup>17</sup> with the exceptions of the counties of Pochalla, parts of Bor, and Pibor. But reports from UN and NGO staff indicate that civilian weapons carrying in late 2007 is widely visible.

Armed raids and clashes corroborate this: rekindled clashes between the Lou Nuer and Murle indicate that the latter still possess significant armaments

and that the Lou Nuer may have rearmed, possibly from Ethiopia, or that they were not disarmed in the first place. Given that disarmament of the Lou Nuer in 2006 left them under constant threat of attack, both of these scenarios are likely.

Ongoing rearmament, raiding during disarmament campaigns, and the lack of protection provided to disarmed communities all raise fundamental questions about the ‘success’ of disarmament campaigns to date. In previous HSBA publications that analyse these initiatives, the Small Arms Survey has voiced concern about ‘disarmament alone’ approaches in South Sudan—whether coercive or ‘voluntary’—especially when security for local communities is not provided and when root causes of armed violence are not addressed (Small Arms Survey, 2007). The conclusions drawn from the 2007 Jonglei survey reinforce this view. 🗨️

## IV. Survey instrument and methods

The survey instrument, developed in collaboration with a group of experts from academic and aid organizations, draws on established epidemiological techniques to review mortality, morbidity, and victimization trends in affected communities. The questionnaire built on experience gained in the previous HSBA survey in Lakes State (Garfield, 2007). The questionnaire included 140 questions divided into a number of sub-categories covering real and perceived security, the distribution and frequency of victimization, weapons possession and use, and livelihoods.

Interviewers were selected in consultation with local community leaders. None worked for local government, and most had taken part in social development campaigns and were well known in and around their communities. One was a community health worker and one was a local teacher. All could read and write in English and at least the predominant local language. Special efforts were made to recruit women, but in the end only three of the 19 interviewers secured were female. During the training male interviewers were encouraged to recruit a female relative to accompany them during surveying to assist in getting detailed information from women informants.

Sixteen interviewers from local communities were selected from four counties that had already undergone disarmament (Ayod, Duk, Nyiroi, and Urur). Interviews were expected to cover both urban and rural communities in their area of operation.<sup>18</sup> They were each to complete a total of 50 interviews in 20 communities accessible on foot or by bicycle. In all of these areas, interviewers were local residents of the dominant ethnic group. In Pibor, where a somewhat less coercive disarmament campaign was just getting under way, three staff from SALF, a local peace and development organization, served as interviewers. All three were male. The team leader was an ethnic Murle from the local area while the others were from other ethnicities. All interviewers were trained for three days at a central location before returning to their communities to carry out interviews over the following 10 days.

The total number of completed interviews falls short of 1,000 because two interviewers were unable to produce their full quota of 50 and one interviewer was believed to have recorded unreliable information. The latter interviews were struck from the data set to give a final set of 880 interviews.

Communities included in the sample were selected on the basis of logistical criteria. There was one vehicle available for transport (and that vehicle had to be brought in from another state), and since many communities were inac-

### Box 1 **Challenges encountered in the survey**

**Logistical challenges.** Much of Jonglei was inaccessible, with some roads completely impassable and others barely passable at an average of 10 km per hour by land transport. HSBA staff were able to reach five of the 11 counties in the state, including mainly areas where HSBA NGO partners were working. Limited transport, isolation, and distance meant that interviewers had to undergo hardships to reach rural areas. Only two supervision visits were possible as a full cycle took three days.

**Lack of geographic and demographic information.** Parts of Jonglei State have not been adequately mapped. Supposedly reliable maps include a major highway that no longer exists, adding considerable time to supervision visits. The lack of demographic data made it impossible to establish response denominators. As noted above, this problem led to the construction of a non-random sample.

**Need for supervision.** The interviewers selected for participation in Jonglei were generally more skilled than those in the previous survey (Lakes State) and performed well. When errors in forms were found during supervision visits, the interviewers returned to complete or correct needed information. Yet without an opportunity for additional close supervision, under-reporting of some sensitive events no doubt exists.

**Sensitive nature of information requested.** The survey addressed sensitive topics, some of which were unusual and new to interviewers and interviewees alike. There was particular reluctance to discuss violence against wives and children. Locally known civil society leaders were the primary interviewers. In Lakes State it had been important to have local people as interviewers to gain local trust. In Jonglei, it was also important for the foreign supervisor to make an appearance to underscore the neutral and confidential aspect of the information provided.

**Accuracy of responses.** There is no way to confirm the accuracy of the answers, but several logical checks embedded in the survey showed consistency in responses. However, as in any victimization survey, it is possible for people to understate or overstate the number of events that have occurred.<sup>19</sup>

cessible by vehicle due to a lack of roads or bridges, communities had to be on or near to the three major state roads. Indeed, as one of those roads turned out to be impassable, supervision visits required two to three days of travel. Most of the urban communities had fewer than 50 family compounds.<sup>20</sup>

The sample in an urban area was designed by drawing an imaginary circle around the area where family compounds were concentrated. A centre point of this circle was identified in order to start survey selection. From the centre, interviewers spun a bottle and walked in the direction indicated, tagging households for participation on the way. When they reached the outskirts of the town, they returned to the town centre and repeated this procedure until a total of 25 household interviews had been completed. Most interviewers conducted this procedure three times to reach a quota. A similar procedure was carried out to identify rural areas fanning out from urban centres to include in the survey.

The procedure had to be modified in the process of interviewing: new rural areas replaced some of those chosen 'by the bottle' as in some areas thus selected all households had moved, either for cattle grazing or because of insecurity from attacks. Interviewers kept a notation of houses visited, houses empty, and refusals to take part in the survey. These data were collected and analysed by the supervisor. Approximately one per cent of all sampled respondents in occupied homes declined to take part in the survey. 🗑️

## V. Survey demographics

The survey sought to generate a randomized sample of respondents from a representative sample of counties. A total of 880 interviews were successfully administered, recorded, and processed. Some 471 (53.5 per cent) of these were drawn from urban or semi-urban areas while 409 (46.5 per cent) were among rural residents (see Table 1). Importantly, 58 per cent (n = 852) of all families said they had lived in the same area for more than four years.

The dynamics of each household also varied considerably. For example, the average number of *tukuls* (typical circular huts) per family compound was approximately three (n = 871). Approximately 14 per cent of respondents had only one *tukul* while nine per cent (n = 871) had more than five.

The survey aimed to generate an evenly balanced sample of respondents from both sexes. In the end, 488 respondents (55.8 per cent) were female and 387 (44.2 per cent) were male (see Table 3). Most respondents could be considered adult: 62 per cent (n = 871) said that they were between the ages of 25 and 40 and the average declared age of respondents was 37 years. Only five per cent were under 21 years and nine per cent were above 50. The average duration of each interview was approximately 32 minutes.

The survey reflected an ethnically heterogeneous sample. Outside of Pibor, approximately 53 per cent (n = 687) of respondents identified themselves as Nuer, 27 per cent as Dinka, 9.6 per cent as Gawaar Nuer, eight per cent as Lou

Table 1 **Respondents by rural/urban sector**

		n	%
Valid	Urban	471	53.5
	Rural	409	46.5
<b>Total</b>		<b>880</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Participating households were more or less evenly dispersed across the five counties surveyed, with Duk county generating the most completed surveys (n = 204) and Nyirol the fewest (n = 147) (see Table 2). Note that Duk County was previously known as 'North Bor' and 'Uror' as 'Wuror'.<sup>21</sup>

Table 2 Households surveyed in Jonglei by county

County	Community	Number of interviews
Ayod (n = 202)	Ayod	50
	Mogok	51
	Pajiek	50
	Wau	25
	Wul	26
Duk (n = 204)	Duk Paywel	51
	Padiet	52
	Pagak	51
	Panyang	50
Nyirrol (n = 147)	Majock	49
	Waat	48
	Lankien	50
Pibor (n = 149)	Pibor	49
	Verthiath	30
	Gumuruk	35
	Lekwangolei	35
Uror (n = 156)	Pieri	44
	Pulchuol	52
	Yuai	15
	Motot	45
Missing		22
<b>Total</b>		<b>858</b>

Nuer, and three per cent identified themselves as belonging to a section of the Nuer tribe'. In Pibor itself (n = 131) all respondents identified themselves as Murle.

On average, nine family members (n = 876) lived in each household, including 3.6 children. Respondents reported that in the 24 months since the CPA

Table 3 Sex of primary respondent

		n	%
Valid	Male	387	44.2
	Female	488	55.8
	Total	875	100.0
Missing		5	
<b>Total</b>		<b>880</b>	

(January 2005), an average of 3.5 additional family members had either arrived from other locations or had been born, while 2.5 had either moved away or died. 57 per cent (n = 853) of respondents reported that at least one child was currently attending school.

The socio-economic profile of respondents was fairly typical of the state. Approximately 61.7 per cent (n = 859) considered themselves poorer than most other people living in their community while 32.4 per cent (n = 859) considered themselves as wealthy as other community members. In Pibor, 50.3 per cent (n = 145) of respondents described themselves as poorer than average, while outside Pibor the figure was 64.2 per cent (n = 710). 📄

## VI. Survey findings

### Perceptions of security following the CPA

The HSBA household survey sought to assess victimization among Jonglei residents in the period following the CPA (January 2005–January 2007). Respondents were asked their opinions regarding the types and frequency of violent crime and violence-related problems occurring in their communities following the CPA. According to the vast majority of respondents, robbery with a weapon was the most common event (41.2 per cent), followed by robbery without a weapon (17.6 per cent). Domestic violence, against both women and children, was also notable and likely to be under-reported (see Figure 1).

When queried about the experiences of their household (as compared to personal experiences) since the CPA, results were somewhat different (see Figure 2). The most frequent violent events reported were robberies (65.2 per cent,  $n = 877$ ),<sup>22</sup> fights with someone outside of the compound (54.3 per cent,  $n = 879$ ),<sup>23</sup> fights inside the compound (45.3 per cent,  $n = 877$ ),<sup>24</sup> and other attacks (45.5 per cent each,  $n = 876$ ). Other events included intentional and unintentional death (62.2 per cent,  $n = 878$ ).<sup>25</sup> There is therefore an important distinction between victimization of individuals and of households.

Figure 1 Types of violence that occurred most often since the CPA





Figure 2 Households reporting a victimization event since the CPA



Patterns of victimization events in Pibor as compared to the other areas surveyed are highly varied (see Table 4). Also notable is the lower reporting of actual events, and the far higher perceptions of insecurity in Pibor, compared to the rest of the state.

Table 4 Victimization since the CPA: Pibor and other areas

	Jonglei except Pibor (%)	Pibor (%)
Fight with someone outside family compound	60.5	25.5
Fight with someone inside family compound	53.8	4.7
Robbery	72.0	31.0
Other attacks	51.6	16.0
Fatal attack	67.3	38.9

Undertaking a balanced and comparative assessment between Pibor and other counties is extremely difficult. Since all data recorded in the victimization survey is ultimately based on verbal (autopsy) reports that cannot be independently confirmed by official records (as most do not exist), it is difficult to confirm if survey findings represent true differences or are affected by differences in cultural attitudes and communication styles among different populations.

Respondents were asked whether security was better, the same, or worse since the CPA (see Tables 5 and 6). A question designed to elicit similar (and comparable) responses was included at the end of the questionnaire.

There were marked differences in the security situation inside and outside of Pibor. Nearly two-thirds (63.9 per cent, n = 645) felt that security was better outside of Pibor while 14 per cent considered it to have remained the same as before the CPA (see Table 7). The overwhelming majority (83.0 per cent) of those

Table 5 **Since the CPA, do you think that security is better or worse here? (n = 877)<sup>26</sup>**

		<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>
Valid	Better	588	67.0
	About the same	149	17.0
	Worse	109	12.4
	Not sure, it goes up and down	23	2.6
	Don't know	6	0.7
	Refuse to answer	2	0.2
Missing		3	
<b>Total</b>		<b>880</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table 6 **Is security in this part of Jonglei better or worse than before the CPA? (n = 791)**

		<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>
Valid	Better	467	59.0
	About the same	146	18.5
	Worse	140	17.7
	Don't know	29	3.7
	Refuse to answer	9	1.1
	Total	791	100.0
Missing		89	
<b>Total</b>		<b>880</b>	

Table 7 **Is security in this part of Jonglei better or worse than before the CPA? (excluding Pibor)<sup>27</sup>**

		<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>
Valid	Better	412	63.9
	About the same	90	14.0
	Worse	117	18.1
	Don't know	17	2.6
	Refuse to answer	9	1.4
	Total	645	100.0
Missing		82	
<b>Total</b>		<b>727</b>	

outside Pibor reporting worse security were in the communities of Motot, Pan-yang, and Yuai.


In Pibor, opinions were more evenly split between those claiming it was better (38.2 per cent, n = 144) and those considering it to be the same (38.2 per cent). Notably, 53.5 per cent said security was 'the same' or 'worse' (see Table 8).

There appears to be mixed sentiments about the impacts of disarmament in Jonglei. In Pibor, 21.7 per cent were concerned about being 'less safe' as a result of a reduction in firearms—probably due to outside attacks and the

Table 8 **Is security in this part of Jonglei better or worse than before the CPA? (Pibor only)**

		<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>
Valid	Better	55	38.2
	About the same	55	38.2
	Worse	22	15.3
	Don't know	12	8.3
	Total	144	100.0
Missing		5	
<b>Total</b>		<b>149</b>	

Figure 3 Will reducing firearms make people safer or less safe? (n = 843)



lack of protection provided by local authorities. Notably, across all communities, approximately 18 per cent said reducing the numbers of firearms would make no difference at all to security (see Figure 3).

### The distribution and frequency of victimization

Across all households and respondents, the most common victimization events included robberies, fights, and attacks. Figure 4 below highlights the occurrence of victimization events reported per all household members. Approximately 85 per cent (n = 767) of sampled households experienced at least one victimization event since the CPA. Another 27.7 per cent (n = 637) of respondents were victimized more than once, while 44.8 per cent (n = 486) had experienced more than two victimization events. The responses show a comparatively high rate of deaths, although the extent to which these arise from a victimization incident or other natural causes remains difficult to ascertain.

Figure 4 Number of victimization events per household member




Table 9 Victimization events by county<sup>28</sup>

County	Number of events	Number of residents	Average victimization per person
Ayod	2,102	1,924	1.05
Duk	1,258	1,539	0.82
Nyirrol	882	1,177	0.75
Uror	1,629	1,697	0.96
Pibor	291	1,344	0.22

It is important to note that there is considerable geographic variation in reported victimization. Specifically, there was significant variation in the average number of victimization events by county (see Table 9).

Paradoxically, Pibor, located in Murle territory, remains armed and less exposed to attacks. It is likely that the presence of considerable numbers of weapons serves as a deterrent to victimization.

While the ability of respondents to date events is often rather poor in surveys of this kind, the average date since the last event can serve as a check on the information provided about the number of events. Results show a greater duration of time since the last reported death, as this is a rarer event (see Figure 5).

A useful indicator of relative security relates to walking alone and perceptions of safety at different periods of the day. The survey found that while the majority of respondents felt safe walking alone during the day, the perception of safety declined dramatically after dark (see Figures 6).

Figure 5 Months elapsed since last violent event





Figure 6 Relative perception of safety when walking alone



## Weapons possession and use

The survey found that before the CPA, the most commonly carried weapon was a gun or rifle followed by bladed weapons (see Figure 7). Since the CPA, sticks are the most commonly reported weapon carried in the state.

These findings are subject to selection bias. Admitting to gun carrying is in fact relatively infrequent.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, among the 13.4 per cent (n = 171) of respondents admitting to rifle or shotgun ownership or ownership within his/her family, AK-47s are reportedly the most common type of firearm owned

Figure 7 Weapon carrying when travelling





Figure 8 Firearms kept in the household



(see Figure 8). It should be noted that the extent to which these findings adequately reflect the 'reality' is hard to discern: it is likely that increased penalties associated with weapons carrying (and for those who did not turn in their arms) limits its validity.

A considerable proportion of respondents nevertheless commented on the appropriateness of certain types of weaponry. Specifically, 75 per cent (n = 660) of all respondents answered a question regarding the most appropriate number of firearms required to protect family and cattle. Of these, 78.3 per cent (n = 660) thought it was best to own one or more firearms. In Pibor, where 69.8 per cent (n = 104) answered this question, almost 80 per cent thought it was best to have one or more firearms (79.8 per cent). Of the few who answered about actual weapons holding, 90.7 per cent (n = 150) of households residing outside of Pibor and 92.1 per cent (n = 38) in Pibor admitted to having at least one firearm (see Tables 10 and 11).<sup>30</sup>

Despite low self-reporting rates of gun ownership, a relatively modest proportion of respondents believe that weapons possession remains widespread. Approximately 8.6 per cent (n = 641) of all respondents outside of Pibor and 3.6 per cent (n = 140) of those in Pibor believe that almost all compounds have a firearm. Meanwhile, some 5.5 per cent (n = 641) outside of Pibor and 22.1 per cent (n = 140) in Pibor think that more than half of all compounds have a firearm.

When asked about whether there were too many guns and who held them, answers varied according to location. For example, outside of Pibor, 13.3 per cent of all respondents stated that there were too many guns in the community. In Pibor, 16.8 per cent (n = 143) of respondents shared this view. Likewise, outside of Pibor, 42.5 per cent (n = 569) believed that those most urgently in

Table 10 **How many firearms does your family have? (excluding Pibor)**

Number of weapons per family		n	%
Valid	0	13	8.7
	1	75	50.0
	2	21	14.0
	3	8	5.3
	4	9	6.0
	5	5	3.3
	6	2	1.3
	7	6	4.0
	8	1	0.7
	9	4	2.7
	10	1	0.7
	12	2	1.3
	15	1	0.7
	30	1	0.7
	75	1	0.7
	Total	150	100.0
Missing		577	
<b>Total</b>		<b>727</b>	

need of being disarmed were the criminals. In Pibor, 39 per cent (n = 177) of residents believed that civilians were the group that most urgently needed disarming.

In fact, residents expressed urgent concern about the prevalence of small arms. When asked to rank priorities, 22 per cent of all respondents claimed that firearms were the ‘most pressing concern’, while 20 per cent prioritized education. Outside of Pibor, 28.6 per cent (n = 727) of respondents stated that ‘better police’ were required to enhance overall security. By way of compari-

Table 11 **How many firearms does your family have? (Pibor only)**


Number of weapons per family		n	%
Valid	0	3	7.9
	1	9	23.7
	2	9	23.7
	3	1	2.6
	5	1	2.6
	10	1	2.6
	30	5	13.2
	40	2	5.3
	50	2	5.3
	51	1	2.6
	60	4	10.5
	Total	38	100.0
Missing		111	
<b>Total</b>		<b>149</b>	

son, in Pibor 32.2 per cent (n = 149)<sup>31</sup> felt that ‘more police’ would enhance overall security. Interestingly, in Pibor only three per cent of the population felt that a ‘better army’ would increase security.

The vast majority of respondents claimed to have surrendered weapons during the disarmament process. For example, outside of Pibor, 73.2 per cent (n = 672) claimed that their family had submitted at least one weapon to the authorities since the CPA. Approximately 48.5 per cent (n = 607) stated that they had given up more than one weapon. Though most respondents felt that the process had contributed to enhancing security, approximately 23.5 per cent (n = 668) outside Pibor stated that the disarmament had actually triggered more fighting.

More optimistically, there appears to be considerable will to report violent incidents to police. Indeed, when asked who they would contact if there was

Figure 9 What would you do if there were an attack on your family?



an attack on their family, the majority of respondents (64.8 per cent) reported they would ‘tell the police’ (see Figure 9). 📍

## VII. Conclusions

An important conclusion of this study is that despite persistent security threats, it is possible to undertake systematic household-level surveys in extremely remote and unstable areas. While logistical and technical obstacles are considerable, the high response rate among sampled households in Jonglei reveals that with proper preparation and coordination, the participation of locally selected enumerators, and the support of trusted civil society partners, individuals are willing to discuss highly personal and sensitive subjects pertaining to the security of themselves, their families, and their communities.

There have been some peace dividends since the signing of the CPA, but communities in Jonglei continue to experience regular insecurity in the form of theft and conflict with neighbouring communities. In this context, and in the absence of a robust state security apparatus, the acquisition and use of small arms is part and parcel of both self-defence and livelihood maintenance patterns.

While disarmament campaigns in Jonglei yielded a significant number of guns and reduced access to them for a period, it is impossible to judge how successful the campaigns were without comprehensive data about the numbers of guns still being held by the same communities. But it is clear that success cannot be judged solely in terms of the numbers of weapons collected. Account must be taken of the ‘costs’ of the campaigns in terms of lives lost, residents displaced, and damage done to the fragile ecosystem of shifting loyalties and oppositions in the delicate post-CPA environment.

While residents reported that they were willing to disarm, they were understandably not willing to remain defenceless in the face of attacks by others who had not yet undergone disarmament, or who were not willing to participate fully in the campaigns. Thus it appears that even in ‘disarmed’ areas rearmament may have occurred (or communities cached weapons during the campaigns). For these reasons, perceived ‘gains’ from the campaign may have been short-lived.

Any disarmament strategy in South Sudan needs to recognize that, without the provision of adequate security, this pattern will be repeated. It is also clear that disarmament should take place in the context of a comprehensive, holistic approach to community safety. Long-term conflict resolution strategies addressing root causes of conflict, as well as reciprocal disarmament and participatory information campaigns to gain buy-in, are essential.

The GoSS is still at the beginning of its civilian disarmament exercise. As its campaigns continue throughout the South, it should learn from its experience in Jonglei in order to develop a transparent disarmament strategy and legal framework that the international community can support. A promising step would be a commitment not to engage in the kind of brutal, repressive campaign that took place in Jonglei in 2006. 📌

## Endnotes

- 1 See UNHCR (2007).
- 2 Under the terms of the CPA, the SPLM controls 70 per cent of seats in the GoSS during a six-year interim period, while the other southern parties control 15 per cent and the National Congress Party 15 per cent.
- 3 The SPLA was always more dominant than the SPLM during the war, with the majority of South Sudanese resources being devoted to the war effort.
- 4 For a discussion of violence in 'post-conflict' contexts, see 'Managing "Post-Conflict" Zones: DDR and Weapons Reduction' in *Small Arms Survey (2005)*, pp. 267–301.
- 5 The term Other Armed Group originates in the CPA, which requires all armed forces outside the SPLA and the Sudan Armed Forces to disband or be absorbed into one of the two armies.
- 6 See Garfield (2007).
- 7 See <<http://www.unsudanig.org/>>.
- 8 The oil industry itself poses a huge threat to both the environment and the development of the state. See Deng (2007).
- 9 These figures derived from maps provided by OCHA's Information Management Unit in Juba, South Sudan. The information is attributed to the preliminary, unpublished results of the Sudan Household Health Survey 2007.
- 10 'Improved water sources' are considered to be piped water to a dwelling/yard/plot, public tap/standpipe, tubewell/borehole, protected well, protected spring, or rainwater.
- 11 Focus group discussion in Ayod, Jonglei State, January 2007.
- 12 Focus group discussion in Ayod, Jonglei State, January 2007.
- 13 This section relies heavily on *Small Arms Survey (2007)*.
- 14 Email from UNMIS official, November 2007.
- 15 During the second Sudanese civil war Khartoum supported armed elements among the Murle. In October 2006, Murle leader Ismael Konye—who maintained a heavily-armed force in Pibor of at least 200–300 men, known as the Pibor Defence Forces—declared his allegiance to the SPLA.
- 16 Resolution 1 from the meeting upheld an earlier resolution of the Southern Sudan Security Committee to disarm the civil population of Southern Sudan. It directed that this be implemented in Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Jonglei 'with immediate effect'.
- 17 Focus group participants in Ayod confirmed that it was 'impossible' to buy guns locally in January 2007. Fears were expressed of 'spies' informing the authorities (SPLA and the police) of weapons ownership, who would then confiscate them, impose a fine (of cows), and subject the owner to violent punishment. They said that since the disarmament, the White Army had been rendered ineffective.
- 18 Rural areas are defined as those at least 20 minutes from an urban centre by walking and where family compounds are far enough apart to be partially or completely out of sight of one another. Urban areas are defined as those with a place name, and containing at least five family compounds, each within sight of at least one other.

- 19 Responses to questions can be biased by expectations on the part of respondents, based on perceived direct gains from taking part in a survey. This was minimized during the introduction, where it was stated that there would be no personal benefits to respondents for taking part.
- 20 Families are composed of groups related by blood or by marriage, with an identified head of household. A head of household is a male, usually with at least one wife, or a widow. A household is defined as a group of people at least some of whom are family members, who share resources and work to generate common resources for subsistence. A household may consist of one or more *tukuls*.
- 21 Recent changes to county names and boundaries have not yet been reflected on available maps. The geographic delineations used in this report were those that were in force at the time of the survey.
- 22 Described as 'trying to take/destroy something of value' in the questionnaire.
- 23 Described as 'fight with someone outside the homestead' in the questionnaire.
- 24 Described as 'fight with another family member living in the compound' in the questionnaire.
- 25 Described as 'death due to an injury or an accident' in the questionnaire.
- 26 Note that the interviewer was requested to make a gesture to denote that 'here' meant the local community.
- 27 Four respondents could not be attributed to a county, which is why Tables 7 and 8 add up to 876 and 880.
- 28 Note that 35 respondents were not attributed to a county.
- 29 Before the CPA, more people in Pibor travelled without any weapon than did residents from outside of Pibor (11.9 per cent [n = 143] as opposed to 9.5 per cent [n = 713]) and fewer Pibor residents carried a gun or rifle than did residents from outside of Pibor (33.1 per cent [n = 143] as opposed to 49.1 per cent [n = 713]).
- 30 In fact, 171 respondents indicated here that they had firearms, compared to only 139 who had admitted this fact in the prior question about gun possession. It is suspected that the 32 people who stated 'no' to the first question found it easier to admit to a number when the follow-up question was asked; thus 139 should be considered a minimum and biased estimate of the total number of respondents having firearms.
- 31 Because respondents were able to indicate more than one issue of concern, 'n' here exceeds the 'n' for the questionnaire as a whole.

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