Tubu Trouble: State and Statelessness in the Chad–Sudan–Libya Triangle

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# Contents

List of boxes and maps ........................................................................................................... 5
List of abbreviations and acronyms .......................................................................................... 6
Key events ................................................................................................................................................................................... 8

I. Introduction and key findings ............................................................................................... 10

II. Regional dynamics .............................................................................................................. 17
   Maintaining the Chadian–Sudanese entente since 2011 ......................................................... 17
   Realignment of Chad’s security concerns .............................................................................. 26

III. The Chadian Sahara since the 1990s: the MDJT, its war, and its legacies ...................... 29
   A populated desert ................................................................................................................. 29
   State absence: a historical constant since colonization ....................................................... 33
   The MDJT war (1997–2011) and its impact .......................................................................... 35
   The MDJT ‘government’ in Tibesti ....................................................................................... 43
   Fragmentation and slow death of a rebellion ....................................................................... 47

IV. The difficult return of the state .......................................................................................... 59
   Administrative instabilities .................................................................................................. 59
   XAF 30 billion for Tibesti’s development: a lost opportunity .............................................. 70

V. Gold without borders: a gold rush on Teda lands ............................................................. 75
   Striking gold from Sudan to Algeria .................................................................................... 75
   Eldorado in Tibesti ................................................................................................................ 80
   Conflicts around gold .......................................................................................................... 83
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local reaction: from self-defence to rejection of the state</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of the state: between collusion and neutrality</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rebel factor</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aftermath of the gold rush</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Wars without borders: northern Chad and southern Libya</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chadian and Libyan Teda: multiple identities</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Libyan Teda under Qaddafi</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Teda at war in Libya</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of the borders, roads, and trade</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese and Chadian interventions in Libya</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Conclusion: a holistic approach to security</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the authors</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Small Arms Survey</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Human Security Baseline Assessment</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Security Assessment in North Africa</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Armament Research</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSBA publications</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online resources</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of boxes and maps

Boxes
1. Mines: the inheritance of several wars 40
2. Seeking international legitimacy: the ‘Para’ opportunity 57
3. New chiefs: the case of Chidi Kallemy 65
4. New schools, few pupils, and practically no teachers 73
5. From old to new wangada 89

Maps
1. Chad–Sudan–Libya: The turbulent triangle 14
2. Chad–Libya borderlands 29
3. Ethnic groups 35
4. Landmines in northern Chad 40
5. Goldmining in eastern and central Sahara 75
6. Trade and trafficking routes 126
List of abbreviations and acronyms

ANS  National Security Agency (Agence nationale de sécurité)
ANT  Chadian National Army (Armée nationale tchadienne)
AU   African Union
CAR  Central African Republic
CEN-SAD  Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CCFAN  Northern Armed Forces Command Council
        (Conseil de commandement des forces armées du Nord)
DGGTPP  General Directorate for Presidential Large-scale Works
        and Projects (Direction générale des grands travaux et
        projets présidentiels)
EU   European Union
EUR  Euro
FACT  Front for Change and Concord in Chad (Front pour
       l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad)
FAP   People’s Armed Forces (Forces armées populaires)
Frolinat  Chadian National Liberation Front
          (Front de libération nationale du Tchad)
FSR   Front for the Salvation of the Republic
GNA   Government of National Accord
GNC   General National Congress
GNNT  Chadian National and Nomadic Guard
       (Garde nationale et nomade du Tchad)
GSPC  Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
       (Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat)
GUNT  Chadian Government of National Unity
       (Gouvernement d’union nationale du Tchad)
IS    Islamic State
HoR   House of Representatives
JEM   Justice and Equality Movement
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LJM</td>
<td>Liberation and Justice Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>LYD</td>
<td>Libyan dinar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| MDJT         | Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad  
|Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad| |
| MP           | Member of parliament |
| MPS          | Patriotic Salvation Movement  
|Mouvement patriotique du salut| |
| NISS         | National Intelligence and Security Service |
| NTC          | National Transitional Council |
| RPG          | Rocket-propelled grenade |
| RSF          | Rapid Support Forces |
| SDG          | Sudanese pound |
| SLA-AW       | Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur |
| SLA-MM       | Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi |
| SPLM         | Sudan People’s Liberation Movement |
| UAE          | United Arab Emirates |
| UFDD         | Union of Forces for Democracy and Development  
|Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement| |
| UFR          | Union of Resistance Forces  
|Union des forces de la résistance| |
| UN           | United Nations |
| USD          | US dollar |
| XAF          | Central African franc |
Key events

1913–14 French forces enter Borkou and then Tibesti. The Chadian Sahara is one of the last parts of Africa to be colonized.

1960 Chad's independence from France.

1966 Exiled dissidents from northern Chad found the Front de libération nationale du Tchad (Frolinat), the source of all subsequent armed opposition movements in northern Chad.

1968 Frolinat begins to establish itself in Tibesti.

1969 Muammar Qaddafi comes to power in Libya.

1973 Libya occupies the Aozou strip.

1978–79 Libyan forces and allied Chadian rebels take control of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti.

1987 Chadian president Hissène Habré retakes control of northern Chad with the exception of the Aozou strip.

1987–98 Tibesti experiences a decade of relative peace and stability.

1989 Omar al-Bashir comes to power in Sudan.

1990 Idriss Déby comes to power in Chad.

1994 Libya withdraws from the Aozou strip.

1997 The Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad (MDJT) is founded in N'Djaména by a dozen people from Tibesti.


1998 Qaddafi revokes the Libyan citizenship of the Aozou Teda.

From 1999 Qaddafi provides financial and logistical support to the MDJT, but not weapons.

2000 President Déby pressures Libya to stop providing support to the MDJT rebellion.

2001 The first internal divisions appear in the MDJT when its leadership bows to Libyan pressure and takes part in peace talks in Tripoli and Sebha.

2002 Death of MDJT leader Youssouf Togoimi in September. His deputy, Hassan Mardage, becomes interim president of the movement. End of Libyan support for the group.


2005 Choa Dazi elected president of the MDJT. Continued fragmentation of the movement.

October 2005 Hassan Mardage’s MDJT faction signs a peace agreement with the Chadian government. Some leaders are given posts in the army or government, and combatants are integrated into the Chadian National Army (ANT).

2005–09 Five years of war between Chad and Sudan carried out via proxy rebel groups.

2005–10 Some MDJT factions unsuccessfully attempt to obtain support from Khartoum and establish links with Chadian armed opposition groups supported by Sudan.
2007 MDJT factions attempt to reunite during a new congress. Choa Dazi’s mandate is revoked and the interim presidency is given to Hassan Soukaya.

2007–08 MDJT Dazagada fighters join the Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement (UFDD) in Darfur.

2008 Weakened by surrenders to the government and confronted with a catastrophic financial situation, the MDJT rebellion effectively ends.

2009 Déby promises to allocate XAF 30 billion (USD 51 million) to Tibesti over a period of three years to fund development.

2009–10 The last MDJT rebels surrender to the Chadian government.

End of 2009 Beginning of the rapprochement between Sudan and Chad.

April 2010 State of emergency ends in Tibesti. MDTJ fighters demobilize.

2011 Sudan supports the uprising against President Qaddafi, in contrast to Chad. Qaddafi tries to gain the support of non-Arab minorities, including Libyan Teda, and Sudanese armed opposition members. He cancels Decision No. 13, which deprived many Teda of Libyan citizenship in 1998. Yet the Teda gradually turn against the regime and play a key role in the ‘liberation’ of southern Libya.

From mid-2011 Large quantities of Qaddafi’s weaponry leave Libya, including to Chad, Sudan, and other Sahel countries. Occurring on a large scale between 2012 and 2014, these flows have slowed progressively since. Chad gradually shifts its centre of attention and redeploys its troops from its eastern to its northern border to deal with the new situation in Libya.

October 2011 Death of Muammar Qaddafi.

Since late 2011 Conflict between Teda and Zuwaya Arabs in Kufra.

2011–14 A series of gold discoveries are made in the Sahel and Sahara in an arc stretching from Sudan to Mauritania, including in North Darfur and in Teda territory in Chad, Libya, and Niger.

2012–14 Conflict between Teda and Awlad Suleiman Arabs in Sebha.

2013 Tibesti sees a growing influx of gold miners, leading to a number of clashes in 2014 (in Ogi) and 2015 (in Miski, Turku, and Kouri Bougoudi).

2014–15 Conflict between Teda and Touareg in Ubari. Teda and Touareg combatants from neighbouring countries (Chad, Niger, Mali) and Darfuran rebels are involved in the fighting.

2014–15 Increasing fragmentation of Libyan armed groups. Two loose power centres emerge in east and west Libya. The General National Congress of Tripoli mostly backed by brigades from Misrata attempts to form a military coalition called Fajr Libya, which falls apart in 2015. In the east the House of Representatives in Tobruk is supported by the so-called Libyan National Army of General Khalîfa Haftar.

From Jan. 2015 ANT deploys combat units in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger to fight Boko Haram.

From mid-2015 Reinforcement of security forces in Tibesti and enforcement of a ban on gold mining in the area.

December 2015 Agreement is signed between representatives of the two rival Libyan parliaments to form a Government of National Accord. The deal is rejected by other parliamentarians, as well as a number of military leaders, most notably Haftar.

April 2016 Chadian UFDD rebels in Libya split, forming the Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad (FACT), led by Mahamat Mahadi, and supported by Misrata’s ‘Third Force’.

June 2016 Another faction splits from the FACT to form the Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la république. Both groups now constitute the main Chadian armed opposition forces.
I. Introduction and key findings

Over the last 50 years the Chadian Sahara has experienced longer periods of war than peace, including repeated insurrections. In Chad’s far north the Tibesti Massif has been more often under the control of armed opposition movements than of the Chadian state. Its inhabitants, the Teda (or Tubu), who also live in southern Libya and north-eastern Niger, have played a key role in these three countries’ rebellions. Their main strength has been their control of the mountainous Tibesti region and the surrounding trans-Saharan routes. The last insurrection in northern Chad, which started in late 1997, was that of the Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad (MDJT), whose last fighters only laid down their weapons in 2011. During this period local forms of governance replaced an absent or unstable state. The rebellion attempted as best it could to administer the areas under its control, and, similar to the state, used and manipulated traditional institutions. As a result these institutions emerged from the war fragmented and fragile. The effect of this conflict was largely negative. It increased the ongoing exodus of northern Chad’s Teda population to Libya and further contributed to cutting off the historical armed opposition stronghold of Tibesti from the rest of Chad.

Since 2011 a difficult process has been under way of the state’s return to a region that is simultaneously geographically peripheral, historically marginalized, and culturally resistant to outside interference. A substantial financial development programme was launched in 2011 with the objective of enabling Tibesti to make up for lost time, but it failed. A more concrete economic opportunity appeared from 2012 onwards in the form of a series of gold rushes throughout the Sahel and Sahara. The newly discovered gold fields stretched from Darfur in Sudan to southern Algeria and included northern Chad. In Tibesti the gold rush caused violent tensions between prospectors coming from outside the area and local communities. The mobilization of the latter slowly evolved into new opposition to the state, which did not, however, have any major destabilizing effect on the state’s authority.
Since 2011 an even greater risk has emerged on Chad’s northern border after the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ and the collapse of the Qaddafi regime in neighbouring Libya. Chaos has been unleashed since the Libyan revolution, mainly in southern Libya, which is inhabited by trans-border Chadian–Libyan communities. This chaos attracts fighters—including armed opposition forces—from northern Chad and Darfur, and is already having repercussions in Chad and Sudan. Thus, as in the 1980s and during the 2003–10 Chad–Darfur crisis, the Chad–Sudan–Libya triangle has once again become the centre of a regional system of conflicts. A notable consequence of these conflicts has been the re-emergence since 2011 of a regional market for cross-border combatants.

This Working Paper provides an overview of Tibesti’s recent history in order to better understand its current situation and context. It reviews the evolution of Tibesti’s socio-political environment over the past few decades, including the most recent MDJT war and its effects, the tentative and partial redeployment of state authority in the region, and the consequences of the fall of the Qaddafi regime in neighbouring Libya. It further discusses the repercussions of regional gold rushes since 2013 and the prospects for a renewed rebellion in northern Chad.

The paper’s key findings are as follows:

- Since Chad’s independence in 1960 the north of the country has experienced successive rebellions. Tibesti has experienced little more than twenty years of light administration by the Chadian state and about thirty years of control by various armed opposition factions. Relative stability and security have prevailed since the last MDJT rebels laid down their weapons in 2011, although isolated outbreaks of opposition to the state have recently resurfaced. These have occurred as a response to gold rushes in the region, violent conflicts between gold miners and local communities in 2014–15, and the state’s (mis)management of related tensions.

- From 2012 onwards the discovery of gold caused a considerable influx of prospectors into the region, which triggered conflicts between the Teda and the gold miners. Because the latter belonged mainly to the ethnic group of President Idriss Déby (the Beri or Zaghawa), these tensions increased local hostility to the Chadian authorities. The Teda self-defence militias that were
formed to protect the region against the influx of gold miners slowly transformed themselves into an autonomous force that increasingly rejected the central state.

• While the Chadian government is not always perceived favourably, currently a large majority of the inhabitants of Tibesti seem to have little appetite for a new insurrection. Even the presence of Chadian armed opposition groups in neighbouring southern Libya has not made rebellion more attractive.

• Despite a number of attempts since 2011, the Chadian state seems to be incapable of fully establishing its authority over Tibesti. This is because of the region’s isolation, the persistent reluctance of the local populations to accept what is considered to be an external authority, the instability of that authority, and the negative experience of a development programme launched in 2012, which started to collapse in mid-2014.

• Historically, customary chiefs have been the main sources of stability and security in Tibesti. The displacement and divisions that the Teda community has suffered have considerably weakened their influence, however. This situation was further exacerbated by the multiplication of chiefs by the government after the rebellion ended. This weakening of traditional authority explains the development among the Teda in both Chad and Libya of opposition to the authority of the derde (the dynastic chief who historically played the roles of arbitrator of disputes and guarantor of customary law).

• On either side of the Chadian–Libyan border (as well as in Niger) the Teda have multiple and fluid identities. Marginalized under Qaddafi, who instrumentalized their claims to Libyan citizenship, those living in Libya played an important role in the 2011 uprising in that country. Since then their claim to full Libyan citizenship has been viewed with hostility by the powers in northern Libya, and rival Arab and Tuareg communities in southern Libya.

• The Teda militias of southern Libya sometimes display signs of unity when facing common enemies. However, they operate under distinct commands, suffer from internal divisions, and are mostly autonomous armed groups that are ready to opportunistically align themselves with other forces.

• From a regional perspective the continuation of the Chadian–Sudanese entente since 2011 has enabled these two countries to focus on other dangers on their borders, in particular those emanating from post-Qaddafi Libya.
Chad and Sudan support opposing parties in the Libyan conflict: Sudan is mainly seeking to establish a friendly regime in Libya, while Chad believes it is vital to prevent armed opposition movements or jihadist groups from using the chaos in Libya to penetrate its northern regions. Meanwhile, armed opposition groups from both countries have established themselves on Libyan soil, hoping to obtain support from Libyan forces hostile to their respective governments.

- Armed opposition groups from Chad and Darfur and Sudanese ‘janjawid’ militias have regularly crossed the region’s borders. Since 2011 they have been observed in Libya in particular. Many of them have prospected for gold throughout the Sahara. Some offer their services as mercenaries, particularly in Libya, while others are involved in trafficking and banditry. The repeated failures of peace agreements and rebel reintegration processes, the lack of economic opportunities, the absence of political alternatives in Chad, Libya’s instability, and the continuing violence in Darfur are chief among the many factors causing the internationalization and growing autonomy of armed factions in the region.

- Between 2011 and 2013 illicit weapons flows from looted Libyan arsenals transited through northern Chad. These flows seem to have dried up, but flows of individual weapons persist and supply the local market in northern Chad. Demand remains relatively high and has increased in reaction to the Tibesti gold rush. Easy access to Libyan weapons has further contributed to the militarization of Chadian Teda society.

It is essential that more attention is paid to the vast Teda territory and the Chadian–Libyan border areas. This problematic area is geographically marginal, yet central to regional security. It is crucial not to limit the focus solely to the military dimension, however, as the Western interventions in response to the crises in Libya and northern Mali have done. Instead, socio-economic interventions should be adapted to the needs of local communities and aim to integrate them into the state. Without this there is a clear danger of these communities on the borders of northern Chad, southern Libya, and northern Darfur becoming even more marginalized in their respective countries. This could in turn result in even more young men offering their services for hire (as militiamen, rebels, mercenaries, or bandits) or engaging in cross-border trafficking.
Sources: Carto Magazine n° 36 (2016).
Map 1 Chad–Sudan–Libya: The turbulent triangle

- Area of fighting
- Reported presence of Sudanese rebels since 2013
- Reported presence of Chadian rebels since 2013
- Presence of jihadi movement, Boko Haram

International boundary
Disputed boundary
Selected provincial/state boundary
National capital
Town or village
Main rivers

All boundaries are an indication only
This report, written in late 2016 and early 2017, is based on field research carried out jointly by the Small Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research since September 2015. The authors undertook several missions to Chad in 2015 and 2016, visiting mainly N’Djaména, Faya in the Borkou region, and Tibesti in November–December 2015; Gouro in West Ennedi in December 2015; and Am Djeres in East Ennedi in January 2016. The authors held more than 100 interviews with Chadian, Libyan, and Sudanese officials and military personnel; Teda customary political and military chiefs; representatives of civil society; economic actors, including cross-border traders and gold miners; Chadian, Sudanese, and Libyan armed opposition members and former members; and international observers and actors. Interviews were also held outside Chad, mainly in Niger and France. Numerous documents, both published and confidential, were consulted. Finally, the authors also used data collected during previous trips to Chad and Sudan in the writing of this report.²

The text that follows contains names of places and people and vernacular terms in the various languages spoken in the region, including Arabic (in particular its dialects spoken in Chad, Darfur, and Libya), Tedaga, Dazaga, and Beri-a (the language of the Beri). These languages are transcribed in quite different ways in different locations. In Chad, local names are often gallicized, while Sudan has sometimes adopted English transcriptions of place names; moreover, in both Sudan and Libya, non-Arabic names have often been Arabized.

As far as possible the authors have attempted to favour a phonetic transcription of local names. But for the most common names they have sometimes chosen to respect the most widely accepted practice, or, in the case of people’s names, the spellings chosen by the people themselves.

They have also chosen as much as possible to designate ethnic groups by the names that they give themselves and places by the names that their inhabitants give them rather than those given by foreigners. For instance, they prefer Teda to the better known Tubu/Toubou,³ Dazagada to Goran, and Beri to Zaghawa or Bideyat.
II. Regional dynamics

Maintaining the Chadian–Sudanese entente since 2011

The regimes governing Chad and Sudan have many historical commonalities, but their cultural differences are perhaps even more striking. Omar al Bashir has been in power in Sudan since 1989 and Idriss Déby in Chad since 1990, the

Chadian president Idriss Déby in his clan’s stronghold of Am Djeres, not far from the Sudanese border. January 2016. © Jérôme Tubiana
latter due largely to Sudanese support. Both came to power in the immediate aftermath of the cold war and have demonstrated a similar longevity. This has led to political fatigue among their respective populations, a proportion of whom once believed in their leaders’ democratic credentials.

One of the most apparent differences between the two leaders was their approach to democratic expectations both inside and outside their respective countries. In 1989 the National Islamic Front coup d’état put an end to a brief—although very imperfect—democratic experience in Sudan. In Chad the takeover of power by the Mouvement patriotique du salut (MPS) armed opposition movement put an end to the brutal dictatorship of Hissène Habré (of whose regime Déby was himself a part until 1989, a year before his rise to power). Sudan, Libya, and France all supported Déby’s rebellion in an opportunistic alliance that would no doubt have been impossible during the cold war. The three allies had very few common interests besides that of opposing growing American influence generated by US support for Habré in a country (that is, Chad) that each considers to constitute its natural and historical sphere of influence.

From 1990 onwards the Chadian regime established itself in the ‘new’ francophone Africa that developed in the aftermath of the cold war: the leaders of this French-influenced zone felt compelled to adopt some visible signs of democracy, however superficial they were in reality. These included a multi-party system, elections, freedom of the press, and the emergence of a civil society.

The National Islamic Front, on the other hand, initially placed Sudan in the vanguard of the international Islamist movement, which at the time was rapidly expanding. This Islamist expansionism affected all of Sudan’s neighbours in various ways. In Chad it was limited to the arrival of clerics trained in Sudan, which provoked the first frictions between the governments in N’Djaména and Khartoum. In the 1990s, while the United States was still mainly worried about Libyan influence, other actors, such as France, were instead concerned about Sudanese influence, and even more about the arrival in Chad, through Sudan, of Saudi and even Pakistani Wahhabi preachers (or Salafists, as they prefer to call themselves). These preachers came in particular from the Ansar al-Sunna group, which had also established itself in Sudan.
Chadian–Sudanese relations and Darfur

Despite these frictions, Chadian–Sudanese relations remained stable. The Chadian government rejected overtures from Sudanese armed opposition groups, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the early rebels in Darfur, who tried to obtain support in N’Djaména throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. This rejection continued until the start of the war in Darfur in 2003, when Déby was unable to prevent members of his own family from supporting Darfur rebels who mainly belonged to their ethnic group. This community, the Beri, are better known by the Arabic names of Zaghawa and Bideyat. The crisis escalated quickly, and in 2004 and 2005 Bashir gave his National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) a free hand to support or even instigate an uprising in Chad. Déby reacted by providing quasi-official support to armed opposition groups in Darfur. This resulted in five years of war between Chad and Sudan carried out via proxy armed groups (2005–09).4

The war was a military failure for both sides. Starting in 2009, politicians who were considered to be pragmatists became more influential than the hawks of the security services and negotiated a rapprochement between the two governments. Key among these pragmatists were Chad’s minister of foreign affairs, Moussa Faki, and Ghazi Salaheddin al-Attabani, who was in charge of the Darfur negotiations in Khartoum. The rapprochement was all the more effective for being based on bilateral talks without the involvement (besides the usual encouragement) of international actors such as the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), France, and the United States.5 The agreement that sealed the entente proved to be viable because each side possessed the necessary political will to exit the dead end it found itself in as a result of the conflict.

The short, two-and-a-half page agreement was a model of its kind—all the more so because the rapprochement was successful even though the terms of the agreement were only partially implemented. For instance, most of the Darfur rebels were expelled from Chad, but were not disarmed, as the agreement required. On the other hand, Chadian rebels in Sudan were mostly disarmed and a number were expelled; some were even handed over to the Chadian government. Thus, only a few remnants of what had once been the Chadian uprising were able to survive in Darfur and the Central African Republic (CAR) (Tubiana, 2011, pp. 42–45).
In 2010 Déby was not in a position to disarm Darfur’s armed opposition groups. However, from that point on he has never failed to consolidate his rapprochement with Sudan by systematically opposing the Darfur rebellion both politically and militarily. Chad considers itself to be a mediator in the Darfur conflict, although neither the actors in the conflict nor international actors recognize it as such. The AU and most of the international community believe that the Darfur problem should be resolved through a ‘national dialogue’ that deals with the whole Sudanese crisis, of which Darfur is only one element. This is contrary to the views of both Sudan and Chad: Sudan has consistently rejected this holistic approach, while Chad has loyal aligned itself with Khartoum’s position. As a result, since 2010 the Darfur rebels have remained estranged from the Chadian government and their periodic meetings with Déby have been unproductive. This is of little concern to the Chadian president, however, because his peace initiatives in Darfur are solely designed to provide evidence of goodwill towards Khartoum.

While meeting from time to time with the leaders of the main Darfur armed opposition groups, Déby has mainly contrived to divide them, including through financial and logistical means. These groups include the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and the factions of the Sudan Liberation Army under the command of Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) and Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur (SLA-AW). In this way he played an essential role in the formation in 2012 of JEM-Bashar/Dabajo (led by Mohammed Bashar, then Bakhit Abdelkarim ‘Dabajo’), which split off from JEM. He also facilitated the secession in 2014 of elements of the SLA-MM under the command of Mohammedein Ismail ‘Orgajor’, and of important SLA-AW leaders, principally Abulgasim Imam, Mohammed Abdelsalam ‘Tarrada’, and Nimir Mohammed.

In 2013, after JEM assassinated Mohammed Bashar on the Chadian–Sudanese border, Déby reacted by sending troops against the group, with Khartoum’s blessing (ICG, 2015b, p. 14). These troops forced JEM forces to leave Darfur and pursued them as far as the borders of Kordofan and South Sudan. More recently, in October 2015 the Chadian government is said to have sent troops in about 150 vehicles to reinforce the mixed Chadian–Sudanese force fighting Sudanese armed opposition groups in North Darfur. These rebels were mainly from the SLA-MM. As had often happened in the past, however, the Chadian
troops, who were mostly Beri, seem to have given the Sudanese rebels advance warning of their arrival and avoided any confrontation with them.\(^6\)

Splinter factions from Darfur armed opposition groups such as JEM and the SLA factions made peace with the Sudanese government with Chadian support. In October 2015 the Chadian president flew dissident leaders of the main Darfur armed opposition groups from N’Djaména to Khartoum in his personal aircraft so that they could participate in the opening of the Sudanese national dialogue.\(^7\) Most of them then refused to remain in Khartoum, forcing Déby to fly them home again. The two ‘rebels’ who participated in the ceremony were in fact dissidents who joined the proceedings with Déby’s assistance.\(^8\)

Finally, Déby organized his own ‘peace process’ for Darfur in his home village of Am Djerès in the East Ennedi region. During two conferences in 2013 and 2014 the Chadian president received a host of Sudanese officials belonging in particular to the Beri group, but no rebel leaders. Once again, far from being a mediation between government and rebels, the ‘Am Djerès process’ was designed primarily to urge the Sudanese Beri to support the Khartoum regime and oppose the rebellion.

Besides the Beri, Déby also invited Darfur Arab leaders to the conferences. One of these was Musa Hilal, the leader of the Mahamid Arabs of North Darfur. He is mostly known for having been the main leader of the janjawid militia armed by Khartoum that terrorised the non-Arab communities that the Bashir regime accused of supporting the uprising in 2003–04. Idriss Déby and Musa Hilal have maintained good relations for many years. These links were discreet when N’Djaména and Khartoum were at (proxy) war, then became more official since 2012, when Déby married one of Hilal’s daughters. In 2014, when Hilal was becoming increasingly hostile to the Khartoum government and was threatening to disrupt the upcoming elections, the Chadian president encouraged him to reaffirm his support for Khartoum. Thus Déby demonstrated to the Sudanese government that he could help to control not only the Beri, but also the Arabs.

In 2013 Chad also intervened militarily (chiefly with the joint Chadian–Sudanese border force) and politically to contain conflicts among Arab groups in Darfur, in particular between the Salamat, on the one hand, and the Missiriya and Ta’aisha, on the other. The intervention’s key objective was to prevent
these conflicts from spreading to Chad, where many members of these three tribes live.

In Khartoum the rapprochement with Chad is generally considered a success and a model to be followed in terms of Sudan’s policies towards its neighbours. It illustrates a degree of pragmatism and flexibility (which have not always been part of the Sudanese regime’s foreign policy), and in particular uses practical tools such as a joint cross-border force. Ghazi Salaheddin al-Attabani, one of the model’s main architects, emphasized this during a conference in London in 2011, when he was still a member of the Sudanese government.

It is interesting to note, however, that at that time Ghazi did not consider that this model of good neighbourliness could be extended to South Sudan. This demonstrates the extent to which the fault lines stemming from the Sudanese civil war run much deeper than those from the Chadian–Sudanese confrontation (Salahuddin, 2012). In mid-2013 Sudan and South Sudan initiated a rapprochement based on the same model, but it was interrupted later in that year by the outbreak of civil war in South Sudan (ICG, 2015a, p. 20).

**Chadian–Sudanese relations and Libya**

Finally, since 2011 the Chadian–Sudanese rapprochement has survived the revolution and ensuing civil war in Libya, even though Chad and Sudan have adopted opposing positions in their Libyan policies.

The Libyan revolution has had important consequences for both countries. From the start Déby opposed the international agenda of regime change in Libya: with considerable foresight he warned his French allies of the possible adverse consequences for the stability of the Sahel (Jeune Afrique, 2011; Marchal, 2011). To this day the Chadian president continues to insist that he was right and that the international intervention bears considerable responsibility for the chaos in Libya.⁹ By contrast, the Sudanese government by its own admission actively supported the Libyan revolution and was effectively an unofficial member of the NATO coalition against Qaddafi (Marchal, 2011; De Waal, 2013a, p. 71).

Simultaneously Sudan also served as an intermediary for the financial support and weapons supplied to Libyan armed opposition groups by Qatar, which
had opposed Libya in the Darfur mediation (Cole and Khan, 2015, pp. 70, 74, 76; De Waal, 2013a, p. 71). The Sudanese regime had long considered Libya to be an essential source of support for all the rebellions that had afflicted it, including those of the SPLM/Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Darfur armed opposition groups. While Qaddafi claimed to be a mediator in the Darfur conflict, Khartoum understood that he was in fact the rebels’ main supporter, rather than Chad. Sudan came to understand that part of the support attributed to Chad was in fact Libyan support transiting through Chad, mainly during the JEM raid on Khartoum in May 2008 (Tubiana, 2011, pp. 52–53; Marchal, 2011). By their own admission Sudanese officials were so afraid of Qaddafi’s reaction that they only dared to accuse him directly of supporting the Darfur armed opposition when the Libyan revolution was under way (Elhag, 2012).10

Chad remained loyal to Qaddafi: Chadian officials in Libya are said to have assisted the Libyan regime in recruiting immigrants from Chad and possibly from other countries to fight the rebellion. Chad has also been accused of sending weapons and regular troops to Libya, although Chadian officials and other well-informed sources categorically deny this (Marchal, 2011).11

However, it does seem that Darfur armed opposition groups who were already present in Libya or had travelled to the country at the time of the revolution did indeed recruit fighters for Qaddafi among migrants from Sudan, Chad, and other African countries. JEM in particular reportedly recruited fighters not only to curry favour with the Libyan regime, but especially to obtain money in exchange. Its leader at the time, Khalil Ibrahim, had been under house arrest in Tripoli since May 2010. Darfur armed opposition groups are also said to have fought for Qaddafi, particularly in Kufra, chiefly in exchange for weapons and ammunition that they then brought back to Darfur (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2012, p. 52).

Both JEM and the SLA-MM managed to obtain weapons in Libya. However, after obtaining weapons from the Libyan regime it seems that SLA-MM fighters did not keep their promise to fight against the Libyan armed opposition groups, and returned to Darfur with their spoils (Tubiana, 2011, p. 54; Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2012, p. 52). Arab militiamen from Darfur (janjawid) also went to Libya in search of bounty. Some of them seem to have fought for Qaddafi, despite the Sudanese government’s support for the Libyan armed opposition. In mid-
2011 one of Musa Hilal’s former lieutenants telephoned from Tripoli to inform his entourage in the Kabkabiya region of West Darfur that he had obtained weapons stockpiles and was seeking ways to bring them back to Darfur.\textsuperscript{12}

One of the objectives of the Sudanese intervention in Libya in 2011 was clearly to eliminate Khalil Ibrahim (De Waal, 2013a, p. 71; Elhag, 2012). This was finally achieved in December 2011, when his convoy was bombed in North Kordofan and he was killed. More generally, since 2011 Sudan’s Libyan policy has been largely aimed at ending Libyan support in the form of weapons flows and rear bases for the Darfur rebellion. If possible, Sudan would also like to set up a friendly regime in Tripoli that is capable of expelling Sudanese rebels from Libyan territory (De Waal, 2013a, p. 71).

In hindsight, Sudan appears to be one of the major winners of the Libyan revolution, which eliminated one of Khartoum’s historical enemies. Chad, on the other hand, has been one of the great losers. The fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya changed the balance of the Chadian–Sudanese relationship in favour of Sudan. To prevent the emergence in Tripoli of a government that might be tempted to support Chadian armed opposition groups, Chad now has an even greater need than previously to maintain peace with Sudan. This allows it to concentrate more on its northern border rather than the shared one with Sudan. Chad has been able to rely on Khartoum to prevent both the latter’s revolutionary Libyan allies and Qatar from supporting Chadian rebels. It has also relied on France and the United States to assist it in achieving these goals. Ironically, in 2011 these latter two countries effectively found themselves in the same camp as Qatar and Sudan—at least before the Libyan revolutionary movement began to fragment.\textsuperscript{13}

From 2011 onwards Chad has been legitimately worried about possible new threats on its northern border from very heterogeneous actors. These include Islamist groups who have established themselves in Libya; and the Teda (or Tubu) who live astride the borders of Chad and Libya, and have frequently rebelled against the government in N’Djaména, including under President Déby. Finally (and this is perhaps the threat that N’Djaména considers the most important), non-Teda Chadian rebels, including Beri rivals of the Déby regime, who could also obtain support in Libya and establish rear bases in the Chadian–Libyan border area.
There is no indication that Sudan has actively intervened to support its allies in Libya, which include a number of Islamist groups, or to prevent them from engaging in hostile activities against Chad. It seems that the Chadian–Sudanese entente’s ability to survive the two countries’ opposing positions on Libya is also because Sudan is unable to end the Darfur rebellion and needs Chad’s support to deal with this ongoing threat. The Darfur armed opposition groups remain active, even if they have been progressively forced to shift the focus of their activities outside of Darfur. Since 2011 they have been strengthened by the weaponry they acquired chiefly in Libya, but have also benefited from support in South Sudan, thanks to their alliance with the SPLM-North as part of the Sudan Revolutionary Front.

In addition, particularly since 2013, Khartoum has been confronted with defections of Arab militias which were once controlled by the Sudanese government. Increasingly, these militias have been fighting with one another and sometimes against government troops. Given Idriss Déby’s influence—even in its current reduced state—with both the Sudanese Beri rebels and the Darfur Arabs, Sudan seems to have decided that it is better not to make an enemy of the Chadian president. This underpins Déby’s Darfur peace initiatives, which aim to show the Sudanese government that he can still be useful to it.

To conclude, the Chadian–Sudanese entente seems particularly stable in a region that has been singularly unstable since 2011, for a variety of reasons. These include independence followed by civil war in South Sudan, the extension of the conflict areas in Sudan itself, and conflicts in CAR and Libya. Since 2015, however, when the Libyan crisis worsened, Chadian officials have been concerned that if instability continues in Libya, Chad and Sudan could become bogged down in a situation of confrontation through proxy armed groups, reminiscent of their indirect conflict in Darfur between 2005 and 2009. Nevertheless, for both governments the risks posed by their differences on Libya are relatively less important than during their earlier proxy war in Darfur and eastern Chad. Meanwhile, other external actors like Egypt, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are intervening more extensively in the Libyan crisis. They are using Chad and Sudan as intermediaries or local allies, thus allowing Khartoum and N’Djaména to benefit from the Libyan conflict by strengthening their alliances. In Libya, Sudan continues to support Islamist factions, in
agreement with Qatar and despite growing pressure from Egypt, which has moved closer to the Chadian position. Chad and Egypt, on the other hand, believe that Libya needs a new strongman who will restore order, mirroring the Egyptian model; both support General Khalifa Haftar for this role.\textsuperscript{15}

The presence of Darfur armed actors on all sides of the Libyan crisis could also complicate Chadian–Sudanese relations if suspicions resurface that they are being supported by either Khartoum or N’Djaména. Indeed, the Darfur armed opposition groups, in particular the SLA-MM, are still present in Libya and mainly side with Haftar and the latter’s Teda allies in southern Libya, but without Chadian support. Arab militias from Darfur have also been identified fighting for various Libyan factions, but Sudan is said to be supporting only those who oppose Haftar.\textsuperscript{16}

**Realignment of Chad’s security concerns**

Since the fall of the Qaddafi regime in 2011 Chad’s northern border has been an area of priority concern for the country’s foreign and security policies. However, the crisis in Libya has not been the only one that the Chadian government has had to face. Waves of instability have followed each other in the sub-region, each giving rise to humanitarian and security challenges in Chad’s southern border area and in the Lake Chad region, on the borders of Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria. From 2012 the Chadian army considerably expanded its operations southward in response to the CAR crisis, which started at the end of that year. It also deployed forces westward, firstly through the Chadian intervention in Mali from the start of the crisis there in January 2013, then through its commitment to help confront the growing threat of Boko Haram.

Indirectly, the management of the CAR crisis also strengthened the good relations between N’Djaména and Khartoum, because Sudan also supported regime change in Bangui. Sudan delivered weapons to the Séléka rebellion, probably before it took power and certainly shortly after Michel Djotodia became president of CAR. Khartoum also gave Djotodia the use of, or tolerated the cross-border activities of, a number of Sudanese commanders and fighters. Among these was Moussa as-Simeh Abulqasim, a former Mahamid Arab militia leader in Darfur: Abulqasim led the force that controlled Bangui until June 2013.\textsuperscript{17}
The convergence of Chad’s and Sudan’s approaches to Séléka stemmed from the fact that both regimes were pursuing an identical objective. This was to prevent their respective rebellions from using CAR territory as bases, which these rebellions had done in the past and continue to do, although to a lesser extent. Small Chadian and Sudanese rebel factions regularly operate on the tripartite Chadian–Sudanese–CAR border and have sometimes cooperated with one another, as well as with factions that later constituted Séléka. A number of Chadian rebels even joined the CAR insurrection. Some Darfur armed opposition groups, particularly JEM, may also be tempted to retreat to CAR. JEM has increasingly felt less and less secure in South Sudan, has been accused of fighting for the government in Juba, and was ordered to leave following the signing of the South Sudanese peace agreement (Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan) in August 2015.18

By aligning its foreign policy objectives with those of the West the Chadian regime has managed to increase its international credibility. Chad had provided the French army’s Operation Serval in northern Mali with a force that totalled 2,400 men by mid-March 2013. This force served as the backbone of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, which the Security Council established on 25 April 2013. Since then the Chadian National Army (ANT) has participated in joint operations as part of the French army’s Operation Barkhane, which is headquartered in N’Djaména.19 Chad’s involvement in the fight against Boko Haram increased in intensity between January and February 2015. At that time the ANT deployed combat units in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger in order to support neighbouring armies under pressure from the Salafist fighters. Chadian military assistance to neighbours around Lake Chad continued throughout 2016. President Déby’s regional policy has thus enabled him to minimize the secondary fallout from the Qaddafi regime’s collapse by strengthening his position on the international scene.

It is clear that Chad is the most stable state in the region, which enables it to benefit from Western political, economic, and military support, despite its inadequacies in terms of economic management and democracy. Meanwhile, Sudan has long negotiated its cooperation with the West via the fight against Islamist terrorism and attempts to stem migration flows to Europe. In return it has obtained the West’s relative silence regarding the violent wars that persist
in its peripheries. As is often the case, the priority given by international actors to security leads to the perception that states such as Chad and Sudan are stable regimes in an unstable environment. This prevents any serious engagement on the issue of democratic change.

Significantly, the Chadian–Sudanese entente has allowed Chad to concentrate on its northern sector and its border area with Libya. The border with Libya is particularly crucial both for Chad’s internal security and for maintaining the Chadian regime in power. This is because Libya, like Darfur, has been the main historical rear base of Chadian rebellions.

Libya remains the main source of destabilization of the Sahel countries. Chad’s capacity to control the strategic area of its northern reaches is clearly a key element of its international policy. It has alliances both with the West and with its neighbours, despite divergences with Sudan on the Libyan issue. It will not suffice, however, for this policy to rely on exterior military interventions and internal security measures. Chad in particular must still find a non-military answer to the consequences of decades of rebellion and the absence of state presence in its Saharan zones, particularly in the Tibesti Massif.
III. The Chadian Sahara since the 1990s: the MDJT, its war, and its legacies

A populated desert

The Chadian Sahara comprises the Borkou, Ennedi (divided into East and West Ennedi), and Tibesti regions. Communities generally grouped under the name of Teda-Daza largely inhabit this area. However, they are better known by two names given to them by neighbouring populations: ‘Tubu’ in the Kanembu language, spoken in Kanem, to the north of Lake Chad; and ‘Goran’ in Arabic. In spite of not giving themselves a generic name that encompasses all their communities, the Teda-Daza generally consider themselves to be one people. ‘Tubu’ is sometimes applied to all of the Teda-Daza, chiefly in Niger, but in fact specifically designates the Teda. ‘Goran’, on the other hand, designates the Daza.
or Dazagada; that is, the speakers of the Dazaga language. The Teda and Daza speak two closely related languages, Tedaga and Dazaga, which belong to the central Saharan group of Nilo-Saharan languages. This group of languages also includes Beri-a, the language of the Beri. This community (better known by the Arabic names of Zaghawa and Bideyat) lives to the east of the Teda-Daza domain in the border areas of north-eastern Chad and the Darfur region of northern Sudan (Tubiana, 2006, pp. 55–76; 2007, pp. 11–13).

Traditionally the Teda-Daza and Beri are mainly transhumant pastoralists. The Teda and Bideyat in the north mostly breed dromedaries, and the Dazagada and Zaghawa further to the south raise cows, although camels also dominate since the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, they make a living from date palm cultivation in the oases, the harvesting of wild plants, the salt trade
and, increasingly, cross-border trade with Libya and Sudan. Trade of this kind was unknown in pre-colonial times, when their main source of income came from raiding the great trans-Saharan caravans.

The Teda-Daza and Beri mostly make up clan confederations of diverse origins that found themselves gathered in the same place at various times. The Teda comprise around 40 clans of very diverse origins (today the Teda themselves generally consider there to be 36 clans). These clans are either settled in or have simply passed through Tibesti, where an enormous volcanic massif rises to a height of more than 3,000 metres. The Teda consider these mountains to be the heart of their historical territory in north-western Chad (Chapelle, 1982, pp. 67–97; d’Arbaumont, 1989). Outside of Tibesti the Teda live in the oases of southern Libya and, together with the Dazagada, in the Chadian regions
of Borkou, Egey, and Manga as far as the north of Kanem, as well as in eastern Niger up to the Termit Massif (Turni in Tedaga). They are also found to the east of Tibesti, between the Gouro oasis and north-eastern Ennedi, among the Murdyia. The latter is a sub-group combining clans of Teda, Dazagada, and Beri origin (Chapelle, 1982, p. 394).

In 2009 Tibesti officially had 21,000 inhabitants. Today officials give a much higher figure of up to 54,000 inhabitants, but others believe the population—a large part of which moves between Tibesti and other regions—does not number more than 10,000–15,000 permanent inhabitants. In Ennedi, which has a population of 150,000 (this figure has perhaps been inflated because it is the president’s native region), there are also said to be several thousand Teda. More than 4,000 (approximately a thousand families) live in the Ennedi sous-préfecture of Gouro. In the 1950s it was estimated that around 90 per cent of the Teda lived in Chad, 5 per cent in Niger, and 5 per cent in Libya. Since then, decades of war and drought have displaced large numbers of Chadian Teda to Libya. Most Teda agree that the majority of their community now reside in Libya, where they are said to number between 15,000 and 50,000.

While the Teda are associated and associate themselves with Tibesti, few of them claim to be indigenous to the massif and its surrounding areas. The historically most powerful clans, chiefly the Tomagra and Gonna, say that they came from Bornu. The Bornu or Kanem-Bornu (around Lake Chad, astride Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon) was the first of the three large kingdoms in what is now Chad to have been Islamized. This gives the Bornu a certain prestige (Zeltner, 1980; Magnant, 1990, pp. 10–11). Many other clans are of Daza or Beri origin, and some are considered to be indigenous to the oases of southern Libya (for example, Kufra and Fezzan). This particularly applies to the Tezerya clan, whose name comes from ‘Tezer’ or ‘Tayzer’, the Teda name for the Kufra oases (Tubiana, 2007, pp. 153–54). The name has survived in one of the oases, Tazerbo (‘the great Tayzer’ in Tedaga). The name Kufra comes from the Arabic kafir or ghaffar, meaning ‘pagan’ or ‘non-believer’. Arabs based in what is now Libya, who were probably the first Muslims to make contact with the Teda at a time when they were not yet Islamized, named the oases that made up the northern limits of the Teda domain Ard el-Kuffar, ‘the land of the pagans’. Currently, the Teda are all Muslims.
State absence: a historical constant since colonization

The Chadian Sahara is one of the last parts of Africa to have been colonized. French forces entered Borkou in 1913 and Tibesti the following year. The military presence was also accompanied by a scientific mission, the Tilho mission, which lasted until 1917. Because of the First World War, the French troops decided to abandon Tibesti in the same year and would only return in 1929. After Chad’s independence in 1960 the French continued to administer all of the Chadian Sahara for five years. This administration, which was carried out by a small number of officers, was particularly light. The French considered that the Saharan nomads did not constitute an obstacle to their presence, unlike the great kingdoms further to the south, such as the Sultanate of Wadday.

In the Sahara the French limited themselves to finding or setting up loyal customary chiefs whom they then largely allowed to administer the areas under their control, in the manner of British indirect rule. The French historiography of the colonization of northern Chad, which was largely written by members of the colonial military, claims that good relations existed between the colonial authorities and the colonized. Local abuses did occur, however, and have remained in the collective memory of the Teda. They also appear in more critical documents, such as the memoirs of the explorer Théodore Monod, who was posted to Aozou in 1939–40. Monod, for example, refers to the forced marriage of a Teda woman to a French soldier (1997, pp. 357, 361).

In 1965 the French soldiers were replaced by Chadians, who often originated from the south of the country. The local population perceived their behaviour to be more abusive than the colonizers. This behaviour provoked the derde, Weddey Kihidemi, the main customary authority, to leave for Libya in 1966. In the same year exiled dissidents from northern Chad founded the Front de libération nationale du Tchad (Frolinat) in Nyala, South Darfur. This movement was the source of all the subsequent armed opposition movements in northern Chad (Tubiana, 2003, pp. 308–9; Weddeye, 2008, pp. 16–40).

Owing to its mountainous terrain and frontier with Libya, Tibesti is an ideal site for a rebellion. In 1968 Frolinat contacted the derde in Libya and, with his agreement, began to establish itself in Tibesti. In the same year Goukouni Weddey, the derde’s son—at the time a young civil servant in Faya—abandoned
the civil service to join Frolinat. The following year he took over the leadership of its ‘2nd army’ in the préfecture of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti.

In 1971 the ‘2nd army’ broke away from Frolinat, calling itself the Conseil de commandement des forces armées du nord (CCFAN). It was led by Hissène Habré (a Dazagada from Borkou), with Goukouni as second-in-command. The CCFAN controlled most of the Saharan part of Chad. In 1976 the two men separated. Habré formed the Forces armées du nord, leaving Tibesti to the forces remaining loyal to Goukouni. In 1978 the latter seized the town of Faya and allied the CCFAN with other factions to form the Forces armées populaires (FAP). The following year a transitional government, the Gouvernement d’union nationale du Tchad (GUNT), was formed with Goukoni as president and Habré as defence minister. This initial unity soon turned into a civil war, however.

When Libyan troops intervened in Chad to support Goukouni, Habré went into exile in Sudan, but retook power in 1982. FAP and its Libyan allies remained in Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti until 1986, when Goukouni fell out with Qaddafi. In 1987 FAP participated in the reconquest of northern Chad with Habré’s army, with French support. Goukouni, however, essentially remained an opponent in exile during the last years of Habré’s dictatorship and under the regime of Idriss Déby, who overthrew Habré in 1990 (Weddeye, 2008, pp. 134–38).

From 1987 to 1997 Tibesti experienced a decade without a rebellion, which was the longest peaceful period of its history since independence. But the region remained extremely marginalized and was a fertile ground for the emergence of a new insurrection. The MDJT’s appearance in late 1997 was therefore no surprise. Tibesti remained largely under the control of this armed opposition group and of the factions splintering from it until 2010. During an interview in 2008 Goukouni Weddeye described the region as follows:

*The Tibesti of Tombalbaye’s time, when there was, despite everything, a state and an administration, has given way to a complete lack of any administrative structure* (Weddeye, 2008, p. 139).

Since 1929 Tibesti has only known 35 years of a light colonial administration, nearly 30 years in which it was partly under the control of armed opposition groups, and only about 20 years intermittently under the control of the Chadian state. The latter’s administration was as light as the colonial and rebel ones. As a result of this history, in Tibesti the state is seen as a distant or even foreign
entity represented by soldiers who are often hostile and violent towards the local population.

The MDJT war (1997–2011) and its impact

The history of the MDJT war has not been written and the media have barely referred to it (with the exception of the ‘Le Para’ episode mentioned below);
neither has it been the subject of empirical or other research. Surprisingly for a conflict that began only four years after the genocide in Rwanda, the war was completely overlooked by humanitarian organizations and the UN. No doubt this can be explained by the remoteness of the region and the low density of the population; but it was also because of the international community’s fear of antagonizing both Chad and Libya.

The armed opposition movement that would become known as the MDJT was founded in N’Djaména in late 1997 by a dozen civilians and army officers from Tibesti. This occurred after a personal argument among some of them, in particular Interior Minister Youssouf Togoimi, with President Déby. Togoimi would go on to head the movement until his death in Libya in September 2002. Among the founders was also Hassan Mardage, an ANT colonel, who would head the organization later on.24

When it commenced its operations in Tibesti the MDJT had only 13 fighters equipped with five firearms. They were soon reinforced with 34 men recruited in Kufra, Libya, each with a firearm, who infiltrated Tibesti from Libyan territory. Because of the exclusion experienced by the Teda under both Habré and Déby, the rebellion was able to quickly recruit more fighters and establish itself. It simultaneously benefited from the support of Libyan and Nigerien Teda, who gave the rebels their first weapons.25

The MDJT numbered around 1,000 fighters at its peak between 2000 and 2001.26 It managed to progressively take control of several localities in Tibesti, including Zouar, and to prevent the ANT from regaining a foothold. It thus constituted a serious threat to the Chadian state, at least until Youssouf Togoimi’s death. In 1999 Togoimi announced that the MDJT would enter N’Djaména before the end of the year. However, the group remained incapable of expanding the scope of its operations far from the Tibesti Massif. In 2002 it only managed to briefly extend its activities to the Ennedi Massif, both Idriss Deby’s and the Togoimi family’s region of origin (Tubiana, 2003, pp. 515–16). The rebels slowly realized that their initial objective of overthrowing the regime was not realistic.27

Teda communities welcomed the insurrection relatively warmly, not only in Tibesti, but also in Libya, where it was initially viewed with relative benevolence by the Qaddafi regime. The support of the Libyan Teda community was
vital for a rebellion isolated in the Tibesti Massif. The Libyan Teda financed the MDJT, supplying it with food and fuel, and 200 of them joined the movement’s ranks. Barka Wardougou, originally from Niger, but who became the main Libyan Teda military leader, reportedly played a key role in providing this support. In 1999 he is said to have sent money, vehicles, and a small number of weapons from a cache in Niger—where shortly before he had participated in a Tuareg and Tubu rebellion partly supported by Qaddafi—in preparation for the MDJT’s attack on Omu. The Libyan regime was prepared to offer only limited support: in 2000 Qaddafi placed Barka under house arrest for seven years before accusing him of planning opposition activities and then moving him to detention in solitary confinement until 2010 (Wardougou, n.d.).

The number of desertions of ANT troops (about 200) during the first part of the conflict provides an interesting indicator of the support that the MDJT benefited from. Togoimi’s personality played a major role in garnering this support. Born in 1953, this jurist from a Bideyat Ennedi family established in Tibesti and considered to be a Teda, was one of the few natives of the massif other than Goukouni Weddey to have occupied a high position in the Chadian government. He was state prosecutor in Abéché and N’Djaména under Hissène Habré, then, in succession, minister of justice, defence, and the interior under Déby. He had a reputation for being an ethical politician who was above ethnic divisions. Because of this he enjoyed a degree of popularity beyond Tibesti, including among politicians from eastern and southern Chad, some of whom joined the MDJT. They quickly left, however, criticizing the Teda control of the movement in the field (Tubiana, 2003, pp. 515–16, 763–64). At the time of its charismatic leader’s death the movement was already experiencing internal divisions and had seen its first defections, mostly of non-Teda political leaders. In 2002, for example, shortly before Togoimi’s death, Frolinat veteran Adoum Togoy, an Ennedi Bideyat who had recently joined the MDJT, signed an agreement with the government, despite his lack of authority to represent the entire movement (Tubiana, 2003, pp. 515–16).

The first part of the conflict—from 1998 to 2002—was particularly violent. But from Togoimi’s death until the last fighters’ demobilization in 2011 it became a low-intensity war with almost no fighting except for two battles in the Barđaï area and two attacks on Zouarké in 2006 and 2007. Even if from a political point
of view the impact of the MDJT’s insurrection was relatively small, however, in Tibesti itself it left scars that are still apparent today.\textsuperscript{32}

The immediate repercussions of the conflict can be measured chiefly in terms of the dead and injured resulting from military confrontations and rebel ambushes. Both parties used mines: the MDJT recycled those placed by state or Libyan forces when they occupied an area. Estimates based on witnesses interviewed between October and December 2015 varied from 500 to 850 MDJT deaths, mainly occurring between 1998 and 2002.\textsuperscript{33} Although no figures could be obtained on ANT losses, several interviewees believed that army casualties were comparable to or slightly higher than those of the MDJT. Dozens of troops were certainly killed between 1998 and 2002 during the main battles, including those at Gouro, Zoumri, and Bardaï. Whichever side they served on, veterans of the war all remember a deadly conflict fought in a hostile environment where survival was extremely difficult.\textsuperscript{34} It was ‘the war that cost the most lives in the whole history of the ANT’, according to an army officer.

The conflict itself resulted in only a limited number of casualties among the local population. However, civilians were killed or injured by mines, and the ANT executed others, chiefly in Yebi-Bou and Yebi-Souma. The conflict also displaced a large part of the local population to Faya, N’Djaména, Libya, and Niger, significantly depopulating the region. On occasion the ANT is said to have forcibly displaced civilians, mainly in the sous-préfecture of Zoumri.\textsuperscript{35} The burning down of houses, chiefly in Zoumri and Aozou, either deliberately by the ANT or because of fires caused by the fighting, added to the pressure on civilians to leave the area. After the conflict officially ended in 2011, although some Teda civilians who had fled Tibesti returned and settled in the area, many never came back.\textsuperscript{36}

The conflict also affected the environment and natural resources. Similar to the villages, a number of palm groves (chiefly in Bardaï, Zoumri, Aozou, Yebi-Bou, Yebi-Souma, and Gouro) were destroyed by fire, either deliberately or accidentally. An undetermined number of livestock were killed, or lost in the aftermath of the fighting. While most of the destruction can be ascribed to the ANT, the MDJT is also said to have destroyed palm trees and houses in the Gouro area. It is easy to understand how the war had such a profound impact on such a fragile environment and contributed to making living there even more difficult.\textsuperscript{37}
Most former members of the rebel movement gave a rather negative assessment of the MDJT experience. Even though the insurrection had some sympathy among the non-armed opposition in N’Djaména, the effects of such a remote conflict were not felt outside the far north of Chad. The MDJT suffered from its geographical and political isolation, from its difficult relations with its sole—and unpredictable—Libyan ally, and from the infiltration of its ranks by pro-government elements. It was unable to undertake military operations beyond the mountains of Tibesti, was weakened by internal dissensions within its ranks, and was progressively caught in a pincer movement by the regimes in N’Djaména and Tripoli. Although it inflicted heavy losses on the ANT, the MDJT never truly threatened the MPS regime’s survival. As one of the movement’s leaders sums it up:

*the MDJT rebellion was mainly a failure, because, ultimately, it caused the loss of many lives, wasted important resources and slowed down development, without ever really weakening the regime that we were fighting.*

The movement’s former president, Hassan Mardage, came to a similar conclusion: ‘Because of this bad experience, no one is still really tempted to rebel in Tibesti’, he emphasized.
Box 1 Mines: the inheritance of several wars

The red and white marks that are supposed to indicate areas that are still mined alongside the roads that cross the massif are now a part of the Tibesti landscape. Strictly speaking, mines cannot be said to be a result of the MDJT rebellion, since most of them were originally placed by Libyan occupiers or the ANT. However, the presence of armed factions in the region until 2011 seriously delayed the start of demining operations, making Tibesti one of the most densely mined parts of the African continent today. Of the 103 km² area of Chad contaminated by mines that are listed by the High Commission for National Demining, 66 km² (64 per cent) are located in Tibesti. The remainder are divided between the neighbouring regions of Borkou and Ennedi, as well as the Moyen-Chari in southern Chad. Tibesti contains 76 of the 113 contaminated areas; that is, 67 per cent.

Map 4 Landmines in northern Chad

Source: Mines Advisory Group
Libyan forces placed large quantities of both anti-personnel and anti-tank mines in northern Chad. This process started with the occupation of the Aozou strip in 1973, during the brief retreat of Libyan troops in 1987, and at the time of their final withdrawal in 1994.\textsuperscript{42} The ANT also used mines in a number of localities to defend its garrisons against the MDJT, especially during the first months of the conflict. It mined essential roads such as those connecting Gouro to Wanyanga and Libya, although the MDJT also mined some of these roads. The ANT also sometimes mined areas before abandoning them to the rebels.\textsuperscript{43} The quantities of mines taken to Tibesti to counter the rebel offensives were clearly less than those placed during previous wars, however. The MDJT did not have access to direct supplies of mines, so it limited itself to using those laid by Libyan troops in Tanoua, Aozou, and Zouar to make booby traps to carry out ambushes.\textsuperscript{44}

The MDJT rebellion and the slowness of the demobilization process directly contributed to preventing demining programmes from starting before 2013, nearly 15 years after the entry into force in Chad of the Mine Ban Convention.\textsuperscript{45} Despite great difficulties, demining operations by the National Centre for Demining and the international NGO Mines Advisory Group made most of the region’s roads secure and decontaminated the Bardaï area between the beginning of 2013 and February 2014. Demining operations then moved to Zouar, where 924 mines had been neutralized before the end of 2015: 90 per cent were of the anti-tank type.\textsuperscript{46} It came as no surprise that the unearthed and destroyed mines came from the pre-1980s stocks of the Chadian and Libyan armies, with one sample exclusively made up of mines manufactured in Belgium (mainly PRB M1, PRB M2, and PRB M3 types), Czechoslovakia (mainly PTMi-BA-I, PTMi-BA-II, and PTMi-BA-III types), and the former Yugoslavia (mainly TMA5 types).

Although it is impossible to carry out a rigorous quantitative analysis of the situation since the start of the demining operations, the number of mine-related incidents seems to have diminished: there have been approximately 100 deaths or injuries since 2010, ten of which occurred in 2015, according to local estimates, and several incidents involving vehicles, seven of which occurred in 2015.\textsuperscript{47} This also shows the positive effects of the awareness-raising campaigns aimed at local communities who have lived with the presence of mines for a considerable time. The risks faced by newcomers from other regions (including gold prospectors) and livestock remain an important issue, however.\textsuperscript{48}

Despite all the efforts made, the demining challenge remains significant because of the extent of the contaminated areas, the complexity and cost of the removal operations, and insufficient means. According to an action plan drawn up by the Haut Commissariat, the demining operations in Tibesti should continue until at least the end of 2019.\textsuperscript{49} After dealing with the Bardaï and Zouar areas, the third phase should concentrate on the Aozou strip, which is still densely contaminated and badly mapped. The urgency of enlarging the scope of the demining efforts in the border area is all the more real because open minefields can serve as storehouses for mines and explosives that can be used on other battlefields. This is how the MDJT obtained its mines. Also, between 2005 and 2010 mines dug up in Tibesti were exported to Libya and even more so to Niger, where the government bought large quantities of them as part of a disarmament process launched in 2008.\textsuperscript{50}
In the vast minefields left by Qaddafi’s forces in the Aozou strip the wind regularly unearths mines that are still dangerous. November 2015.
© Jérôme Tubiana
Even though the MDJT cannot be considered directly responsible, from 1998 the war in Tibesti also contributed to making permanent three burdens that still adversely affect the region: the absence of the state, the influence of a war culture, and the more immediately threatening presence of landmines.

The MDJT ‘government’ in Tibesti

Parallel administrations

Like many rebel movements, including its predecessor, Frolinat, the MDJT attempted to establish a form of administration in the areas that it controlled. ‘The MDJT was a sort of government’, explained a local chief. ‘In any case, it did all that it could’ to fulfil this role.51 According to a former MDJT administrator, however, ‘the government’s law was different from that of the MDJT, for the movement’s laws were limited and provisional’.52 Another former administrator stated that the MDJT’s administration was basically ‘incomplete’.53

Between 1998 and 2010, as the movement increasingly fragmented, the MDJT’s presence and administrative methods varied considerably depending on location and time period, and suffered from a lack of educated cadres. The supposedly civilian administrators were mainly military leaders. Under Youssouf Togoimi the civilian administration of the main localities in the rebel area was undertaken by five sous-préfets, who were in charge of Zouar, Wour, Aozou, Zoumri, and Yebi-Bou. Bardaï remained under government control, but later the MDJT apparently created a sixth sous-préfecture, that of Goubon. The sous-préfets depended directly on the movement’s president and his deputy in charge of administration. Later they sometimes remained in their posts under the leadership of local faction leaders when these leaders did not directly administer the areas in question. In Aozou, Yahya Koki combined the role of sous-préfet with that of leader of one of the three factions present in the area. Indeed, some sous-préfets saw themselves as being ‘commanders of the civilians’ rather than administrators.54

Thus a parallel MDJT administration was nominally in place in at least part of Tibesti. The government administration was itself largely theoretical because in reality administrators were unable to travel to the areas under MDJT control; for example, Yebi-Bou was administered by an MDJT sous-préfet, while the government sous-préfet lived in Faya.55
The MDJT also set up a parallel customary administration. It recognized the customary chiefs who had remained in the area under its administration and replaced those that had left for Faya or N’Djaména with its own appointees. It appointed new chefs de canton in Zouar, Yebi-Bou, and Aozou. Since the government was slowly doing the same, some cantons simultaneously had a government chief and a rebel chief. In this way the chef de canton in Zouar, Issa Alifa, having fled the area during the rebellion, was replaced by an MDJT appointee, Korey Hassan.

The conflict period was difficult, especially for these customary chiefs who attempted to retain the neutrality that they considered to be appropriate to their position, or even to play a mediation role in the conflict, and who felt themselves caught between the government and the rebellion. In Zoumri, for instance, a few months before the beginning of the rebellion, Mayna Wuche began to act as chief in 1998 without being officially nominated. During the conflict, because he refused to take sides, the MDJT initially imprisoned him for eight months. Once he was freed, the government imprisoned him for a month after he had travelled to a government-controlled area, because he was suspected of being pro-rebel. He claims never to ‘have been MDJT-affiliated’, even if, after returning to rebel-controlled Zoumri in 2003, the MDJT recognized him as a chef de canton, and for a time he fulfilled a key role in the movement’s judicial system. Despite this, he seems to have managed to maintain a position of relative neutrality for the duration of the conflict and to have encouraged peace by cooperating with both the government and the armed opposition.56

The MDJT did not levy taxes on the people who remained in the areas it controlled. This can be explained by their low numbers and their poverty, as well as by the close links between the Teda fighters and the region’s civilians. These close links explain how the movement was able to benefit from irregular voluntary contributions, mainly in the form of livestock, rather than from a forcibly levied ‘revolutionary tax’.

**Fragmented services**

In the areas it controlled the MDJT attempted to provide services, which were, however, subject to frequent change. The lack of skills among the fighters proved to be a major impediment, together with their lack of material resources.
principle, a school was opened in each of the five MDJT sous-préfectures, in addition to more numerous Koranic schools. The MDJT’s few educated fighters, as well as better-educated prisoners of war from southern Chad, ran ordinary schools, while civilian volunteers managed Koranic schools.\(^57\)

Similarly, the MDJT had no doctors. A few fighters were able to act as paramedics, while captured government nurses from the south of the country were also pressed into service. In principle, health centres were opened in Zouar, Zoumri, and Yebi-Bou, and mobile paramedics occasionally visited other communities. The MDJT was also able to evacuate a number of patients for whom it was impossible to provide treatment in the region to Libya, including both fighters and civilians.\(^58\)

Finally, tribunals and assessors, four of whom were appointed in each sous-préfecture, administered justice under the authority of the sous-préfet to deal with abuses committed by fighters against civilians and disputes among fighters. The MDJT recruited them among both military and civilian leaders, in particular chefs de canton and elders or wise men *(bugudi* in Tedaga). The MDJT sous-préfets also helped to resolve disputes, or, if they could not do so, referred them to the local rebel commander. The derde, having left Zouar for N’Djaména in 2002, could not fulfil his role as supreme judge after his departure. In 2004, when Choa Dazi became MDJT president, he appointed the chef de canton of his Zoumri stronghold, Mayna Wuche (who was from the same Derdekichya clan as Choa), as head of the judicial system—that is, as supreme judge and head of the assessors. By his own admission, however, Mayna rarely intervened in cases.

Local assessors first dealt with cases. If they were unable to resolve them, they handed them over to the village chiefs, and finally, if this failed, to Mayna Wuche, who was always assisted by assessors, bugudi, and village chiefs. A tribunal’s composition varied. For instance, in 2006 Mayna assembled a tribunal composed of four assessors and three village chiefs in the presence of the MDJT’s vice president, Hassan Soukaya, to judge the case of a civilian killed by a mine that the movement had placed. After the fighters concerned had explained that they had warned the population of the presence of mines, the tribunal decided that the family of the victim would not be paid *diya* (blood money).\(^59\)
According to several interviewees, in cases of disputes between civilians and fighters the judicial system tended to favour the MDJT fighters. In 2006, for example, there was a skirmish between fighters manning a checkpoint and civilians that caused the death of one man on either side, injured a civilian, and destroyed a civilian car. Despite the fighters’ apparent responsibility for the civilian’s death, the tribunal decided that the two deaths cancelled each other out and that no diya would be paid. Incidents between fighters, which were judged by a separate military tribunal, gradually became unmanageable because of the MDJT’s increasing fragmentation.⁶⁰
Fragmentation and slow death of a rebellion

Weakened by its almost complete isolation and its inability to move the front line towards the south, the MDJT quickly split into several factions after the death of its leader, Youssouf Togoimi, in September 2002. The circumstances of the charismatic leader’s death remain obscure. It is clear that Togoimi was wounded when a mine blew up his vehicle near Zouar, and he was then transferred to Tripoli for care, where it seems that his life was not in danger. There are several theories about what happened to him next, including that he was assassinated in the Tripoli hospital where he was being treated or that the
Libyan regime handed him over to the Chadian authorities. However, there is little doubt that Togomi’s death did not result from the blowing up of his vehicle and that the Tripoli regime played a role in it. While the Chadian government’s direct role in Togomi’s death has not been proved, there is also no doubt that the Chadian authorities immediately benefited from his disappearance. The event precipitated the MDJT’s implosion, signs of which had already been apparent.

The first internal divisions seem to have begun in 2001, when the MDJT’s leadership bowed to Libyan pressure and took part in peace talks in Tripoli and Sebha. The first defections then occurred and two distinct currents emerged. One, formed by most of the movement’s founders, rejected the idea of giving up the armed struggle. The other, led by the movement’s vice president, Adoum Togoy, and his spokesperson, Ahmat Kaylan, supported negotiations. Togoy, who had brought the MDJT’s cause to Qaddafi’s attention before joining the movement, stood out as the main proponent of talks. He had distanced himself from Togomi before the latter’s death and obtained the support of a number of fighters. Kaylan, who came from a Libyan Arab Zuwaya family settled in northern Chad, was one of the movement’s founding members and its first spokesperson while in exile in France. He had felt threatened when politicians from other regions in Chad joined the MDJT, one of whom, Youssouf Saleh Abbas, a Waddayan, also hoped to act as a spokesperson from France. Kaylan joined Adoum Togoy, but subsequently remained in France and ceased to play a role in the MDJT.

The Qaddafi regime: ‘With friends like these . . .’

The Libyan government tolerated the MDJT’s use of its territory without truly backing the movement. At first very suspicious of Qaddafi, Togomi soon felt the need to reduce the movement’s isolation, and Tripoli appeared as a sole possible ally. The MDJT therefore agreed to participate in a first meeting with the Libyan regime’s representatives in Sirte in September 1999. The Qaddafi regime subsequently provided financial and logistical support to the MDJT, but it was too little to be decisive.

The relationship remained icy because Togomi rightly suspected that Qaddafi wanted to use the MDJT to improve Libya’s relations with Chad while simul-
taneously keeping Libya’s Teda community under control. Over time Qaddafi adopted several successive positions, ranging from initial passive goodwill, to providing direct support, before opting for repression. Once the rupture between the MDJT and Tripoli occurred the Libyan government became hostile to the Libyan Teda who supported the movement.\(^6^4\)

Qaddafi’s aide Bashir Saleh was tasked with managing relations with the rebel movement, while Adoum Togoy managed the financial support. Togoy is a Bideyat Borogat from Ennedi who, together with Goukouni Weddey, had been one of the historical leaders of Frolinat. Having retained links with the Qaddafi regime, Togoy was at that time not an MDJT member, but the secretary-general of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), and had access to a bank account at the Libyan Foreign Bank.\(^6^5\) Between early 1999 and the end of 2000 tens of thousands of dollars were handed over to emissaries of the rebellion through this arrangement.

Simultaneously, the MDJT also received logistical support from the Libyan intelligence services. They facilitated the movement of the rebel leadership between Libya and Tibesti, the transport of the support provided by the Libyan Teda, and access to medical care in Libya for wounded or sick MDJT fighters. The Libyan regime seems never to have supplied weapons to the MDJT, however: the few weapons donated by the Libyan Teda seem to have been supplied without Qaddafi’s knowledge.\(^6^6\)

Libyan support quickly faded away. In early 2000, after the ANT had suffered several defeats, President Déby managed to convince his Libyan neighbour to stop providing support to the rebellion. Déby started to make contact with the Libyan opposition and, during a Benghazi summit, threatened to leave CEN-SAD and managed to have Adoum Togoy dismissed from the organization. Togoy then joined the MDJT, but was quickly suspected of wanting to link the movement with the Libyan regime, with the ultimate goal of agreeing terms with the Chadian government. This is why in 2001 Togoimi’s followers arrested him in Mourdi, in the north of his native region of Ennedi, where he was attempting to recruit troops to form his own faction.\(^6^7\)

Qaddafi’s attitude towards the Chadian rebels changed from 2001 onwards. Libyan support for the MDJT was progressively reduced, and effectively stopped completely in 2002 with Togoimi’s death. Any benevolence towards the Libyan
Teda and the Chadian migrants in Libya who supported the rebels increasingly turned into repression. Some were executed, handed over to Chad, or, like Barka Wardougou, put under house arrest or imprisoned for years, some until Qaddafi’s downfall in 2011.68

Several former MDJT commanders claim that the support obtained from Libya (the movement’s only ally by default) mainly served the Chadian government’s interests.69 Libya did not contribute to the strengthening of the MDJT’s military capacities, for example. Its main activity was urging the rebel leadership to participate in talks in Libya, thus cutting off fighters in the field from their leaders and creating internal divisions within the movement. It simultaneously facilitated the movement’s infiltration by Chadian government agents and Teda elements who advocated joining the government side.70

ANT veterans who fought the MDJT believe that the Chadian government’s infiltration of the movement destabilized it more than military pressure in the field.71 This was one of the major factors that led the group loyal to Hassan Mardage and other factions to change sides.72

_**A laborious peace process and partial demobilization**_

When Togoimi’s death was announced on 24 September 2002 the interim presidency of the MDJT was entrusted to his deputy, Hassan Mardage, until a congress could elect a new president, in conformity with the movement’s statutes. Shortly after Mardage was appointed, a government delegation led by Daosa Déby, the president’s brother, made contact with the rebels.73

Mardage, who was weakened by health problems, was unable to maintain MDJT cohesion and the movement suffered a wave of defections. The rebellion began to fragment into autonomous groups whose spheres of influence were limited to their respective fiefdoms, and whose troops were recruited on a geographical and clan basis. With little confidence in Mardage’s leadership, a number of commanders, in particular Mahmoud Hissein in Zouar, started to support the former president, Goukouni Weddey. At the time Goukouni was in exile in Algeria, still under the Frolinat banner. Attempts at a rapprochement between him and the MDJT had previously failed, but Togoimi’s disappearance from the scene changed their stance. A branch of the MDJT refused to place itself under Goukouni’s command, however, while still wanting to replace Mardage.74
The question of the renewal of Mardage’s mandate was finally addressed during an MDJT congress in Zoumri in 2005. A significant number of commanders, who accused him of being weak and of having an over-conciliatory stance towards the government, rejected the interim president. The congress gave the presidency to Choa Dazi instead. From exile in France he had been sent to Tibesti by Goukouni Weddey at the end of 2004 with the aim of placing the MDJT under the authority of the former Frolinat leader. But Choa quickly distanced himself from Goukouni and asserted his own claim to the presidency (Weddeye, 2008, p. 15).75

Choa Dazi’s appointment did not change the movement’s internal dynamics, and the MDJT continued to fragment. Choa managed to regroup several dozen elements under his authority, in particular in his region of Zoumri, while a separate branch remained loyal to Hassan Mardage, who essentially controlled the area between Yebi-Bou and Gouro. Choa nominated Hassan Soukaya, a founding MDJT member, as secretary-general. But Soukaya immediately distanced himself from Choa and formed his own faction, based between Zouar and Bardaï. Yet another faction that was active between Aozou and Zoumri proclaimed its loyalty to Brahim Tchouma, another Teda rebel in exile. Other factions also emerged. According to a former commander,

there were as many factions as there were people defending different opinions—as many divisions as the government was able to create by promising money to each and every one.76

Military operations almost completely ceased during this phase of the conflict, and the ideological spirit that had inspired the MDJT’s founders withered inexorably.

By 2005 the rebellion had fragmented into the following main factions:

- Mardage’s faction;
- a faction in Wour under Mahmoud Hissein and Sidi Tchigeymi that was considered to support Goukouni Weddey;
- Hassan Soukaya’s faction in the Zouar area;
- a small dissident group from Soukaya in the Bardaï area under the command of Brahim Bokor;
- a faction in Zoumri under Choa Dazi and Yahya Wuche; and
- a faction in Aozou led by Yahya Koki, Mollo Salah, and Juma’ Chaha.
Acknowledging the insurrection’s failure, Brahim Bokor’s group, followed by Mardage’s and several autonomous factions, went over separately to the government.\textsuperscript{77}

Teda ANT general Saleh Kone organized Bokor’s surrender to the government. The terms of the surrender included the integration of demobilized fighters into government forces, the recognition of their ranks, and the provision of compensation to Bardaï communities for the damage their area had suffered during the conflict. In the end, 43 out of 63 fighters were incorporated into the AN\textsuperscript{T} at a centre in Moussoro, the capital of Bahr-el-Ghazal, while the local community received compensation of XAF 50 million (USD 85,000).\textsuperscript{79}

Shortly after this, in October 2005, Mardage’s group, which the Chadian government considered to be the most legitimate MDJT faction, signed a peace agreement under the mediation of then-State Secretary Adoum Younousmi, a Dazagada with a Teda mother. The agreement mainly dealt with the integration of fighters into the ANT and the provision of financial compensation to the local population. The faction’s leaders and a first group of around 70 fighters were integrated as early as October 2005. Nearly 700 fighters—a number of whom, as former MDJT commanders admitted, were Libyan or Nigerien Teda and Chadian civilians—joined the Moussoro centre between October 2005 and March 2006.

A number of MDJT leaders also received posts in the army or government: Hassan Mardage was appointed general, then presidential adviser; General Sidi Arabi, an Arab former MDJT commander-in-chief, became head of the Garde nationale et nomade du Tchad (GNNT); and Issa Ali Taher (a Daza) occupied several posts in the administration before being appointed economy minister in 2013, then animal husbandry minister in 2015. A significant number of officers and non-commissioned officers were, however, also integrated into the army as ‘assimilated’ officers—a status equivalent to that of reserve officers.\textsuperscript{80} In addition, the group surrendered nearly 700 individual weapons, a few rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and Goryunov machine guns, and 46 vehicles to the ANT.\textsuperscript{81}

In the majority of cases the integration of MDJT fighters who joined the government side into the ANT in 2005 was temporary. Most of them, chiefly the assimilated officers, were dismissed from their positions—or ‘\textit{deflatés}’, to
use the expression current in Chad—during the army restructuring known as the ‘Moussoro control’ in 2010. This forced them to return to civilian life. Some joined other rebel factions with the aim of benefiting from a second surrender to the government.\(^8^2\)

At the conclusion of the integration of Mardage’s troops approximately ten main factions remained in Tibesti, including:

- two factions in the Zouar and Wour areas, commanded by Mahmoud Hissein and Hassan Soukaya, respectively;
- three factions in Zoumri under the command of Choa Dazi and two dissenters, Galmay Wardougou and Mahamat Toshi; and
- two factions in Aozou under Yahya Koki and Mollo Salah.

After 2005 MDJT factions attempted to obtain support from the Khartoum regime and establish links with the Chadian rebel groups supported by Sudan. Several such attempts were made between 2005 and 2010. Mahamat Nouri, the leader of the Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement (UFDD), one of the main Chadian factions supported by Sudan, tried hard to forge such links, even stating that the group was prepared to take the name ‘MDJT 2\textsuperscript{nd} army’. The forces in Tibesti would then become the 1\textsuperscript{st} army, recalling the names used by the rebels in the 1970s. Nouri made contact with Choa Dazi and invited Hassan Soukaya to Khartoum in 2008.

At the same time, Goukouni Weddey also seems to have had largely fruitless contacts with the Sudanese government. The mistrust between Tibesti-based and Sudan-based armed opposition factions proved to be too deep for them to conclude an alliance. This was partly because some of the rebel leaders based in Sudan had previously fought the MDJT as members of the Chadian government. The Tibesti-based groups were unwilling to move fighters to Sudan, while the rebel groups based in Darfur refused to send fighters and weapons to Tibesti. Between 2007 and 2008, however, MDJT Dazagada fighters—some of whom had previously submitted to N’Djaména—joined the UFDD in Darfur (the UFDD was mainly composed of Dazagada).\(^8^3\)

In 2007 the MDJT factions attempted to reunite one last time during a new congress. After two weeks of debate Choa Dazi’s mandate was revoked and the interim presidency given to Hassan Soukaya. Mahmoud Hissein, Choa’s
former chief of staff, then officially announced his allegiance to Goukouni Weddey. In the following year, weakened by the earlier surrenders to the government and confronted with a catastrophic financial situation, the movement organized its last congress. Participants acknowledged their inability to continue the struggle because of a lack of means and cohesion, as well as the need to put an end to the suffering of the population by halting the region’s isolation. Inevitably, this triggered the last wave of surrenders to the government.\textsuperscript{84}

Two Zoumri factions that opposed Choa Dazi, which were led by Galmay Wardougou and Mahamat Toshi, were the first to conclude a peace deal with N’Djaména, respectively in 2007 and 2009. This left the Zoumri area to two main factions: one was under the command of Choa Dazi and Adeli Wardougou with around 100 men; the other, with only 25 men, but equipped with heavy weapons, was under Belqasim Azingei, Mardage’s former chief of staff. In 2007 Galmay’s group negotiated its surrender to the government. It demanded the integration of fighters into government forces, compensation for the destruction in Tibesti and the civilians killed by mines, and development projects for the area (for example, roads, wells, schools, and health centres). These demands were largely rejected, and the faction eventually surrendered in exchange for compensation of XAF 200 million (USD 340,000) for the palm groves and houses that had been burnt down, in addition to the creation of a sous-préfecture and a canton.\textsuperscript{85} Galmay’s faction was the last to obtain compensation in exchange for its surrender.\textsuperscript{86} Despite other claims, factions that subsequently surrendered had to agree to do so without conditions. The Chadian government considered that after the peace agreement signed by Mardage’s group the MDJT no longer existed and that only pockets of unorganized insurrection remained in Tibesti.

The last chapter of the surrender process began in 2009 with a mediation carried out by Youssouf Abassalah, a Teda politician who at the time was a minister representing Tibesti in the Chadian government.\textsuperscript{87} At the same time Goukouni Weddey returned from exile and the government entrusted him with a mediation role with the remaining rebels in Tibesti. Chad’s former president undertook a mission of several months to the field (March–June 2010) and, working with Youssouf Abassalah, managed to bring over the main rebel factions.\textsuperscript{88}

After Goukouni had been in the Zouar region for about 40 days the first agreement was signed between the governor of Tibesti, Wardougou Bollou, and
ten West Tibesti faction leaders. These leaders included Mahmoud Hisssein, Hassan Soukaya, Adoum Sidi, Jiddi Habre, Senoussi Barka, Gihinni Gedey, Adoum Bokori, Mahamat Taher, and Touka Tchaotchao.89 During the second leg of his mission, in East Tibesti, Goukouni arranged the surrender of most of the remaining rebel factions, including those of Adeli Wardougou, Yahya Koki, Mollo Salah, Mahamat Allatchi, and Belqasim Azingey.90 Several government members, including the minister of the interior, Ahmat Bachir, were present for the agreement’s signing ceremony in Bardaï. This symbolically marked the end of the MDJT war.

Similar to the Zoumri groups’ talks, the government only offered the option of joining the government side without conditions. In some rare cases a few commanders were appointed to government posts immediately after they joined the government or a little later. For example, in 2013 Hassan Soukaya was appointed minister of infrastructure, then state secretary for public health, then presidential adviser; Sidi Chaha, an MDJT-appointed sous-préfet in Zouar, retained his post at the end of the war; Adeli Wardougou was appointed sous-préfet of Goubon in 2015; and Sidi Bokor was made the head of the customs office in Zouar at the end of 2015. In addition, some fighters received an allowance of XAF 150,000–300,000 (USD 255–510), depending on their ranks.91

This process officially brought back into the fold between 400 and 500 fighters from a dozen factions. This meant that a total of 1,500–2,500 men had surrendered since 2003.92 A number of factions retained their small arms, while handing over most of their heavy weapons to the government. At the end of June 2010, at the conclusion of the process led by Goukouni Weddey, only about 100 fighters who were reluctant to surrender remained in the field in the Zoumri region. They were theoretically under the command of Choa Dazi, who was in exile in Libya, and in the field under the command of Mahamat Mardae and May Wardougou. They surrendered in April 2011 following a new mediation led by Governor Wardougou Bollou, the ‘national mediator’ Abderahman Moussa, and Daosa Déby.93 Even though at the time Choa Dazi seemed to be cut off from field operations that were supposed to be under his command, he was appointed adviser to the prime minister. He still occupied this post in 2017. Thirteen years after the start of the MDJT conflict and eight years after the first individual surrenders, the state of emergency in Tibesti was lifted after
the signing of the peace deal with Choa in April 2010, and the development programme promised by President Déby in 2009 began.

Another effect of the MDJT war is that many of the movement’s former leaders and members have continued to play an important role in Tibesti and the region despite the rebellion’s failure. Most of them eventually joined—at least for a time—the N’Djaména authorities. Some were given government or civil service posts in N’Djaména and were employed in administrative functions in Tibesti, even if often for relatively brief periods. For many the promises of integration into the army or being given government posts did not materialize. Many—perhaps the majority—have returned to civilian life. They have, however, often kept their weapons and many have been involved in armed activities in the region since.

Because of the lack of opportunities in Tibesti itself, many became traders or smugglers between Chad, Niger, and Libya. A number turned to banditry along trans-Saharan roads. Some MDJT members can also be found among the
For many rebel movements, presenting themselves as entities administering a civilian population and thus replacing the state is a means of acquiring legitimacy, especially on the international stage. Operating as it did in a context of near total isolation and in a conflict area from which international humanitarian actors were absent, the MDJT was never able to play this card. However, an unexpected event enabled the movement to briefly attain international legitimacy: the arrest of Ammari Saifi, also known as ‘Abderrazaq le Para’, the Algerian second-in-command of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).

At the beginning of 2004 ‘Le Para’ led a convoy of terrorist groups fleeing Mali and crossed Niger towards the east. On the Chadian–Nigerien border the Chadian army attacked the convoy and about ten survivors, including ‘Le Para’, attempted to take refuge in Tibesti. They probably hoped to obtain asylum from the MDJT in exchange for money. But the fugitives were captured by the MDJT faction operating in the Wour area, not far from the borders of Niger and Libya, under the command of Sidi Tchigeymi, Mahmoud Hissein, and Allatchi ‘Koukoula’. A number of MDJT members immediately saw an opportunity to make money out of Le Para:

> a number of them were convinced that either the Algerian government or the GSPC would have agreed to pay us a ransom; they even thought that we could exploit the competition between these two actors to raise the stakes.94

The most important leaders, including those in exile far from the fighting, saw a major opportunity to move the MDJT out of its international isolation. They began busily establishing contacts with the Algerian, French, and US governments. This was a sensitive issue because the Wour faction was not closely linked to the MDJT president, Hassan Mardage, and supported Goukouni Weddey. The latter had direct contacts with the Algerian government and involved himself in the negotiations.95 Exacerbating matters, international actors were wary of upsetting the Chadian government, which considerably slowed down any progress.

Events speeded up when in November 2004 Sidi Tchigeymi and Mahmoud Hissein surreptitiously seized Le Para and delivered him to the Libyan authorities, who then handed him over to Algeria. The Algerian government is said to have paid EUR 400,000 or 500,000 for him, which was shared among Sidi Tchigeymi, Mahmoud Hissein, and Choa Dazi.96 The latter is said to have used it chiefly to organize an MDJT congress, enabling him to have himself elected president of the movement. Sidi Tchigeymi’s faction, however, reportedly told Hassan Mardage that Teda civilians had stolen the ransom from them.97

Thus, while the episode enabled the MDJT to present itself as an important actor in the Saharan area and an enemy of the Islamists, it also further deepened the divisions in the movement, mainly between Hissein, Dazi, and Mardage.98
miners who in recent years have been mining gold in Tibesti and neighbouring countries. Others have led Teda militias formed to chase off gold miners arriving from other countries or other parts of Chad. Finally, during the Libyan uprising in 2011 some MDJT veterans joined the Libyan Teda militias who initially fought against Qaddafi’s forces, and then against the Arab and Tuareg militias of southern Libya.

These activities are not incompatible, and many former MDJT members carried out several of them in succession or simultaneously. The trajectories of the MDJT veterans illustrate that especially for the Teda, as for other communities from the region, being part of the rebellion offered those involved a rare opportunity to acquire influence and power, both locally and farther afield; to enrich themselves; and to improve their social standing in extremely hierarchical societies.

Like the earlier Frolinat rebellion, the MDJT insurrection thus constitutes an important root cause of instability in the border areas of Chad and Libya. MDJT veterans’ individual trajectories show that their experience from this time, and the lack of opportunities they later found in both Chad and Libya, made them perfect candidates for cross-border military or paramilitary activities. In addition, the absence of the state in northern Chad and the marginalization of southern Libya have contributed to turning the region into a fertile ground for new armed adventures, although the Teda have been resistant to jihadism.
IV. The difficult return of the state

Administrative instabilities
Since the MDJT rebellion ended in 2010 the state has slowly re-established itself in Tibesti. This has occurred in a context in which local authorities seem to be in permanent negotiations between a remote central authority that provides unstable and limited resources, and local communities in which autonomous authorities have emerged. These autonomous actors include traditional or new customary chiefs, cross-border traders enriching themselves by various forms of trafficking, and MDJT veterans frustrated by the broken promises of the peace process. ‘We are trying to convince people that the state’s authority is justified. One has to be patient’, explained the governor of Tibesti, Taher Barkay. Another official asserted:

The state’s return has been very timid. Encouraging minds to respect the state is no easy matter. The population has no link to any authority, since effectively the state does not exist. Because prior to 2010 the region was managed by clan-based [rebel] factions, it is clan membership that takes precedence over any ideology.

This instability represents a challenge that is all the more important today because it has been aggravated by frequent changes in the administration’s structures since the start of the 21st century.

A region to stabilize and define
From the end of colonization to 2002 Chad’s great north (equivalent to half of the country’s surface) was made up of just one préfecture, Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti, divided into three sous-préfectures: Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti. In 2002 an administrative reform process created a higher echelon of ‘regions’ for the whole of Chad administered by governors who are appointed by the central authorities. This process elevated 14 préfectures into 17 regions, sous-préfectures into préfectures, and lower administrative posts into sous-préfectures. Because the MDJT war was under way, the reform was only really applied in
Tibesti from 2008, when the region was created and the first governor appointed. Since then, the region of Tibesti has two préfectures and seven sous-préfectures. The préfecture of East Tibesti, whose capital, as well as that of the entire region, is Bardaï, oversees the sous-préfectures of Zoumri, Yebi-Bou, and Aozou. That of West Tibesti, headquartered in Zouar, supervises the sous-préfectures of Zouar, Wour, and Goubon. In parallel to this restructuring, each préfecture has been elevated into an electoral district with two deputies in the National Assembly.101

Immediately to the east of Tibesti, the locality of Gouro has been attached to Ennedi since the end of the colonial era. This is because a large part of the Gouro Teda spend the main part of the year on the Mourdi pastures, immediately to the north of the Ennedi Massif.102 In 2009 Gouro became a sous-préfecture in the new region of West Ennedi, whose capital is Fada.103

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century most of Tibesti was still under MDJT control. The region’s administrators, including the governor, remained under siege in the garrison town of Bardaï without being able to reach all the sous-préfectures, which were in practice under the direct administration of the MDJT’s sous-préfets. Slowly, especially from 2010 onwards, the administration expanded its reach beyond Bardaï and re-established itself in the sous-préfectures, often after negotiations with local overlords who were leaving the MDJT.

The current administrative divisions appear in some ways to be a partial result of the rebellion. The creation of new sous-préfectures in 2008, chiefly Goubon, which was the last to be created and the most isolated, was in response to the MDJT’s claims and validated the rebels’ creation of sous-préfectures. It also allowed a number of local MDJT leaders to be appointed as administrators, giving an official stamp to the realities on the ground, even if many remained in their posts for very brief periods. They were replaced either by former brothers-in-arms—the state attempted to satisfy everyone in the process of dividing and ruling—or often by Teda who remained loyal to the authorities during the rebellion.104

Administrators, including the governor, rarely remain in their posts for more than a year. From 2008 to 2017 ten governors succeeded one another, six of which were Teda and four from other regions. The latter are respected for their competence, but were often insufficiently aware of local complexities.
Teda civil servants are considered to be more capable of properly administering the area, but are also accused of favouring their locality or clan members.\(^{105}\) One of the reasons for the ongoing instability in the region is that the population has challenged the authority of many governors, both Teda and non-Teda. Some governors have proved themselves to be incapable of asserting their authority over parts of the region. In order to combine the benefits of two profiles, the state has often appointed a Teda governor with a secretary-general originating from another region, or vice versa.\(^{106}\)

Another difficulty facing administrators is the vagueness of the territorial demarcation lines of the new Tibesti region, in particular the boundary lines with Borkou. No accurate maps are available and administrators are unclear as to where these boundaries lie. This is especially the case in the areas of Ogi, Enneri Maro, and Enneri Dohor, which are the subject of a dispute between Tibesti and Borkou. This can be explained chiefly by the presence in these areas of Dôza communities (a Dazagada sub-group) who are in the majority in the préfecture of Borkou Yala (north Borkou). Although they have historically maintained good relations with the local Teda community, they would prefer to be part of Borkou.\(^{107}\) A new Dôza chef de canton resides in Ogi itself, even though in principle his chieftaincy is located in Tigi, in Borkou Yala.\(^{108}\) At the end of 2014 the Borkou governor deployed troops in the Ogi and Enneri Maro areas. This territorial conflict deepened at the end of 2015, when the regional electoral commissions were carrying out a census ahead of elections due in April 2016. The Tibesti and Borkou commissions both wanted to count voters in Ogi, Enneri Maro, and Enneri Dohor, but the Ministry of Territorial Administration decided that these voters should be included on the Borkou voters’ roll.\(^{109}\)

Finally, in accordance with the system known in Chad as ‘geopolitics’, a minister originating from the region represents Tibesti in the central government. Since February 2016 this minister has been Youssouf Abassalah, first as minister of justice, then of tourism. Frequent changes of ministers and their briefs keep the rivalries between the region’s politicians alive and feed the Teda’s mistrust of these remote representatives. Besides the Tibesti governor, who is himself often a Teda (in 2015–16 it was Taher Barkay), Teda have regularly been appointed governors of other regions, including recently of Salamat (Ahmat Barkay) and Batha (Keley Abdallah).\(^{110}\)
Weakening of customary chieftaincies

The Déby regime has not only increased the number of administrative entities, but also of customary chieftaincies. Once again, this phenomenon is common to all of Chad, even if it is particularly pronounced in the northern part. French colonization, similar to other colonial systems elsewhere, made the customary chiefs auxiliaries of the administration, giving them the title of ‘chef de canton’. Supervised by colonial administrators, they were mainly responsible for tax collection and the administration of justice. In this way a number of customary chiefs of territories or ethnic groups deemed to be loyal by the colonial administration were recognized as sultans or chefs de canton. Others who were judged to be insufficiently welcoming of colonial rule were removed and often replaced by rivals from pre-colonial dynasties. The great Chadian chieftaincies—as opposed, for example, to the Darfur sultanate in Sudan—were therefore not removed from power, but were integrated into the new colonial order.\textsuperscript{111}

In the Saharan part of Chad the colonizers were confronted with communities divided mainly by clan allegiance that were scattered over an enormous territory and did not recognize tutelary chiefs. It therefore seems that, prior to colonization, the derde was not a supreme chief of the community, but rather a guarantor of customary law and an arbitrator with limited authority. The term ‘anarchic’ has sometimes been used to describe the Teda-Daza system of governance, but it would probably be more accurate to speak of high levels of fluidity. This has allowed individuals to play on their different identities to give allegiance to different authorities and switch chiefs depending on their interests. These identities stem from patrilineal or matrilineal clan identities, as well as from allegiance to the authorities of the place where people live, which may be very distant from the homelands of the clans they claim to be a member of (Baroin, 1985; d’Arbaumont, 1989, p. 31).

The French attempted to gather groups of 20–30 clans into geographic rather than ethnic confederations in which Teda, Dazagada, and Beri clans were sometimes combined in the same territory. They appointed confederation chiefs who belonged to one of the clans to govern these groupings. As a result, these chiefs often found it difficult to impose their authority on the whole of the community they were supposed to govern. French colonization also sometimes gave chieftaincies to members of illegitimate clans, sometimes created new chief-
taincies and even new sub-groups, and established new hierarchies among the clans (Tubiana, 2006, pp. 151–52).

While recognizing the derde, the French divided Chad’s Teda territory into a number of small cantons using criteria that were more territorial than ethnic or clan based. Each canton was under the authority of a chief. These cantons were Bardai, Zouar, Wour, Teda Ouria (covering mainly the eastern part of the Tibesti Massif around Yebi-Bou), and Teda Gouroa (administratively in Ennedi, and responsible for most of the nomadic Teda in Mourdi) (Chapelle, 1982, p. 119).

This structure remained more or less stable until 2006, when the authorities began to increase the number of Teda chefs de canton. The MDJT indirectly contributed to this process by appointing its own chefs de canton, some of whom the government later recognized in exchange for the allegiance of rebel factions. In parallel, during the conflict the government counterbalanced the power of the chefs de canton appointed by the rebellion by appointing pro-government rivals in the same cantons. This explains why Zouar now has two chefs de canton: Adoum Issa Alifa, the son of the historic chief, who supported the government during the war; and Korey Hassan, who was appointed by the MDJT. Zoumri also has two chefs de canton, both appointed in 2007. These are Ali Koki (or Ali Siddiq), who supported the government during the war, and Mayna Wuche, who was first recognized by the MDJT, and then by the government in 2007, after the surrender of one of the local MDJT factions led by Galmay Wardougou. The Aozou strip has four cantons, all created after the surrender of one of the local MDJT faction leaders, Juma’ Chaha. Two are in Aozou (one of which does not have a chief because of rivalries within the Derdekichya clan that obtained the chieftaincy), one in Omu, and one in Gezendu.

A second canton formed in Bardai for the neighbouring locality of Zoui and the new cantons of Goubon and Modra were also formed after the surrender of rebel factions. In the sous-préfecture of Yebi-Bou the Teda Ouria chef de canton is now only the chief of the Odobaya canton (a clan), and four other cantons have been created since 2006, mainly after the surrender of rebel factions. Similarly, the Teda Gouroa chef de canton is now only the chief of the Arna canton, and three other cantons were created in 2011. Dadi Chemi, the chef de canton, continues to claim the name of Gouroa for his canton and explained that apart from the clans of the three new cantons, the other clans
remain under his authority. He nevertheless believes that members of these clans will probably also try to obtain their own canton.\textsuperscript{112}

Currently there are 17 chefs de canton in Tibesti and four in Gouro. In principle, most of the cantons remain territory based rather than clan based, but several chefs de canton are based in the same places and their territories are not clearly defined. In Zoumri, for instance, the two chefs de canton do not have separate territories and administer all the clans in the locality without distinction. In principle this means that any Zoumri resident is subject to two chiefs. While a number of chiefs believe that they govern the same territories, others demand that their respective territories be properly defined, which can cause needless tensions. The general tendency seems to be for territorial chiefs to disappear and clan chiefs to proliferate.\textsuperscript{113}

In a territory with chiefs from several clans, individuals tend to recognize the authority of the chief belonging to their own clan, even if that chief lives in another territory. In this way, according to the former chief of Gouroa canton, Gouro residents who do not have a chef de canton from their own clan can attach themselves to a clan-based canton somewhere else. For example, the Odobaya of Gouro could ask to be attached to the Odobaya chef de canton of Yebi-Bou.\textsuperscript{114}

In addition, a number of clans have several chiefs, while others do not yet have any. Individuals who do not have a chief belonging to their clan are generally hesitant to identify the chief to whom they owe allegiance, or bargain with several chiefs for their allegiance.\textsuperscript{115} In light of this trend, it is possible that ultimately each of the 36 Teda clans will demand that the government nominate at least one chief to represent it. In the former Teda Ouria canton, which is now divided into five cantons, there are already five candidates hoping to become chefs de canton. This includes one non-Teda candidate from the Dôza community settled in the Miski area.\textsuperscript{116}

The issue is not solely political, but also financial. Chefs de canton are paid by the state and have the right to nominate ten goumiers (armed guards) and a secretary who are often chosen from their own families, all of whom receive salaries. Several sous-préfets therefore believe that ‘it is a good thing to have new cantons; it makes for extra revenues and jobs’.\textsuperscript{117}

The recent trend towards a multiplication of cantons also causes frustrations, however. The former chefs de canton, who were once responsible for large
territories and administered communities made up of several clans, have a reduced role today that increasingly resembles that of a clan chief. ‘With the disorganization of social life, somebody who is rich or well positioned can become a chef de canton’, one of them explained. ‘The fragmentation of the chefs de canton is a sign of the decline of Teda society. From now on, there will always be divisions.’

Even some of the beneficiaries of the new cantons are sceptical of the government’s approach. Many fear that the multiplication of chiefs will divide the Teda community even further. They accuse the Chadian government of deliberately trying to provoke rivalries in order to prevent the emergence of united

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**Box 3 New chiefs: the case of Chidi Kallemay**

With the increasing number of chefs de canton in Tibesti, new types of chiefs have begun to appear. Some of them are former military officers or former MDJT rebels: a chef de canton position allows them to retain part of the authority they acquired by taking up arms. In practice, a chef de canton position is often more permanent than a position in the Chadian army or a post obtained after joining the government. Other chiefs are more like entrepreneurs, for whom a chef de canton position is a refuge or form of protection.

The most spectacular example of this new kind of chief is Chidi Kallemay, who was nominated Dôza chef de canton of Tigi in Borkou Yala on 19 June 2014. Mostly known as a wealthy cross-border trader with Libya and Niger, Chidi is said to have facilitated the transport of drugs between Niger and Libya along routes passing mainly through southern Tibesti and Borkou Yala. Chidi was reportedly associated with Toke Molley, another Dôza once considered to be the leader of the main trafficking network on this leg of the journey, until he was killed in 2012 during inter-tribal fighting between Teda and Awlad Suleiman Arabs in Libya. The house that Chidi built in Ogi, together with two irrigated gardens, is known as ‘Dubai’ (Brachet and Scheele, 2015, p. 747).

In early 2015 Chidi’s past caught up with him on the occasion of a deadly confrontation between Gatrun and Murzuq in southern Libya that pitted his followers against rival drug traffickers led by Idris Jaber (a Murdya). Accusing Chidi of having stolen a haul that belonged to them or their share of a common booty, Jaber’s group killed at least one Dôza and wounded Chidi, leaving him for dead (Alwihda Info, 2015). Former Chadian rebels were reportedly involved on both sides.

Despite this episode, Chidi now seems to be seeking respectability, and his appointment as a chef de canton can be explained as much by his wealth as his desire to be recognized as a notable. The derde Erzey Barkay married one of his sisters and Chidi supported Erzey’s candidacy for derde (mainly by giving him a vehicle) and helped to fund his enthronement ceremony in January 2012.
clans who might be in a stronger position to make claims on the central government.\textsuperscript{123} Some of the region’s administrators, however, believe that the new cantons, which respond to ‘the interests of the authorities and local individuals’, will probably not last: ‘they have no historical basis and another regime could question their existence.’\textsuperscript{124}

**Conflicts surrounding the derde**

Historically the Teda do not appear to have had a supreme chief. The role of derde, which is transmitted dynastically in the Tomagra clan, is probably the closest thing, but before the colonial era the derde’s authority seems to have been limited to that of a guarantor of customary law. Colonization strengthened the derde’s authority and slowly transformed him into a customary chief who ruled over all the Teda, comparable to the great sultans of the Sahel kingdoms of Kanem and Wadday. This transition was helped by the fact that the colonial administration was able to establish good relations with the derde in office at the time of the French arrival, Chahay Bogarmi, who used French support to consolidate his authority (Chapelle, 1982, pp. 91–97).\textsuperscript{125}

This dynamic was confirmed after Chad’s independence in 1960, so that today the derde is sometimes given the title of ‘sultan’. His authority continues to spread beyond Chad to include the Libyan and Nigerien Teda. The former have their own paramount chief, but he is somehow considered to be the local representative of the Tibesti derde, whose authority he acknowledges, mainly as the guarantor of customary law.\textsuperscript{126} In addition, both during and after colonization, the modern administration exercised its authority to the detriment of that of the customary chiefs, who became more and more its subordinates. Traditional chiefs, who are appointed and sometimes dismissed by the state, are dependent on state financing to pay their salaries and those of their goumiers (armed guards).

The derde Weddey, Chahay’s successor, fled to Libya in 1966. He spent ten years there, and received a salary from the Libyan authorities. In 1979 his successor, Kinimi Edeymi, was appointed derde by a decree of the Chadian state (whose president at the time was Goukouni Weddey). But he also sought refuge in Libya from 1982 to 1987, when Hissène Habré took power in N’Djaména and Goukouni’s GUNT became a Tibesti-based rebellion supported by Libya.
Habré replaced Kinimi with a derde based in northern Kanem rather than Tibesti, until Kinimi’s return to Chad in 1987 (Brachet and Scheele, 2015, p. 736). Kinimi Edeymi died in 1995 and May Barkaymi replaced him in the following year (Brachet and Scheele, 2015, p. 736). According to tradition, the role of derde is rotated among the three branches of the Tomagra clan, and on May’s death in 2009 the title was supposed to have devolved to the Lay branch. But at that time Teda intellectuals from non-Tomogra clans asked to participate in the choosing of the new derde. In addition, competition broke out among the Lay between Erzey Barkay, a former Frolinat fighter and the most legitimate derde claimant in dynastic terms, and Sougui Mahamat, a MDJT veteran who had become an ANT lieutenant colonel. The younger Sougui presented himself as better able to manage current problems.

Faced with this dispute, General Khalifa Weddey, Goukouni Weddey’s brother and himself a former Frolinat fighter, also declared his candidacy, despite the fact that Weddey’s children could not in principle inherit the title. The Lay were unable to agree and the state intervened in the dispute. President Déby sought the opinion of Goukouni Weddey, who considered Erzey Barkay to be the most legitimate claimant in dynastic terms. Déby then called an assembly of Tomagra elders, which also pronounced in favour of Erzey, who was enthroned in January 2012. However, the fact that the state had to intervene in the nomination process and that non-Tomagra were not consulted diminished the derde’s legitimacy among them.

This weak legitimacy favoured the emergence of a new non-Tomagra pretender to the post of derde in the person of Ahmat Hokay. A Teda from the Derdekichya clan who was born in 1968 in Aozou, he was initially little known, even among the Teda. Like most of the Aozou Teda, he was given Libyan citizenship, was educated in Libya, and his career appears more oriented towards Libya than Chad, as he himself acknowledges. Hokay was in succession a soldier and an agent of both the Libyan and Chadian intelligence services. He also briefly joined the administration as sous-préfet of Aozou between 2012 and 2014.

Over the course of the long campaign for the election of the new derde, and taking advantage of the internal Tomagra strife, Hokay started a parallel campaign for the derde to no longer be chosen exclusively from the Tomagra clan.
Instead, he advocated for the position to be rotated among all the Teda clans.\textsuperscript{131} He also questioned revisions of customary Teda law undertaken by the derde Erzey Barkay in 2013 (Barkay, 2013).\textsuperscript{132} In May 2015, when Hokay attained a degree of popularity among non-Tomagra, the authorities imprisoned him for
ten days in N’Djaména. In mid-October, despite the governor’s instructions, he entered Bardaï with a convoy of around 100 vehicles and assembled his followers, some of whom had come from Libya. A meeting of his followers, who belonged to 33 of the 36 Teda clans, voted for a new mechanism to appoint the derde and proclaimed Hokay derde with authority over all the clans except the Tomagra. Not only the Tomagra and the members of other clans who did not wish to modify customary law, but also the governor of Tibesti, consider these decisions to be illegitimate.

Following this meeting, the minister of security, Ahmat Bachir, ordered Hokay’s arrest, but a convoy of nine GNNT vehicles sent to Aozou to arrest him returned empty-handed. The governor, Taher Barkay, and a number of officers, although supporting Hokay’s arrest, acknowledged that it could not be enforced outside Bardaï, particularly in Aozou, Hokay’s fiefdom. In May 2016, after a new attempt to assemble his followers in Bardaï, a new arrest order compelled Hokay to flee to Libya.

A Teda politician described how Erzey Barkay and the Tomagra as a whole ‘first remained silent then woke up’ in reaction to the threat represented by Hokay. On 5–7 November 2015 a rival meeting was held in Zouar, the Tomagra fiefdom, in reaction to the one in Bardaï. Several hundred people participated, including the governor of Tibesti and the minister representing the region. Many participants also came from Libya, in particular the derde of the Libyan Teda, Godeyenou Mayna, also known as sheikh Zelawi. The aim of this meeting was mainly to reaffirm the value of the Teda ‘tradition’, and therefore, implicitly, to support Erzey Barkay as derde and delegitimize Hokay. Later in November Erzey travelled to Libya to resolve a deadly conflict among Teda there. He therefore presented himself as an arbitrator (the traditional function of the derde) and reaffirmed the cross-border nature of his authority (that is, distinct from the Chadian state). This conflict had pitted the self-appointed Gatrun ‘security committee’, a Libyan Teda militia force formed to ensure the security of the Gatrun area, against a group of armed Teda chiefly from Niger who had set up checkpoints in the area and were collecting taxes from travellers. The clashes between these two forces caused ten deaths, seven among the highwaymen and three among the security committee. The derde’s mediation team decided that the parents of each victim would receive the diya, but that the right of
‘irregulars’ to the diya would not be recognized in future clashes between ‘irregular groups’ and a ‘regular unit’ (in this case the Gatrun security committee). Paradoxically, it appears that Ahmat Hokay’s challenge obliged the derde to involve himself more deeply in resolving the affairs of the Teda community—which a Teda intellectual explained by saying that ‘Hokay enables the derde to assert himself’. 138

In January 2016 Hokay carried out his own mission in Libya and travelled to Misrata, where he met Hisein Ben Himeda, one of the port’s managers, and brigade commanders from Misrata who are said to be hostile to the Chadian government. 139 Hokay claims to have numerous supporters among the Libyan Teda, chiefly the Murzuq youths and a few wealthy businessmen. Some of the traders he mentions as his supporters and funders are said to have been implicated in drug trafficking. 140

In the past the various governments of Chad and Qaddafi’s government in Libya competed for the derde’s support, and various candidates for the chieftaincy attempted to obtain the support of one of the two states. Since 2011, Libya’s division into several centres of power provides even more opportunities and resources for new political-economic entrepreneurs. In contrast to the relative availability of resources in southern Libya, northern Chad’s under-development provides fertile ground for the emergence of cross-border entrepreneurs.

**XAF 30 billion for Tibesti’s development: a lost opportunity**

For the people of Tibesti, as for the majority of MDJT fighters, the region’s development should have been the main dividend of the long peace process. This expectation, which was one of the motivations behind the 2005 peace talks, was strengthened by a commitment made by President Déby. During a visit to Bardaï in 2009 he promised that if the last rebels laid down their arms, extraordinary financing of XAF 30 billion (USD 60 million at the time) would be given to Tibesti over a period of three years to fund development. 141

In June 2010 the government confirmed its intention to release the funds, shortly after the conclusion of a demobilization process led by Goukouni Weddey. A ‘coordination and implementation unit’ was set up to select projects in partnership with the Direction générale des grands travaux et projets présidentiels
(DGGTPP). In order to obtain the approval of local communities, the government appointed a steering committee of Tibesti notables to supervise the unit and decided to prioritize the awarding of contracts to companies belonging to natives of Tibesti. The committee was headed by Mahamat Abba Ali Salah, who at the time was minister of the civil service and a Tibesti representative in the central government. The vice presidency was given to Daosa Idriss Déby, President Déby’s son, who was in charge of the DGGTPP and the only member of the committee who was not from Tibesti. The other members were the region’s governor; two Tibesti MPs; the coordinator of the unit; the chef de canton of Zoumri; and the derde Erzey Barkay. The coordination unit identified a number of areas for priority action, including demining, roads, construction and renovation, water, and health and education.

The first projects started in 2011. Until 2012, the funds enabled the launching of several projects. These included the construction or rehabilitation of offices and houses for the administration, a hospital in Bardaï and several health centres in five of the seven sous-préfectures, several educational facilities, the drilling of boreholes, and the construction of a water tower in Bardaï. Overall, however, it seems that priorities slowly refocused on the construction of buildings, mainly of an administrative nature, to the detriment of development projects. For instance, dam-building projects that would have assisted animal husbandry and market gardening were stopped in favour of buildings that had not initially been planned.

To date, a large number of infrastructure projects that are probably superior to those in use remain uncompleted or unused because of errors of concept, poor execution, and a lack of materials, personnel, or demand for infrastructure of this kind. The most notable unused projects include the Bardaï and Zouar high schools, the Zouar préfecture and sous-préfecture offices, and the Bardaï tourist camp and hospital. In the latter, as in most health centres, the planned technical equipment was never delivered. The unfinished projects resulting from the state’s failure to deliver all the promised funds also include the Zouar water tower; the Yebi-Bou health centre; the sous-préfecture offices and residences of the sous-président of Yebi-Bou, Zoumri, and Aozou; other administrative buildings in Bardaï; the road from Yebi-Bou to Miski (for which an amount of more than XAF 4 billion (USD 6.8 million) is said to have been budgeted); and
social housing in Bardaï and Zouar. Some projects were never even started, such as the offices and residence of the Bardaï sous-préfet, and boreholes and water towers in Bardaï, Zoumri, and Yebi-Bou.\textsuperscript{145}

Part of the difficulty stemmed from the fact that many companies only received an initial payment, corresponding to 30 per cent of the approved cost of the project, but not the later instalments. The awarding of what were probably an excessive number of contracts and the payment of the corresponding advances reportedly gave rise to embezzlement by fictive companies created to obtain the contracts in question.\textsuperscript{146} The process also increased debt among entrepreneurs who invested their own assets beyond the advances they received. One entrepreneur who was forced to stop a project that he had been awarded stated that once they had been paid the initial instalment, several companies invested large sums over and above the amount before eventually suspending their projects.

The problems that arose during the implementation of the programme caused local communities to hold protests. Criticisms focused in particular on the priorities given to various projects, the bad management of funds, and the lack of clarity regarding the procedure for awarding contracts. One of the entrepreneurs awarded a project declared that the committee offered him the contract ‘without [his] trying [applying] to get it’, probably in order to limit his ‘political ambitions’.\textsuperscript{147} Far from remaining confined to Tibesti, the debate on the ‘30 billion’ programme reached N’Djaména and was the subject of several articles in the Chadian press. These articles repeated the accusations of bad management and embezzlement by members of the steering committee (\textit{Abba Garde}, 2015). The latter rejected the allegations and attributed the problems to a lack of understanding among local communities and the frustrations of entrepreneurs who were not awarded contracts.\textsuperscript{148}

The local population’s complaints, chiefly put forward by a group of young Teda supported by the derde, were presented to President Déby in June 2012. This happened again in September, on the occasion of the head of state’s visit to Tibesti, after protesting members of the population blocked a number of projects. The president could not ignore the communities’ dissatisfaction, but was unable to find a replacement to lead the steering committee.\textsuperscript{149} After consultations with notables and local authorities, he decided to dissolve the committee and transfer the remaining funds—estimated at XAF 9–20 billion (USD 15.3–34
million)—to the Ministry of the Economy and Planning. The ministry allocated a portion to the building of social housing based on the Libyan model—around 100 units for the poorest families of Bardaï and 135 more in Zouar. Tours of inspection by four MPs from the region and a control mission comprising members

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**Box 4 New schools, few pupils, and practically no teachers**

The relevance of the projects chosen and their utility has been a criticism directed at the steering committee, including the building and renovation of primary schools in various sous-préfectures and two secondary schools in Bardaï and Zouar. Several Teda observers maintain that these projects are not useful in light of the low numbers of school children in Tibesti, in particular at the secondary level; the low population density; and the fact that in recent years many school children, in particular at the secondary level, have left school to go prospecting for gold.  

In Aozou, for instance, only ten pupils attended secondary school in 2015–16, all of whom were girls. Boys of the same age had all joined the gold rush, as did 50 schoolboys from Yebi-Bou in 2014–15. In Gouro, high school attendance fell from 142 to 70 pupils, 36 of whom were girls.

According to the critics, the education-related projects illustrate the shortcomings of a development programme focusing on building infrastructure rather than the provision of long-term services. Apart from its lack of schoolchildren, Tibesti is also faced with a chronic shortage of teachers. This stems from three factors: the insufficient number of appointments by the Ministry of Education, the frequent refusal of teachers to take up posts in remote areas, and the low numbers of Teda candidates taking up a career in teaching. A civil servant posted to Tibesti claimed that

> the only ones who are happy about an appointment to Tibesti are police and customs officers, because the proximity of the Libyan border offers them more opportunities for personal enrichment [by the collection of illegal transit duties] than elsewhere in the country.

To make matters worse, teachers who accept postings in Tibesti often arrive there after long delays, which in turn delays the beginning of the school year.

Concerned with ensuring that schools function properly, Tibesti communities, like those of other regions of Chad, have spontaneouslyShouldered a part of the state’s responsibilities. In various localities pupils’ parents have formed associations to gather contributions that enable them to recruit additional teachers, pay them, cover their travel expenses to Tibesti, and provide them with food and firewood.

While local initiatives often allow services to work, they are insufficient to trigger an adequate development process or restart the building sites and projects abandoned after the ‘30 billion’ project, however. In terms of education, the teachers paid by local communities are insufficient to reverse the trend towards the exodus of young Teda, many attend schools in Faya, N’Djaména, or (in larger numbers) Libya.
of the DGGTPP’s management were carried out in 2013 and 2014, respectively, and found construction defects in many of the projects (Abba Garde, 2015).155

Starting in mid-2014, the economic crisis and the reorientation of the national budget to finance military operations (for example, in Mali and against Boko Haram) resulted in an interruption to the embryonic development of Tibesti that threatens to be lasting. The abandoned projects scattered over the Tibesti landscape are stark reminders of the failed opportunity that the ‘30 billion’ project eventually proved to be. Despite a few positive results obtained through significant investments, the development programme has not been able to fulfil either the expectations or the needs of the Tibesti communities. It has left the local population with the bitter aftertaste of a mismanaged mess and the feeling of having missed an opportunity that will probably never be repeated.156

To gauge the extraordinary nature and size of the sums allocated to the programme, one only has to consider the direct revenues of the Tibesti governorate, which are estimated to average about XAF 80 million (USD 136,000) per month from customs revenues. The ‘30 billion’ project is considered to be a blatant example of the government’s poor management practices. It also illustrates the primacy of individual over community interests in a Teda community that appears to be less unified and inclusive than it would like to appear to the outside world. 📈
V. Gold without borders: a gold rush on Teda lands

Striking gold from Sudan to Algeria

Between 2011 and 2013 a spectacular series of gold discoveries took place in the Sahel and Sahara in an arc stretching from Sudan to southern Algeria. The gold rushes that occurred in North Darfur and then in Teda territory in Chad, Libya, and Niger had an important impact on both local populations and armed actors in northern Chad, southern Libya, and western Sudan. Competition for
access to the new wealth sometimes resulted in violent conflicts, but gold also constituted a new source of income for impoverished communities. Among other things, it prevented or slowed down both the exodus of local people and their involvement in armed adventures.

The first epicentre of these gold discoveries was Jebel Amir, an enormous gold mine in North Darfur, which was being worked by around 100,000 gold miners in 2012 (Tubiana, 2014). It later became the scene of clashes between janjawid militias from various Arab tribes, causing hundreds of deaths and the displacement of around 150,000 people. Since 2013 the site has been mainly under the control of the Arab Mahamid militias of Musa Hilal and other autonomous war chiefs. While these militias have officially allowed gold miners from other tribes to work on the site, their predatory ways have nevertheless discouraged many from doing so (Tubiana, 2014; 2017, p. 9). A Beri gold prospector who worked at the site before the clashes and then returned after they had stopped in the second half of 2013 explained that now ‘all of the good mines are in the hands of the janjawid; if you find a lot of gold, they take it away from you’. But by then the news was spreading in Sudan that a new Eldorado was to be found in Tibesti.157

As early as 2012 gold miners who had gone to work in the mines in Darfur heard of gold being discovered in Tibesti and recrossed the border. ‘At the end of 2012 the first of them returned’, recounted a resident on the Chadian–Sudanese border:

_They had new cars. I didn’t believe it, but I met a classmate who had left for Tibesti on the Sudan border, where he was going to sell the gold that he had found. He showed it to me and I left [for the gold fields] as well._ 158

Others left for Tibesti after the Jebel Amir conflict at the beginning of 2013. In that year discoveries in Dar Sila in south-eastern Chad by veterans of the Jebel Amir mine also attracted several thousand gold prospectors from Darfur and eastern Chad, including refugees from Darfur. But because the gold lay deep underground they quickly left again for the more promising sites in Tibesti (Tubiana, 2016b).159

The gold rush in the Miski area in particular mixed thousands of Chadians and Sudanese, including many Darfurians. The latter were often more experienced than the others, with their knowledge of the semi-mechanized techniques
used in Jebel Amir and their mining equipment, particularly metal detectors. In 2013 a visit to the site by the Chadian minister of mines, Oumar Adoum Sini, intensified the rush, exactly as had happened a few months earlier in Jebel Amir. The discoveries spread on either side of the Chadian–Libyan border, particularly in the Kouri Bougoudi area between Wour, Aozou, and Gatrun.

New towns of several thousand inhabitants appeared in the middle of the desert on both sides of the border. Tankers delivered water supplies from Libya, while food, generators, metal detectors, mercury, and other mining equipment came mainly from Libya and Sudan. On the Libyan side of the border the majority of the gold miners seem to have come from Chad, although they were not necessarily Teda. The latter, similar to the Beri of Chad and Sudan, often owned the vehicles that transported gold-prospecting teams to mining sites in exchange for a share of what they found. They also hired out or sold mining equipment from Libya; traded other goods, including vehicles and food; and had a monopoly on the water supply. By 2014–15 a 200-litre water barrel was reportedly sold for 1–1.5 grams of gold. On the Libyan side of the border the area was administered by a committee representing the various communities working in the gold fields. Access was controlled by Libyan Teda militias, who occasionally levied taxes on both gold miners and traders.

To the east of Kouri Bougoudi other sites were discovered in the Kilinge and Ezri areas, and in Enneri Oyurom and Enneri Kahbor, which are also located on either side of the Chadian–Libyan border. There the workers were mainly from Sudan and Chad. Teda from Chad and Libya, including members of the Libyan Teda militias, and Beri from Chad and Sudan all took part. After initially being expelled by the Chadian army in September 2013, gold miners from Miski moved to these sites.

From Chad, many gold miners continued on to Libya, as well as the Djado (Brao) area in north-east Niger, which is also in Teda territory. Beginning in 2014, the discoveries there were larger and the security better. The Nigerien goldfield attracted thousands of gold miners from all over Niger; Chadians of many ethnicities; Teda from all three countries; Tuareg from Niger, Algeria, and Libya; and Beri and Arabs from Chad and Sudan. A gold miner who left for Niger recounted:

> our life was divided into three parts: working, praying, and sleeping. When you are looking for gold, everything is aimed at one sole goal: to enrich yourself.
From Djado some also continued further west towards the Tchibarakaten area in Tuareg land on the Algerian border, even entering Algerian territory. There, however, prospecting for gold was more risky: the Algerian air force bombed the gold miners and ground forces arrested several hundred of them. ‘We had to work at night, then cross the border to return to spend the day in Niger, out of the planes’ reach’, remembered one of those who braved the Algerian prohibition.

In mid-2014 the Nigerien authorities attempted to establish administrative control over the already overcrowded Djado area, pressuring the foreign (mostly Chadian and Sudanese) gold prospectors to return home.165 Many returned to Chad. However, immediately accessible reserves were progressively drying up in Chad and competition to find gold was becoming fierce (Tubiana, 2016a; Sudan Tribune, 2016).166

Eldorado in Tibesti

Once rumours of the presence of gold spread in mid-2012, local people quickly supplied themselves with portable detectors and began to collect the stones containing gold. Initially these stones were available in great quantities on
the surface, in particular in the Miski region of the Yebi-Bou sous-préfecture. But a number of areas, particularly in the Aozou strip, were covered in so much metallic debris that it was difficult to use metal detectors there. Landmines also claimed victims among the gold prospectors.167

News of the discovery spread rapidly, and from 2013 the region saw a growing influx of gold miners. At first the Teda community did not oppose their arrival, believing that they had no right to claim a resource that was both unexpected and bountiful. In Miski, however, a local chief imposed a fee for using a well on gold miners who were neither Teda nor Dazagada.168

Between 2013 and 2014, at the height of the gold rush, gold miners in Tibesti were to be found mainly in the areas of Miski, Kouri Bougoudi, Wour, Aozou, and Zouar. All the ethnic groups of northern Chad were represented, as well as a large number of Sudanese. The latter included Beri, Arabs, and other cross-border non-Arabs such as Masalit. People from other countries (including Libyans, Nigeriens, and Mauritanians) were also present, mainly working for Teda or Beri bosses from Chad and Sudan.169

The majority of the teams were made up of a handful of men (between ten and 20 per vehicle), each providing a specific contribution either in kind (for example, a vehicle or metal detector) or labour. The gold that was found was then generally split in three. A third went to the owner of the vehicle, a third to the owner of the metal detector, and a third was divided among the workers. At the mining sites the gold was used directly as currency to pay for services (such as repairing vehicles) or to buy vehicles. Alternately, the gold was sold on in southern Libya or Chad, in the gold fields themselves, and in Zouar, Faya, Abéché, or N’Djaména.

In the Tibesti gold fields prices varied between XAF 15,000 and XAF 19,000 (USD 25–32) per gram in 2014–15.170 In Faya, where in 2015 there were around 20 buyers from N’Djaména and eastern Chad, a gram of gold was sold for between XAF 15,000 and XAF 19,500 (USD 25–33). In N’Djaména gold was resold for between XAF 15,000 and XAF 23,000 (USD 25–39) per gram between 2013 and 2015. In Libya between 2012 and 2015 prices generally varied between LYD 50 and LYD 70 (USD 35–49) per gram and could go as high as LYD 95 (USD 66), depending on the mineral’s quality and fluctuations in global markets. Prices were higher than in Chad, but the risks of the journey were also greater.
Chadian gold could also be resold in Sudan, but not without risk, and for prices that were not necessarily higher—in August 2015 a gram cost SDG 280 (USD 45) in Tine on the Chadian–Sudanese border. In fact, it seems that a large proportion of the gold mined in Darfur was smuggled out and resold in Chad or Libya. Most of the gold extracted in Tibesti is believed to have been resold on world markets after being exported to the Dubai emporiums, mostly without being declared to customs and without the payment of export taxes.\textsuperscript{171}

In Tibesti gold mining remained completely informal and did not generate any revenue for the Chadian public treasury. This was in contrast to the system adopted by Sudan, which bought up gold at a price slightly above the global rate to prevent illicit exports and to build up national reserves to guarantee the country’s access to international currencies (Tubiana, 2017, p. 9).\textsuperscript{172}

In most of the region the mining sites were managed in a more or less formal way by the gold miners themselves. Kouri Bougoudi-Chad, like Kouri Bougoudi-Libya, Kilinge, and Jebel Amir, is managed by a multi-ethnic committee. In 2014–15 a Beri chaired the Kouri Bougoudi-Chad committee, reflecting this community’s importance among the miners, with a Libyan Teda deputy and other members representing the various Chadian ethnic groups present at the site. The Teda gold miners were therefore represented, but this was not sufficient to prevent conflicts between the gold miners and the local population.\textsuperscript{173}

The initially welcoming attitude of the Teda community towards foreign prospectors progressively turned into exasperation due to their numbers. Tibesti saw an influx of gold miners estimated at between 25,000 (roughly the equivalent of the local population) and 150,000 men.\textsuperscript{174} In 2013 up to 600 vehicles and perhaps up to 40,000 gold miners arrived in the Miski area, whose local population did not number more than 300 families.\textsuperscript{175} ‘We were sometimes so close to each other that the detectors caused interference’, explained a gold miner.\textsuperscript{176} Military authorities estimate that until mid-2015 there were 40,000 gold prospectors in the Chadian part of Kouri Bougoudi (Tubiana, 2016a).\textsuperscript{177}

Several factors contributed to the deterioration of relations between the Teda and the miners. These included competition over the mining regions’ poor resources, particularly water; the adverse effect of the presence of thousands of men and hundreds of vehicles on both the environment and livestock; the irresponsible use of cyanide and mercury to separate gold from the other
elements contained in the gravel; and the sometimes violent tensions between gold-mining groups, who were often armed. Tree felling, the escape of camels, the deaths of wild animals (dorcas gazelles) that had been prevented from accessing pastures and water points, as well as the contamination of water were also problematic. 

The Teda felt themselves to be the victims of an invasion, while the authorities’ initially passive attitude was perceived as a sign of complicity with the gold miners. Local communities asked the authorities to remove the prospectors, mainly in Miski in mid-2013 and in Gezendu at the end of that year. In September 2013 the army expelled several thousand miners from Miski, then others from Gezendu in early 2014. When the Chadian army expelled them from the areas near the Libyan border they simply took refuge in Libyan territory and then returned to Chad a little later.

Inevitably, the tensions culminated in a series of armed clashes between Teda communities and miners from outside the region. The first of these clashes occurred in the Ogi area in August 2014.

Conflicts around gold

The difficult cohabitation between the Teda and the gold miners gave rise to both isolated incidents and pitched battles in which people from both sides were killed. Two additional factors exacerbated tensions: on the one hand, the militarization of the actors on both sides, and, on the other hand, the authorities’ inability to enforce the ban on gold mining issued by the Chadian government as early as December 2013. Both Teda and other gold miners confirmed the presence of weapons (mainly assault rifles and, to a lesser degree, heavier weapons) on both sides.

The chaos in Libya that started in July 2011 had resulted in the increased circulation of weapons in the sub-region. Although it is impossible to estimate the quantities of weapons that were moved from Libya to Chad after 2011, several witnesses, including Chadian officials, confirmed that Qaddafi’s downfall increased the militarization of Teda society, as new stocks of individual weapons (mainly Kalashnikov- and FAL-type assault rifles) spread through the region from looted Libyan stocks.
Similarly, many gold miners who came to Tibesti from 2012 onwards came armed for their own protection. A military leader estimated that 600 weapons, mostly small arms, were seized in Tibesti in 2015, mainly from gold miners. According to another official, weapons confiscated from gold miners were largely small arms (mainly Kalashnikov-type assault rifles) and a few 12.7 mm machine guns and RPG-type rocket launchers. The Teda have also claimed that there were arms traffickers among the gold miners.\footnote{181} Even if the availability of weapons on both sides was not the primary reason for the conflicts that arose, it certainly helped to aggravate tensions and make the clashes more deadly.\footnote{182}

The weakness of the measures taken by the Chadian authorities after the prohibition of gold-mining activities at the end of 2013 and the first waves of violent clashes between gold prospectors and local communities also increased tensions. It reinforced the Teda community’s feeling of vulnerability and encouraged it to react with violence due to the lack of protection from the state.
The battle of Ogi, August 2014

The first clash between Beri gold miners and Teda populations in Chad occurred in the village of Ogi in August 2014. Located between Faya and Zouar, Ogi is a staging post for Chadian and Sudanese gold prospectors on the route to the Djado (Brao) gold fields in Niger.

In August 2014, shortly after the end of Ramadan, the Nigerien authorities gave several hundred foreign (mostly Chadian and Sudanese) gold miners who had entered Niger illegally 24 hours notice to leave Djado or have their vehicles and equipment impounded. According to a number of gold miners, Chadian authorities were behind the ultimatum by telling the Nigeriens that the Chadian gold miners had drug traffickers and Boko Haram members in their ranks. Several thousand Chadian and Sudanese gold miners then left Brao.

After the first departures the Nigerien authorities began to confiscate vehicles belonging to uncooperative miners. Simultaneously, armed Teda are said to have attacked gold prospectors in the Brao market, killing several of them, stealing their gold and other goods, and causing the stragglers to leave. Perhaps in retaliation, some gold miners at the Chadian–Nigerien border en route to Chad killed two Teda, one of whom was from Ogi, and stole their vehicle. In response, a group of Teda ambushed a convoy of nine gold miners’ vehicles driven by mainly Beri miners travelling eastwards towards Derdewini, to the south of Ogi. The ambush killed two Sudanese and forced the convoy to turn back to Niger. In hot pursuit of the convoy, the Teda, armed with RPG-type rocket launchers, destroyed two vehicles and killed two more gold miners. The members of the convoy were only armed with two Kalashnikov-type rifles, but a number were Darfur rebels from the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). They used telephone contacts with a comrade who had left for Libya to find a weapons cache that the latter had left in the Chadian–Nigerien border area.

The gold miners were thus able to arm themselves with three Kalashnikov-type rifles, one FAL-type rifle, one Goryunov-type rifle, an RPG-type rocket launcher, and ammunition. The convoy then turned back on the Ogi road and fought a battle lasting several hours with the Teda who had previously attacked them. Six Beri gold miners, all of whom were armed opposition group members from Darfur, were killed during this second clash. In retaliation, the gold miners looted and torched villages in the Ogi area. ‘We killed and destroyed
everything we found on our route’, explained a convoy member. ‘A number of us who had lost family members were angry and burned houses and trees’ (Tubiana, 2016a).

When they reached the village of Ogi the gold miners stole some barrels of fuel and a 4 × 4 vehicle before being chased away by the local population and escaping in the direction of Faya. Around 40 vehicles containing armed gold miners drove through the village the next day. After another violent clash the gold miners are said to have continued on their way, looting the village’s few shops as they went, seizing fuel barrels and food, and setting fire to up to 17 houses and shops, as well as to palm trees. An army detachment and personnel from the police and ANS were deployed in Ogi from the time of the first clashes, but seem to have merely observed the skirmishes without intervening. The Ogi population interpreted this as a sign of the authorities’ complicity with the gold miners.

The authorities, however, did not remain completely inactive. Indeed, their reaction shows that President Déby was prepared to take action against the Beri gold miners in order to avoid a wider conflict between his own community and the Teda. On the first day of the confrontations Chadian helicopters chased the fleeing gold miners towards Sudan and shot at a convoy, without causing casualties. The next day, in Faya, the army attempted to block the gold miners coming from Ogi. Reinforcements backed by helicopters were sent to Ogi to confiscate the gold miners’ vehicles and weapons. In addition, Déby himself went to Faya four days after the fighting to oversee the arrests. In total, the authorities are said to have arrested 600 miners between Ogi and the Sudanese border, and impounded between 300 and 400 vehicles, a number of which are said to have belonged to the ANT, as well as metal detectors, a few weapons, and some gold. The Chadian authorities claim that all the Sudanese gold miners were repatriated by force, but it seems that after about a month in detention those who had been arrested were released without being deported. A number of them reportedly returned to the gold fields, including at Kouri Bougoudi.

The Ogi clashes also gave rise to a communal mediation process, in which President Déby participated. In accordance with customary law, the two ethnic groups involved—the Teda and Beri—both claimed compensation for the losses suffered in the form of diya, but did not agree on the number of victims. The
Beri at first refused to pay compensation for the Teda victims who were killed in Nigerien territory.

Faced with these diverging opinions, Déby facilitated the establishment of a mediation committee in late 2014. Mahamat Abba Ali Salah, who was then a member of the MPS political bureau, presided over this committee, representing the Teda. General Mahamat Saleh Brahim, the GNNT commander-in-chief and Déby’s nephew, was appointed vice president and represented the Beri. The derrée Erzey Barkay was also a member. The committee travelled to the location, concluded that there were 14 Beri and two Teda victims, and fixed the diya at XAF 20 million (USD 34,000) per victim. This was in line with the traditional payment of 100 camels per victim, with one camel being worth about XAF 200,000 (USD 340).

According to Mahamat Abba Ali Salah, by the end of 2015 the entire amount of the diya had been raised from contributions that, unusually, were not only paid by the Teda of Chad, Niger, and Libya, but also by cadres in N’Djaména from northern and western Chad. The payment, however, was later suspended following new violent incidents so as not to legitimize future claims.

**The Miski clashes, July 2015**

The first expulsion of gold miners from Miski took place in September 2013. An ANT battalion that had remained in Miski then set up a checkpoint to control the southern entrance to the area. But this was not enough to discourage the gold prospectors, who came back illegally in early 2014. Similarly, the measures taken in the aftermath of the Ogi incidents in mid-2014 did not discourage the miners, and after a few weeks the Tibesti gold rush resumed at a rapid pace, in particular in the Miski area, triggering new tensions.

In December 2014 the first incident occurred when an ANT patrol accompanied by two local guides ordered a group of about ten Dọza gold miners to leave the area. Some of the miners reportedly threatened the soldiers with knives and managed to disarm one of them. The soldiers opened fire and killed a miner. The other prospectors then reportedly accused one of the Teda guides of causing their comrade’s death and insisted that the community pay them diya. The Teda customary authorities eventually decided not to pay the diya, which would have meant acknowledging their guilt. Instead they offered a
simple form of ‘compensation’ of XAF 2.35 million (USD 3,995, which is about 10 per cent of the standard diya) to prevent the violence from escalating.\textsuperscript{192}

After this incident the local community, realizing the military authorities’ helplessness, formed a self-defence committee known as *lejna wangada* (committee of monitors) to monitor the gold miners and encourage them to leave.\textsuperscript{193} The ensuing lull in prospecting only lasted a few months, however. The gold miners’ vehicles had to stop at a checkpoint erected at the southern entrance to Miski village, but gold mining continued to the south of this checkpoint. The prospectors managed to illegally reach the gold fields on foot or by camel, returning regularly despite a series of expulsions.\textsuperscript{194}

The inhabitants of Miski continued to ask the army to expel the miners. At the end of 2014, after a fight among prospectors in which one of them was killed, the governor himself asked the army to expel the miners, but they returned illegally after a few days. The number of deadly incidents increased. In early 2015 a convoy of miners leaving the area under military escort was shot at and one prospector was killed. Another was killed when a military patrol opened fire on fleeing miners.\textsuperscript{195}

On the night of 3 July 2015, during a patrol to the south of Miski, Salah Nokur, a Dõza wangada, reportedly asked a group of Beri prospectors to leave the area. Some interviewees claim that Nokur was not only a monitor, but also a miner, who was perhaps seeking to oust his rivals. As he was attempting to confiscate a metal detector the miners killed him, then fled southwards. A number of wangada and some Teda civilians pursued them, breaking through the Miski checkpoint despite being shot at by soldiers who attempted to stop them. Following the fugitives’ tracks, the Teda reached a gold-mining camp in the Enneri Dohor area and attacked it at night. Six miners were killed, including five Beri. On the road back to Miski the Teda were involved in another clash with armed men: according to interviewees they were either miners or the soldiers who had initially attempted to prevent the Teda from pursuing the prospectors and who opened fire again. Four wangada were killed, another was wounded, and at least two Teda vehicles were destroyed.\textsuperscript{196}

After these incidents relations between the authorities and the Miski community deteriorated. The wangada committee accused Governor Taher Barkay of being too lenient towards the gold miners, of minimizing the gravity of the
situation, and of failing to visit the area after the clashes to offer his condolences to Teda victims.\textsuperscript{197} Following these complaints, on 10 July 2015 the prime minister sent a delegation to the area led by the minister of public sanitation and good governance, Abderrahman Salah, who represented Tibesti in the government. The mission also included four Tibesti MPs (Salah, 2015, p. 1).\textsuperscript{198} The delegation found in favour of the community and Salah’s report blamed the local authorities for failing to enforce ‘the prohibition on the collection and exploitation of gold’ (Salah, 2015, pp. 1–2). It also referred to their ‘negative track record’ in terms of arresting gold miners and confiscating their weapons and equipment. Furthermore, it accused the authorities of ‘blatant complicity’ with the miners and recommended that Governor Taher Barkay be replaced, although this did not happen (Salah, 2015, p. 6).

Box 5  \textbf{From old to new wangada}

Faced with a gold rush that they saw as an invasion, the Teda responded by reactivating a customary function: the wangada. Traditionally, the wangada were the ‘protectors’, ‘monitors’, or ‘guardians’ of the land and its natural resources. Under the authority of the village chiefs, they were responsible for preventing illegal logging; protecting local palm trees, gardens, and pastures; and preserving wild plants consumed by the Teda chiefly during periods of scarcity. They gave people permission to fell trees, pick dates, and harvest wild cereals at given times; impounded cattle that strayed into gardens; and imposed fines on offenders. The Teda often compare their wangada to the agents of the Inspection des eaux et forêts (the water and forestry service).

The customary wangada spontaneously mobilized themselves to monitor the gold miners present in their areas whose activities negatively impacted these areas’ natural resources. But they were soon reinforced by newly-constituted wangada mobilized specifically to deal with the miners. These new recruits continued to call themselves wangada, but to distinguish them from the customary wangada they were called wangada dahab (the Arabic term referring to gold), while the customary wangada were called wangada enneri (the guardians of the wadis) or wangada yidae (the guardians of the trees). The profiles of these two groups were very different. While the customary wangada were armed with sticks and spears, many of the new wangada were veteran MDJT fighters or demobilized soldiers (or both), and were equipped with cars, satellite telephones, and weapons. Some even reportedly wore uniforms (Tubiana, 2016a).\textsuperscript{199} As had previously occurred in other parts of the region and in south-eastern Chad in 2003–08 (Tubiana, 2008, p. 51), a customary function became the basis for the formation of a new armed group. Thus, what was at first a self-defence or vigilante group filling the security vacuum left by the state slowly became a militia.
The Turku spark

Less than a month after the Miski clashes, on 24 July 2015, a series of armed clashes occurred between the Teda and gold miners in Turku, between Wour and Bardaï. Once again the violence erupted when the local wangada committee asked a group of gold miners to leave. Shots were exchanged and two wangada were killed. In response, a number of Teda from Wour mobilized and attacked the gold miners, and another Teda and two Beri prospectors were killed. According to the gold miners, the veteran MDJT commander and former ANT colonel Allatchi ‘Koukoula’ led the Teda attackers.200

After these incidents, other Teda volunteers from the Wour area mobilized under the command of Koukoula, Omar Wuche (also known as ‘Omri Boma’), and Sougui Mahamat. All three were MDJT and ANT veterans. The three leaders asked the Teda in Tibesti, Libya, and Niger to assist. A meeting took place in Tuduhu, not far from Turku, on 13–16 August 2015 to draw up a common strategy for the struggle against the gold miners. Those who attended decided to model themselves on the Miski committee and form a self-defence organization with authority over all Teda territory. Orozi Loso, the vice president of the Miski wangada committee, was chosen to head the new grouping. He had been an ANT lieutenant colonel, a Yebi-Bou administrator, and an adviser first to Youssouf Togoimi and then Hassan Mardage in the MDJT.201

The meeting decided to immediately enforce the prohibition on gold mining in the Tibesti region and, as a start, to force the gold miners settled in Kouri Bougoudi to leave the area.

The battle of Kouri Bougoudi

In mid-2015 the Chadian part of the Kouri Bougoudi gold field reportedly contained some 40,000 gold prospectors, 10,000 of whom were in the area’s main camp.202 The new wangada committee set up in Tuduhu informed the authorities of its intention to take action if the army did not expel the miners within a week. The Teda sent three messages to the gold miners warning them to leave the area. The miners rejected these warnings, however, arguing that they were Chadian citizens and therefore had the right to travel anywhere in Chad.203

A wangada team was given the responsibility of monitoring the gold miners, and threatened any who strayed from the main encampments. The Teda
attacked prospectors twice, killing three of them and stealing two vehicles and gold from them. A Teda killed another miner in the main camp’s market. In addition, around 20 Teda volunteers led by Allatchi ‘Koukoula’ and Omri Boma tried to persuade the Libyan Teda traders not to supply Kouri Bougoudi with water and food. However, on the way to Libya Beri gold miners ambushed these volunteers and five Teda were killed. The rest of the volunteers continued on to the Fawar water point in Libya to attempt to seize control of it. When the Libyan Teda continued to supply Kouri Bougoudi, the forces of Omri Boma and Allatchi ‘Koukoula’ began to patrol the border area in order to prevent supplies of food and water from entering Chad. The gold miners began to feel the effects of the blockade, but some rainfall in the area protected them from its worst effects.\(^{204}\)

On 24 August 2015, once the one-week ultimatum had expired and no miners had left, the wangada committee organized a convoy of around 100 men in 30 vehicles equipped with 12.7 mm calibre machine guns and led by Koukoula and Boma.\(^{205}\) It is probable that the Tuduhu volunteers had recruited reinforcements and sourced weapons in Libya. The convoy left Fawar and attacked the main Kouri Bougoudi encampment. According to a Beri gold miner, the Teda gold miners in the camp joined the attackers and also opened fire.\(^{206}\)

The non-Teda gold miners fought back. Many of them, especially the Beri, were experienced fighters, including former soldiers from the Chadian army and Darfur rebels or former rebels from the LJM, JEM, SLA-MM, and SLA-AW. Many of them were armed, although only with Kalashnikov-type assault rifles. The gold miners wounded three Teda (two of whom died shortly after from their injuries), and a major battle ensued. It only ended when the Teda attackers retreated to Libya after learning that the army was on its way. A total of 67 gold miners, including 23 Beri, reportedly died (Tubiana, 2016a).\(^{207}\) According to one interviewee, the attackers singled out the Beri.\(^{208}\)

The army quickly intervened. It prevented the arrival of Beri reinforcements from Dar Zaghawa, and about 100 vehicles, some of which were civilian and others from the Chadian army, were intercepted not far from Kouri Bougoudi. General Mahamat Saleh Brahim and the customary Beri chiefs persuaded these reinforcements to turn back.\(^{209}\) Subsequently, tankers supplied Kouri Bougoudi with water from Wour, then several dozen more trucks were
requisitioned to evacuate around 12,000 gold miners who were still in the area to Faya, with the Sudanese miners taken onwards to Abéché.  

By the end of 2015 the Kouri Bougoudi battle seemed to have resulted in the intended effect. Most of the gold miners still present in the Kouri Bougoudi had moved to the Libyan side of the border and most of the Beri miners had left Tibesti. The miners who remained and those who came to Tibesti after the clashes were mainly Dazagada. The conflicts between the latter and the Teda seem to have been more easily contained, mainly because the Teda did not accuse them of systematic collusion with the authorities.

Another violent incident in Tibesti directly linked to gold mining occurred in mid-November 2015. The ANS deputy head for East Tibesti, a Dazagada, and five of his agents, including one in uniform, had travelled in an ANS vehicle to prospect for gold in Gobur between Ogi and Enneri Dohor. When members of the local wangada committee surprised them, the ANS agents proceeded to beat them with a whip before killing four of them. Other wangada intervened, three of whom were also killed. Civilians from the area then arrived and killed the ANS leader and one of his agents in reprisal.

More recently, in early 2017, a gold-mining incident in Miski triggered, possibly for the first time, a conflict between Teda and Dazagada miners. After two Dõza prospecting clandestinely were killed (either by the ANT or by Teda wangada), the Dõza reportedly retaliated by burning a Teda official’s car.

**Local reaction: from self-defence to rejection of the state**

Until September 2013, when the army first expelled gold miners from Miski, there were no ‘wangada dahab’ (gold monitors) either in Miski or in the rest of Tibesti. But after a few weeks the return of the miners, despite the army’s presence, convinced the Miski community of the need to mobilize forces for its own protection. Young armed Teda on board a dozen vehicles arrived at the house of Issa Yusuf, the village chief of Miski 1, and informed him of their intention to expel the miners by force. The Yebi-Bou sous-préfet was not in favour of this and at his request the army once again expelled the prospectors.

A few days later, during a meeting in Miski in December 2013, the first wangada committee was formed. It had 23 members and was under the com-
mand of Marchallah Abukore, François Ordikodi, and Youssouf Olohi. Among the group were ten MDJT veterans, six of whom had also been soldiers after joining the government.214

At the end of 2014 a new meeting in Miski decided that a structure should be formed to oversee the wangada committee. This structure was headed by Kellâ Goukouni, the Tega chef de canton, who resided in Miski, with Orozi Loso, a former lieutenant colonel and MDJT veteran, as his deputy. It also included the five chefs de canton of the Yebi-Bou sous-préfecture and the former sous-préfet, Togui Keley. Its leaders were prepared to present this new organization as a parallel administration: ‘because we are not properly governed, we have decided to manage our affairs ourselves’, one of them explained. However, their hostility was directed against the governor, Taher Barkay, whose replacement they demanded, rather than the central government.215

The Miski committee subsequently served as a model for the other committees that were formed elsewhere in Tibesti.216 At the end of 2014 a committee of a dozen wangada, mostly of the customary kind, but equipped with vehicles, was formed in Gezendu under the authority of the village chief. This committee gave an ultimatum to the gold miners in the area to leave immediately, threatening to levy fines if they did not do so. A unique feature of this committee was that it claimed that its authority extended into Libyan territory, because the gold-producing area of Enneri Kahbor to the north of Gezendu was located astride the Chadian–Libyan border. But, whereas in Chad it coordinated its activities with the local authorities, in Libya it called on Libyan Teda militias from Waw el-Kebir to help expel the gold miners.217 In May 2015 an umbrella committee was formed for all the Aozou sous-préfectures (including Gezendu) and Zoumri.218

After the Turku incidents, Teda delegates from Tibesti, Libya, and Niger assembled in Tuduhu in August 2015. They established a ‘commission’ of 40 members representing ‘the different localities’, with a mandate to enforce the prohibition on gold mining, chiefly through fines and sanctions. In each sous-préfecture three delegations were appointed to monitor the gold fields and collect money to fund the commission’s work. It was also decided that each local committee could call on the others for assistance if necessary.
The resolutions that were adopted stressed the need to preserve the solidarity and unity of the Teda community. The meeting decided that ‘any person who undermines our unity and solidarity’ would be ‘warned’, ‘suspended’, or ‘excluded [from] the community’.\textsuperscript{219} If anyone confessed to undermining Teda unity, the culprits would be punished with a fine of XAF 1 million (USD 1,700). As mentioned above, in addition to the Teda from Tibesti, Teda from Libya and Niger were also present, including Adam Tcheke, a veteran of the earlier Niger Teda rebellion who in 2016 was to announce the launch of a small Teda rebel group in Niger known as the Mouvement pour la justice et la réhabilitation du Niger.\textsuperscript{220}

Similar to traditional wangada, the wangada committees claimed that they were authorized to levy fines of variable amounts on the gold miners. They mainly used the threat of fines to enforce their authority. Miners and state representatives, however, said that some wangada levied fines on the miners and pocketed the proceeds themselves. Others seem to have turned a blind eye to the presence of prospectors in exchange for payments in money or gold.\textsuperscript{221} The wangada also confiscated materials belonging to miners, in particular metal detectors mainly belonging to Teda, which they may have used to prospect for gold themselves.\textsuperscript{222} In Miski 44 detectors were handed over to the ANT in August 2015.\textsuperscript{223} According to Orozi Loso, the Miski committee confiscated more than 100 detectors from Teda miners.\textsuperscript{224}

Due chiefly to the wangada committees’ autonomy, relations between them and state representatives fluctuated. At first, even before the formation of the wangada committees, the army used Teda civilians as guides to track down illegal gold miners. The Miski community also provided vehicles and supplied the military with fuel when the latter were not properly equipped to expel the miners. The Miski wangada described ‘joint operations’ against miners.\textsuperscript{225} According to the wangada, until the Kouri Bougoudi battle the local administration encouraged their activities.\textsuperscript{226} Indeed, a month before the fighting a circular from the governorate of Tibesti authorized the formation of a ‘monitoring committee’ in the sous-préfectures of Wour and Bardaï to ‘clear out’ the gold miners.\textsuperscript{227}

Similarly, in 2014 the Aozou sous-préfet and the Gezendu chefs de canton asked the customary wangada and other civilians to form a committee. In May
2015 the préfet of East Tibesti is also said to have given written authorization for the formation of a joint committee for the sous-préfectures of Aozou and Zoumiri. He was reportedly present during the wangada’s (peaceful) expulsion of around 100 gold miners. A number of officials, including the secretary-general of the East Tibesti prefecture, seem to have encouraged the formation of the Miski committee and the one covering all of Tibesti in Tuduhu.

The tone changed after the incidents in Miski of July 2015, and even more so after the fighting in Kouri Bougoudi in August. In November 2015 Governor Taher Barkay, whose resignation the Miski committee had demanded, stated that the wangada committees were ‘illegal’ and had to be disbanded. At the same time the Yebi-Bou sous-préfet announced the dissolution of the Miski committee, while simultaneously asking the five local chefs de canton to each designate a wangada who would act as ‘monitor’ and ‘informant’ on behalf of the authorities. These ‘new wangada’ would not be armed and would act under the sous-prêfets’ control. The committees’ leaders were not prepared to completely renounce their autonomy, however.²²⁸
As a result, while the wangada sometimes allied themselves with the state, at times they also competed with it. Thus they slowly attracted the hostility of the authorities, while simultaneously displaying hostility to representatives of the state, whom they considered to be accomplices of the gold miners. Over time, and taking advantage of the authorities’ weakness, a number of wangada began to see themselves not only as an autonomous militia, but also as a possible new rebellion.

The role of the state: between collusion and neutrality

In principle, N’Djaména banned gold prospecting in Tibesti as early as 2013.\textsuperscript{229} As early as the beginning of 2013 approximately 100 gold miners who had been working for a week about 40 km south of Bardaï had been arrested, and their metal detectors and the gold they had found confiscated. In early 2014 the Ministry of Mines issued a new prohibition on gold-mining activities and the use of mercury derivatives to refine gold. On 21 July 2015 the governor of Tibesti decreed that ‘any gold miner in possession of a detecting machine or any other gold exploitation equipment seized is liable to a fine of XAF 500,000 [USD 850]’; that ‘any vehicle transporting water, foodstuffs or gold miners [will be] seized at the various exit checkpoints and the owner liable to a fine of XAF 1 million [USD 1,700]’; and that ‘the weapons and gold-detecting machines seized during eviction operations will be systematically handed over to the area’s administrative authorities’.\textsuperscript{230}

These measures were only partially enforced, however. In Miski an expulsion of gold miners, a military deployment, and the setting up of a checkpoint in September 2013 were followed by other regular expulsions and the deployment of army reinforcements as incidents continued. In general the army did not confiscate equipment, contenting itself with pushing the prospectors back to south of the Miski checkpoint. The wangada carried out most of the limited confiscations in the area, handing over 44 metal detectors and one Kalashnikov-type rifle to the army in August 2015.\textsuperscript{231} The army also imposed fines on the owners of metal detectors and vehicles transporting gold miners. In addition, weapons were systematically confiscated at various checkpoints.\textsuperscript{232}
In August 2014, after the Ogi fighting, the ANT pursued the gold miners between Tibesti and the Sudanese border. The soldiers were supported by helicopters that shot at the fugitives. Miners were arrested and their vehicles, weapons, metal detectors, and gold were seized. A year later the army intervened again to expel the Kouri Bougoudi prospectors. Despite these interventions, the government’s management of the Tibesti gold rush received a great deal of criticism, in particular from the Teda. The latter often perceived the authorities’ responses as passive and inefficient, and understood this as clear proof of the regime’s complicity with the Beri gold miners.

The preponderance of Beri in both the ranks of the army and among the gold miners meant that some Teda considered the army to be furthering a policy of giving Beri access to Tibesti’s gold. It is probable that the ethnic affinities between the military and the Beri miners gave the latter a feeling of impunity. In addition, the negative perception of the role of the army was aggravated by the fact that a number of gold-mining teams actually worked for army officers, who provided them with vehicles and materiel. Even more obviously, the miners included demobilized or retired former military personnel; soldiers on leave; and even—as government officials admitted—soldiers who had deserted their posts.

Several Beri members of the military, including a colonel, were reportedly killed during the Kouri Bougoudi attack. According to the Teda, a number of gold miners sometimes wore uniforms, drove vehicles, and carried weapons belonging to the army. Other members of the Chadian military reportedly sent vehicles with gold miners to work for them in both Chad and Niger, much to President Déby’s displeasure.

Besides these ethnic connections, the Teda also accused the military of accepting payments from gold miners. In addition, private Chadian or international mining companies, either owned or encouraged by Beri with close links to the government, visited or tried to access gold-mining sites. This gave credence to the belief that powerful people in N’Djaména were attempting to appropriate Tibesti’s gold, to the detriment of the local population.

The army’s attitude during the Kouri Bougoudi battle had given rise to virulent criticism from both sides. The Teda accused the military command of inaction and collusion with the Beri gold prospectors. The gold-mining camp’s
management committee, whose members were mostly Beri, claimed that the army had failed to protect the camp. The committee claimed to have paid 7 kg of gold to the Daza officer in charge of the Kouri Bougoudi area in exchange for his troops’ protection, but according to the miners he sided with the Teda.\footnote{238}

After the Turku clashes and the subsequent fighting in Kouri Bougoudi, the government reorganized the military command in Tibesti, appointing General Kallemi Sougui, a Daza, to head it in place of General Hunno Abbakar, a Beri. Subsequently, Sougui was replaced by General Khalifa Weddey, Goukouni Weddey’s brother, in May 2016. Army and gendarmerie reinforcements were also deployed. Since then, relations between the Teda and the army have improved. Gold miners who attempted to return to Miski and the Chadian part of Kouri Bougoudi were reportedly expelled once again by the army in 2016.\footnote{239} In Miski in late 2016 the ANT and the wangada also reportedly cooperated to expel gold miners. In Kouri Bougoudi the army occasionally sent patrols to chase miners away, but by 2017 increasingly tolerated their return in exchange for the payment of (unofficial) taxes.\footnote{240}

While representatives of the state were certainly guilty of shortcomings and abuses, it seems that, overall, the central authorities displayed a degree of impartiality in their dealings in Tibesti, as was demonstrated by their attempt to resolve the Ogi conflict through mediation—although some gold miners and a number of government officials believe that after the Ogi incidents President Déby came to support the Teda.\footnote{241} The government’s main objective was not to unwittingly create pockets of tension in the area. The priority for N’Djaména was to guarantee a level of stability on Chad’s northern border while preventing Tibesti from becoming fertile ground for new threats and a gateway for rebel infiltration.

The rebel factor

The presence of Chadian rebels among the gold miners

The Chadian military based in Tibesti claimed that armed opposition members who were still active mostly avoided the gold mines on Chadian territory, but were present at mines located in Libya, and sometimes in Chad. It appears that the Chadian authorities’ decision to act against the miners was in fact taken
because a number of miners, including among the Beri, were Chadian rebels or former rebels. For the Chadian authorities, there is a perceived risk of a reconstituted rebellion with a presence in Tibesti that could both establish links with the Teda and use gold as a source of funding. This prospect has become unlikely, however, due to the conflicts between the Teda and the miners. At the same time, the presence of former rebels did not escape the attention of the Chadian rebels in exile in Sudan and Libya, who tried to contact their former comrades and encourage them to return to the armed struggle.

The presence of Darfur armed opposition

Darfur rebels or former rebels were present among the gold miners in Tibesti, probably in larger numbers than the Chadian rebels. These included Beri, some of whom had previously prospected for gold in Jebel Amir in Darfur, as well as in Libya, Niger, and Algeria. Among them were fighters from the United Resistance Front (URF), the main armed force of the LJM coalition, which was a signatory of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in 2011 (ICG, 2014, p. 11). The agreement included a provision for the integration of rebel fighters into the Sudan Armed Forces, which has never been implemented. LJM fighters did not necessarily want to be integrated into the army, which could have sent them to fight against other Sudanese rebel groups, and preferred to leave their camps and prospect for gold, first in Jebel Amir, then in Tibesti.

Former JEM, SLA-MM, and SLA-AW fighters also went to Tibesti. For example, JEM’s former head of intelligence prospected for gold in Kouri Bougoudi in 2014–15 at a time when another former JEM combatant led the mining site’s committee. Beri fighters of the LJM, JEM, and the SLA-MM, some of whom were native to the Chadian–Sudanese border, often had Chadian citizenship and could move without difficulty in Chadian territory. A number of them were also previously members of Chadian armed opposition groups. Particularly since the Chadian–Sudanese rapprochement, they had enjoyed good relations with Chadian rebels based in Sudan and Libya, while the latter also attempted to form alliances with the Darfur insurgents or recruit among them. Because of this it seems likely that the Chadian authorities considered the presence of Sudanese rebels among the gold miners to be a potential threat. Arab janjawid fighters from Darfur, a number of whom were of Chadian origin, also prospected for gold in Chad and Niger.
Aftermath of the gold rush

Despite the reinforcement of the security forces in Tibesti from mid-2015, gold miners were still present in Tibesti in December of that year—but in more limited numbers and less prominently than previously.\footnote{245} The gold rush had lost a great deal of its momentum compared to the period 2013–14. In addition, the gold miners were mainly Teda and Dazagada from Borkou rather than Beri, who had become more cautious since the battle of Kouri Bougoudi.\footnote{246} Lower levels of gold-mining activities were probably due to two factors: the government’s and local authorities’ efforts to prevent uncontrolled small-scale extraction, and the depletion of surface and shallow gold reserves.\footnote{247}

Although somewhat discouraged by the violent incidents that had occurred in Tibesti, by late 2015 and early 2016 many gold miners said they were ready to return to the massif if conditions improved there.\footnote{248} A number of miners who had tried their luck in Tibesti left for more promising gold fields that were
easier to access or less dangerous. Many first went to Libya, but new discoveries in early 2016 in central Chad, particularly in the area of Lake Fitri in Batha, caused a gold rush similar to the one in Tibesti. In January 2016 a Darfur gold miner who had previously left for Tibesti and Niger and who was preparing to leave for Batha, explained:

_This gold in Batha is a challenge, it’s something like an adventure. We know 100 per cent that we are going to have problems, but we have to go. We have no other option. Our families still live in refugee camps. We have children to feed_ (Tubiana, 2016a).249

In early February 2016 approximately 45,000 gold miners were in the Lake Fitri area from Chad—including from Tibesti—Sudan, and Libya. The government subsequently prohibited gold mining in Batha, as well as the importation and sale of metal detection equipment. The ANT reportedly expelled gold miners from at least a part of the gold fields there and opened fire on those who were reluctant to leave (Journal du Tchad, 2016). In addition, 400 vehicles carrying gold miners were said to have been stopped at the Sudanese border.

In mid-2016 gold miners began to return to the Kouri Bougoudi area, including a second wave of Beri prospectors. With the army not present in the area itself, these miners settled in Libya and crossed the border at night to work in Chadian territory. Others worked in sites far away from the Chadian military, fleeing to Libya if a patrol was detected nearby.250 The soldiers gradually tolerated the miners’ return, reportedly demanding taxes from miners and traders, in addition to looking for gold themselves.251

In both Tibesti and Batha the authorities seem to have been unsure of how to manage the peaceful extraction of gold. A number of government officials did not conceal their preference for industrial-scale gold mining, with small-scale exploitation eventually controlled by the state in parallel to large-scale operations. The Tibesti experience, however, prompted them to be cautious. Many Teda said they did not oppose the industrial exploitation of gold in their areas, provided that they received sufficient guarantees that the environment would be protected and that a share of the proceeds would go to local communities. But the experience of the ‘30 billion’ project has made other community members extremely suspicious of such guarantees.252
In late 2016 Governor Taher Barkay announced his intention to allow industrial mining in Miski; in response the local wangada committee reportedly threatened to take up arms. Togui Keley, a known wangada leader, was then appointed Yebi-Bou sous-préfet for a second time, and Hassan Tchonay, a Dazagada, replaced Taher Barkay.\textsuperscript{253}

The positive effects of the discovery of gold in Tibesti should not be underestimated. A Faya gold trader estimated that in 2015 ‘few [gold miners] became rich, and a number even became poorer’, because they did not find enough gold to pay back their investments in equipment. But some of the Teda were able to benefit from the gold discoveries before the waves of miners arrived from outside the region, and many continued to prospect for gold after the rush was over. The gold enriched many Teda, notably in Tibesti, enabling them to buy goods in Libya such as cars, televisions, and satellite telephones. ‘If by the grace of God, gold had not appeared we would not even have anything to eat’, reflected an Aozou gold prospector (Tubiana, 2016a).\textsuperscript{254}

Another benefit was indirect: the attraction of gold mining probably helped to dissuade young Teda from being tempted to engage in armed adventures (including banditry, rebellion, or offering their services as mercenaries), particularly in Libya.\textsuperscript{255} Curiously, neither Teda militias nor Chadian and Darfur rebels present in the region appear to have sought exclusive control of the gold resources. They also do not appear to have seen the gold as a source of funding for armed groups. However, the wangada movement carried the seeds of demands for Teda control over the region’s gold resources and a possible Teda insurrection in Chad, which could be strengthened by feelings of solidarity with Teda armed groups in Libya and Niger. 📝
VI. Wars without borders: northern Chad and southern Libya

Chadian and Libyan Teda: multiple identities

In 1973 Qaddafi annexed the Aozou strip, a 115,000 km² triangle that lies along the whole length of the Chadian–Libyan border between Niger and Sudan, immediately to the south of the line commonly marking Chad’s northern border. Only the western part of the triangle, including the north-western part of Tibesti, has a few water points and oases exclusively inhabited by Teda. The latter have links with the Teda in other parts of Tibesti and with those in the oases of southern Libya. To underpin the annexation and continue his expansionist project in the rest of northern Chad, Qaddafi granted Libyan citizenship to tens of thousands of Teda. These included more than a thousand families from Aozou, Gezendu, Omu, Omchi, and Wour, and others from further south (Cole, 2012, p. 15). As a result they were given the opportunity of settling in Libya and benefiting from services (such as education and health care) that were difficult to access or non-existent in Chad; housing and jobs; and subsidized and therefore inexpensive consumer goods.

The Aozou strip was occupied until 1994, when Libya, having lost its case in the International Court of Justice at The Hague, agreed to return the territory to Chad (ICJ, 1994). The Aozou Teda were not particularly happy with Libya’s departure. According to sous-préfet Senoussi Koki, 2,000 families (90 per cent of the population) left Aozou in 1994 with the Libyan troops and authorities. The Libyans encouraged the exodus by promising continued access to jobs and subsidized goods. Only around 30 or 40 families are said to have continued to live in the village of Aozou.

Today the Aozou health centre is abandoned, while the school remains open, but is largely deserted. Senoussi Koki, who was a pupil at this Arabic-language school at the time of the Libyan occupation, explained that there were then 600 students. Transformed into a French-speaking school, it now has only 40 schoolchildren, 30 in the primary school and 10 in the secondary school. Many
Aozou inhabitants who experienced the Libyan occupation are nostalgic for it and their identity remains conflicted, as an inhabitant of Aozou explained:

*We know that this is Chadian land here, but all the same it was better under Qaddafi. We had water and electricity. The Libyans had built a hospital and a large school attended by children from all over Tibesti. Today, there is nothing—no teachers. Even now all of northern Chad depends on Libya.*

In 1998 Qaddafi suddenly revoked the Libyan citizenship of the Aozou Teda, however, believing them to be traitors after Libya lost the disputed area (Lacher, 2014, p. 2). This was known as Decision No. 13 and affected nearly 7,000 people. Tibesti’s persistent underdevelopment after 1994, followed by the MDJT war, continued to encourage more departures from the region than returns to it. The ruined houses of Aozou village, a number of which were destroyed by the war, while others were simply abandoned, bear witness to the fact that the area has never recovered from the 1994 exodus.
In addition, and also in reaction to the verdict at The Hague, the Libyan authorities imprisoned Teda they considered to be renegades. A number of them would only be freed during the 2011 Libyan revolution. For example, Allatchi Mahadi, a sergeant of the Libyan army, deserted in 1988, was recruited into the
Chadian army and given a higher rank, and then sent with a Chadian delegation to Kufra in 1996, where the Libyan authorities arrested him as a deserter. A number of Teda believed that Chad effectively handed Mahadi over to Qaddafi.\textsuperscript{261} In the first decade of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century the Libyan regime also arrested Libyan Teda who supported the MDJT, perhaps at Chad’s request.\textsuperscript{262}

Regardless of their citizenship, the Teda continue to have and to claim multiple identities—Chadian, Libyan, and Nigerien—to variable degrees. This process is amplified by the fact that, because they cannot fulfil their needs in Chad, people from Tibesti have adopted a new form of nomadism. The men make return journeys between Tibesti and the markets and towns of Libya, where they sometimes live for more than six months at a time. Mirroring this, men with families in Libya leave them to visit their relatives in Tibesti. A number of Teda from Tibesti estimated that today half of the people considered to be ‘from Tibesti’ actually live in Libya.\textsuperscript{263} ‘We do not recognize the border. Our animals and our date palms are not aware of the border’, explained the Gezendu chef de canton in the Aozou strip.\textsuperscript{264}

The Libyan Teda under Qaddafi

The Libyan Teda and other Teda living in Libya felt marginalized under Qaddafi and were systematically ‘considered to be foreigners occupying Arab lands’, explained a Libyan Teda.\textsuperscript{265} This marginalization was primarily social and economic. For instance, Teda found it difficult to access a number of university departments that were considered to be strategic (for example, military engineering and medicine). Almost no Teda were employed in state institutions and the administration, even locally. It was only in Gatrun, the unchallenged stronghold of the Teda in Fezzan, that three Teda were appointed in succession to head the town’s lejna sha’biya (popular committee): Edji Yoskoymi, Ali Galma, and Mohammed Sidi.

The Teda joined the Libyan armed forces in large numbers, particularly at the time of the conflict between Chad and Libya in the early 1980s. Many of them, including high school students, were recruited, some possibly by force. They were mainly foot soldiers and rarely reached high ranks (Lacher, 2014, p. 2).
According to a former Libyan Teda soldier, Qaddafi’s forces never appointed more than about ten Teda officers in the army, in addition to around 30 in the police, and others in the customs and security services.\textsuperscript{266} The highest ranking Teda were two brigadier generals from the security services, and a few colonels and lieutenant colonels, including Ramadan Allatchi and Ali Ramadan Sida (or Ali Kuri, aka ‘Colonel Fendi’), in the army, and Ahmad Barka Bezey in the police. At the end of the 1980s, after the Libyan defeat in Chad, many Teda soldiers were barred from the army and some were even imprisoned.\textsuperscript{267}

Due also to their lack of education, most of the Teda were employed as workmen or guards. They rarely played an important role in the economy, with the exception of a few important Teda entrepreneurs or traders, in particular Youssouf Adam Mahmay. In the Qaddafi era he invested in the construction of roads and buildings, and is also said to have been involved in the trans-Saharan trafficking of cigarettes and drugs together with Qadhadhfa Arabs (Qaddafi’s tribe). Another trader involved in cigarette smuggling at that time was Wardougou Mahadi, who, together with his sons, acted as guide for the Qadhadhfa smugglers. One of his sons was the war chief Barka Wardougou, who also traded cars from Nigeria to Libya in the 1980s (Wardougou, n.d.).\textsuperscript{268}

A degree of geographical segregation was evident: even in southern Libya the Teda mainly lived in their own neighbourhoods.\textsuperscript{269} Teda marginalization was also—perhaps mainly—cultural: non-Arab minorities, chiefly the Teda, the Tuareg, and other Berbers, were the victims of a forced ‘Arabization’. It was made difficult for them to speak their mother tongue in public spaces, and Teda names were Arabized. This explains why Libyan Teda often answer to two names, one Arabic and the other Teda. The racism of the Libyan Arab majority, although in part dampened by Qaddafi’s pan-Africanist stance, played a role: the Teda were treated similarly to migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. Like the other ‘blacks’, the Arabs often called them ‘slaves’ (\textit{abid} or \textit{ibeid} in Arabic). The Libyan military even used these terms in Aozou, but much less than in Libya itself.\textsuperscript{270}

Discrimination against the Teda worsened after the Chadian army reconquered Tibesti at the end of the 1980s, when Qaddafi’s speeches became particularly hostile. It worsened even further after the return of the Aozou strip to Chad in 1994.\textsuperscript{271}
The Teda at war in Libya

The Teda against Qaddafi, 2011

In 2011, threatened by the ‘Arab Spring’, Qaddafi immediately tried to gain the support of the ‘black’ populations: these included Libyan Teda, Sudanese or Chadian armed opposition members, and migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. In May he cancelled Decision No. 13, which had deprived many Teda of Libyan citizenship after 1994 (Cole, 2012, p. 16). The regime also freed imprisoned Teda. However, some Teda detainees, like Allatchi Mahadi and Dunay Zaid, had reportedly met some of Qaddafi’s political opponents, such as Islamist leader Abdelhakim Belhaj, in jail, and had established early contacts between the Teda and the revolutionaries. Qaddafi’s attempts to win Teda support came too late.272

The revolutionaries in northern Libya were soon competing with Qaddafi to attract the Teda to their side. The National Transitional Council (NTC) formed by the revolutionaries and presided over by Mustafa Abdeljalil granted or promised to grant citizenship and financial assistance to many Teda living in Libya, including those from Aozou (Cole, 2012, p. 16). The latter claim that many of the promises made to them in the first half of 2011 (including of financial indemnities, development, and services) were forgotten after Qaddafi’s death in October. Libya’s Teda currently consider themselves to be marginalized as non-Arabs by the new ‘Arab’ authorities of northern Libya, whatever their ideology, because of the authorities’ failure to restore their Libyan citizenship.273

Nonetheless, the Teda played a key role in the ‘liberation’ of southern Libya. When the revolution first broke out in eastern Libya in February 2011, residents from the east living in Fezzan, including members of the administration and the army, were afraid of being targeted by the Qaddafi regime and asked the Teda for protection. A convoy of some five vehicles was organized to drive approximately 20 officials who came from the east to Benghazi, together with a dozen Teda who were sympathetic to the revolution. These included Ali Galma, the former head of the Gatrun popular committee; Lieutenant Colonel Ramadan Allatchi; and Cherfeddin Barkay, a young cross-border trader originally from Niger. The group carried small arms that General Messaoud Abdelhafed, the army commander in Fezzan, had distributed to local civilians shortly after the revolution broke out, and others they had hidden in their homes.274 They first drove across northern Chad to Kufra, where local Teda and Zuwaya revolutionaries had also begun to organize.275
In March–April this group, together with Teda and Dazagada notables from Kufra, some of whom were already present in Benghazi, joined the rebellion there. Some of the revolutionaries from Kufra, such as Adam Arami and Hassan Keley, had reportedly already formed an underground opposition movement to Qaddafi in the period 2006–09 (Murray, 2015, p. 310). In March or April 2011 Keley, Cherfeddin Barkay, and Bahareddin al-Shereydi, an Awlad Suleiman Arab smuggler from Sebha, left to source weapons in Sudan in order to attack Kufra. The arrival of these weapons created divisions among the Teda, however. Ali Sida wanted to transport them to Benghazi, which was the centre of the revolution, while other Teda leaders wanted to keep them in Kufra.276

Events in Kufra

The first Teda rebels entered an alliance with Arabs hostile to Qaddafi, including members of the Awlad Suleiman tribe in Fezzan and Zuwaya in Kufra. As early as March 2011 Ali Sida and Zuwaya officers who joined the revolution looted important weapons depots on the Ma’ten es-Sarra military base, not far from the Chadian border (Murray, 2015, p. 312). Together with Ali Sida, Adam Arami, and Hassan Keley, other Kufra Teda joined the revolution. Issa Abdelmajid Mansour announced that he was merging his Tubu Front for the Salvation of Libya with the revolution (until then it had been a movement without fighters). Issa Abdelmajid was a former policeman who opposed Qaddafi at an early stage and had been living in exile in Norway since 2008. He reached Kufra and mobilized a small militia. Banay Keley, Hassan Keley’s brother, whom Qaddafi had imprisoned for supporting the MDJT, also travelled to Kufra.

In May 2011 the Teda forces of Ali Sida, Issa Abdelmajid, and Hassan Keley, strengthened by the weapons they had brought from Sudan, allied themselves with Zuwaya revolutionaries and took control of the Kufra and Sarir oil fields further north (Lacher, 2014, p. 4). They reportedly found a few other weapons in Kufra. At the end of 2011 the NTC made Issa Abdelmajid’s militia responsible for controlling the border with Sudan (Murray, 2017).277

Events in Fezzan

General Messaoud Abdelhafed, a Qadhadhfa commanding the troops loyal to the regime in Fezzan, reportedly tried to avoid fighting the Teda and negotiated with those from Murzuq and Gatrun to leave the road open to Qaddafi’s
followers attempting to flee to Niger. This agreement was largely respected. The loyalists also gave a vehicle and 30 Kalashnikov-type assault rifles to Barka Wardougou, who had been released from prison in late 2010 and assured them of his loyalty, but then joined the revolution (Lacher, 2014, p. 4).278

Before being imprisoned Barka had long been close to the Qaddafi regime. In 1974 he joined the Libyan army and, as a non-commissioned officer, participated in the training and formation of Nigerien (Teda and Tuareg) and Chadian rebel forces in Libya, including Teda Frolínat rebels. Then in 1981, with about 50 followers, he joined the GUNT presidential guard. In 1994, still with Qaddafi’s support, Barka formed the Forces armées révolutionnaires du Sahara, a Nigerien rebel group. Then in 1998–2000, while most of his comrades were negotiating peace with Niger, he supported the newly formed MDJT until Qaddafi placed him under house arrest (Wardougou, n.d.). Barka is considered to have been the first to take up weapons in the Fezzan region. Over the course of a few days in June 2011, at the head of a small group of 14 fighters in three vehicles, he took control of several military checkpoints south of Tajarhi (Tazaro), the most southern oasis of the Fezzan region and his family’s stronghold. He captured five more vehicles, three of which were mounted with 12.7 mm machine guns. He also seized the highly strategic crossing point of Tomou on the Nigerien border, from where he announced his official support for the revolution and gave his force the name Dira’ Sahara, or ‘Sahara shield’. He then moved back north and took the airstrip and weapon depots at El-Wigh (Domozey), which Qaddafi’s forces had abandoned (Cole, 2012, p. 16). He then repelled a counter-attack by troops, including Teda, who were loyal to Qaddafi.279

Around the same time the Teda from Fezzan who had travelled to Benghazi formed the katiba shuhadā Um-el-Araneb (battalion of the martyrs of Um-el-Araneb), with Lieutenant Colonel Ramadan Allatchi as commander and Cherfeddin Barkay as his deputy (Lacher, 2014, p. 4).280 Ali Galma, Cherfeddin Barkay, and Bahareddin al-Shereydi returned to Fezzan from Benghazi with some 30 vehicles and weapons, and joined Barka Wardougou at El-Wigh.281

The fall of Gatrun, Murzuq, Sebha, and Ubari

In July 2011 some of the katiba shuhadā Um-el-Araneb and Barka’s forces moved from El-Wigh toward Gatrun, where spontaneous anti-Qaddafi demonstrations occurred (Murray, 2015, p. 314). Reinforcements led by Barka repelled two
counter-attacks by Qaddafi forces that included alleged Darfur rebels or mercenaries. After clashes that caused a limited number of casualties on either side the army retreated, while the civilian population, fearing more violent fighting, asked the Teda fighters to leave the town. The troops then left for Kazra’ near Tajarhi, where they were joined by 20 combatants from Murzuq in three vehicles led by Bokori Sougui, Barka’s son-in-law. Qaddafi’s forces were then retaking control of the road between Gatrun and El-Wigh, so the revolutionaries decided to bypass them and directly attack Murzuq, the second largest town in the Fezzan region. Bokori was sent ahead to support the attackers from inside the town.\textsuperscript{282}

In mid-August Murzuq was taken by a force led by Barka Wardougou, including Awlad Suleiman combatants under Bahareddin al-Shereydi, after limited fighting (AFP, 2011). The revolutionaries seized vehicles and weapons depots, and were joined by a large number of Teda from the area, as well as Awlad Suleiman recruits.\textsuperscript{283}

From Murzuq, Barka Wardougou defeated a pro-Qaddafi force in Tragan, to the east. Gatrun and other towns further east, such as Um-el-Araneb and Zawilah, fell without any fighting. Bokori Sougui and Rajeb ‘Abay’, Barka’s brother, took the El-Fil oil field and farms in the Murzuq area.\textsuperscript{284}

In Sebha protests had already been under way since June, but the town was only captured by the revolutionaries in September, after low-intensity fighting between Qaddafi’s loyalists and various revolutionary forces, including Hasawna and Awlad Suleiman from Wadi al-Shati in the north, in coordination with others from southern and eastern Libya. Barka Wardougou had supplied an Arab and Teda force led by Bahareddin al-Shereydi with two vehicles loaded with weapons, which the fighters used in the capture of Sebha (Cole, 2012, p. 16).\textsuperscript{285}

Arms were also given to Teda fighters from Ubari led by the brothers Ali and Hisein Egrey and Ali Issa. Allied with Tuareg fighters, they took control of the Sharara oil field, while revolutionary forces from Zintan and eastern Libya liberated Ubari town.\textsuperscript{286}

\textit{The Teda in conflict with other southern Libyan communities}

After Qaddafi was deposed numerous local and intercommunal conflicts broke out in Libya. Between mid-2014 and early 2016 two main centres emerged from
the revolution. The General National Congress (GNC) of Tripoli and the heteroge-
neous coalition Fajr Libya (Libya Dawn) were formed in western Libya. The Misrati brigades constituted the main armed wing of this coalition until it fell apart in 2015. In the east the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk and the government of Beyda were supported by the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army of General Khalifa Haftar and in the west by the Zintan brigades. Haftar had been a former Qaddafi officer who had been in exile in the United States since 1990. The HoR and the government of Beyda, which comprise revolution-
aries and former Qaddafists, have been supported at various levels by Chad, Egypt, France, Jordan, and the UAE. At the same time Turkey, Qatar, and Sudan have been supporting the Tripoli government, which contains Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood (Fitzgerald, 2016).

In southern Libya the divisions and confrontations that occurred were all primarily local and communal. The fighting focused firstly on control of territory, trafficking routes, and urban centres, and then on oil resources and the distribution and local smuggling of fuel. After Qaddafi’s fall Libyan Teda fighters took control of the borders with Chad and Niger, and even to some extent with Sudan. They also took control of important routes connecting southern Libya to these countries, and of localities, urban areas, and oil infrastructure in southern Libya. But they soon encountered opposition from the other main southern Libyan communities, including the Tuareg in Ubari, the Awlad Suleiman Arabs in Sebha, and the Zuwaya Arabs in Kufra. Generally the Misrata brigades and some Islamist figures supported the Arabs and Tuareg. The Teda attempted to ally themselves with the rival forces of the Zintan brigades; the petrol guards of Ibrahim Jadhran (a warlord from the Magharba tribe who controlled the Ras Lanuf and Sidra oil terminals until 2016); and to some extent General Haftar. In reality the local tribal militias are highly autonomous and their loyalties to the competing authorities in northern Libya remain fragile and fluid.287

The Teda live in three countries, have multiple identities, and do not acknowledge the inherited colonial borders. Some of them can legitimately be considered indigenous to the oases of southern Libya, chiefly those of Kufra (known as Tayzer in Tedaga), from which some Chadian Teda clans originate (Chapelle, 1982, pp. 97–98). A minority remain in the main towns of southern Libya (such as Sebha, Kufra, and Ubari), even though many generations of Teda from Chad
and Niger, attracted by Qaddafi’s promises or fleeing war and poverty, joined the indigenous Libyan Teda nucleus.

The Teda who are settled in Libya are concerned that Libyan Arabs see them as foreigners and migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. They consider themselves to be natives of southern Libya and the victims of Arab expansion to the south that started in the 18th century (Brachet and Scheele, 2015, p. 743). They are deeply troubled by the racial rhetoric of some of their Arab and Tuareg adversaries, who discriminate against them for being ‘blacks’ and ‘Chadians’, and therefore foreign to Libya. They also accuse Sudan and Qatar of encouraging an Arabization policy in Libya that duplicates the one previously carried out in Darfur by successive Sudanese governments. Some Teda intellectuals describe this policy as an Arab supremacist movement that dangerously recalls the ideology that inspired the creation of the janjawid in Darfur, which was itself partly inspired by Qaddafi’s ‘Pan-Arab’ period (De Waal, 2005, p. 198).

Sebha

In southern Libya, each conflict has its own dynamics, which can easily be exacerbated by other dynamics originating in northern Libya or neighbouring countries. In Sebha, the Fezzan capital, the main area of contention is over control of the town. Although they are in a dominant position, the Awlad Suleiman are concerned about the Teda’s increasing power in the area.

In March 2012 an attempted car robbery involving a Teda escalated into a series of deadly incidents. Subsequently Teda fighters linked to Allatchi Mahadi seized money sent by the NTC and earmarked for the various Sebha brigades, killing Arabs during the robbery (Lacher, 2014, pp. 2, 4). The Awlad Suleiman shelled a Teda neighbourhood and killed several Teda notables in reprisal. The fighting caused at least 150 deaths before a ceasefire was concluded, followed by a peace agreement in March 2013, but the conflict resumed in January 2014. Even though they had fought them in 2011, the Teda formed close ties with the Qadhadhfa, who are also rivals of the Awlad Suleiman. This alliance of convenience worsened the conflict, as did the intervention of reinforcements sent by Cherfeddin Barkay and the presence of Teda combatants from Chad and Niger. In early 2014 the Misrata ‘third force’ under Jamal al-Triki intervened. After initially claiming to be a neutral peacekeeping force, it seems to have taken the side of the Awlad Suleiman (Murray, 2017; Stocker, 2015, p. 5).
Further to the west, in Ubari, Teda and Tuareg challenged each other mainly for control of the oil fields, the local distribution of petrol, checkpoints, and the town of Ubari itself. In 2011 Teda forces occupied the Sharara oil field together with Zintani brigades, whose territory is crossed by the pipeline from Fezzan to the coast, and who interrupted the flow of oil after having lost control of Tripoli airport and the Sharara oil field in late 2014. After taking control of the only petrol station in Ubari, which in principle belongs to the state, the Teda forces of Goukouni Tokwe, Ali Egrey, and Ali Issa distributed petrol to the various brigades according to a quota system. Teda and Tuareg have accused each other of trafficking petrol (which was sometimes adulterated) both locally and to neighbouring countries.

A number of Teda leaders, including a former Qaddafi regime police commander, also controlled town institutions such as the municipal council and the local security council (lejna amniya). Feeling threatened, the Tuareg mobilized forces to put a stop to the petrol trafficking and reclaim control of fuel distribution from the Teda. The conflict seems to have been triggered by clashes in September 2014 between Teda and Tuareg fighters for control of the Sharara oil field and the Ubari petrol station. The Teda, supported by Zintan forces, were ousted from their positions (including Sharara, which they lost in November) by the Tuareg, supported by the Misrata ‘third force’ (UNSC, 2016a, p. 16; Stocker, 2015, p. 5). Local Teda war chiefs mobilized troops, and other leaders, including Cherfeddin Barkay, Barka Wardougou, and even chiefs from Kufra, sent significant reinforcements (Murray, 2017). In 2015 a number of Chadian Teda, including Allatchi ‘Koukoula’, also reportedly fought alongside Cherfeddin Barkay’s forces in Ubari.²⁹¹

Kufra

In Kufra the Teda and Zuwaya confronted each other over control of oil infrastructure, commercial routes to the south, and urban neighbourhoods. Fighting had already taken place in 2008, which reportedly enabled Qaddafi to prevent an alliance at the time between the two communities against his regime.²⁹² In 2011 Teda fighters took control of the oil wells abandoned by Qaddafi’s security forces, and on several occasions pushed back Zuwaya fighters who were
attempting to drive them out. In addition, Issa Abdelmajid’s forces imposed
taxes on vehicles in the name of the NTC on the routes south of Kufra, which
many felt to be unwarranted. As early as November 2011 Zuwaya fighters
attacked Abdelmajid’s forces and attempted to take control of a checkpoint
(Murray, 2015, p. 316). The NTC then distanced itself from Abdelmajid, but
his militia continued to control the routes to the south.

In 2012 the clashes continued in Kufra, and the town has since been under
two administrations, one Zuwaya and the other Teda. The latter was headed by
Mohammed Ramadan Sida, Ali Sida’s brother. The Teda also controlled check-
points all around Kufra, but the Zuwaya set up other roadblocks nearer the
town that controlled the main entrances to Kufra and prevented the Teda’s forays
from the town.

In 2015 three months of fighting between July and October reportedly caused
more than 100 casualties among the civilian population. The Zuwaya encircled
the Teda neighbourhoods of Garat Tubu (Suher) and Gederfey and bombarded
them with heavy weapons (UNSC, 2016a, p. 16). In retaliation, Teda fighters
reportedly torched around 600 Zuwaya houses. From mid-2015, in response to
the Zuwaya encirclement of Kufra, the Teda not only blocked the routes leading
to the Sudanese border, but also the vital road linking the town to Ajdabiya
to the north. By taking Zuways travelling along this road hostage they slowly
forced the Zuwaya to negotiate. The latter were mainly demanding the end
of the Teda blockade on food and the evacuation of their injured. In 2016 the
Zuwaya were able to break part of the Teda blockade and reopen a road from
Kufra to the Sudanese border.293

A separate ‘peacekeeping’ force that came from the north in 2012 had also
been accused of being biased in favour of the Zuwaya (Murray, 2017; UNSMIL,
2012, p. 3). Later the Teda and Zuwaya complained that Khalifa Haftar’s follow-
ers were not evacuating the tribes’ injured fighters for treatment in the north.
Initially, the Teda seemed to support Jadhran and Haftar, while the Zuwaya
supported the GNC in Tripoli (UNSC, 2016a, p. 16). But the Teda also accused
Haftar of playing a double game, of having bombed the Teda forces, and of
having provided better treatment to the injured Zuwaya than to their own.
These differences resulted in the eventual withdrawal of Teda fighters from
Haftar’s forces in Benghazi.294
In October 2015 an Arab tribal mediation team from Cyrenaica arranged a ceasefire. This was reportedly soon violated by snipers, and the death of a Teda caused the blockade of the Ajdabiya road to be reinstated. The Teda also claimed that the mediation had agreed to provide neutral forces to control the northern exit of Kufra, but that it remained in Zuwaya hands.\textsuperscript{295}

**Mediation efforts**

The intercommunal conflicts in southern Libya have been the focus of several mediation attempts, local and international, state-led and non-governmental.

Qatar organized several peace conferences in Doha, in particular on the Ubari conflict. The Teda were represented by Barka Wardougou and Adam Arami; the latter heads the Tubu National Gathering (*Tajamu watani tubawi*). The Qatari mediation initially suffered from two handicaps, however. Firstly, as in the Darfur peace process, instead of encouraging constructive discussion of the issues, Qatar emphasized its ability to provide financial incentives. These included funding promises for the signatories of the peace agreement in addition to ‘gifts’ such as accommodation in luxury hotels in Doha. Secondly, and more seriously, as in Darfur, Qatar was not considered to be neutral in Libya, but closer to Fajr Libya and its allies in southern Libya (the Awlad Suleiman, the Tuareg, and some Teda). The Qataris suggested that the Misrata ‘third force’ should guarantee the peace in Ubari. The Teda were relatively suspicious of Qatar’s intentions, believing that it either supported the Tuareg or was encouraging the Teda to join the Misratis.

First Algeria then Chad (with the latter supporting Haftar) attempted rival mediation processes between the Teda and Tuareg. In January 2015, with the help of the French NGO Promediation, a meeting was held in N’Djaména between Tuareg and Teda representatives, including Godeyenou Mayna (Blary, 2015). Goukouni Weddey, who participated as a mediator, recounted how he suggested to the Chadian authorities that Qatar should be included in the Chadian initiative in order to prevent the two mediation processes from competing, but they refused.

The Chadian mediation seems to have also suffered from a disparity between the two delegations. The Teda delegation was more motivated and representative than the Tuareg one, which was perceived to be more ‘Malian’ than Libyan.
During a second meeting in March 2015 only the Teda returned to negotiate. The Tuareg apparently considered Chad to be an insufficiently neutral mediator, although it is also possible that Qatar pressured them to reject Chad as a mediator. In June 2016 Chad also attempted to mediate between the Teda and Zuwaya.296

The UAE also attempted to compete with Qatar by holding talks in Dubai among Teda, Tuareg, and Arab representatives. Barka Wardougou, who facilitated these talks, reportedly tried to unite rival Qatar and UAE mediation efforts, before he fell ill and died in the UAE in July 2016.297

Promediation continued its efforts during meetings between the Teda and Tuareg, specifically on the Ubari conflict. It achieved a ‘declaration of goodwill’ in July 2015 at meetings held first in Tunis, then in Brussels.298 Then in November 2015 a peace agreement for Ubari was signed in Qatar (Qatar News Agency, 2015). After initially being called into question by an immediate renewal of the fighting, the agreement seems to have subsequently been revived. This was mainly due to parallel discussions organized in the field that clarified uncertainty surrounding a peacekeeping force. As a result, a force recruited among the Hasawna tribe and led by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood was replaced by another Hasawna brigade that was considered to be more neutral (Murray, 2017; Menas Associates, 2016).299

The Community of Sant’Egidio charitable and religious organization facilitated meetings in November 2015 and April and June 2016, whose participants gave their support to the Qatari agreement and to Fayez Seraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA) (Sant’Egidio, 2016). Some Teda, however, challenged the legitimacy of their ‘representatives’ at these meetings, while the mediators appeared to find it difficult to identify actors who were genuinely influential locally.300

Mediation efforts were slower in Sebha. In late 2015–early 2016 local mediation efforts by representatives of the Misrata, Warfalla, and Qadhadhfa tribes reached an agreement between the Awlad Suleiman and the Teda, but some Teda disputed it and fighting broke out again later in 2016. In October Sant’Egidio facilitated a goodwill agreement between Awlad Suleiman and Teda representatives. Then in March 2017 another Italian mediation organization, the Ara Pacis Initiative, together with the Italian government, facilitated a peace agreement signed by elders from the two tribes, with Tuareg and GNA representatives as
witnesses. It appears that Italy is mainly interested in turning southern Libya’s tribal militias into allies to curb migration to Europe (RFI, 2017).\textsuperscript{301}

**Disunity among Libyan Teda armed groups**

Despite the threats they are facing and although a number of Teda personalities have called for the setting up of a ‘united Teda organization to hold dialogue with the West’, the Libyan Teda armed groups seem to be extremely fragmented.\textsuperscript{302} Neither the few personalities who emerged under Qaddafi nor the new war chiefs that appeared at the time of the revolution seem to be able to unite the Teda fighters in Libya.

**Fezzan**

In 2011, especially in Fezzan, Barka Wardougou seemed to be the favourite to become the charismatic leader of the Teda forces: he was nicknamed ‘\textit{qa‘id tahrir jonub}’ (leader of the south’s liberation) because of the speed with which he joined the rebellion and was recognized by the NTC as the leader of the military council of Murzuq province in 2011–12. The council was supposed to coordinate the various forces present in the province, but most Teda militias quickly became largely autonomous. From 2013 Barka seems to have gradually lost influence as Cherfeddin Barkay grew in popularity. After his death in July 2016, Barka was replaced by his brother, Rajeb, who in late 2016 was elected head of the Murzuq military council, with Allatchi Mahadi as deputy head. Rajeb’s ‘Sahara shield’ forces control the family’s Tajarhi fiefdom and Tomou, on the Nigerien border.\textsuperscript{303}

The katiba shuhadā\textit{ Um-el-Araneb} is reportedly the largest Teda militia, with some 400 men. Its first leader, Ramadan Allatchi, left for Dubai, and in 2013 left the command to his deputy, Cherfeddin Barkay. Its headquarters are in El-Wigh. It once controlled the strategic checkpoint 17 to the south of Sebha, which has now been left to local autonomous youths.\textsuperscript{304}

Another Teda from Sebha, Allatchi Mahadi, a former Libyan then Chadian soldier imprisoned in Libya in 1996 and freed during the 2011 revolution, leads the katiba shuhadā\textit{ Gatrun} (battalion of the martyrs of Gatrun). It controls a checkpoint in Sebha and several others near the Chadian–Libyan border, and the cross-border gold-mining areas of Kouri Bougoudi and Ezri. It has reportedly
also levied taxes on vehicles, including those travelling to the Libyan part of Kouri Bougoudi, but was unable to control the gold mines themselves.\textsuperscript{305}

In Ubari the main Teda military chief is Ali Egrey, who has close links with Cherfeddin Barkay. Further to the south, Bokori Sougui controls the oil field of El-Fil and part of the Murzuq area.\textsuperscript{306}

In Gatrun a militia was formed that many Teda described as more legitimate than those led by the local war chiefs. The Gatrun ‘security committee’ appointed itself to guarantee security in the area and oppose banditry, while maintaining good relations with the most important war chiefs (Cherfeddin Barkay and Barka Wardougou). Bedey Mahmay (or Mohammed) Makni, a former officer under Qaddafi, leads this committee. It was, however, challenged and its forces attacked by a Teda militia from the border area that the committee accused of imposing illegitimate taxes on vehicles and their passengers travelling from Niger. Another influential actor in Gatrun is Godeyenou Mayna, also known as sheikh Zelawi. The main traditional chief of the Libyan Teda and sometimes called the derde of Libya, Godeyenou is generally considered to be of lower status than the Tibesti derde and subordinate to him. As a result he sometimes requests the Tibesti derde to resolve problems in Libya.\textsuperscript{307}

The border areas and the areas of El-Wigh and Waw el-Kebir, which each include an airfield, are shared among the Gatrun security committee and various war chiefs. These include Cherfeddin Barkay, Rajeb Wardougou, and Allatchi Mahadi, as well as Ali Mohammed ‘Wujij’ in Waw, who intervened to evacuate gold miners in the Kilinje area.\textsuperscript{308}

**Kufra**

Further to the west, in Kufra, one of the main Teda chiefs who emerged during the revolution was Issa Abdelmajid Mansour. In late 2011 he reportedly formed a Teda militia of about 100 men who became known as the ‘border guard’ and were tasked with levying taxes for the NTC on the routes south of Kufra. He subsequently joined the Beyda government, where he was in charge of African affairs. His departure, and the fact that he is supposed to have been particularly opposed to the Zuwaya, reportedly caused his loss of influence in Kufra.\textsuperscript{309} His militia, under the command of Issa May, nevertheless remained active in the border area, controlling a checkpoint in the gold-mining area of Kilinje.
The main Teda force in Kufra seems to have been the battalion of the martyr Ahmed al-Sharif (*katiba shahid Ahmed al-Sharif*), initially led by Ali Sida (Lacher, 2014, p. 4). He also left for Cyrenaica and joined General Haftar, but was wounded while fighting against Ansar al-Sharia jihadists in Benghazi in late 2014. Since his departure the main Kufra Teda forces are under the command of Hassan Keley (who is also known as Hassan Moussa) and Goukouni Barkay. These forces control a part of Kufra, the Sarir oil field, and checkpoints on roads to Chad and Sudan, including in the gold-mining area of Kilinje (Murray, 2017; UNSC, 2016a, p. 22). They have also reportedly fought against the Awlad Suleiman in the Sebha area, alongside the Teda of Fezzan.

**Fluid loyalties**

The Teda militias and war chiefs appear to be largely autonomous. However, Ali Sida is considered to be ‘Haftar’s man’ among the Teda: after joining the general in Benghazi (UNSC, 2016a, p. 102), he was sent back to Fezzan in January 2017 to encourage the Teda to support Haftar. Issa Abdelmajid, Ali Egrey, and Allatchi Mahadi seem to be on relatively good terms with the general. Barka Wardougou was occasionally accused of double-dealing, but was generally also on good terms with Haftar, particularly after forging links with the UAE, which reportedly provided him with weapons by way of the Waw and El-Wigh airfields. Since Barka’s death the Murzuq military council seems to be divided, with only some of its members supporting Haftar and Ali Sida.

The Libyan Teda war chiefs, particularly those close to the border, such as Allatchi Mahadi, have maintained good relations with Chad, which has also been encouraging them to support Haftar. From 2013 onwards Mahadi provided troops to Ibrahim Jadhran. But in September 2015 elements of Mahadi’s forces left to join the GNC in Tripoli and turned against Haftar (UNSC, 2016a, p. 103). Jadhran himself joined the newly formed GNA of Fayez Seraj in January 2016. In September 2016 Haftar regained control of the oil terminals of Ras Lanuf and Sidra without meeting resistance from Jadhran’s guards. In the future Allatchi Mahadi may find it difficult to remain simultaneously on good terms with Jadhran, Haftar, and the Chadian government.

A number of Teda war chiefs seem to have become increasingly sceptical of General Haftar, including Ali Sida’s successors in Kufra, Hassan Keley and
Goukouni Barkay, as well as Bokori Sougui, all of whom have difficult relations with the Libyan National Army leader. Hassan Keley is said to be close to both Jadhran and the Misrata brigades, and to have taken part in attempts to retake the oil fields from Haftar in late 2016–early 2017. The Teda of Kufra accuse Haftar of supporting their Zuwaya adversaries. They generally consider him to be pro-Arab, which would explain why he only gave the Teda limited supplies of vehicles and ammunition. As a result, whether of their own volition or in reaction to political or military events, many Teda fighters have distanced themselves from him. They have either established closer links with Tripoli factions or distanced themselves from the northern powers in general.

The Teda have also been sensitive to international opinion, and the shift of international recognition from Tobruk to the GNA explains why most Teda military chiefs appear to favour Seraj’s government. Thus Rajeb Wardougou, Cherfeddin Barkay, and the Gatrün security committee are said to recognize the GNA. (The committee’s president, Bedey Mahmay, is a brother of Taher Mahmay Makni, a former NTC deputy.) Economic interests may also explain their thinking: while claiming to be autonomous, the Teda ‘petrol guards’, such as those from the El-Fil oil field, depend on financing from the GNA.

Under Qaddafi, and especially after the revolution, several Teda personalities presented themselves as political rather than military leaders and representatives of the Teda in their dealings with the competing northern Libyan authorities. They include a handful of HoR representatives and a few politicians supporting the Tripoli factions, more out of personal interest than due to ideology. While these political leaders occasionally obtained posts in northern Libya, chiefly as Teda ‘representatives’, in reality they have only limited influence over the Teda militias and war chiefs.

The jihadist threat

At the start of the 21st century the MDJT rebels proved that the Teda were more impervious to jihadist influence than the Tuareg, in particular by arresting Abderraizaq ‘Le Para’ and handing him over to Algeria. In 2011 al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb reportedly attempted to establish links with the Teda of the Libyan–Nigerien border region, for example, with no success.
After the revolution the Libyan Teda also appeared to be rather hostile to the political Islamists in Tripoli, while their Arab and Tuareg adversaries in Fezzan and Kufra supported the Fajr Libya coalition. Local issues remained paramount in these decisions. In addition, while Libyan political Islamists and the jihadists who had established themselves in the country were distinct and often hostile towards each other, the Teda opportunistically used the situation to group their adversaries under one label (‘Islamists’). This allowed them to present themselves as a bulwark against the establishment of Islamism in southern Libya. In this way they hoped to attract the goodwill of Western actors, including the French, who are legitimately worried by the expansion of jihadist groups in Libya (Bobin, 2015; AFP, 2016b).

Clashes occurred among Teda (some fighting for northern Libyan factions) and jihadist elements. In March 2015 a group of Allatchi Mahadi’s men guarding the Ghani oil field to the north of Zella (Jufra) were reportedly captured and had their throats cut by fighters of the so-called Islamic State (IS). In March 2016 IS claimed to have been responsible for an ambush that occurred 150 km south of Tripoli, while other sources referred to IS attacks in early 2016 on the Sarir oil field and in the Tazerbo area (AFP, 2016a). After its defeat in the Sirte area in late 2016 IS may have retreated to southern Libya, where IS cells were reportedly present in the areas of Tazerbo, Ubari, and Sebha.320

If IS manages to retreat towards Fezzan, it could then attempt to move into the Sahel, in particular Niger, and establish links with Boko Haram (which claims to be an IS subsidiary in West Africa). Western sources claim that Libyan weapons have been found in the hands of Boko Haram forces, but there is nothing to indicate that they originated from IS’s Libyan branch.321 Meanwhile, Chadian authorities are also worried about possible IS attempts to move into Chad. Chadian military sources say that in the current circumstances it is unlikely that an armed Islamist group could infiltrate Chad. However, isolated terrorist activity remains possible, as Boko Haram’s attacks in Chad in 2015 demonstrated (Tubiana et al., forthcoming).322

Teda drivers are said to have already been paid to transport jihadist fighters in southern Libya (Galtier, 2015).323 It is possible that some Teda have been tempted to join Islamist groups, for either opportunistic or ideological reasons, and this may continue. In addition, generational divisions are appearing within
the community. Similar to the Chadian government, members of the Teda elite believe that if the chaos continues in Libya, radical Islamist groups will be able to establish themselves in the south of that country and recruit among the Teda, particularly among the numerous and poorly educated youths (AFP, 2016b).

Control of the borders, roads, and trade

Trade between Chad and Libya since Qaddafi’s downfall

Historically, the great trans-Saharan routes crossed the margins of Teda territory, in particular the route linking Fezzan to the kingdom of Kanem-Bornu around Lake Chad. To the east of Teda territory another important route, the ‘40 days road’ (Darb al-Arba’in), connected Darfur and Egypt. In the 19th century the Wadday sultanate was also able to open a direct route to Kufra through the oasis of Wanyanga and the Ma’ten es-Sarra well (Cordell, 1977).

Trade along these routes has continued, with motor vehicles replacing camels as the means of transport, but camels are still exported to the north for their meat. Illicit goods continue to be transported on the trans-Saharan routes, including smuggled products, cigarettes, and drugs, in addition to the migrants whose convoys to the Mediterranean recall the slave caravans of earlier times.

The Qaddafi regime closely controlled cross-border trade and trafficking—and was also their primary beneficiary. The role of the Teda was mainly limited to being drivers and guides. After the collapse of the Qaddafi regime the Teda, chiefly due to their presence in Libya, Chad, and Niger, have taken control of the borders between these three countries, and between Libya and Sudan. Their militias have erected checkpoints on the main trans-Saharan routes between Libya and its southern neighbours. They give preferential treatment to the Teda vehicles that transport food, fuel, and manufactured products (such as televisions, satellite dishes, and clothes) from Libya; cattle from the Sahel; and occasionally other products manufactured in Nigeria. Their cross-border activities also include transporting migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to the Mediterranean and smuggling products such as cigarettes, drugs, and even weapons, according to demand.

Trade is vital to the Teda for a variety of reasons. Their communities in the Chadian and Nigerien Sahara completely depend on both Libyan food and
The routes across Chad are plied by trucks overloaded with goods and passengers. © Claudio Gramizzi
manufactured products. There are very few markets in Tibesti, and while the massif is 500 km from the first asphalt roads and shops of Fezzan, it is 1,500 km of difficult tracks and five days of travel from N’Djaména. In addition, in a region where there is nearly no state presence or development projects, transporting goods is one of the few available sources of revenue.

Under Qaddafi the Libyan authorities controlled trade between Libya and its southern neighbours. They imposed limitations on the quantity and type of goods that traders could export (for example, textiles were easier to export than food). The regime levied custom duties, although smuggling was widespread. ‘Nowadays’, explains a Teda trader, ‘it is not the Libyan forces but our [Teda] relatives who control the borders’. Qaddafi’s fall benefited the Teda traders: the quantity of goods exported from Fezzan to Tibesti and Faya increased, and prices remained competitive, even if they have been increasing since 2015, perhaps because of the fluctuating value of the Libyan currency. The increasing number of cross-border traders is said to contribute to keeping prices relatively low.327

The transport of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya seems to have decreased due to the insecurity in that country and the political and financial incentives that the European Union (EU) has offered to both Niger and Sudan to prevent the movement of migrants. The large trucks loaded with passengers that could be seen when Qaddafi was in power have been increasingly replaced by smaller vehicles carrying smaller loads.328 The 2011 civil war caused a wave of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa to return to their countries of origin, mainly Chadians and Sudanese (Oxfam–ACF, 2011, p. 5). A number of them subsequently returned to Libya, however, because of the lack of opportunities in their own countries, with the aim of continuing on to Europe.

It is estimated that around 50,000 (mainly Sudanese and Eritrean) migrants a year travel from Sudan to Libya, either directly or through northern Chad. Many are able to claim political asylum in Europe because of repression in their own countries. The ‘trafficking’ of migrants across Libya’s southern border is said to represent a market of approximately USD 250 million per year for those who transport them.329 Each load of migrants between Agadez in Niger and Fezzan carried in Teda trucks reportedly earns USD 5,000–15,000 per vehicle.330 Some Libyan Teda militias also reportedly tax the migrants. In addition, some
militias sometimes detain migrants in the areas they control and eventually expel them from Libya, acting as self-proclaimed border guards and auxiliaries of EU migration policy.\textsuperscript{331} Some smugglers and militias in southern Libya have also reportedly forced migrants to work for them in gold mines or on farms, sometimes for several months.\textsuperscript{332}

Trade between Libya and the Sahel has remained profitable, in particular thanks to continued low prices in Libya, despite the many checkpoints. In addition to the customs duties levied by the Chadian state, traders have had to pay taxes at checkpoints in Libyan territory that have varied according to the road used, the time of the year, and the traders’ relations with the armed men controlling the checkpoints. At the end of 2015 traders reported seven checkpoints between Murzuq and Tomou. In November 2015 truck drivers arriving in Zouar from Libya said they had gone through ten checkpoints between Sebha and the Chadian border.\textsuperscript{333} Teda militias commanded by Barka Wardougou, Cherfeddin Barkay, Allatchi Mahadi, and the Gatrun security committee controlled the checkpoints close to the Chadian and Nigerien borders.

At each checkpoint each vehicle had to pay LYD 300–400 (USD 213–284), and each passenger LYD 20 (USD 14).\textsuperscript{334} Between Um-el-Araneb and Gouro, where there were four or five checkpoints in the same period, taxes were said to be LYD 200–500 (USD 142–355) for each heavy-duty truck. Prices were negotiable. Those who refused to pay risked the confiscation of their vehicles. Teda traders who used smaller vehicles mentioned sums of LYD 50–200 (USD 36–142) per vehicle, but some claimed that they did not have to pay because Teda controlled the checkpoints. Between Kufra and Chad tariffs are said to have varied from LYD 200 to LYD 1,000 (USD 142–710) per truck, while each passenger was charged LYD 30 (USD 21). In this area, besides the Libyan Teda militias, Saad Adoum, a Teda from Gouro, controlled a checkpoint nicknamed ‘Bawaba Azrael’ (from Azrael, the angel of death in Arabic) because of the violence of its guards. Even if the distinction was not always readily apparent, Teda and traders differentiated between ‘regular’ checkpoints controlled by these southern Libyan militias and those set up by bandits who levied abusive taxes and stole goods.

The same truck drivers said that bandits had stopped them on seven occasions during their trips between Sebha and Zouar: ‘you give or they kill you.’\textsuperscript{335}
To protect themselves, these traders hired Teda escorts armed with Kalashnikov-type assault rifles, carrying three or four men per vehicle between Um el-Araneb and the Chadian border. The charge for this service was LYD 700 (USD 497), which added to their costs and increased the prices of goods sold in Chad.

According to a Teda trader, towards the end of 2014 the Teda militias in southern Libya under the Gatrun security committee, Barka Wardougou, and Cherfeddin Barkay strengthened their presence on the roads to the borders. They avoided confrontations with bandits until the incident that led to the Gatrun fighting in November 2015. Armed Teda from Niger and Chad then stole a Libyan Teda civilian’s car. These Teda were under the command of Wardaga Goukouni, a young Teda camel rustler and highwayman from Niger. They had initially been used by Libyan Teda militias as mercenary guards on checkpoints in Libyan territory, but had committed abuses. When the owner of the vehicle complained to the Gatrun security committee, its forces arrested the robbers in the El-Wigh area. Comrades and well-armed relatives then tried to free the detainees by force. The fighting that followed caused three deaths among the security committee forces and seven among the attackers (including a lieutenant colonel of the Chadian army). Reinforced by fighters of Barka Wardougou and Cherfeddin Barkay, the committee arrested around 50 attackers, dismantled several irregular checkpoints, and called on the derde Erzey Barkay to resolve the matter. Partly as a result, in early 2017 the number of checkpoints between Tomou and Gatrun was reduced to four—two controlled by Rajeb Wardougou, one by Cherfeddin Barkay, and one by the security committee.

The incident illustrates both the Teda’s divisions and their capacity to unite to resolve a problem using their own mechanisms—even though the UAE is said to have finally paid the diya, with Barka Wardougou acting as intermediary. It also shows that, despite the fluidity of the Teda’s identity, a number of actors such as the Gatrun security committee are considered to be more legitimate than others in southern Libya. According to traders plying these routes, the armed men setting up ‘fake checkpoints’ and the ‘bandits’ operating to the south of El-Wigh and in the Kufra area include Teda, in particular from Niger. Dazagada from Niger and Chad are also present, while Beri are involved on the road to Kufra. A number of bandits are said to be involved in drug trafficking.
Drug trafficking

The transport of drugs (such as cocaine and cannabis) and contraband cigarettes forms part of the trans-Saharan trade between southern Libya, Chad, and Niger. After its arrival in West Africa, cocaine from South America is moved to the Mediterranean coast and from there to consumers in Europe and the Middle East. Moroccan hashish also goes eastward along the Algerian borders with Mali and Niger.

On these routes Niger is an unavoidable hub. From there, traffickers can directly access Algeria or Fezzan, or cross northern Chad to southern Libya, and eventually move on to Egypt. Drug trafficking is a multinational operation involving dozens of local intermediaries. The role of the Teda and their Dazagada neighbours is limited to transporting the drugs and protecting the convoys in their territories between north-eastern Niger (where they take over from Tuareg intermediaries) and southern Libya. These convoys either transit through Chad or take an alternative route.

Because governments, international actors, and armed protagonists operating in the area closely monitor drug smuggling, those who transport drugs generally avoid the main trade routes. To do so they use fast $4 \times 4$ vehicles rather than large trucks. Their routes change constantly.

Under Qaddafi, the Qadhadhfa and their allies monopolized the trafficking of both cigarettes and drugs in Libya. At the time two main routes passed through northern Chad, skirting the Tibesti Massif either to the south or north-east. To the south, the route ran from Niger to Chad to the south of Zouar, before reaching the Ogi area and then Borkou Yala (northern Borkou). It then circled south of the Emi Koussi volcano and looped back up towards the Gouro and Wanyanga area, or sometimes farther to the east towards Mourdi, before entering Libya. Dôza traffickers tended to operate this route. Chadian authorities then deployed forces between Gouro and Wanyanga and attempted to interrupt the traffic flowing through this area. The route was still in use in 2013, when Chadian forces arrested two drug convoys. To the north-west a second route, mainly operated by the Teda, briefly entered northern Chad in the areas of Wour and Kouri Bougoudi before reaching Fezzan.

Since Qaddafi’s fall in 2011 southern Libya has become much more permeable to trafficking, with those responsible avoiding northern Chad and reaching...
Libya directly from Niger, despite the presence of French troops in the latter’s north-east. Since 2015 Chadian army deployments in Kouri Bougoudi have made the route through northern Chad particularly difficult, reportedly leading to a decrease in drug trafficking locally.338 Southern Libya has also become an area of choice for bandits preying on drug traffickers. Both bandits and Chadian and Sudanese armed opposition groups have attacked drug convoys passing through the area. The armed men who capture the convoys release them in exchange for a ransom (a number of which are said to have been as high as several million dollars) or attempt to sell the drugs on to other networks. Since 2006 Chadian army units operating in the strategic Wour area seem to have regularly resold seized drugs. Former MDJT commander Allatchi ‘Koukoula’, who integrated into the ANT and was commanding army units in his Wour fiefdom, was allegedly involved in such operations and is said to have been expelled from the army for this reason.339

A number of international observers accuse the Chadian authorities of turning a blind eye to Teda and Dazagada involvement in the trafficking in an attempt to maintain good relations with them.340

**New weapons flows**

After the collapse of the Qaddafi regime large quantities of military equipment left Libya as early as the second half of 2011. Some went to the Darfur rebels (HSBA, 2016, p. 4), while others reached rebels in northern Mali and the Salafist groups affiliated to al-Qaeda or IS operating in the Sahel, including Boko Haram.341 Despite the Chadian government’s efforts a number of these weapons reportedly transited through Chad. This occurred chiefly in the border area with Sudan, which is sometimes crossed by convoys carrying weapons intended for the Darfur rebels, and that of Niger, across which weapons are transported to the Lake Chad region (UNSC, 2013a; 2015; HSBA, 2016, p. 4).342 A third important route transits through north-eastern Niger, not far from Tibesti, to supply northern Mali.343

The dispersal of Qaddafi’s weaponry, which occurred on a large scale between 2012 and 2014, has progressively slowed and no large-scale arms seizures have been recorded since mid-2015. This can be explained by a decrease in the number of weapons that are still available; the setting up of a joint monitoring
force by the Malian, Nigerien, Chadian, and French armies as part of Operation Barkhane; and the outbreak of intercommunal conflicts in southern Libya that have strengthened local demand for weapons in Libya.\textsuperscript{344}

In the months that followed Qaddafi’s fall the cross-border weapon flows inevitably passed through Teda commercial networks.\textsuperscript{345} While it remains difficult to quantify the weapons that transited through Tibesti or Teda networks, the Chadian authorities’ purchase of 35 SA-7b-type ground-to-air missiles from Teda traders in 2012 confirms the existence of the phenomenon.\textsuperscript{346}

Chad was not the only country in the region faced with the immediate repercussions of the dispersal of the Libyan arsenal. Sudan made similar acquisitions, and trafficking routes originating in southern Libya also crossed its territory. These routes included the so-called Dongola route connecting Fezzan to the Sudanese town that gives it its name.\textsuperscript{347} This route is used both by smugglers of weapons originating from Libya and for deliveries of weapons from the Sudanese government to Libyan militias—including to Teda battalions from Kufra in 2011.\textsuperscript{348}

In Tibesti the looting of Libyan weapons stores seems to have enriched only a small number of cross-border traders, but reportedly also allowed many people to acquire new personal weapons (such as handguns and rifles) and ammunition. Although large-scale weapons transfers from Libya have decreased, the flows of individual weapons persist, mainly in small batches, and supply the local market in northern Chad. Demand remains relatively high and has increased in reaction to the Tibesti gold rush.\textsuperscript{349}

The easy access to Libyan weapons has further contributed to the militarization of Chadian Teda society. The illicit possession of firearms in Tibesti is important for MDJT veterans (who have surreptitiously retained their weapons), cross-border traders, gold miners, and the wangada, who all rely on their weapons for their personal security. According to an ANT officer, 600 individual weapons (mainly handguns and Kalashnikov- or FAL-type assault rifles) and their ammunition were seized in Tibesti in 2015.\textsuperscript{350} Data provided by the Chadian authorities on weapons seizures is probably incomplete. However, there is no indication of the inhabitants of Tibesti wanting to take advantage of new supply sources to obtain more sophisticated military equipment to use locally.\textsuperscript{351}
Sudanese and Chadian interventions in Libya

_Chadian interventionist proclivities_

The Chadian–Sudanese rapprochement has survived the opposing positions adopted by N’Djaména and Khartoum on Libya since 2011. Despite its entente with Sudan, the Chadian government, like those of Egypt and the UAE, seems to consider that the best solution would be for General Haftar to receive sufficient international support to become the new ruler of Libya and re-establish order—by violent means if necessary—in the mould of General al-Sissi in Egypt. Chadian officials responsible for dealing with the Libyan crisis are surprised by Westerners’ scepticism about Haftar’s chances of controlling the whole country and are quick to dismiss reports of the general’s lack of popularity among Libyans.

Despite past disputes, Haftar and Déby have now become allies of convenience. The alliance is probably facilitated by the fact that former Qaddafists also seem to be supporting Haftar. Since 2011 Chad has found it difficult to find reliable allies among the constantly changing groupings of the Libyan revolution. Actors of all persuasions continue to criticize Déby for his loyalty to and alleged military support for Qaddafi.352

As discussed above, a number of Teda war chiefs accuse Haftar of having sided with the Arabs in the intercommunal conflicts in southern Libya, and have slowly distanced themselves from him. Because of this, the links between Chad and Haftar could make the Teda more hostile to the Déby regime. However, the Chadian government also wants to maintain good relations with the Teda in both Chad and Libya. Its aim is to use them to prevent Islamists’ infiltration attempts and the reconstitution of a Chadian rebellion on the Chadian–Libyan border.353 This strategy is likely to work because the majority of the Teda do not intend to be drawn into a rebellion against Chad while they are busy with their struggle for control of southern Libya against the Zuwaya and Awlad Suleiman Arabs and the Tuareg.

Some Libyan Teda have expressed regret that the Chadian government does not support them militarily. However, various Chadian sources, including government ones, claim that the government is providing financial support.354 A recent French parliamentary report noted that President Déby ‘manages, for
the time being and through various means, to ensure the allegiance [of the Teda] and to have them contribute to the “lockdown” of the Libyan border’ (Fromion and Rouillard, 2014, p. 114).

It is possible that some among the 300,000 Chadian immigrants in Libya have joined Teda militias in the south of that country. These are mainly Dazagada, some of whom fought for Qaddafi in 2011. Nothing indicates, however, that they did so at the request of the Chadian government. It seems that all the warring parties in Libya have recruited Chadian citizens as mercenaries.

Since 2011 Chad has slowly shifted its centre of attention and redeployed its troops from its eastern to its northern border to deal with the new situation in Libya. In 2013 the Chadian army deployed reinforcements in Bardaï, Wour (the last outpost on the Fezzan route), and Tanoua, the military base that the Qaddafi regime built on the Chadian–Libyan border. In reaction to the clashes between the Teda and the gold miners in 2015, Chadian forces based in Tanoua were increased from more than 300 men to a full-strength battalion of 800, while another battalion was deployed in the Kouri Bougoudi area. At the end of 2015 the former Aozou strip reportedly contained more soldiers than civilians. In November 2015 Chadian troops who had just returned from fighting Boko Haram in Cameroon were reportedly transferred to the Libyan border. According to French officials, at the beginning of 2016, 2,500 Chadian troops were deployed there.

As early as 2013 rumours circulated of Chadian army incursions onto Libyan territory. These allegations persisted, but were mostly refuted by the Chadian authorities, Teda sources in Chad and Libya, and even sources close to Chadian rebels. In private one Chadian official said that it was possible that an operation had taken place against a suspicious airstrip in southern Libya. At the end of 2015 and in 2016 there were rumours of deployments of Chadian troops near the Libyan border with the objective of fighting Chadian rebels, but there is no proof that these troops actually crossed the border. Similarly, in 2016 it was alleged that Chadian soldiers were supporting Teda fighters in Kufra, Seba, and Ubari, as well as General Haftar’s forces in the oil-producing areas. These allegations were not substantiated, but it is possible that Chadian Teda who had deserted from the army did fight on these fronts. Finally, in late 2016 Chadian troops reportedly penetrated into Libyan territory in the Kouri Bougoudi area,
where former Chadian UFDD rebels were looking for gold. The ANT soldiers reportedly searched and disarmed many of the gold miners, but also a small number of Libyan Teda elements under Rajeb Wardougou.\(^{361}\)

In Libya, fears of a Chadian military intervention were aroused by Idriss Déby’s speech in December 2014 during the Dakar Forum on Peace and Security in Africa organized by the French Ministry of Defence. After reiterating his criticism of French involvement in Libya, he suggested that a new military intervention was necessary, specifically in southern Libya, and in particular targeting what he claimed to be jihadist groups.\(^{362}\) He explained that it was France’s responsibility to repair the damage caused by its intervention in Libya, but that, as it had done previously in Mali, Chad would be ready to support its Western and regional allies. French minister of defence Jean-Yves Le Drian seemed to support this plan of action at the time. Niger also supported the plan, while Algeria was more sceptical.\(^{363}\)

The idea of a French–Chadian intervention in southern Libya seems to have been abandoned in favour of an intervention against Boko Haram, which took place in January 2015. At the end of 2015 Chadian officials estimated that a Chadian intervention in Libya could have considerable collateral effects, including that of ‘awaking the racist demons’ of the Libyans, as had occurred following Qaddafi’s recruitment of sub-Saharan fighters in 2011. At the beginning of 2016 French officials also believed that the idea of such an intervention was ‘no longer on the table’.\(^{364}\) The possibility has nevertheless regularly reappeared in speeches made by Chadian officials.\(^{365}\) In Libya, Déby’s Dakar speech has permanently implanted in people’s minds the belief that the Chadian government has interventionist tendencies. This in turn complicates relations between Chad and the authorities in Tripoli (Paris Match, 2016).\(^{366}\)

**Sudanese interventionism**

Taking the opposite position to that of Chad, Sudan supported the uprising against Qaddafi in 2011. Its main contribution was that of delivering weapons to the revolutionaries in coordination with Qatar (Sudan Tribune, 2011; Reuters, 2011).

According to Sudanese officials, from the start of the Libyan revolution Sudan supported in particular Abdelhakim Belhaj, the founder of the former al-Qaeda-affiliated Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, who was for a time in exile in Khartoum
Imprisoned by Qaddafi from 2004 to 2009, Belhaj then abandoned the armed struggle, only to resume it again in 2011. With the NTC’s blessing he established the Tripoli military council, over which he presided. In 2011 Qatar and Sudan reportedly co-organized the delivery of 300 armed vehicles to him. Qatar had bought these vehicles from the UAE and they had been armed in Sudan by the NISS. The Sudanese government subsequently diversified its alliances and supported revolutionaries from various ideological backgrounds.367

From March or April 2011 ground convoys left Benghazi and Kufra to supply the Libyan revolutionaries with ammunition in northern Sudan, avoiding Darfur. Teda who knew the tracks to the south of Kufra staffed these convoys from May onwards. According to Teda sources associated with the deliveries, in the early stages the Sudanese government did not deliver these weapons to Libya; instead, Libyan revolutionaries, including Kufra Teda, sent vehicles to fetch the supplies from Sudanese military bases. Less and less discreet deliveries took place later on in Libya, including some by aircraft (in Kufra, Benghazi, Tripoli, Misrata, and Zintan) (UNSC, 2016a, pp. 27, 34; Sudan Tribune, 2015a). The NISS, which had agents in Kufra as early as 2011, coordinated these deliveries (Cole, 2015, p. 76; De Waal, 2013a, p. 72). A Sudanese infantry battalion and tanks also reportedly participated in the revolutionaries’ capture of Kufra (De Waal, 2013b, p. 377; Elhag, 2012).368

Like its Qatari ally, the Sudanese government has openly supported the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood and Fajr Libya. The Teda accuse Sudan of having continued to arm not only forces affiliated to Fajr Libya, but also Arabs from southern Libya who are in conflict with the Teda, in particular the Zuwaya in Kufra. This support has been based less on ideological affinities than on pragmatic considerations linked to concerns over border security. A number of Teda said that ammunition convoys from Sudan continued to be sent to the Zuwaya.369 There are also allegations that the Sudanese government has delivered spare parts for tanks and sent soldiers and Arab militias from Darfur (janjawid) to Kufra. These forces mainly trained the Zuwaya in the use of these tanks and heavy artillery (UNSC, 2016a, p. 101). Although this accusation has not been proved, Sudan did admit to having sent troops to Kufra as part of a joint border force, whose Libyan component was at least
partly made up of Zuwaya militias (*Le Monde Afrique, 2015; Sudan Tribune, 2014*). Sudan has also been trying to prevent Darfur rebels from sourcing weapons in Libya. With this in mind, while delivering weapons to selected groups, the NISS has been buying back other weapons that have been less useful to the Libyan revolutionaries, including from Teda. Chad has been involved in similar activities.  

In mid-2016 Shaban Hadiya ‘Abu Obeyda az-Zawi’, a Libyan political-military actor linked to Abdelhakim Belhaj, was in Khartoum claiming to be Belhaj’s representative. He met with Musa Hilal, one of the main leaders of the janjawid, to whom he allegedly offered USD 7 million in exchange for sending 5,000 fighters to Libya. It is unclear whether Hilal agreed to do so and whether the Sudanese government endorsed the offer. Abu Obeyda also allegedly tried to acquire anti-aircraft missiles in Sudan.  

The Sudanese government and its Libyan allies believe that it is essential to control the Sudanese–Libyan border. In 2013 Sudan reportedly attempted to replicate the Chadian–Sudanese border force by creating joint units that combined NISS forces and Libyan militias to monitor the border (*HSBA*, 2016, p. 4). In 2014 and 2015 Sudan used this joint force to justify its weapons deliveries and transfers of Sudanese troops to Kufra, as if the force’s Libyan components were troops of a recognized government (*Le Monde Afrique, 2015; Sudan Tribune, 2014*). In mid-2015 Teda militias prevented the Zuwaya from accessing the road from Kufra to Sudan. The Zuwaya were able to reopen it in 2016, however, and their militias reportedly continue to carry out joint patrols with Sudanese forces in the border area.  

In 2016 Khartoum announced the deployment of a thousand paramilitaries at the Libyan border to prevent both IS incursions from Libya into Sudan and the movements of Darfur armed opposition groups. This deployment added to the Sudanese army and NISS forces that were based in Karam at-Tom, near Jebel Aweynat, on the Sudanese–Libyan–Egyptian tri-border. In mid-2016, 400 vehicles of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the most recently formed Sudanese paramilitary force, were deployed to monitor the border. These RSF forces were essentially composed of Darfur Arab militias commanded by Mohammed Hamdan Dagolo ‘Hemmeti’, an Arab warlord from South Darfur whose family is originally from Chad.
Redeployed in Daba on the Nile to the south of Dongola, these forces made incursions to the west, where they claimed to have stopped more than 1,500 ‘migrants’ and ‘traffickers’ during the second half of 2016 (Sudan Tribune, 2016b). This operation, which was widely publicized in the Sudanese media, coincided with an EU donation of EUR 40 million to the Sudanese authorities as part of the ‘Khartoum Process’ designed to limit migration from the Horn of Africa to Europe.\textsuperscript{374} In reality, even if the Sudanese government allowed ‘Hemmeti’ to claim that his forces were acting on behalf of the EU, the true objective of the RSF’s deployment at the Libyan border was probably to fight the Darfur rebels operating in the area (Tubiana, 2017, p. 11).\textsuperscript{375}

\textbf{Sudanese rebels in Libya}

The Qaddafi regime was a major source of support for the Darfur rebels, although Chad was their rear base until 2010. This was both for practical reasons (a more populated frontier area), and because Libya wished to be more discreet in its support for the Darfurians. This enabled Qaddafi to present himself as a mediator in a conflict that he was actually encouraging. On the other hand, the Darfur rebels were conscious of the threat that the support of the unpredictable Libyan leader represented for them: Qaddafi regularly attempted to impose his wishes on them. In 2010–11 JEM chairman Khalil Ibrahim was held as a virtual prisoner in Tripoli. Placed under house arrest, he was unable to participate in the Doha negotiations, which Qaddafi sought to compete with or derail. UN and AU mediators’ attempts to have Khalil join the negotiations failed, despite the links of the joint chief mediator Djibril Bassolé (from Burkina Faso) with Libya. One can surmise that the absence of the rebel leader was one of the reasons why the negotiations stalled.\textsuperscript{376}

In addition, the presence of Khalil in Libya was itself a consequence of the Sudanese government’s new regional strategy from 2010: the rapprochement between Chad and Sudan obliged Idriss Déby to expel JEM. Unable to operate from rear bases in Chad, the Sudanese armed opposition groups then attempted to establish new ones on the other borders of Darfur, in both South Sudan and Libya. When the Libyan revolution broke out in 2011 the Darfur rebels in Libya recruited fighters among the Sudanese, Chadian, and other migrants to support Qaddafi, and occasionally fought against the Libyan revolutionaries.
themselves. This was the price they had to pay for the money and weapons they had obtained from the Libyan government.

Later JEM and the SLA-MM reportedly managed to obtain weapons from Qaddafi’s stocks. In an attempt to rescue Khalil from Tripoli, JEM sent a convoy from Darfur to the vicinity of the Libyan capital in August 2011. This convoy reportedly returned to Sudan with a large number of weapons. On two occasions in April–May 2011 JEM forces reportedly fought alongside Qaddafi’s forces in Kufra. In June JEM attacked a convoy of Sudanese weapons earmarked for the NTC, then clashed with Barka Wardougou’s forces. Also in April–May 2011 an SLA-MM convoy commanded by Mohammedein ‘Orgajor’ briefly entered Libya, fought anti-Qaddafi forces near the border, and was able to transport weapons back to Sudan.

In the Kufra area, where Sudan had armed Teda and Zuwaya revolutionaries in 2011, the Darfur rebels supported Qaddafi. But when Teda and Zuwaya began fighting each other (with the latter supported by Sudan), the Darfurians established links with Teda leader Hassan Keley, who had reportedly once acted as intermediary between some of the Darfur rebels and Libyan authorities under Qaddafi. Chadian Teda MDJT veterans also reportedly facilitated contacts between Libyan Teda and Darfur rebels. In the Fezzan region the Teda reportedly recruited Darfur rebels to fight against Qaddafi’s forces as early as 2011, then from 2012 against the Awlad Suleiman and Tuareg (Al Jazeera, 2011; Murray, 2017; UNSC, 2016a, p. 16). Forces from northern Libya, in particular those of General Haftar, recruited Darfur rebels. The Misrata brigades, although more closely linked to the Sudanese government, also attempted to win the Darfurians over to their side (UNSC, 2016a, p. 16).

SLA-MM

Since 2014 the most active Darfur rebel group in Libya seems to have been the SLA-MM (UNSC, 2017, p. 12). In March 2015 a convoy of about 50 vehicles containing SLA-MM fighters led by Khater Shatta established itself in the Chadian–Sudanese–Libyan border area and allied itself with both General Haftar and Hassan Keley, in spite of Keley’s difficult relations with the Tobruk general. In September 2015 Teda troops led by Hassan Keley and SLA-MM fighters in several dozen vehicles regrouped to the north-west of Kufra. They
probably aimed to break the Zuwaya siege of the town, but were bombed by Haftar’s aircraft. Abdelkarim Adam Arja, who was commanding the Darfur forces, was reportedly killed in this attack (UNSC, 2016a, pp. 84–85; 2017, p. 12).

This episode, as well as others that revealed Haftar’s ambiguous response to the conflict in Kufra, did not, however, put an end to the Libyan general’s links with the SLA-MM. Minni Minawi minimized the incident in which Arja was killed, explaining that Arja officially left the SLA-MM in late 2014 and was not under his command. But he did acknowledge the loss of a vehicle and 11 men in another incident in early 2016. Another SLA-MM leader said that Arja had been one of the movement’s leaders in Libya.

In December 2015 SLA-MM forces commanded by Jaber Ishaq ‘Sye’ also fought alongside General Haftar’s forces against Misrata-backed forces in Benghazi. The Misratis then offered the SLA-MM fighters better terms to lure them over to their camp, but were unable to attract significant numbers of defections. In 2016 SLA-MM fighters were reportedly present in the oil fields together with Libyan forces loyal to Haftar or autonomous Teda militias, mainly in Zella, as well as in Fezzan and Rebyana (UNSC, 2017, p. 12). The SLA-MM’s aim was still the same as in 2011: to obtain weapons, which it appears to have succeeded in doing.

JEM

JEM, which since 2013 has concentrated most of its forces in South Sudan, is less present in Libya. In April 2015 the movement attempted to regain a foothold in Darfur, but its convoy was ambushed in South Darfur. A few vehicles were able to escape and reach rebel strongholds in North Darfur. From early 2016 JEM elements—some of whom were recruited in the Darfur refugee camps in Chad—slowly entered south-east Libya. There they were supported by Beri elements who had arrived earlier and had originated from the SLA-MM and the Chadian rebels. The JEM forces also established contact with Libyan forces. JEM was courted both by Misrata forces and Haftar, but, similar to the SLA-MM, seemed to favour Haftar.

LJM/URF

The LJM is a heterogeneous coalition of JEM and SLA splinters that was created by the international community. The LJM actually only included one real armed
faction: Bahar Idris Abu Garda’s URF, which united Abu Garda’s JEM-Collective Leadership and the National Movement for Reform and Development of Jibril Abdelkarim Bari ‘Tek’. Both groups were composed of dissident Beri JEM fighters. After the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in 2011, in terms of which the LJM became part of the Sudanese government, the fighters were stationed at a base in the Kabkabiya region of North Darfur while waiting to be integrated into Sudanese government forces in line with the agreement (ICG, 2015b, p. 3).

The integration was delayed chiefly because various LJM political leaders who had no troops recruited thousands of civilians in an attempt to profit from the process. The delay resulted in the real fighters slowly escaping from the control of any authority and becoming less and less willing to be integrated into government forces (ICG, 2014, p. 11). In 2015, when a few hundred former rebels were finally incorporated into the Sudanese army, only one genuine URF fighter was included.384

The other fighters dispersed slowly, seeking ways to earn a living for themselves and their families, who mostly lived in Darfur refugee camps in Chad. Some left to prospect for gold in Jebel Amir, then in Tibesti, Niger, Algeria, and southern Libya. Others, ‘tired of digging the ground like foxes’, in the words of one of them, found other sources of income in Libya. General Haftar’s forces recruited a number of them as mercenaries. In March 2015 a first group of LJM (URF) fighters travelled to south-east Libya and allied themselves with Teda fighters. In mid-2015 they were joined by one of their military leaders, Jibril ‘Tek’, and about 30 fighters. Tek only spent a short time in southern Libya, probably to offer his troops’ services as mercenaries. A number of his men remained there, however. Some LJM members reportedly fought in Ubari alongside Teda forces. The fact that Tek and other fighters in the group had on occasion been soldiers in the Chadian army may explain the accusations that Chadian soldiers were fighting alongside Teda forces in Ubari.385

In August or September 2015 Abdallah Banda, the LJM’s operations commander, accompanied by Chadian Beri rebels reached the Jufra area with seven vehicles and joined the fighters who were already there. By then 60–70 LJM troops were in Libya. Anti-Haftar militias recruited them to control checkpoints to the north of Kufra, together with Teda fighters of Hassan Keley and Chadian
rebels. The LJM group, however, seemed to have operated independently. In late 2015, mounted on nine vehicles, LJM fighters and their allies captured a convoy of six Teda drug traffickers’ vehicles in the Kufra area on the road to the Egyptian border. Thanks to their telephone contacts with the smuggling network’s backers or intermediaries in Europe, they were paid a ransom of several million dollars to free the convoy.\textsuperscript{386}

In February 2016 the LJM and its Chadian rebel allies were in turn the victims of two attacks between Kufra and Jufra carried out by Zuwaya militias. One Darfur leader and several fighters were killed. With prisoners having been taken on both sides, negotiations to exchange them were held in Sudan between representatives from Tripoli and the LJM. The aim of the attack was most probably to dissuade the Sudanese and Chadian elements from continuing to erect checkpoints in Libyan territory. Other Beri fighters accused the LJM of having had a negative impact on their presence in the area.\textsuperscript{387}

In mid-2016, made wary by these attacks, a number of LJM fighters joined a Chadian rebel faction and posed as its members in order to surrender to the Chadian government and receive bonuses of XAF 20 million (USD 34,000) per vehicle and XAF 5 million (USD 8,500) per fighter.\textsuperscript{388} In the same way that rebel movements straddled borders, a regional market in demobilization had sprung up that Darfur fighters could exploit in both Chad and CAR.\textsuperscript{389}

\textbf{Other Darfur factions}

Other less visible armed opposition factions are also present in Libya, despite the fact that Libyan actors often wrongly identify them as JEM or SLA-MM forces.\textsuperscript{390} These include:

- autonomous SLA-AW elements under the command of Youssif Ahmad Youssif ‘Karjakola’;
- a dissident SLA-AW faction know as the SLA-Transitional Council led by Mohammed Abdelsalam ‘Tarrada’ and Nimir Mohammed, whose troops operate with Jaber Ishaq’s SLA-MM group;
- fighters of Abdallah Yahya’s SLA-Unity;
- members of SLA-Justice, led by Taher Hajer since the death in combat of Ali Abdallah ‘Kerubino’ in 2014;
- SLA-MM splinters under Salah Jok ‘Bob’; and
elements from JEM-Bashar/Dabajo, a group that also joined the Sudanese government in late 2016. These dissidents, commanded by Abdallah Janna, left North Darfur for Libya, where Haftar recruited them as mercenaries. They subsequently abandoned Haftar for Ismail Sallabi’s Benghazi defence brigade (tharaya difa’ Benghazi), which the GNA supports and Qatar finances.

While acting as mercenaries, essentially for Haftar, these fighters also carry out operations for their own profit, including by collecting taxes on trading vehicles and migrants.391

Chadian rebels in Libya

The Chadian government is concerned about the movement of Islamists to southern Libya, and also, less openly, about the possible reconstitution of a rebellion on Chad’s northern border. For decades Libya has been home to thousands of Chadian nationals, including former rebels, chiefly Dazagada (Oxfam-ACF, 2011, p. 5). While many returned to Chad during the 2011 crisis, some then left again for northern Libya due to a lack of opportunities in Chad. Others left to prospect for gold in the Chadian–Libyan border area.392

In 2011 a number of Chadian armed opposition members attempting to survive the Chadian–Sudanese rapprochement hoped that Déby’s support for Qaddafi would enable them to obtain support from the Libyan NTC. Mahamat Nouri, the leader of the UFDD, one of the main Chadian factions, who had been in exile in Qatar since his expulsion from Sudan in 2010, announced his support for the Libyan revolution as early as February 2011. In March 2011 he promised to send his troops to help the rebels without really being in a position to do so.393

Former UFDD fighters who had remained in Sudan travelled to Libya in the hope of finding work there as mercenaries. The first contacts did not seem promising. For the Libyan revolutionaries the Chadians were Qaddafi supporters and therefore not potential recruits. A few UFDD veterans, however, were able to obtain employment as mercenaries in both camps. In southern Libya Teda revolutionaries attempted to disarm Chadian fighters recruited by Qaddafi or even to incorporate them into their own ranks, but with limited success.394 Later, individual Dazagada fighters fought alongside the Teda against the Tuareg, Awlad Suleiman, and Zuwaya.395
In 2012–13 Libyan political leaders emerging from the revolution rejected Chadian rebels’ requests for help, because they did not wish to antagonize Idriss Déby. When the Libyan revolution began to fragment the various factions began to compete to recruit Chadian mercenaries, including Dazagada. Some of them fought for Haftar, mainly against Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi in 2015. The Zintan brigades recruited other Chadians as mercenaries and the Misratis attempted to lure them into their ranks in response.

In October 2015, during a meeting in N’Djaména, one of the topics Idriss Déby and Khalifa Haftar reportedly discussed was the presence of these mercenaries in Haftar’s forces. Déby was concerned that a number of them could be Chadian rebels seeking support in Libya. Since then, Haftar’s relations with the Chadian rebels have been more distant, while the rebels have been establishing closer links with the Misratis. In December 2016 Chadian rebels from the Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad (FACT), who were supported by the Misrata ‘third force’, accused Haftar’s air force of bombing their base in Jebel as-Sawda in central Libya on behalf of the Chadian government, killing a Chadian fighter (FACT, 2016b).

**From UFDD to FACT (Dazagada)**

Since 2015 several hundred Chadian rebels, notably Dazagada, have been based in Jebel as-Sawda, to the south of Hun, the capital of Jufra province, which is held by troops of the Misrata ‘third force’. French government sources reported their presence in Hun, labelling them ‘Chadian mercenaries’. It seems that their Libyan hosts’ initial aim was to prevent these Chadian forces from being recruited as mercenaries by their adversaries in Tobruk. Another aim was to encourage Haftar’s Chadian recruits to switch sides, then to use them as mercenaries against Haftar or IS. The aim of the ‘third force’ was also to use these troops to put pressure on Déby and to distance him from Haftar. It is unlikely that the Misratis intended to support attempts at regime change in Chad.

These Chadian rebels were partly UFDD veterans recruited mainly among the Dazagada and led by Mahamat Nouri. They called themselves UFDD members, but Nouri, who was then in exile in France, seems to have had minimal control over them.

In December 2014 the Tripoli authorities perceived Idriss Déby’s speech in Dakar as a declaration of war against themselves, and immediately made contact
with Nouri (Paris Match, 2016). In January 2015 Nouri sent the UFDD’s former secretary-general, Mahamat Mahadi Ali ‘Goran’, who was also in exile in France, to Libya. Mahadi, a Kecherda Daza from Bahr-el-Ghazal, was a member of the MDJT from 1999 onwards before demobilizing with Hassan Mardagué. He joined the UFDD in 2008. In Libya Mahadi was tasked with re-establishing Nouri’s authority over the UFDD fighters. Once there he noticed that most of them were Dazagada from Kanem and Bahr-el-Ghazal (that is, Kreda and Kecherda, his own sub-group), rather than Anakazza from Borkou (Nouri’s sub-group). Emboldened by this situation and taking advantage of his presence among them, Mahadi slowly imposed himself as the group’s leader.\footnote{400}

The ‘third force’ encouraged Mahadi to attract into his movement’s ranks Chadian mercenaries fighting for Haftar, uncontrolled Chadian–Libyan elements (including Teda) who had become ‘bandits’, and Chadian migrants in general. Dazagada gold miners evicted from Tibesti also joined the group. According to Mahadi, his Libyan hosts encouraged him to act as an intermediary in the Sebha area between themselves and the Teda.\footnote{401} Chadian rebels, however, were not necessarily well placed to intervene in southern Libya’s ethnic conflicts.

On the other hand, Mahadi had also showed himself to be open to his Misrata hosts’ using his troops as mercenaries, including against IS, despite Nouri’s disapproval. In March 2016 the followers of the two rival leaders (that is, Mahadi and Nouri) clashed. Mahadi’s more numerous supporters defeated those of Nouri, and about 20 men, mainly Anakazza, were killed. Nouri reacted by accusing Mahadi of being in the pay of a ‘Libyan jihadist militia’. As a consequence, at the beginning of April Mahadi announced the separation of his troops from the UFDD to form FACT.\footnote{402}

In June 2016 FACT suffered its own bout of ethnic discord. Several hundred Kreda fighters under the command of Mahamat Hassani Bulmay, the former UFDD spokesperson, formed their own faction, which took the name Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la république.\footnote{403} According to rival rebels, the Kreda fighters first offered Haftar their services in exchange for vehicles, before abandoning him in late 2016 for the Benghazi defence brigade.\footnote{404}

With possibly 1,000 fighters and 200 vehicles at the time of writing, FACT now constitutes the main Chadian armed opposition force. In 2015 two groups
of 450–500 fighters each were trained for three months to the south of Hun. In early 2016, 250 other recruits were reportedly also being trained there. Since 2016 FACT’s role on behalf of the ‘third force’ has reportedly been to block IS’s eventual retreat southwards from the Jufra area—as Mahadi had proposed as early as February 2016 (RFI, 2016a). Meanwhile, fighters loyal to Nouri reportedly regrouped in Um el-Araneb under the command of Kalle Issa, a Dôza. They are said to have established good relations with a number of Libyan Teda war chiefs. Since mid-2015 they have also controlled a checkpoint to the west of Tazerbo. Similar to other Chadian and Sudanese rebels, they have allegedly confiscated drugs from traffickers.

Another former UFDD leader was in southern Libya at the time of writing. This was Gihinni Korey, the former leader of Hissène Habré’s Direction de la documentation et de la sécurité, a political police force whose crimes helped to earn the former president a life sentence in Dakar (Hicks, 2016). One of the reasons for Gihinni’s presence in Libya seems to be to escape justice. He has reportedly been on good terms with General Haftar since Habré’s times and was said to have formed a small group of Anakazza fighters who fought for Haftar against Ansar al-Sharia in 2015.

A few hundred other UFDD veterans—Beri from the Bideyat Borogat subgroup and Dazagada recruited by Haftar in Benghazi—were previously under the command of Abbakar Tollimi, who is a Borogat and the former UFDD secretary-general (before Mahamat Mahadi). Tollimi has admitted that he remains in contact with these veterans, but no longer considers himself to be their leader. In exile at the time of writing, he was attempting to create an unarmed political opposition movement.

UFR (Beri)

Remaining members of Timan Erdimi’s Union des forces de la résistance (UFR) consisting of Beri fighters, as well as some Waddayan and Arabs, also crossed from Darfur into Libya. As early as 2013 Daud Ali Boyenno, the UFR’s chief of staff, left for Libya with three or four vehicles to acquire ammunition, eventually returning in 2015. In the Sebha area he allied himself with UFDD Dazagada rebels who had arrived earlier and were already on good terms with the Misrata ‘third force’. He was thus able to obtain ammunition, which he sent to Darfur.
With the UFDD growing much more quickly than the UFR, the latter moved to the Kufra area. Since then relations between the two groups have been tense. First the UFDD and then FACT tried to prevent the UFR from establishing itself in Libya. For its part, the UFR does not want to see the Dazagada return to Darfur. The two groups share the territory they occupy, with each tending to operate in areas peopled by its own ethnic group. In 2016 the UFR had 200 fighters in Libya and 300 in Darfur. The group remains better established in Sudan than in Libya, where its presence is less significant than that of the Dazagada from FACT.

After their brief association with the UFDD the UFR elements in Libya principally benefited from the presence of Darfur Beri rebels from the SLA-MM and LJM. All of them reportedly received vehicles, weapons, and ammunition from General Haftar in 2014–15, and a number of UFR fighters reportedly fought in Benghazi. In addition, the UFR established links with pro-Haftar Qadhadhfa in the Sebha area, while in the Kufra area they joined with the Libyan Teda under Hassan Keley, with whom they are said to have fought against the Zuwaya. As a result, Chadian and Sudanese Teda and Beri fighters banded together to set up checkpoints on routes in the Kufra area. Haftar does not seem to have ordered these operations, and the fighters involved seem to have mainly acted autonomously. The Misratis also courted the UFR political leaders in exile.

Similar to their LJM Darfur allies, UFR elements or former elements have reportedly been associated several times with the trafficking of vehicles and drugs, or involved in attacks on traffickers. These elements were reportedly commanded by Abdullahi Ali Boyenno, the brother of Daud Ali Boyenno, the UFR commander-in-chief in Libya. In early 2015 former UFR elements, including Abdullahi, were reportedly involved in a clash in which the trafficker Chidi Kallemay was wounded. Drugs seized in this clash are said to have been resold for USD 11 million, USD 5 million of which was given to Daud. The UFR commander then bought 15 armed vehicles in Libya and Sudan, returned to Darfur, and handed them over to Gerdi Abdallah, who then travelled to Libya to replace him at the head of his fighters. In March 2016 the Sudanese authorities arrested Daud (RFI, 2016b).
The Zuwaya have also accused the UFR and its Darfur allies of kidnapping travellers for ransom and raping Zuwaya women. This perhaps explains why in early 2016 the UFR and its Darfur rebel allies were attacked by Zuwaya militias, including a Salafist group known as the katiba salafiya sibil al-salam (the ways of peace), supported by Haftar. Abdullahi Ali Boyenno was killed during one of these attacks in February 2016. According to Chadian rebel sources, jihadists from IS or Ansar al-Sharia reinforced the Zuwaya during a second attack in the same month.\textsuperscript{415}

**UFDD-Fondamentale and FSR (Arabs)**

At the time of writing the Chadian Arab rebels seemed less well represented in Libya than they once were in Sudan. A number of them, however, have been recruited as mercenaries, in particular a group of about 400 men, including 100 veterans of the UFDD-Fondamentale, the main Chadian Arab rebel group after 2009. In 2016 this group of mercenaries was led by Issa Mahamat ‘al-Rahib’, the former UFDD-Fondamentale head of operations nicknamed ‘\textit{kaseh wa meseh}’ (raid and destruction). Initially recruited by Ibrahim Jadhran, who promised them Libyan citizenship, these fighters eventually abandoned Jadhran for Haftar. They do not seem to have a Chadian rebel agenda, and some of them appear to occasionally operate with the Sudanese RSF.\textsuperscript{416}

In 2011 the first Chadian rebel leader to travel to Libya was probably Ismail Moussa, who succeeded Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane at the head of the Front for the Salvation of the Republic (FSR), another Arab rebel movement. Soubiane had gone over to the Chadian government side. At that time Ismail did not find any support in Libya for a ‘Chadian spring’, and then went into exile in Tunisia, where, on the recommendation of the Libyan revolutionaries, he reportedly obtained financial support.\textsuperscript{417} In 2016 he returned to Libya and attempted to reconstitute the FSR in Fezzan. He may obtain support there from Chadian Arabs settled in Libya and from the Awlad Suleiman.\textsuperscript{418}

**Future risks**

The chaos in Libya offers numerous opportunities to obtain weapons and financial resources. However, the Chadian armed opposition groups (like the Chadian authorities and the Sudanese rebels) acknowledge that contemporary Libya
does not provide circumstances that favour a rebellion as organized as the one the Chadian government faced in 2008. This is largely because potential rebel fighters tend to become mercenaries or traffickers, or even to fight among themselves for loot or for strategic, clan, or personal reasons, while political leaders have difficulty controlling them.\textsuperscript{419}

In addition, the Chadian government’s support for General Haftar obliges the Chadian rebels to seek support from the Misrata brigades and other members of the former Fajr Libya coalition in an alliance that seems dictated more by circumstances than ideology. The Islamist affinities of some of these Libyan allies, which are easily oversimplified by Chad and its international allies, could become an impediment to the Chadian armed opposition.\textsuperscript{420} Thus, in January 2017 the French government decided to freeze the assets of Mahamat Nouri and Mahamat Mahadi over the ‘activities of these individuals in their respective countries to incite and facilitate acts of terrorism’.\textsuperscript{421}

One of the collateral effects of the alliance with the Misrata ‘third force’ is that it complicates the Chadian rebellion’s relations with part of the Teda, in particular those who support Haftar. Some may be ready to form a buffer between the Chadian regime and its possible enemies further north. While this latter role is encouraged by the Chadian regime’s gestures (including financial ones) towards Teda war chiefs in Libya, it is especially encouraged by the situation in Libya itself. Qaddafi’s downfall has opened up space for the emergence of new ambitions among the Teda. These ambitions include control of their territory and its resources, but also affirmation of cross-border identities and even a desire for self-determination (AFP, 2012).

A general desire for greater local autonomy is apparent among the Teda of Libya, Chad, and Niger. Those who harbour this idea, including former armed opposition members in the three countries and young political, military, or economic entrepreneurs, have links among themselves and could also form alliances with the Chadian Dazagada, some of whom have been in rebellion since 1990. Current tensions in Libya threaten all the Teda; that is, those residing in Libya and their relatives in Chad and Niger, all of whom are economically dependent on access to southern Libya. Many believe that other communities question their very presence in Libya. This situation compels the Libyan Teda to maintain good relations with Chad. Furthermore, the Teda seem weary of the
successive rebellions in Tibesti since the 1960s, which are largely responsible for their current marginalization.422

In the short run, it seems improbable that the Chadian rebellion in Libya will be able to recruit among the Teda from either Chad or Libya and establish itself in Tibesti. It is equally unlikely that a new rebellion will emerge among the Teda in Tibesti. Not only has the MDJT experience bred caution among the Teda, but Qaddafi’s fall has encouraged ambitions other than a hypothetical takeover in a remote capital (that is, N’Djaména). These include greater Teda control over their historical territory and its resources (for example, gold and oil), be they in Chad, Niger, or Libya.

However, the balance established between the Chadian government and the Teda is unstable, and made even more fragile by the actions of Sudanese actors. Up to now Khartoum has been able to maintain its entente with N’Djaména despite the two governments’ conflicting positions in Libya. But Chadian officials believe that ultimately, if the crisis in Libya continues, it could reignite the confrontation between Chad and Sudan through proxies (for example, armed opposition groups and militias) in southern Libya.

Chad and Sudan are not immune to changes that could negatively impact their entente. In both countries the chances of a regime change by force, a rebel attack, or a coup d’État seem less likely than they were a few years ago. However, the two regimes remain fragile, chiefly in economic terms, and their longevity has bred weariness and a desire for change for its own sake: Omar al-Bashir and Idriss Déby have been in power for 28 and 27 years, respectively. Power in Khartoum and N’Djaména has been concentrated more and more in the hands of the respective presidents. As a result, the disappearance of one of them from the political scene could easily lead to new internal violence and put an end to the two countries’ good neighbourly relations. A power vacuum in Chad would necessarily cause ethnic competition for power. If this were to happen, Chadian Arab politicians would no doubt avail themselves of the support of the Arab militias of Darfur, where many janjawid are of Chadian origin. Sudan could also be tempted to set up an even more pro-Sudan regime in N’Djaména. Finally, if hardliners were to replace him, Bashir’s disappearance from the political scene could also put an end to the entente. 

Tubiana and Gramizzi Tubu Trouble 151
VII. Conclusion: a holistic approach to security

In 2011 the last MDJT flags in Tibesti were replaced with the Chadian banner. President Déby’s promise of a multi-billion XAF fund allowed observers to believe for a time that one of the most marginalized regions of the African continent—and one that has been longest at war—would finally be able to rebuild itself. These dreams were short lived, chiefly because of the Chadian state’s structural deficits (that is, bad governance and institutional weakness), as much as the Teda community’s divisions at the end of decades of increasingly fragmented rebellions.

Exacerbating matters, the Chadian–Libyan border area has experienced two major upheavals in recent years: the outbreak of conflict in Libya, and the gold rushes that worsened the divisions among the Teda and their distrust of the Chadian state. Despite declarations of unity, dissent has frequently been apparent within the Teda community on the subject of development projects, the role of the administrative or customary authorities, the management of the region’s gold resources, and the control of cross-border routes.

The MDJT war may be over, but the challenges looming in northern Chad remain large, and the importance of the region for the stability of Chad and the wider Sahara–Sahel area is paramount. The Chadian government has constantly attempted to make its borders less permeable to rebellions. Its main objective is to prevent Tibesti from being transformed once again into a fertile ground for any form of insurrection. Instead, the government wants the region to form a barrier against destabilization originating in Libya. The Teda community of Chad is conscious of the failures of previous rebellions and seems largely unwilling to attempt the adventure once more. It has also declared itself ready to play the role of bulwark against new armed opposition groupings or possible jihadist infiltration. However, the Teda of Chad, Niger, and Libya will only contribute to regional stability in the long run if they are rewarded for it—notably if their rights as minorities are acknowledged in the three countries.
Once long forgotten, in recent years Tibesti seems to have become an important strategic area for Chad and its allies. Chad has progressively reinforced its military presence in the area since 2011. Since 2014 the French army has been based in Madama in north-east Niger, about 100 km from Libya and 200 km from Chad. Neither the return of the former colonial power nor the continuous presence of French forces in northern Chad since 1983 seems to have had much impact on local populations. Yet it is clear that the Madama base, which lies in Teda territory, cannot function effectively without good relations with the area’s Teda.

A number of the Teda militias active in southern Libya would probably be ready to serve as partners of an international operation to stabilize the region, similar to the Kurds in the Middle East. This would enable them to receive support and increase their control of key parts of southern Libya. But the Teda remain hamstrung by their disunity and lack of a shared vision of their future in the three countries in which they live. In Chad they have been able to develop a political elite that has emerged from successive rebellions. But in Libya they lack representative political leaders who can negotiate space for them with neighbouring communities, the authorities of northern Libya (who are themselves deeply divided), and international actors (who are equally disunited).

The state seems remote everywhere in the region. The presence of institutional armed actors—ideally armies that are truly national—is certainly necessary, whether to support the return of the state or to enforce the rule of law, for example in matters related to gold mining. But in contexts in which the respective government forces have for so long been seen as enemies by local populations, to concentrate efforts on an essentially military response or presence would undoubtedly be an error of judgement. This is because the hostility of the environment and the area’s sheer size would require the use of disproportionate operational and logistical resources that would inevitably achieve incomplete results.

Similarly, the Libyan crisis and the issue of a jihadist presence in the Sahara will not be resolved by a military intervention in southern Libya or by placing Western soldiers along porous and virtually non-existent borders. The solution, which depends largely on the Libyans themselves, is to re-establish a government in Tripoli that controls the whole of Libya. But this scenario seems so
distant that, for now, northern Libya’s divisions will likely encourage the cen-
trifugal tendencies of the country’s southern actors. The importance of the pres-
ence of the three states (that is, Libya, Chad, and Niger), not only militarily, but
also in terms of providing services and development, cannot be underestimated.

The region and its populations will only be able to fulfil the role of a barrier
against the chaos in Libya if their needs are taken into account. Any attempt to
stabilize the region should therefore include the provision of basic services.
This would allow the Teda and the other communities that surround them to
feel that they are full citizens of whichever country they happen to live in. A
word of caution is necessary, however. Only local projects that are wanted by
local communities will enable their members to live on their lands, farm their
oases, educate their children, have jobs in their villages, and ultimately build
assets to be defended instead of giving in to the temptations of exile and the
easy gains derived from trafficking and war.

Stabilization will take time and political will; for now, Libya is likely to remain
the main centre of attraction for Teda populations looking for a means of sub-
sistence. But no matter how precarious life may be, Tibesti will always
remain the ‘house’ and ‘home’ of the Teda from the three countries, to quote a
Teda intellectual from Niger. The missed opportunity of the ’30 billion’ Tibesti
development project should encourage the Chadian government to renew the
exercise, while avoiding earlier mistakes. A first step should be that of reinitiat-
ing meaningful dialogue between the Chadian state and the Teda community.

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development project should encourage the Chadian government to renew the
exercise, while avoiding earlier mistakes. A first step should be that of reinitiat-
ing meaningful dialogue between the Chadian state and the Teda community.
According to Brachet and Scheele (2015, p. 748), ‘It is a region that seems at first glance to be geographically marginal, but has developed its own centrality within the contemporary Sahara by avoiding rather than renegotiating state control or any other form of government’.

Information sources are referred to in notes, although the identity of a number of sources has been deliberately omitted in order to respect the confidentially requested by interlocutors or to protect their personal security.

While locally ‘Teda’ is considered to be preferable, ‘Tubu’ is more widely known particularly among neighbouring populations.

For background, see Tubiana (2008).

Up to that point these international actors had called for peace, but without success.

Author interview with a JEM member, March 2016; see Tubiana (2008, p. 11; 2011, p. 27).

The government of Sudan launched a national dialogue process long requested by the AU, but without the participation of the armed opposition and boycotted by some of its main opposition parties.

Author interviews with Darfur rebels, N’Djaména, October 2015; see Sudan Tribune (2015b).


Author interviews with Sudanese officials, including Amin Hassan Omar, head of the Darfur portfolio, Khartoum, May and August 2011.

Author interviews with a French official, Paris, July 2011; and Chadian rebels, chiefly from the Union des forces de la résistance (UFR) and Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement (UFDD), Khartoum, May and July 2011, and other locations, March and October 2016.

Author interviews with Darfur Arab leaders, including Musa Hilal, Khartoum, July–August 2011; and JEM leader Suleiman Jamous, March 2011.

Author interview with Chadian government opponent Acheikh Ibn Oumar, Paris, October 2016.

Author interviews with Chadian officials, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with Chadian officials, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with Teda leaders, N’Djamena and Tibesti, October and December 2015; Chadian officials, N’Djaména, October 2015; Chadian rebels, March 2016; and international observers, Paris, June 2016.

Author interviews with former Séléka members, CAR and Chad, July 2014–October 2015; and Chadian Arab rebels, October–November 2016. See also CAR (2015, pp. 8–12, 22); ICG (2015a, p. 13); HSBA (2016, p. 9).

Author interviews with Darfur rebels, March–April 2016; and a Chadian rebel, November 2016.

Operation Barkhane was launched on 1 August 2014 and was designed to replace Operation Serval and allow the French army (which had units stationed in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad) to intervene more extensively in the Sahel–Sahara sphere. It is mainly formed by the permanent presence of operational units in Faya (Chad), Madama (Niger), and Tessalit (Mali). The operation has 3,500 men, 200 logistics vehicles, 200 armoured vehicles, some 20 helicopters, 6 fighter aircraft, 3 drones, and 10 cargo planes of the French army.
Figures from the final report of the most recent census are approximately 21,000 inhabitants (Chad, 2012a). The census, however, was conducted in June 2009 and the outcome for Tibesti was biased by the inaccessibility of several areas of the region for security reasons.

Author interviews with Governor Taher Barkay and other leaders, Barðái, November 2015; and a former Teda leader, N’Djaména, October 2015. See Salah (2014); Chapelle (1982, p. 394); Stocker (2014, p. 3); Murray (2017).

See, for instance, Chapelle (1982).

Author interview with General Keley Abdallah, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with former MDJT leaders Hassan Mardage, Hassan Soukaya, and Choa Dazi, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with Hassan Mardage and Hassan Soukaya, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with former MDJT leaders Hassan Mardage, Hassan Soukaya, and Choa Dazi, N’Djaména, October 2015; and with former MDJT combatants in various Tibesti localities, November and December 2015.

Author interviews with Hassan Mardage and Hassan Soukaya, N’Djaména, October 2015; and former MDJT commander Brahim Bokor, Barðái, November 2015.

Author interviews with former MDJT commander Belqasim Azingei, Zoumri, November 2015; and a Libyan Teda leader, location withheld, February 2017.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, Zouar; and Belqasim Azingei, Zoumri, November 2015.

Author interview with a former MDJT member, Goz Beida, June 2016.

A former Chadian ambassador to Libya and former secretary-general of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (the Sahel–Sahara organization sponsored by Tripoli), Adoum Togoy was initially an intermediary between the MDJT and the Libyan authorities. As vice president of the MDJT and head of the Committee for National Reconciliation in 2001, Togoy advocated making peace with the government, thus causing the first important division in the movement. In 2002, while he was recruiting fighters in the Mourdi area (in Ennedi), forces loyal to Togoiimi detained him for several months.

Author interviews with former MDJT commanders and fighters; ANT officers who participated in the conflict; civilian and traditional authorities appointed during the conflict; and Teda civilians, Tibesti, October–December 2015.

Author interviews, N’Djaména and Tibesti, October–December 2015.

Author interviews, N’Djaména and Tibesti, October–December 2015.

Author interview with Belqasim Azingei, Zoumri, November 2015.

Author interviews with Taher Barkay and Brahim Bokor, Barðái; Zoumri sous-préfet Hamid Hilali and Belqasim Azingei, Zoumri; and an Aozou resident, November 2015.

Author interviews with Hamid Hilali and Belqasim Azingei, Zoumri; an Aozou resident; and Zoumri z chef de canton Mayna Wuche, Barðái, November 2015; and Arna chef de canton Dadi Chemi, Gouro, December 2015.

Author interview with former MDJT leader Barkay Choa, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interview with Hassan Mardage, N’Djaména, October 2015.

See Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (n.d.).

In light of the differences among the national reports on demining activities, it is difficult to make numerical comparisons. A cursory analysis of the national data of countries neighbouring Chad, however, indicates that the problem is particularly acute in Tibesti.
Author interviews with an Aozou resident and Aozou sous-préfet Senoussi Koki, Aozou, November 2015; see Tubiana (2016a).

Chad then signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Anti-Personnel Mines on 1 July 1998 and ratified it on 6 May 1999. Authors’ interviews with General Bokhit Kossié, acting ‘Area Commander’ in Tibesti, Bardaï; Belqasim Azingei, Zoumri, November 2015; and the sous-préfet of Gouro, December 2015.

The provisions of the convention came into force in Chad on 1 November 1999, including those dealing with states parties’ obligation to ensure the destruction of existing stocks.

Author interviews with Choa Dazi, N’Djaména, and Bokhit Kossié, Bardaï, November 2015.

Numbers obtained during author interviews with an official in charge of the demining programme, N’Djaména, October 2015; and with other officials, Bardaï, November–December 2015. Between 2009 and 2014 the Chadian authorities recorded 1,220 mine victims, including 238 deaths, 686 injuries, and 286 unspecified cases. No statistics are available for Tibesti, and it is difficult to estimate the extent to which the available data is representative, taking into account both the culture of poor assistance to victims prevalent in Chad and the fact that some of the victims seek medical help in Libya rather than Chad.

Most of the incidents recorded over the last years have involved vehicles travelling without local guides. In January 2015, for example, a vehicle transporting gold miners is said to have triggered an anti-tank mine in the Wour area, causing the deaths of seven passengers and gravely injuring ten others. A similar incident occurred in October 2015 in the same area, but without causing any victims (author interviews with the secretary-general of the governorate; and Bardaï sous-préfet May Issa, Bardaï, November 2015).

The demining programme may have to be extended beyond 2019. According to the terms of the Mine Ban Convention, the Chadian government is obliged to finish the mine-clearing operations by 2020, a deadline that, according to the experts consulted in October and December 2015, may not be met.

After negotiating peace with Nigerien rebels, the Nigerien government proposed to buy their weapons, including mines. While Niger’s approach initially appeared fruitful and allowed it to collect several thousand mines (in October 2008, for instance, the Niger Armed Forces collected some 2,038 mines, including 1,673 PRB M3s, 252 PTMi-BA-IIIs, and 113 TMA5s), several observers concluded that the majority of the mines handed over were procured from Tibesti rather than from former Nigerien rebel groups’ stockpiles (author interviews with witnesses, N’Djaména, October 2015, Tibesti, December 2015, and Niger, February–March 2017). Figures on mines collected in Niger and cited above are from a confidential Nigerien army report viewed by the authors, dated 3 October 2008.
Author interviews with Aozou residents; Sidi Chaha, sous-préfet of Zouar; and former sous-préfet Belqasim Azingei, Zoumri, November 2015.

Author interviews with Mayna Wuche and former MDJT faction leader Brahim Bokor, Bardaï; former sous-préfet Belqasim Azingei, Zoumri; the sous-préfet of Zouar, November 2015; Hassan Waheli, sous-préfet of Yebi-Bou; and Issa Tchou, acting sous-préfet of Yebi-Bou, Yebi-Bou, December 2015.

Author interviews with Mayna Wuche and former MDJT faction leader Brahim Bokor, Bardaï; the sous-préfet of Zouar, November 2015; and Hassan Soukaya, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with Hassan Mardage, N’Djaména, October 2015; Belqasim Azingei, Zoumri; and Mayna Wuche, Bardaï, November 2015.

Author interviews with former MDJT commanders, some of whom had maintained regular contact with Togoyim until a few hours before his disappearance, N’Djaména and Tibesti, October–December 2015; see <http://www.mdjt.nang>.

Author interviews with former MDJT commanders, including Choa Dazi and Hassan Soukaya, N’Djaména and Tibesti, October–December 2015.

Author interviews with former MDJT commanders, N’Djaména and Tibesti, October–December 2015; and a former colleague of Adoum Togoy, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with former MDJT commanders, N’Djaména and Tibesti, October–December 2015.

Author interview with a former colleague of Adoum Togoy, N’Djaména, October 2015. Created on 4 February 1998 on Qaddafi’s personal initiative, CEN-SAD comprised 28 member states, including some well outside the Sahel-Sahara region: Benin, Burkina Faso, CAR, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, and Tunisia.

The MDJT had several regional support offices that transported the aid obtained from the Teda diaspora or other Chadian sympathizers to the field. Each bureau managed a particular aspect of assistance to the rebellion; for instance, the North American bureau mainly collected funds (about USD 16,000 in Canada), the European bureau supplied the leadership with satellite telephones and managed the credit cards used by the movement, and the Libyan bureau mainly collected food for the fighters at the front (author interviews with Barkay Choa, former leader of the Canadian support bureau, N’Djaména, October 2015; former MDJT commanders; and Libyan Teda, N’Djaména and Tibesti, October–December 2015).

Togoy’s arrest in Ennedi, where the MDJT had virtually no secure bases, surprised the Libyan regime and contributed to the worsening relations between Tripoli and the MDJT (author interviews with former MDJT commanders, N’Djaména, October 2015).

Author interviews with former MDJT commanders, including Hassan Soukaya, and Libyan Teda, N’Djaména, October 2015, and Tibesti, December 2015.

Author interviews with former MDJT commanders, including Hassan Mardage, Hassan Soukaya, and Barkay Choa, N’Djaména and Tibesti, October–December 2015.
Author interviews with former MDJT commanders, including Hassan Mardage, Hassan Soukaya, and Barkay Choa, N’Djaména and Tibesti, October–December 2015.

Author interviews with ANT veterans, N’Djaména and Bardaï, October–December 2015.

The infiltration strategy mainly involved making payments to the families of MDJT fighters so that they would convince their relatives in the field to abandon the fight and go over to the government. According to one of the ANT officers interviewed, ‘after Togomi’s death, the government invested large sums of money to deepen the movement’s internal divisions’ (author interviews with ANT veterans who fought the MDJT, N’Djaména and Bardaï, October–December 2015).

Author interviews with Hassan Mardage, Hassan Soukaya, and Choa Dazi, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with Belqasim Azingei, Zoumri, November 2015; and Barkay Choa and Kadhafi Weddey, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with Choa Dazi, Hassan Soukaya, and Kadhafi Weddey, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with Choa Dazi, Hassan Soukaya, and Kadhafi Weddey, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with former MDJT commanders, Zoumri and Bardaï, November 2015.

Author interviews with Brahim Bokor, Bardaï; and Choa Dazi, sous-préfet of Aozou, N’Djaména, November 2015.

At the end of 2015 only eight of these veteran elements of the MDJT were said to be still active in the ANT, including Brahim Bokor, at the time the deputy commander of the ANT’s 6th Groupement posted to the Bardaï area (author interview with Brahim Bokor, Bardaï, November 2015).

Author interview with Brahim Bokor, Bardaï, November 2015.

Author interviews with former MDJT commanders, including Hassan Mardage, N’Djaména and Tibesti, October–December 2015.

Author interview with Barkay Choa, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interview with Barkay Choa, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with former MDJT commanders, a number of whom personally carried out liaison missions in Khartoum, N’Djaména, October 2015, and Paris, March 2016; and Mahamat Nouri, March 2016.

Author interview with Hassan Soukaya, N’Djaména, October 2015.

An amount of XAF 5,000 (USD 8.50) was paid for each destroyed palm tree (author interviews with Hamid Hilali and Belqasim Azingei, Zoumri, November 2015).

Author interviews with the sous-préfet of Zoumri and Belqasim Azingei, Zoumri; and Mayna Wuche, Bardaï, November 2015.

Youssouf Abassalah was a minister on four occasions between 2002 and 2012, then Chad’s ambassador to the Russian Federation, and in 2016 a minister again, briefly in charge of justice, then tourism.

Author interviews with Goukouni Weddey, N’Djaména, June 2016; and Hassan Soukaya and Choa Dazi, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with a member of the mediation team led by Goukouni Weddey, N’Djaména, October 2015; and the secretary-general of the Tibesti governorate, Bardaï, November 2015.

Author interviews with a member of the mediation team led by Goukouni Weddey, N’Djaména, October 2015; Belqasim Azingei, Zoumri, November 2015; and the secretary-general of the Tibesti governorate, Bardaï, November 2015.
Author interviews with Hassan Soukaya, N’Djaména, October 2015; a member of the mediation team led by Goukouni Weddey, N’Djaména, October 2015; and Sidi Chaha, sous-préfet of Zouar, November 2015.

Some of these fighters seem to have been recruited by the rebels shortly before the signing of the agreements to increase the negotiating power of the factions involved.

Author interviews with Wardougou Bollou and Choa Dazi, N’Djaména, October 2015; and Belqasim Azingei, Zoumri, November 2015.

Author interviews with Choa Dazi, N’Djaména; Brahim Bokor, Bardaï, November 2015; and Mahamat Mahadi, March 2016.

Author interviews with Goukouni and Kadafi Weddey, N’Djaména, September 2015; and Choa Dazi, N’Djaména, November 2015.

Author interviews with Hassan Mardage, N’Djaména, October 2015; and other MDJT veterans, Bardaï, November 2015.

Author interviews with Hassan Mardage, N’Djaména, October 2015; and other MDJT veterans, Bardaï, November 2015; see Katchadourian (2006); Mellah and Rivoire (2005); Rémy (2004).

Author interviews with Choa Dazi, N’Djaména, and Brahim Bokor, Bardaï, November 2015; and Mahamat Mahadi, March 2016.

Author interview with Taher Barkay, Bardaï, November 2015.

Author interview with a civil servant, Tibesti, November 2015.

Author interviews with Taher Barkay, Bardaï, November 2015; and Abdelkarim Saïd Bosh, minister of territorial administration, N’Djaména, October 2015; see Salah (2014).

Author interview with Keley Abdallah, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interview with the sous-préfet of Gouro, December 2015.

Author interviews with the sous-préfets of Zoumri and Goubon; and Mayna Wuche, Bardaï, November 2015.

Author interviews with Taher Barkay, Bardaï, November 2015; and Wardougou Bollou, former governor of Tibesti, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with Taher Barkay, Bardaï, November 2015; and Wardougou Bollou, former governor of Tibesti, N’Djaména, October 2015; see also Salah (2015).

Author interviews with Taher Barkay, Bardaï; and Chidi Kallemay, Ogi, November 2015.

This chef de canton is Chidi Kallemay Yahya, who was appointed on 19 June 2014. The Dôza traditionally earned their livelihood from the palm groves and salt pans of north Borkou (Bedo, Tigi, and Yarda); see Chapelle (1982, pp. 120–21); Capot-Rey (1961, pp. 86–87, 99–102).

Author interviews with Taher Barkay, Bardaï; and Chidi Kallemay, Ogi, November 2015; see Salah (2014).

Author interviews with Keley Abdallah and Choa Dazi, N’Djaména, October 2015.

For a comparison with Darfur, see Tubiana, Tanner, and Abdul-Jalil (2012); author interview with Abdelkarim Saïd Bosh, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with Taher Barkay, and a number of chefs de canton and sous-prêfets, Tibesti, Faya, and N’Djaména, November 2015-January 2016.

For example, those originating from the Teda Ouria and Teda Gouroa groupings, respectively in Yebi-Bou and Gouro.

Author interviews with Taher Barkay, Bardaï, November 2015; the sous-préfet of Gouro, December 2015; and a number of chefs de canton, N’Djaména and Tibesti, November 2015-January 2016.
Author interviews with various chiefs, Tibesti, November–December 2015.

Author interviews with Allatchi Koso, Dôza; village chief and candidate chef de canton Dôza Miski, Arkenya, December 2015; and a number of chefs de canton, N’Djaména and Tibesti, November 2015–January 2016.

Author interviews with Allatchi Koso, Dôza; village chief and candidate chef de canton Dôza Miski, Arkenya, December 2015; and a number of chefs de canton, N’Djaména and Tibesti, November 2015–January 2016.

Author interviews with sous-préfets, Tibesti, November–December 2015.

Author interview with Dadi Chemi, Gourou, December 2015.

Author interview with Chidi Kallemay, Ogi, November 2015; Chad (2014).

Author interview with a Teda officer, Tibesti, November 2015.

Author interviews with military and administrative leaders, Tibesti and Faya, November–December 2015; and Chadian UFR and UFDD rebels, April 2015 and March 2016.

Author interviews with Chidi Kallemay, Ogi, November 2015; and with a Teda intellectual, Tibesti, November 2015.

Author interview with a Teda intellectual, N’Djaména, January 2016.

Author interview with a civil servant, Tibesti, November 2015.

Author interview with a Teda intellectual, N’Djaména, November 2015.

Author interviews with Godeyenou Mayna, derde of the Libyan Teda, October 2015; and Mohammed Wardougou, brother of the Libyan Teda war chief Barka Wardougou, September 2015.

Among the Lay, Aner Sidi, a Libyan Teda trader, was also a candidate (author interviews with Teda intellectuals, N’Djaména, October 2015).

Author interviews with Teda intellectuals, N’Djaména, October–November 2015; and Ahmat Hokay, Aozou, November 2015; see Salah (2012).

Author interview with Ahmat Hokay, Aozou, November 2015.

Author interviews with Ahmat Hokay, Aozou; Taher Barkay and other civilian and military Teda leaders, Tibesti and N’Djaména, November–December 2015; and Libyan Teda, Barдаï, November 2015.

He proposed that the derde should be appointed by a consultative council of around 40 members that would include representatives of the 36 Teda clans and a few intellectuals (author interview with Ahmat Hokay, Aozou, November 2015).

At least since the colonial period the derde seems to have been the main repository and interpreter of customary law (hadaga), which serves as a basis for judging disputes among the Teda. This law blends strictly Teda elements and borrowings from sharia law, which probably rose to prominence during contacts between the derde Chahay and the Sanusiya sect in Libya at the end of the 19th century (Chapelle, 1982, p. 324). For more on the Sanusiya, see Triaud (1995). This traditional code seems to have been progressively set down in writing in the 1930s and 1950s with the support of colonial administrators (Durand, 2002, pp. 464–73; Barkay, 2013, p. 37). Each derde has the authority to modify the law and bring it up to date in consultation with customary Teda chiefs, taking into account the contextual evolution and the appearance of previously unknown problems. Hokay challenged the modifications introduced by the derde Erzey Barkay, accusing him of not having sufficiently consulted other customary chiefs (author interviews with Ahmat Hokay, Aozou, November 2015; and Hassan Soukaya, N’Djaména, October 2015).

Author interviews with Taher Barkay and other civilian and military leaders (some of whom were present at the meeting), Tibesti and N’Djaména, November–December 2015; and Ahmat Hokay, Aozou, November 2015.
Author interviews with Ahmat Hokay, Aozou, November 2015; and a number of Teda leaders (some of whom were present at the meeting), Tibesti, N’Djaména, and Faya, November–December 2015. The authors have seen the minutes of the meeting.

Author interviews with Taher Barkay and other civilian and military leaders, Tibesti and N’Djaména, October–November 2015; and Ahmat Hokay, Aozou, November 2015.

Author interviews with Taher Barkay and other civilian and military leaders, Tibesti, November 2015.

At that time this was the minister of pastoral water resources, Mahamat Abba Ali Salah, who is a Tomagra and a descendant of the derde Chahay.

Author interviews with Teda intellectual and Ali Koki, chef de canton of Zoumri and a member of the derde’s delegation, N’Djaména, January 2016; and Goukouni Weddey, N’Djaména, June 2016. See ‘Règlement définitif à l’amiable de l’incident’, 24 November 2015, a document seen by the authors.

Photographs seen by the authors. A Chadian rebel chief supported by Misrata is said to have established these contacts (author interview with a Chadian rebel chief, March 2016).

Author interview with Ahmat Hokay, Aozou, November 2015.

Author interviews with Chadian officials, including current and former ministers and traditional leaders, N’Djaména and Tibesti, October–December 2015.

The unit’s coordinator, Ahmat Abdallah Sougui, and his deputy, Radjab Edji, were appointed by presidential decree, while the other members were coopted by the director of the DGGTPP. Although a member of the steering committee, the derde is said to have played only a marginal role as an observer (author interviews with committee members, including Mahamat Abba Ali, minister of water resources; and Adeli Edji Tarsoui, MP for West Tibesti, N’Djaména, October 2015; and Ali Koki, N’Djaména, January 2016).

The remits of the committee and unit are defined by the presidential decree of 25 March 2012, which formalizes the management mechanism (Chad, 2012b).

Author interviews with Taher Barkay and other administration officials, Bardaï; and MPs Mahamat Bazinge and Molya Taher, N’Djaména, November 2015. The DGGTPP’s evaluation team that inspected the infrastructure in 2014 considered the water tower to be insufficient for the Bardaï population’s water needs, and the tower is said to have been built without a prior technical study; see Abba Garde (2015).

Author interviews with Taher Barkay and other administration officials, Tibesti, November 2015.

Author interviews with administration officials, entrepreneurs, traditional leaders, and civil society representatives, N’Djaména and Tibesti, October–December 2015.

Author interview with a company director, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with committee members, including Mahamat Abba Ali, Adeli Edji, and Molya Taher, N’Djaména, October 2015. President Déby is said to have asked a group of young Teda to head the steering committee, but to have been turned down. He then reportedly offered the post to former president Goukouni Weddey, also without success (author interviews with young Teda representatives, Tibesti, November 2015; and committee members and Teda intellectual, N’Djaména, October 2015).

Author interviews with Abderrahman Salah, N’Djaména, October 2015; Taher Barkay, Bardaï, November 2015; and local civil servants and teachers, Tibesti, November–December 2015.

Author interviews with Yebi-Bou sous-préfet Hassan Mahmoud Wâheli and teachers, Yebi-Bou, December 2015.
According to teachers posted to Tibesti who were interviewed in November 2015, the most recent intake of the national college for primary school teachers only included two Teda. But even Teda teachers do not necessarily want to be posted to Tibesti.

Author interview, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with Hassan Soukaya, N’Djaména, October 2015; and Molya Taher, N’Djaména, November 2015. The two reports in question were handed over to the National Assembly, but were never made public. A member of one of the missions believes, however, that the Abba Garde (2015) article is based on one of the reports.

Author interview with Taher Barkay, Bardaï, November 2015.

According to teachers posted to Tibesti who were interviewed in November 2015, the most recent intake of the national college for primary school teachers only included two Teda. But even Teda teachers do not necessarily want to be posted to Tibesti.

Author interview, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with Hassan Soukaya, N’Djaména, October 2015; and Molya Taher, N’Djaména, November 2015. The two reports in question were handed over to the National Assembly, but were never made public. A member of one of the missions believes, however, that the Abba Garde (2015) article is based on one of the reports.

Author interview with Taher Barkay, Bardaï, November 2015.

The prices in this section reflect data collected from a wide range of sources, including Chadian and Sudanese gold prospectors in N’Djaména and traders who invested in gold in August 2015 and January 2016.

According to a Chadian trader who resold gold from Tibesti in Dubai, the selling price on the Emirati market in early 2015 was around XAF 25,000–27,000 (USD 44–46) per gram (author interview with a trader, N’Djaména, October 2015).

The approach adopted in Sudan is not particularly relevant to Chad: managing foreign currency reserves is not a priority for N’Djaména because of the fixed exchange rate of the Central African franc to the euro.
Figures reflect a dozen estimations collected from civilian and military authorities, traditional leaders, and gold miners, N’Djaména and Tibesti, August 2015–January 2016.

Author interviews with Miski chef de canton Kellã Goukouni, Miski, December 2015.

Author interview with a former gold prospector, Gouro, December 2015.

Author interviews with Bokhit Kossié and other officials, Bardaï, Miski, and Aozou, November–December 2015; and prospectors, Tibesti, December 2015.

Author interviews with the chef de canton of Gezendu, Faya, December 2015; a village chief; and Brahim ‘Okwi’, wangada committee member, Miski, December 2015.

Author interviews with representatives of the administration (civilian, military, and customary) and civil society, Tibesti, November–December 2015.

Author interviews with traditional leaders and Teda civilians, Tibesti, November–December 2015.

Author interviews with Bokhit Kossié and an administration official, Bardaï, November 2015; Chadian official, N’Djaména, October 2015; and village chief, Miski, December 2015. The availability of weapons among the prospectors was confirmed by officials interviewed in N’Djaména and Tibesti between October and December 2015, who knew of several seizures of weapons between 2013 and 2015. Weapons were also seized among prospectors in Niger (UNSC, 2016a, p. 18; author interviews and observations, Niger, February–March 2017).


Author interviews with convoy member, Am Djerés, January 2016; an ANT officer, Bardaï, November 2015; and Chidi Kallemay, Ogi, November 2015.


The description of the clashes presented here is based on accounts collected between August 2015 and January 2016 from officials, customary chiefs, Ogi civilians, and several prospectors involved in the clashes.

Author interviews with officials, N’Djaména, October 2015; military leaders, Bardaï, November 2015; and Beri prospectors involved in the clashes, Am Djerés, January 2016.

Author interviews with a Darfur rebel chief who sent fighters to Niger to mine gold, December 2015; Beri prospectors involved in the clashes, Am Djerés, January 2016; and ANT officers, Tibesti, November–December 2015.

Author interview with Mahamat Abba Ali, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with Mahamat Abba Ali, Minister of Mines Hassan Tchonay, and advisers of the Chadian ‘national mediator’, N’Djaména, October 2015; and Chidi Kallemay, Ogi, November 2015.

Author interviews with Tega chef de canton Kellã Goukouni and members of the Miski wangada committee, Miski and Yebi-Bou, December 2015; and an ANT officer, Bardaï, November 2015.

Author interviews with customary chiefs, Miski, December 2015.
Author interviews with customary chiefs, Miski, December 2015; and an ANT officer, Barдаи, November 2015.

Author interviews with members of the wangada committee, Miski and Yebi-Bou; and the sous-préfet of Yebi-Bou, Yebi-Bou, December 2015.

Author interviews with a civil servant, Barдаи, November 2015; and customary chiefs and members of the wangada committee, Miski and Arkenya, December 2015. See also Salah (2015).

Author interviews with members of the wangada committee, Miski and Yebi-Bou, December 2015. See also Salah (2015).

Author interviews with members of the wangada committee, Miski, December 2015.

Author interviews with customary wangada and customary chiefs, Miski; and prospectors, N’Djaména, December 2015. See also Le Cœur (1950, p. 187); Barkay (2013, p. 31).

Author interviews with Teda prospectors, Tibesti, November 2015; a Beri prospector, Am Djeres, January 2016; wangada, Miski, December 2015; and a military leader, November 2015. The authors have seen the Tibesti governorate’s report on the investigation. Some prospectors claimed that both sides suffered heavier casualties.

Author interviews with Orozi Loso and Kellà Goukouni, Miski, December 2015; and an ANT officer, Barдаи, November 2015.

This figure is based on estimations collected from civilian and military authorities, Teda traditional leaders, civil society representatives, and gold prospectors, N’Djaména and Tibesti, August–December 2015.

Author interviews with Beri prospectors, Am Djeres, January 2016; and Kellà Goukouni, Miski, December 2015.

Author interviews with Beri prospectors, Am Djeres, January 2016; Orozi Loso, Miski, December 2015; and Taher Barkay, Barдаи, November 2015.

Author interviews with a Teda officer, Tibesti, November 2015; and wangada, Tibesti, December 2015.

Author interviews with Beri prospectors, Am Djeres, January 2016; a Teda officer, Tibesti, November 2015; and wangada, Tibesti, December 2015.

Author interviews with Beri prospectors, Am Djeres, January 2016; and a Teda officer, Tibesti, November 2015.

Author interview with a prospector, Dar Sila, June 2016.

Investigation report of the Tibesti governorate seen by the authors.

This reconstruction of the Kouri Bougoudi battle is based on several accounts collected in N’Djaména and several localities in Tibesti and eastern Chad between October 2015 and June 2016, on interviews with the civilian and military authorities in Barдаи in November 2015, and on the Tibesti governorate investigation report.

Author interviews with members of the Miski committee and an ANT officer, Miski, December 2015; a customary chief, Faya, December 2015; and Beri prospectors, Am Djeres, January 2016.

Author interviews with officials, Barдаи, November 2015; and wangada, Yebi-Bou, December 2015.

Author interview with a Teda gold miner, location withheld, March 2017.

Three among these six former soldiers were successively deputy sous-préfets of Yebi-Bou.

Author interviews with wangada committee members, Miski, December 2015; and a Teda prospector, Tibesti, December 2015.

Author interviews with Taher Barkay, Barдаи, November 2015; and the sous-préfet of Yebi-Bou and wangada committee members, Yebi-Bou, December 2015.
Author interviews with the chef de canton of Gezendu, Faya, December 2015; and Teda prospectors, Tibesti, November–December 2015.

Author interview with the sous-préfet of Zoumri, November 2015.

Report of the Tuduhu meeting dated 16 August 2015, seen by the authors.

Minutes of the Tuduhu meeting seen by the authors. See also <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GSboymkZeeo>. Author interviews with Orozi Loso and Kellâ Goukouni, Miski, December 2015; and a Nigerien Teda government opponent, February 2017.

Author interviews with the sous-préfet of Yebi-Bou, December 2015; Gaëda prospectors; and wangada committee members, Miski, December 2015.

Author interviews with the sous-préfet of Yebi-Bou, December 2015; and wangada committee members, Miski, December 2015.

Document seen by the authors.

Author interview with Orozi Loso, Miski, December 2015.

Author interviews with wangada committee members, Miski, December 2015.

Author interviews with wangada committee members, Miski, December 2015.

Note circulaire No. 091/MATSP/RTI/SG/DC/015 of 21 July 2015, seen by the authors.

Author interviews with Kellâ Goukouni, Miski, December 2015; the sous-préfet of Yebi-Bou and another administration official, Yebi-Bou, December 2015; and Taher Barkay, Bardaï, November 2015.

Author interview with the then minister of mines, Hassan Tchonay, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Note circulaire No. 091/MATSP/RTI/SG/DC/015 of 21 July 2015, seen by the authors. Author interviews with Hassan Tchonay, N’Djaména, October 2015; Taher Barkay, Bardaï, November 2015; and Bokhit Kossié, Bardaï, November 2015.

Receipt document seen by the authors.

Author interviews with Bokhit Kossié and other officers, Bardaï and Miski, November–December 2015; customary chiefs, Miski, December 2015; and a Beri prospector, Am Djeres, January 2016.

Various author interviews, including with traditional chiefs and leaders of the wangada committee, Yebi-Bou and Miski, December 2015.

Author interviews with administration official and Beri prospectors, Am Djeres, January 2016, and another location, January 2017; a Teda prospector, Tibesti, December 2015; and an ANT officer, Bardaï, November 2015.

Author interviews with administration official and Beri prospectors, Am Djeres, January 2016, and another location, January 2017; Teda prospector, Tibesti, December 2015; ANT officer, Bardaï, November 2015; leaders of the wangada committee, Yebi-Bou and Miski, December 2015; and gold miners, northern Niger, February–March 2017.

Author interviews and telephone interviews with gold miners, Tibesti, December 2015, and other locations, April 2017.

Author interviews with representatives of the civil service and civil society, Tibesti, November–December 2015; investigation report of the Tibesti governorate seen by the authors.

Tibesti governorate investigation report seen by the authors.

Author interviews with a former Teda prospector, N’Djaména, January 2016; Beri intellectuals, N’Djaména, December 2015 and January 2016; and a civil servant, Bardaï, November 2015.

Author interviews and phone interviews with gold miners, Niger and other locations, February–April 2017.
Author interviews with a civil servant and a Teda officer, Tibesti, November 2015; and Beri gold miners, Am Djeres, January 2016, and other locations, January 2017.

Author interviews with military leaders, Tibesti, November 2015; and a former UFDD fighter, N’Djaména, December 2015; and telephone interview with Tom Erdimi, UFR, September 2014. Former Chadian rebels also prospected for gold in Niger and Algeria.

Author interviews with Beri prospectors, Am Djeres, January 2016, and another location, January 2017.

Author interviews with a military leader, Tibesti, November 2015; and a former UFDD fighter, N’Djaména, December 2015; and telephone interview with Tom Erdimi, UFR, September 2014. Former Chadian rebels also prospected for gold in Niger and Algeria.

Author interviews with military leaders, Tibesti, November 2015; and a former UFDD fighter, N’Djaména, December 2015; and telephone interview with Tom Erdimi, UFR, September 2014. Former Chadian rebels also prospected for gold in Niger and Algeria.

Author interviews with military leaders, Tibesti, November 2015; and a former UFDD fighter, N’Djaména, December 2015; and telephone interview with Tom Erdimi, UFR, September 2014. Former Chadian rebels also prospected for gold in Niger and Algeria.

Author interviews with Teda prospectors, Tibesti, November 2015; customary wangada, Miski, December 2015; a gold trader, Faya, November 2015; and civil servants, Bardaï and Yebi-Bou, November–December 2015.

Author interviews with gold prospectors, Am Djeres, January 2016, and Tibesti, November 2015.

Author interviews with gold prospectors, Am Djeres, January 2016, and Tibesti, November 2015.

Author interviews and telephone interviews with Beri prospectors, January 2017.

Author interviews with a Darfur Arab prospector, August 2015.

Author interviews with gold prospectors, Am Djeres, January 2016, and Tibesti, November 2015.

Author interviews with gold prospectors, Am Djeres, January 2016, and Tibesti, November 2015.

Author interviews with gold prospectors, Am Djeres, January 2016, and Tibesti, November 2015.

Author interviews with gold prospectors, Am Djeres, January 2016, and Tibesti, November 2015.

Author interviews and telephone interviews with Beri prospectors, January 2017.

Author interviews with Darfur Arab prospector, August 2015.

Authors’ observations in Tibesti, November–December 2015.

The prohibition measures and the threat of fines applied equally to Teda and non-Teda gold miners, although it was easier for the Teda to continue to try their luck in secret.

Author interviews with Teda prospectors, Tibesti, November 2015; customary wangada, Miski, December 2015; a gold trader, Faya, November 2015; and civil servants, Bardaï and Yebi-Bou, November–December 2015.

The prohibition measures and the threat of fines applied equally to Teda and non-Teda gold miners, although it was easier for the Teda to continue to try their luck in secret.

Author interviews with a Teda gold miner, location withheld, March 2017.

Author interviews with an Aozou resident and a gold trader, Faya, November 2015.

Author interviews with an Aozou resident and a gold trader, Faya, November 2015.

Author interviews with an Aozou resident and a civil servant, Bardaï, November 2015.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November 2015 and May 2016; see Tubiana (2016a).

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November 2015 and May 2016; see Tubiana (2016a).

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November 2015, May 2016; see Tubiana (2016a).

Author interviews with Libyan Teda leader Hassan Keley, November 2016; other Libyan Teda, including former soldiers of the Libyan army, multiple locations, November 2015 and May 2016; and Senouss Koki, Aozou, and Choa Dazi, N’Djaména, November 2015.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda leader Hassan Keley, November 2016; other Libyan Teda, including former soldiers of the Libyan army, multiple locations, November 2015 and May 2016; and Senouss Koki, Aozou, and Choa Dazi, N’Djaména, November 2015.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda leader Hassan Keley, November 2016; other Libyan Teda, including former soldiers of the Libyan army, multiple locations, November–December 2015 and May 2016.


Author interview with Libyan Teda, Aozou, November 2015.
Author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November–December 2015 and May 2016; see also Tubiana (2001).

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, Bardaï and Aozou, November–December 2015.


Author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November–December 2015 and May 2016.

The regime had previously distributed weapons to the village chiefs of all ethnicities in line with Qaddafi’s slogan ‘sha’b al-musallah’ (an armed people). However, it seems that machine guns (12.7 mm, 14.5 mm, and 7.62 mm) and RPG launchers were only distributed to Arabs (author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November–December 2015, May 2016, and February–March 2017).

Author interviews with members of Libyan Teda militias, locations withheld, February–March 2017.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November 2015–November 2016.


Author interviews with members of Libyan Teda militias, locations withheld, February–March 2017.

Author interviews with members of Libyan Teda militias, locations withheld, February–March 2017.

This name refers to a violent incident that occurred in 1989 in Um-el-Araneb, when a number of Teda squatting on farms and in empty social housing were forcibly expelled by the regime’s forces. Six Teda who had attempted to resolve the issue were arrested and reportedly died under torture (author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November 2015–November 2016; and Goukouni and Kadhafi Weddey, September 2015).

Author interviews with members of Libyan Teda militias, locations withheld, February–March 2017.


Author interviews with members of Libyan Teda militias, locations withheld, February–March 2017.


Author interviews with members of Libyan Teda militias, locations withheld, February–March 2017.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, Barдаї and Gouro, November–December 2015.

Author interviews with a Chadian official, N’Djaména, October 2015; and Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November 2015–November 2016.

Author interviews with Awlad Suleiman intellectuals, locations withheld, February–March 2017.

Author interviews with Godeyenou Mayna, October 2015; Bokori Sougui, November 2016; other Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November 2015–November 2016; and Awlad Suleiman intellectuals, locations withheld, February–March 2017.
Author interviews with Godeyenou Mayna, October 2015; Bokori Sougui, November 2016; other Libyan Teda (some of whom were present in Ubari), multiple locations, November 2015–November 2016; a Libyan Tuareg representative, November 2016; and international observers, September–October 2016.

Author interview with Hassan Keley, November 2016.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, December 2015 and May 2016; and an international observer, October 2016.

Author interviews with international observers, September–October 2016.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, Gouro and Miski, December 2015.

Author interviews with international observers, September–October 2016; and Goukouni and Kadhafi Weddey, September 2015.

Author interview with Goukouni Weddey, N’Djamëna, June 2016.

Author interviews with mediation participants, September 2016; and Eric Blanchot, Promedia’s director of operations, November 2016.

Author interviews with Bokori Sougui and other Libyan Teda, May and November 2016; a Libyan Tuareg representative, November 2016; and international observers, September–October 2016; see UNSC (2016a, p. 16).

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, May and November 2016.

Author interviews with an international observer, October 2016; and a witness of the negotiations, April 2017.

Author interviews with Libyan and Chadian Teda, November 2015–November 2016.

Author interviews with Mohammed Wardougou, September 2015; Bokori Sougui, November 2016; and other Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November–December 2015, May 2016, and February–March 2017.

Author interview with Libyan Teda militia members, locations withheld, February–March 2017.


Author interviews with Bokori Sougui, November 2016; and other Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November–December 2015, May 2016, and February–March 2017.

Author interviews with Godeyenou Mayna, October 2015; Goukouni and Kadhafi Weddey, N’Djamëna, September 2015; Ali Koki, N’Djamëna, January 2016; and a Libyan Teda war chief, location withheld, March 2017.

Author interviews with Teda prospectors, Tibesti, November–December 2015; and Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November 2015 and May 2016.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, December 2015, May 2016, and February 2017.

It was named after a Teda killed by the Italians during the colonial period.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, December 2015, May 2016, and March 2017; a Teda prospector, Tibesti, December 2015; and international observers, September–October 2016.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, Tibesti, November–December 2015, and other locations, February–March 2017.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda militia members, locations withheld, February–March 2017.
Author interviews with Libyan Teda, Tibesti, November–December 2015; and Chadian Teda, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interview with a Libyan Teda war chief, location withheld, March 2017.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November 2015–November 2016.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November 2015–March 2017; Chadian Teda, N’Djaména, October–November 2015; and a Chadian rebel leader, October 2016.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November 2015–November 2016; Chadian Teda intellectuals, N’Djaména, November 2015–June 2016; and international observers, October 2016.

Author interview with a Darfur rebel leader, December 2011.

Author interviews with Western sources, 2015–16.

Author interviews with Western sources, 2015–16.

Author interviews with Chadian military and political leaders, multiple locations, October–November 2015; Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November–December 2015 and May 2016; and international observers, March and October 2016.

Interview with Niger official, location withheld, April 2017.

Author interviews with Goukouni and Kadhai Weddey, September 2015; Chadian officials, Bardaï, November 2015; Libyan Teda, May 2016; and an international observer, October 2016.

Author interviews with Teda intellectuals and Libyan Tuareg, November 2016.


Author interviews with traders, Gouro, Aozou, and Ogi, November–December 2015; administration officials, Bardaï, November 2015; chefs de canton of Gouro and Gezendu, Faya, December 2015 and January 2017; and gold prospector, January 2017; see also Westcott (2016).


Author interviews with French officials, Paris, February 2016; see also Westcott (2016).

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, Zouar, November 2015, and another location, November 2016; and migrants smugglers, Agadez and Dirkou, February–March 2017.

Author interview with a Libyan Teda militia leader, location withheld, March 2017.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, Zouar, November 2015, and another location, November 2016; Chadian officials, Tibesti, December 2015; and French officials, Paris, February 2016; see also Westcott (2016).

Author interviews with truck drivers and traders, Zouar and Gouro, November–December 2015.

Author interviews with truck drivers and traders, Zouar and Gouro, November–December 2015; an Aozou resident, November 2015; and a Teda prospector, Tibesti, December 2015.

Author interviews with truck drivers and traders, Zouar and Gouro, November–December 2015.


Author interviews with Libyan Teda, traders, and truck drivers, Zouar, November 2015.

Author interviews with Bokhit Kossié and other military and civilian leaders, Bardaï, November 2015; Gouro, December 2015, and N’Djaména, November 2015 and June 2016; Libyan Teda, Zouar, November 2015; Chadian rebel leaders, March and October 2016; a French official, September 2015; and a Libyan Tuareg representative, November 2016; see also UNSC (2016a, p. 167).

Author interviews with Chadian military and civilian leaders, Tibesti, November–December 2015.
Author interviews with international observers, 2015–16.

Various author interviews, 2011–16; see also UNSC (2013b; 2014; 2015a; 2016a); CAR (2016); HSBA (2016, p. 4).

Various author interviews, 2011–16; see also UNSC (2016b, pp. 53, 54).

Weapons and ammunition transiting between Libya and northern Mali were seized in Niger between 2001 and mid-2015, notably in February 2015 from Chadian–Libyan Teda drug traffickers and prospectors; see UNSC (2016a, pp. 44, 167).

See previous section. Author interviews with Chadian and Libyan Teda, and civilian and military authorities, Tibesti, November–December 2015; CAR (2016, pp. 7, 23).

Author interviews with several Chadian officials, a number of them at high level (state ministers), and regional diplomatic community representatives, 2011–December 2015.

The lack of data regarding the exact extent of the Libyan arsenal in mid-2011 and the dearth of information available in Chad compared to that for other countries in the region are major obstacles to any quantitative analysis (author interviews with Chadian authorities, Tibesti, November–December 2015; and Libyan Teda, May 2016; see also UNSC (2013b, p. 32); CAR (2016, p. 23)).

Author interview with Libyan Teda who organized arms convoys along this route, May 2016; see also Tabib (2012; 2013).

Author interview with Libyan Teda, May 2016; see also UNSC (2013b; 2014; 2015a; 2016a); CAR (2016, pp. 10, 20).

Author interviews with Taher Barkay, Bardaï, November 2015; and other Chadian officials, N’Djaména, October 2015; see also CAR (2016).

Author interviews with Bokhit Kossié, Bardaï; and other military and civilian leaders and Teda civilians, Tibesti, November–December 2015.

Chad, as opposed to some of its neighbours, rarely issues information on weapons and ammunition seizures, as is emphasized by the reports of the Panel of Experts on Libya, which regrets the low level of cooperation from the Chadian government. Several military officers of other countries that have participated in monitoring activities with the ANT confirm that information on the Chadian army’s weapons seizures is only rarely shared, including within the military coalition. The seized equipment is said to be often immediately given to ANT reserve operational units (author interviews with officers involved in monitoring operations in the Sahel, 2011–16).

Author interviews with Acheikh Ibn Oumar, Paris, October 2016; Mahamat Nouri, March 2016; and Chadian officials, N’Djaména, October 2015; and Am Djerès, January 2016.

Author interviews with a Chadian official, May 2016; and Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November 2015 and November 2016.

Author interviews with a Chadian official, May 2016, and a Libyan Teda militia member, location withheld, February 2017.

Author interviews with a Chadian official, May 2016; Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November 2015 and November 2016; Acheikh Ibn Oumar, Paris, October 2016; and a French official, September 2015.

Author interviews with a Chadian official, N’Djaména, January 2016; Acheikh Ibn Oumar, Paris, October 2016; and Libyan Teda, May 2016.

Author interviews with French officials, Paris, February 2016; and military and civilian leaders, N’Djaména and Tibesti, October–November 2015.
Author interviews with a Teda ANT officer, Tibesti, November 2015; Chadian officials and former officials, N’Djaména, October 2015, and other locations, March–May 2016; and Chadian rebel leaders, March–April and September 2016 and January 2017. See also Tubiana et al. (forthcoming).

Author interviews with Chadian official, N’Djaména, October 2015.

Author interviews with Western diplomats, October–November 2016.

Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, January 2017; and Libyan Teda militia and gold miners, northern Niger, February–March 2017.

Observations of one of the authors at the Dakar Forum, December 2014.

Observations of one of the authors at the Dakar Forum, December 2014; author interviews with Chadian officials, N’Djaména, October 2015, and Mahamat Nouri and Mahamat Mahadi, March 2016; see also Tubiana et al. (forthcoming).


Author interviews with Chadian officials, May 2016.

Author interviews with Chadian officials, May 2016; and Mahamat Nouri and Mahamat Mahadi, March 2016. See also Tubiana et al. (forthcoming); Jeune Afrique (2015).

Author interviews with Sudanese officials, September 2016; and an international observer, October 2016.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, multiple locations, November–December 2015 and May 2016; a Chadian official, May 2016; an AU leader, April 2011; and Darfur rebel leaders, May and December 2011.

Author interviews with Libyan Teda, May 2016.

Author interviews with a Sudanese official, September 2016; Libyan Teda, May 2016; and General Mohammed al-Dhabi, at the time in charge of the Sudanese–Libyan Friendship Bureau, Khartoum, May 2011.

Author interviews with an Arab politician from Darfur, July and September 2016.

Author interviews with an Arab politician from Darfur, July and September 2016; and a Sudanese official, September 2016; see also Tubiana (2017, p. 11).

Author interviews with a village chief and Libyan Teda, Tibesti and another location, September and December 2015; a Sudanese official, September 2016; and an international observer, October 2016.

See IOM (2017).

Author interviews with an Arab politician from Darfur, July and September 2016; and a Sudanese official, September 2016.

Author interviews with Suleiman Jamous, March 2011; and a Beri businessman and Western diplomats, Khartoum, May and August 2011.

Author interviews with Sudanese officials (including Amin Hassan Omar, who was in charge of the Darfur portfolio), a Beri businessman, and Western diplomats, Khartoum, May and August 2011; and an SPLM-North leader, Addis Ababa, September 2011.

Author interviews with Sudanese officials (including Amin Hassan Omar, who was in charge of the Darfur portfolio), a Beri businessman, and Western diplomats, Khartoum, May and August 2011; and an SPLM-North leader, Addis Ababa, September 2011.

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392 Author interview with a UFR leader, April 2016.

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394 Author interviews with Chadian rebel leaders, Doha, June 2011, Khartoum, August 2011, and other locations, March–October 2016; and Libyan Teda, May and December 2016; see Tubiana (2011, pp. 31–32); Paris Match (2016).

395 Author interviews with Mahamat Nouri, March 2016; and other Chadian rebels, April and September 2016.

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400 Author interviews with Mahamat Nouri, Mahamat Mahadi, and former UFDD secretary-general Abbakar Tollimi, March 2016; other Chadian rebels, April–October 2016; Chadian officials, N’Djaména and northern Chad, November 2015–January 2016; and a Sudanese official, January 2016.

401 Author interview with Mahamat Mahadi, location withheld, March 2016.

402 Author interviews with Mahamat Nouri, March 2016 and March 2017; Mahamat Mahadi and Abbakar Tollimi, March 2016; other Chadian rebels, April–October 2016; and Darfur rebels active in southern Libya, January 2016. In an interview with Radio France Internationale on 26 February 2016 Mahadi stated: ‘Today, the only preoccupation is to know how to contain the Islamic State. We are somehow a bulwark against these people’s progression towards the south. If we have the possibility of helping the Libyans to recover peace in their country, we
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This UFR group should not be confused with the Darfur URF; see above.

Author telephone interview with Tom Erdimi, February 2016; interviews with UFR members, April 2016; and other Chadian rebels, March–November 2016.

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